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Abstract
This thesis provides a fundamental reassessment of the limits of the power of the Chinese
Communist Party in the years following its takeover of China in 1949 through an
examination of its policies towards eliminating British businesses from Shanghai. In the early
years of the People's Republic of China, the Party sought to eliminate all foreign influence. It
wanted to reset completely China's foreign relations following what was portrayed as a
century of 'national humiliation'. It has previously been assumed that the CCP went about
this task in a pre-planned and thoroughly ruthless manner, and that their policy making was
primarily motivated by their anti-imperialist sentiments. This thesis argues that the CCP
decided to take a long-term and pragmatic approach in order to prevent economic instability.
Revolutionary transformative goals were compromised in order to preserve short-term
stability. Rather than having a grand plan for the elimination of British businesses, the CCP's
policy was often contingent and provisional. Policies directed at Chinese businesses were
often adapted to pressure British businesses. The CCP lacked skills, knowledge, resources
and manpower. This thesis contributes to a growing literature on China in the early 1950s by
suggesting that the CCP was not strong, it was in fact weak, but that its great strength lay in
its awareness of its own weaknesses and in its ability to work around them.
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Introduction
In May 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) seized control of China's largest and most
economically important city: Shanghai. The capture of Shanghai signalled the CCP's
effective victory in their long war against their rivals, the Guomindang (Nationalist Party)
and established them as de facto rulers of China. Taking this major industrial and financial
centre was a great coup for the CCP in both symbolic and practical terms. The city's
economy could now be harnessed to further the revolution. Yet the Communists viewed the
prospect of running Shanghai with temerity. The eyes of the world were upon them: both
foreign and Chinese observers watched to see if they were capable of running such a city.
Furthermore, the city was the epitome of all that the CCP disliked about 'old China': it was
home to the people the CCP saw as the worst exploiters and reactionaries. Worst of all, it had
become China's most foreign-influenced city over the course of what the CCP saw as a
century of national humiliation.
This thesis provides a fundamental re-assessment of strength of the CCP at the time of its
victory in 1949 and in the formative years that followed. This is done through an exploration
of its everyday and transformative management of Shanghai, specifically via the case study
of the elimination of the British business presence in the city. Shanghai had been the centre of
foreign influence in China for over a hundred years. This made it a semi-colonial city in the
eyes of the Communists. How, then, would they set about transforming it? It is argued that,
rather than being a shadowy group of radical ideologues concerned only with expropriating
foreign property, the CCP demonstrated a great deal of pragmatism as they sought to balance
their revolutionary goals with their need for stability while they consolidated their new
regime.
How do we understand the transformation that the city underwent in the following years?
How did party officials attempt to exercise control over this resilient, free-wheeling city,
which was strongly embedded in global trading networks? How did they tum it into the
utopian 'New Shanghai' celebrated in their publications and propaganda discourse? In the
process of answering questions such as these, we come to a greater understanding of the
nature of Communist state-building efforts in the early years of the People's Republic of
China (PRC).
7
Conventional narratives have tended to portray the early years of the PRC as a relatively
stable 'golden era' at the end of the Chinese Civil War, which was then overshadowed by the
turmoil of Mao Zedong's later years. This interpretation is particularly appealing to China's
present rulers as they seek to base their current legitimacy on the successes of the early years
of the revolution and distance themselves from the excesses of the Mao era. As historians
have focused their attentions on this exciting period of transition, it has become increasingly
obvious that this was not a 'golden era' of stability.' As Joseph Esherick has observed, the
revolution of 1949 represented a 'watershed, not an unbridgeable chasm.' 2 There were
significant continuities as well as significant changes across the '1949 divide. ,3 The early
1950s was a period of turbulence. This was a period and often contentious negotiation
between different groups as to what form the new society would take. Some resisted the CCP
openly, while others sought roles in the new order. The result of these early explorations is
. that both the extent of the CCP's power and their revolutionary successes have come to be
seen as much more limited than was once imagined."
The issue of how to deal with the remaining foreign presence in Shanghai was fraught with
difficulty for the CCP. Foreign firms, especially British ones, dominated whole sectors of the
city's economy: from banking and finance to shipping, public utilities and real 'estate. They
had inherited a shell-shocked city that had undergone a series of economic crises culminating
in a great inflationary spiral in 1948.5Unemployment had reached crisis levels and labour
unrest was common." The Communists' first priority on entering Shanghai was, therefore, to
curb inflation and to ensure economic stability. Long-term revolutionary goals had to be held
in abeyance. Their approach towards foreign businesses had to be cautious. As well having
one eye on the economic situation, they also wished to avoid giving foreign powers excuses
for intervening directly in the ongoing civil war. How would they balance their search for
1 Julia Strauss, 'Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: Regime Consolidation
and After, 1949-1956,' The China Quarterly, 188 (1), (2006). pp. 891-912.
2 Joseph W. Esherick, 'Ten Theses on the Chinese Revolution,' Modern China, Vol. 21, No.1, IV (Jan., 1995),
p.48.
3 Paul A. Cohen, 'Reflections on a Watershed Date: the 1949 Divide in Chinese History' in Jeffrey N.
Wasserstrom (ed.), Twentieth Century China; New Approaches (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 27-37.
4 Jeremy Brown and Paul G. Pickowicz (eds.) Dilemmas of Victory; the Early Years of the People's Republic of
China (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 105-129. '
S Chang Kia-ngau, The Inflationary Spiral: The Experience in China, 1939-1950 (Massachusetts: MIT Press,
1958).
6 Elizabeth J. Perry, Patrolling the Revolution:, Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State
(Lanham, Md.: Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006).
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stability with their desire for revolutionary transformation? How did this contradiction in
their goals play out at the ground level?
English language accounts have tended to portray Shanghai as a foreign city within China
and to examine the elimination of the British business presence in isolation from the wider
Chinese context. Such a clear division belies the complex situation on the ground. The CCP
often did not produce policies specifically targeted towards foreigners. Rather, they adapted
and intensified existing policies and techniques as a way of dealing with foreigners. The
foreign and Chinese economies were inextricably linked: there was no clean division between
the two. Foreign companies often depended entirely on Chinese raw materials, markets and
capital. The very running of these companies depended on Chinese 'comprador' middle men,
workers, agents, managers and shareholders."We must, therefore, consider the CCP's actions
towards foreign businesses within the context of both their domestic and foreign policies.
Although they have been portrayed as ruthlessly efficient and almost omnipotent in both
Chinese and English language literatures, much of the CCP's policy was, in reality,
provisional. Their power was limited by a severe lack of manpower, knowledge and
resources. Their aim was to completely transform Shanghai, but because dealing with
foreigners was of secondary importance to them compared with other domestic Chinese
problems (such as public order and economic stability), they took a long-term and flexible
approach. The CCP were not strong and efficient, but weak. Their strengths lay in their
awareness of their weakness and their ability to work around it, and in their willingness to use
ruthless force when they considered it necessary. Long-term revolutionary goals, such as the
total elimination of foreign businesses, were compromised in favour of short-term economic
stability.
7 Robert A. Bickers, The Scramble for China (London, Allen Lane, 2011), pp. 102-3; Yenping Hao, The
Commercial Revolution in Nineteenth-Century China: The rise of Sino-Western mercantile capitalism (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1986),
9
Britain in Shanghai, 1842-1949
The Communist takeover was preceded by over a century of war and instability. In the mid-
nineteenth century, the declining Qing Dynasty had suffered from the twin shocks of foreign
encroachment and domestic civil wars. The Sino-British Opium War (1839-1842) was the
first in a series of wars against mercantile European powers who were intent on 'opening'
China to trade. Later, the Europeans would be joined by the Japanese. The foreigners
extracted numerous concessions from the Chinese, the most visible of which was the opening
of Chinese ports to foreign trade and residence. By the end of the nineteenth century, the
Chinese coast was lined by a network of interlinked treaty ports." Internally, the state was
challenged and weakened by a series of rebellions and civil wars, including the Nian
Rebellion (1851-1868), the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and the Boxer Uprising (1899-
1901).
Shanghai was the centre of the British endeavour on the Chinese coast. For over a hundred
years, it sat at the periphery of the British empire. It was inextricably linked to broader
networks of imperial economics, population movement and culture.f Its strategic position on
the Huangpu River near the mouth of the great Yangzi ensured it a commercial significance
that came to be matched by its symbolic significance as it developed into China's most
foreign-influenced city, and the birthplace of a particular kind of Chinese 'modernity.' 10
After opening as a treaty port in 1843, Shanghai became the largest city in Asia: the 'Paris of
the East.' It attracted people from across the world, of all nationalities, occupations and
classes. The foreign concessions reluctantly granted by the Chinese to the British and
Americans had evolved into a somewhat peculiar 'International Settlement', which formed
part of an administrative triumvirate, along with the French Concession and the walled
Chinese city. While the French had opted to retain direct control over their concession
through their consul, the International Settlement was not controlled by the British
s Robert A. Bickers, Britain in China: Community, Culture and Colonialism, 1900-49 (Manchester: Manchester
University Press, 1999).
9 Robert A. Bickers, Empire Made Me: An Englishman Adrift in Shanghai (London: Allen Lane, Penguin and
Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 3-6.
10 David Strand, 'New Chinese Cities,' in Esherick, Joseph W., (ed.), Remaking the Chinese city: modernity and
national identity, 1900-1950 (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000), pp. 211-224; Samuel Y. Liang,
Mapping Modernity in Shanghai; Space, gender and visual culture in the sojourners' city, 1853-98 (London:
Routledge,2010).
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Government. The Settlement was run by the Shanghai Municipal Council, an oligarchic and
exclusive body elected by wealthy rate-payers and dominated by British business interests.
The Council had regulated and administered. It established a police force and presided over
the provision of public utilities on the European model. 11The Settlement became the
economic heart of Shanghai.
The question as to whether this constituted 'informal empire" 'semi-colonialism' or
something entirely different continues to be a matter for debate. Regardless of the label
applied to it, the foreign presence in China certainly had some of the characteristics of
imperialism: including the creation of territorial enclaves; extraterritoriality (foreigners were
subject to the laws of their own countries rather than to Chinese law until 1943); racial
discrimination against the indigenous population; the presence of foreign troops in the
concessions; frequent intervention in domestic and foreign policy and the forced admission of
evangelising mlssionaries.F Jiirgen Osterhammel has argued that perhaps the best way of
imagining British imperialism in China is as a 'business system', built on the interlocking
interests of British firms, their immunity from Chinese law and their ability to organise into
pressure groups. This business community was independent from, but supported by, the
British state.I3
The elite of the International Settlement were the 'taipans', the 'old China hands' who ran the
great merchant 'hongs' that dominated trade on the Chinese coast. Foremost among
them were Jardine, Matheson & Company and Butterfield & Swire. British-owned
textile mills and light manufacturers based themselves here in order to sell their
products to the millions in the vast hinterland. The city's commercial nature was made
manifest in its most famous landmark, the Bund. This was the long line of banks,
consulates and merchant houses that lined the bank of the Huangpu and provided
what W.H. Auden and Christopher Isherwood termed 'the facade of a great city.,14
The city's tall buildings became the most visible mark of foreign imperialism in
II Bickers, Britain in China; Bickers, Scramble/or China.
12 For a much longer list see Jiirgen Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth
Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis,' in W.J. Mommsen, and Jiirgen Osterhammel (eds.),
Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London: German Historical Institute, 1986), pp. 290-
291, 299-300.
13 Ibid., pp. 302-309.
14 W.H. Auden, and Christopher Isherwood, Journey to a War (London: Faber & Faber Ltd., 1939), p. 252.
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China, and of a modernity either forced upon her, or that she had embraced willingly,
depending on the observer's ideological standpoint.
Figure 1: The Shanghai Bund c. 1929
Figure 2: The Bund and Huangpu River, Shanghai, 1945
The large white building in the background is the former Compagnie des
Messageries Maritimes building, which is now the Shanghai Municipal Archives
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The Shanghai British asserted a strong sense of ownership over the city. They took a great
deal of pride in their role in the development of this modem, cosmopolitan and industrial city.
They were the ones, they proudly stated, who had built it up from a fishing village on a
muddy flat into the largest, richest and most exciting city in Asia.':' Chinese historians have
echoed this narrative, and have presented the story of foreign involvement as a fairly
simplistic history of foreign aggression and Chinese resistance, led, of course, by the CCP.16
Scholars in the West have long criticised this overly simplistic approach: the foreign presence
was by no means monolithic. Itwas diverse, multi-racial, and divided in purpose.V Relations
between foreigners and Chinese people were similarly complicated, ranging over time and
place from enthusiastic cooperation to outright antagonism. The situation in China was
unique, and the role of the foreign presence there cannot easily be categorised as 'imperialist',
'colonial' or even 'semi-colonial.' All of these terms deny the ambiguity, negotiation and
interaction that characterised life in treaty port China. Bickers and Wasserstrom have argued
that, although there undoubtedly was racism and violence, Shanghai's rapid growth was born
of Sino-foreign communication and cooperation."
The small 'fishing village' of the foreigners' founding myth had not existed. Shanghai was a
prosperous provincial town with a population of around 200,000 when the foreigners
arrived.i" Chinese people had flooded into the booming city to take advantage of the benefits
afforded by its peculiar legal status, convenient trade links, employment opportunities and
international nature. The whole foreign enterprise had relied on Chinese cooperation, capital
and labour. Chinese life went on in the city, often with a degree of contact with foreign
influences, but also often in isolation from them.2o Shanghai flourished as a peculiar entity: a
IS Robert A. Bickers, 'Shanghailanders: The Formation and Identity of the British Settler Community in
Shanghai, 1843-1937', Past and Present, No.159 (May 1998), pp. 161-211.
16 See for example Hu Sheng, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Westport, Connecticut: Hyperion Press Inc.,
1955, English edition 1973).
17 See for example Chiarra Betta and Claude Markovit's chapters on Sephardic Jews and Indians in Robert A.
Bickers and Christian Henriot (eds.) New Frontiers: Imperialism's New Communities in East Asia, 1842-1953
(Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2000).
18 On this debate see for example; Osterhammel, 'Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire'; Bryna Goodman"
'Improvisations on a Semicolonial Theme, or, How to Read a Celebration of Transnational Urban Community,'
The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No.4 (November 2000), pp. 917-921; Robert A. Bickers, and Jeffrey N.
Wasserstrom, 'Shanghai's "Dogs and Chinese Not Admitted" Sign: Legend, History and Contemporary Symbol,'
The China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 462-6.
19 Bickers, Scramblefor China.
20 Lu Hanchao, Beyond the Neon Lights: Everyday Shanghai in the Early Twentieth Century (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1999); Liang, Mapping Modernity in Shanghai.
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city administered by foreigners, but populated overwhelmingly by Chinese people. At the
time of the Communist takeover in May 1949, foreigners made up only around 0.6% of the
city's population of over five million."
Auden and Isherwood's phrase the 'facade of a great city' implied that behind Shanghai's
Western and cosmopolitan exterior, there was another city, chaotic and Chinese city.22
Shanghai was not a 'foreign city' within China, but rather a hybrid city in which foreign
imports from cosmetics to Communism were used, appropriated and assigned new meanings.
What is undeniable, however, is that foreign imperialism had a huge symbolic and
psychological impact.23Nationalists did not doubt that their country had been the subject of
imperialist aggression. Their world view was shaped in response to acts of violence (real,
perceived, military, economic, cultural or otherwise) perpetrated by Western powers.
Shanghai was particularly significant in the development of Chinese nationalism. Many
identify the May Thirtieth Incident of 1925, in which Chinese and Indian police under British
command fired on Chinese protestors in a Shanghai street, as the moment that first gave rise
to Chinese anti-imperialism.i"
The British presence in Shanghai in 1949 was not what it once had been. After the
Guomindang successfully reunified China in 1927, concerted pressure had been exerted
against 'imperialists' of all countries. Following this, British hegemony in East Asia had been
challenged, first by the Japanese in the 1930s and then by the Americans in the 1940s.25After
Japan entered the Second World War in 1941, the International Settlement was occupied.
British property was confiscated and, perhaps more importantly, the assumed superiority and
inviolability of Westerners was definitively discredited. As a gesture of wartime solidarity,
the French Concession was returned by the Vichy Government to the Japanese-controlled
puppet Chinese Government in 1943. Not to be outdone by the Axis, the British and
21 Figure based on 32,049 foreigners in Shanghai July 1949; Zhou Weiming, Tang Zhenchang, Shanghai waishi
zhi (Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe, 1999), pp. 334, 345, and Chinese population of 5,440,000 in
December 1948 from 'Shanghai Gaikuang' [Shanghai Outline] in Shanghai Shi Danganguan (Bian), Shanghai
Jiefang [Shanghai Municipal Archives (ed.), The Liberation of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai Sanlian Shudian,
IShanghai Third United Bookshop], 1999), pp. 3-6.
2 Auden, and Isherwood, Journey to a War, p. 252
23 Albert Feuerwerker, The Foreign Establishment in China in the Early Twentieth Century (Ann Arbor, Mich.:
Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1976), p. 111.
24 Esherick, 'Ten Theses,' p. 65.
2S John Darwin, After Tamerlane; the Global History of Empire Since 1405 (London: Allen Lane, 2007), pp.
469-71.
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Americans also negotiated the return of the Settlement and the cancellation of their special
privileges (including extraterritorialityj.i''
The Guomindang's return to Shanghai in 1945 was a pillage. As Bergere has observed, 'a
veritable army of carpetbaggers', descended on Shanghai to abuse their position as victors."
This was a portent of the corruption and mismanagement that was to come. After the war, the
British had to fight hard for the return of the possessions that had been seized, first by the
Japanese and then by the Guomindang as 'enemy property.' British firms remained dominant
in certain sectors of the city's economy, but occupied a much weaker position than previously.
'They had been wrong-footed by both Chinese nationalism and by Japanese imperialism. On
the international level, Britain became increasingly reliant on the USA.28
In 1945, it had looked to all concerned, including the Communists' ideological ally the Soviet
Union, as if the Guomindang would re-establish itself, defeat the Communists and lead China
into a new post-war era where they would recognised as a global power.i" This promised
stability never came. Economic crises and political turmoil cost the Guomindang their
legitimacy. As the situation worsened they increasingly came to resemble the corrupt,
inefficient and repressive reactionaries they were portrayed as in CCP propaganda. 1948 was
a turning point: the military situation turned in the CCP's favour and inflation had spiralled
out of control. In early 1949, the Guomindang's best American-trained and equipped units
were destroyed: defeat was now almost certain.'?
26 Robert A. Bickers, 'Settlers and Diplomats; The End of British Hegemony in the International Settlement,
1937-1945,' in Christian Henriot and Wen-hsin Yeh (eds.,), In the Shadow of the Rising Sun; Shanghai Under
Japanese Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 229-256.
27 Marie-Claire Bergere, Shanghai; China's Gateway to Modernity (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 2009), p. 325.
28 Nicholas Clifford, Retreatfrom China; British Policy in the Far East, 1937-1941 (London: Longmans, Green
and Co. Ltd., 1967).
29 Odd Arne Westad, 'Losses, Chances, and Myths: The United States and the Creation of the Sino-Soviet
Alliance, 1945-1950,' Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No.1 (Winter 1997), pp. 105-115.
30 For more on the Chinese Civil War see; Odd Arne Westad, Decisive Encounters: the Chinese Civil War,
1946-1950 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,2003); Suzanne Pepper, Civil War in China; the
Political Struggle, 1945-1949 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); Steven I. Levine, Anvil of
Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987);
Joseph K.S. Yick, Making Urban Revolution in China; The CCP-GMD Strugglefor Beiping-Tianjin, 1945-1949
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
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Britain in Shanghai on the eve of the Communist takeover
In May 1949, Shanghai was occupied by the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Their entrance
into the city was watched with concern from London and Hong Kong. The more
optimistically inclined saw this as the arrival of yet another in a long line of Chinese
governments who would, of necessity, come to some form of accommodation with the British.
After all, British commercial contacts were vital to the Chinese economy. They were to be
proved wrong."
The CCP had a long and ambiguous relationship with Shanghai. Many of the CCP's leaders
had enjoyed long associations with the city, and some considered the modem, foreign-
influenced city their spiritual home. The Party had been founded there in 1921, but it had also
suffered its greatest defeat there in 1927 when the Guomindang, in cooperation with the
foreign authorities and the city's criminal gangs, snuffed out the brief period of socialist
insurrection known as 'the Shanghai Commune.t " They therefore approached the running of
this major modem city with a large degree of temerity in 1949. The uncertainty they felt was,
perhaps, compounded by the usual feelings of excitement, bewilderment and distrust
common to those used to rural surroundings when suddenly confronted with a metropolis.
Shanghai's decadence, carnality and gross inequality were anathema to the moralistic and
egalitarian Communists. Their negative view of the city was succinctly summed up in the
following comment by a leading cadre in the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department (FAD) in
early 1950. Shanghai, he said, was the
largest of all the cities founded and developed according to the will of the imperialists using the
blood and sweat of the Chinese people.P
When the CCP entered Shanghai, they encountered a substantial number of foreigners and
foreign businesses. There were around 32,000 foreigners in June 1949 and nearly 12,000
31 See for example: Hansard, Hong Kong Defences, Lord Strabolgi (Joseph Kenworthy) speaking in the House
of Lords, HL Deb, Vol. 16,3/2/49, pp. 543-5.
32 Stephen A. Smith, A Road is Made; Communism in Shanghai 1920-1927 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2000).
33 Shanghai Municipal Archives [SMA] BI-2-3658, Shanghai Waiqiao Shiwu Chu gongzuo zongjie (chugao)
[Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department draft summary of work], May 1949 to March 1950; 'largest of
all the cities ... ' (Zhe shi youyu shangsshi shiyong Zhongguo renmin xuehan, yizhao diguozhuyizhe de yizhi er
jianli yu fazhan qilai de chengshi zhong zui da zhe, l!~EI3T1~~fifflrpOOA.~l!n}f. mR~HirOO~)(;i~U{_J;:
.~~n~a~g*~N$rp~*.~
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remained in December 1950.34 Some 3,228 of the 28,683 foreigners present in November
1949 were British. There were also significant numbers of Americans, French, Russians (both
Soviet and 'White'), and stateless refugees. This large foreign community was served by a
variety of different organisations. There were no fewer than 31 consulates, consulates general,
embassies and representative offices. The CCP counted 58 different foreign-run social,
cultural and publishing organisations, which provided the foreign community with news,
entertainment and places to spend their leisure hours. Among these organisations were news
agencies and radio stations." There were four foreign news agencies and thirteen foreign
newspapers.l" One in every seven schools was foreign-run.V
Table 1: Foreigners in Shanghai between 1942 and November 1949
1942 1945 1946 Nov. 1949
British 5,865 670 3,102 3,228
French 2,000 2,109 3,872 1,279
German 2,538 2,251 1,496 889
Japanese 94,768 72,654 No Fig. 441
Other 9,941 9,422 17,564' 5,525
Portuguese 2,177 2,043 2,281 1,402
Stateless 28,994 31,811 11,468 2,393
USA 1,369 290 9,775 1,720
USSR 1,622 1,548 8,834 6,740
White Russian 1,657 ., 7,017 5,066
Total 150,931 122,798 65,409 28,683
Source: adapted from Zou Yiren, Jiu Shanghai Renkou Bianqian de Yanjiu
(Research on Population Change in Old Shanghai) cited in Zhou et al., Shanghai
waishi zhi, p. 252.
34 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 334, 345.
3S 'Shanghai Gaikuang", pp. 15-16, 126.
36 SMA Y15-1-20l-593, Shanghai Gaikuang; Xia Bian, Waiqiao [Shanghai Outline, Part Two, Foreigners],
04/49, pp. 601-602.
37 SMA B 1-2-3658, Shanghai Waiqiao Shiwu Chu gongzuo zongjie (chugao) [Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department draft summary of work), May 1949 to March 1950.
• This figure is unusually large due to an increase in numbers of people from countries such as Poland and
Greece and the addition of some 5,000 Koreans and Vietnamese who had previously been counted as 'stateless.'
.. White Russians were included in figure for 'stateless' at this time.
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What were the CCP's aims when entering Shanghai? It is clear that the CCP wished to
eradicate certain aspects of the old society: the imperialists, reactionaries and exploiters. They
wanted to crack down on crime and immorality and rid the city of foreign influences. It is
worth remembering, however, that the CCP's programme was not entirely aimed at
destruction, They did not simply wish to abolish the old way of life in the city: they sought to
transform it in positive ways. After the tragedies of the Chinese revolution have fully
unfolded it is difficult to write about it without one's vision being obscured. In the early
1950s, however, the Chinese revolution was not necessarily destined for tragedy: it was an
attempt to inspire and to create a new, more equitable and better world. Liu Shaoqi wrote in
1939 that, in the utopian Communist future, 'the spirit of mutual assistance and mutual love
will prevail among mankind ... Such a society will, of course, be the best, the most beautiful,
and the most advanced society in the history of mankind.' 38 The Communists sought to
fundamentally improve the world. Ironically, it was this utopian goal that justified the
violence and turmoil that was to follow.
Making it clear to all that Shanghai was now an independent Chinese city was imperative. In .
line with Marxist orthodoxy the CCP believed that China's political and cultural
superstructure was defined by the economic relations that underpinned it. China's economy
had been corrupted by imperialists and their Chinese compradors. It was vital to transform
the economy to secure political indepcndence.i" To the Communists, Shanghai was 'not a
productive city, rather it [was] a model consumerist city that serve[ d] the bureaucrat,
comprador, landlord and imperialist.' The city's economy was geared towards profit and not
towards the best interests of the people. One of the most important material changes in the
creation of the 'New Shanghai' was, therefore, the transformation of the city from a
'consumerist city' (xiaofei chengshi, j~~fJiXm) into a 'productive city' (shengchan chengshi,
~f'=fJiXm).40
38 Liu Shaoqi, 'How to be a Good Communist,' Liu Shaoqi, Selected Works of Liu Shaoqi, (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, 1984) Vol. 1.
39 Mao Zedong, 'On New Democracy,' January 1940, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign
Languages Press, 1969 (First Edition 1961, Third Printing 1969), Vol. II, pp. 338-84, 'A given culture is the
ideological reflection of the politics and economics of a given society. There is in China an imperialist culture
which is a reflection of imperialist rule, or partial rule, in the political and economic fields. '
40 SMA B 182-1-461-187, Shanghai ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi zhuanbian wei shengchan chengshi, ru he bai
tuo diguozhuyi de shufu wei gongren jieji fuwu [How Shanghai turned from being a consumerist city into a
productive one, how the binds of imperialism were escaped to turn towards serving the people], 25/4/53.
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It is surprising then that, despite the fact that the CCP were obviously so keen to break the
power of foreign companies and to fundamentally transform the economic relations that
underpinned society, their emphasis was on stability. This was because they feared economic
crises. Shanghai had been at the centre of a storm of inflation that had its roots in the 1937-
1945 war with Japan and which had already brought down the Guomindang. Speculators had
earned great fortunes while ordinary working people had seen their savings disappear. As
factories had closed, Shanghai's famously militant workers had taken action. The approach of
the Communists caused further problems as the most prominent capitalists fled to the safe
havens of Taiwan and Hong Kong. Those who remained were extremely cautious and
reluctant to risk making long-term plans. How would the CCP set about calming the mood in
the city and reviving the economy without alienating either the capitalists or the workers?
Shanghai's capitalists were courted by the new authorities. They were guaranteed protection
and profits in exchange for resuming production." Foreign businesses were also to be
tolerated and protected as long as their owners did not break the law. Foreign businesses
would not be nationalised: the CCP had neither the manpower, the expertise, nor the will to
do so. In 1947, the CCP had been in control of relatively limited areas of north-west and
north-east China: their rapid successes had left them with a real shortage of trained cadres
and resources.f As the PLA swept southwards from Manchuria to Beijing and Tianjin, across
the Yangzi to Nanjing, on to Shanghai and from there onwards to Guangzhou in the far south
and Chengdu in the south-west, they were faced with administering enormous areas of
unfamiliar territory. There were administrative organs to establish, supplies to find, and
'counter-revolutionaries' to be eliminated. The sheer scale ofthis task was enormous.
Even the idea of administering Shanghai was daunting. The city was home to 5,440,000
people in December 1948 and population density in its central areas was higher than that of
London or New York. Being home to more than 12,500 factories, Shanghai was also China's
industrial centre. In 1948,45 per cent of China's textile companies were located in Shanghai.
The city was home to some 420,000 industrial workers. These workers were disgruntled, and
in 1948 there were over 2,300 labour-capital disputes (six or seven every day). On the
41 Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 351-3.
42 Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars' Cold War International History Project website:
URL < http://www.wilsoncenter.orglindex.cfm?fuseaction=topics.home&topic id-1409> Accessed 5th January
2011. Hereafter [CWIHP]. Also see the CWIHP Bulletin, Issue 16, Inside China's Cold War, Fa1l2007, Winter
2008. CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3111149.
\'.
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commercial side, Shanghai had twice as many shops as Tianjin and six times as many as
Beijing. In 1946 85 per cent of national imports and 62 per cent of exports had been moved
through Shanghai's port."
On the national level, there were 1,I04 foreign enterprises in China belonging to more than
thirty different nationalities. They varied in type and size, but a large number (490) were
companies engaged in trade, such as shipping, import and export. The second-largest
category of company was medium to light industry (130) and the third was financial services,
banking and insurance (79). There were over seventy foreign real estate companies. Foreign
property holdings were significant: foreigners owned over 9,000,000 square metres of real
estate and 132,000mu of land (1 mu is equal to 666m2). The British were perhaps the most
significant national group. Around 35 per cent of all foreign businesses in China were
British-owned and British interests accounted for 68 per cent of the total capital invested.l"
Shanghai was the focus of foreign investment in China. Important sectors of the city's
economy were completely dominated by foreign firms. These included shipping, banking,
insurance, docks and warehouses, real estate and public utilities.45 In June 1950, a year after
the Communist takeover, 685 foreign businesses remained in Shanghai, belonging to
proprietors of 34 different nationalities. Of these, 185 (27 per cent) were British. These
British firms were closely tied in to the Chinese economy, not least because they employed
nearly 30,000 Chinese workers. The second- and third-largest foreign presences after the
British were the Americans (22 per cent of the total number of companies) and the French.
These three players dominated the market. Capital invested by British, American and French
companies accounted for 91.4 per cent of the total invested by all foreign companies.
Companies from the same three countries held 99 per cent of all real estate owned by
foreigners and employed 95.5 per cent of all Chinese workers employed by foreign firms."
Foreign firms were central to the running of Shanghai's economy. The CCP estimated that
the American-owned (formerly British) Shanghai Power Company produced 89 per cent of
43 'Shanghai Gaikuang', pp. 3-6. .
44 Zhang Hanfu zhuan bian xie zu [Biography of Zhang Hanfu editorial and writing group], Zhang Hanfu zhuan
[Biography of Zhang Hanfu] (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2003), p. 146.
45 SMA B 1-2-3658, Shanghai Waiqiao Shiwu Chu gongzuo zongjie (chugao) [Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department draft summary of work], May 1949 to March 1950.
46 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 314-5.
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Shanghai's electric power.47 Foreign companies were responsible for supplying 83 per cent of
Shanghai's gas supply and 71 per cent of its water. The city's public transportation system
was dominated by the two large tram companies (one British and one French), and the
telephone network was almost completely managed by the American-owned Shanghai
Telephone Company. In light manufacturing, companies such as British American Tobacco
had created extensive networks of raw material harvesting, industrial processing and
distribution. British American Tobacco's easily recognisable 'Pirate' and 'Ruby Queen'
cigarettes were well-known as far away as Tibet and Xinjiang in the far west.48 Foreign firms
were completely integrated into the Chinese economy and the products they sold had become
commonplace in the daily lives of millions of Chinese people. As well as purchasing foreign
commodities, Shanghai consumers travelled in British trams, gambled at the French-owned
canidrome and consumed American electricity. Foreign signs and advertisements were
everywhere.
Table 2: Foreign enterprises in Shanghai, June 1950
Enterprises Chinese workers Capital (10,000 RMB) Land occupied (mu)4'.1
No. Percentage No. Percentage No. Per cent No. Percentage
British 185 27 29,313 61 3,700 34.8 7,224 65
French 41 6 3,836 8 2,863 26.9 633 5.4
Other • 173 25.3 961 2 369 3.5 127 1.1
Swiss 35 5 801 1.7 533 5 45 0.4
USA 123 18 12,773 26.5 3,162 29.7 3,102 28
USSR 128 18.7 410 0.8 14 0.1 4 1.6
Total 685 100 48,094 100 10,641 100 11,135 100
Source: Adapted from Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 315.
Global contexts
47 'Shanghai Gaikuang', pp. 15-16.
48 'Shanghai Gaikuang', pp. 15-16; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 314; SMA BI82-1-461-187, Shanghai
ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi.
49 One mu is equal to 666m2•
• 'Other': here includes following 27 countries and 'stateless:' Austrian, Belgian, Canadian, Czechoslovakian,
Danish, Dutch, German, Greek, Hungarian, Indian, Iranian, Iraqi, Italian, Japanese, Korean, New Zealand,
Norwegian, Romanian, Pakistani, Panamanian, Philippine, Polish, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish.
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The disruption and chaos of World War Two had triggered a violent reordering of the
relations between different states, and between states and their populations. Events in China
took place within a climate of change, characterised by the decline of the Europe-centred
global order through decolonisation and the growth of the new socialist world under the
leadership of the Soviet Union. 50 Mao Zedong quite clearly conceived of the Chinese
revolution as being part of a wider struggle against aggressive American imperialism in
Europe, Asia and the Americas. In China, the involvement of the United States in the Civil
War on the side of the Guomindang had made them the most obvious target of anti-
imperialist rhetoric. This took the focus slightly off the British.51
In hindsight, the withdrawal of British influence from Shanghai can appear to be a logical
consequence of her post-war decline and as part of the wider processes of decolonisation. Yet
the extent of this decline was by no means apparent to British merchants and diplomats at the
time. Many anticipated a post-war resurgence.52 They keenly desired to maintain a trading
presence on the Chinese coast. Britain remained influential on the world stage and especially
in south-east Asia: they were the chief ally of the dominant world superpower, a founder
member of the United Nations Security Council and one of the world's biggest economies.
Besides, it was widely believed that whoever ruled China would 'need' British trading
companies to connect them with the wider world. The depth of anti-imperialist feeling was
severe1y underestimated.
The CCP conceived of their imperialist enemy within a framework dictated by Lenin's
writings on imperialism as monopoly capitalism. All vestiges of British influence in China
were seen to be symptoms of the imperialists' desire to export capital and dominate markets.
The imperialists sought to facilitate this subjection through the use of cultural weapons such
as missionaries and educational institutions. Imperialism was dying capitalism: it was
therefore violent and irrational.
50 Darwin, After Tamelane, p. 428, 440-2, 473-4.
51 Mao Zedong, 'Farewell, Leighton Stuart!' Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (Peking: Foreign Languages Press,
1969), Vol. IV, pp. 433-40; Mao 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship,' 30/6/49, in Selected Works, Vol.
IV, pp. 411-24.
52 John Darwin, 'British Decolonization since 1945: A Pattern or a Puzzle?' inHolland, R. F. and Rizvi, G. (eds),
Perspectives on Imperialism and Decolonization: Essays in Honour of A. F. Madden (London: Frank Cass,
1984), p. 190; Darwin, After Tamerlane, p. 44l.
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The post-war era saw an enormous expansion of the Soviet-led socialist world in Europe and
Asia. Despite the fact that the new Communist countries came under the leadership of the
Soviet Union there were significant differences in the experiences of 'imperialists' within
them. In Yugoslavia, foreign enterprises were quickly nationalised. In Hungary, some foreign
capitalists were arrested for long periods on espionage charges. The Chinese took a more
pragmatic line: they needed the foreigners in the short term to help stabilise and develop their
economy.
The experience of Turkey following Mustafa Kemal's rise to power in 1923 perhaps provides
a more accurate comparative model for the CCP's revolutionary economic nationalism and
expulsion of foreign interests than does Eastern Europe. As in China, the ejection of foreign
interests from 'semi-colonial' Turkey was tied to the twin themes of national assertion and
economic development. In the process of nationalisation, one contemporary commentator
noted, the 'old laissez-faire ha[ d] given way to a new spirit of independence, a new desire for
self-respect and self-reliance.V' Kemal's anti-imperialist vision for an independent Turkey
bore many similarities to the doctrine of Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who was
acclaimed by the CCP as the' 'father' of their revolution. For a year or more before his death
in 1925, Sun had come to blame imperialism for the majority of China's ills. It was the
encroachment of foreign powers, he suggested, that had weakened China and that had caused
it to stagnate and decay. Anti-imperialism was part of national renewal.j"
In the early 1950s, China was not the British Govemment's top priority. The preservation of
the strategic alliance with the USA was much more important. Within Britain's traditional
spheres of interest there were larger concerns, such as the threat of nationalisation of British
oil companies in Iran and the insurgencies in Kenya and Malaya. Robin Winks has suggested
that the decolonisation of informal empire was intrinsically more complicated than that of
formal empire, where more influence could be exerted both over the colonised and the agents
of the coloniser. He refers to an old Mexican proverb which says that to divorce one's spouse
is a simple matter of law, but to divorce a lover is a much messier business. 55 It is true that
the British consuls in Shanghai often felt frustrated about their lack of power over their
charges, and that British businessmen often acted in their own interests rather than on those ':"
53 Hans Kohn, 'Ten Years of the Turkish Republic,' Foreign Affairs, Vol. 12, No.1 (Oct., 1933), pp. 150-1.
54 Marie-Claire Bergere, Sun Yat-sen (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 361-2.
55 Robin W. Winks, 'On Decolonization and Informal Empire,' The American Historical Review, Vol. 81, No.3
(June 1976), pp. 540-56.
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of the state, but experiences in Kenya and Malaya in the early 1950s suggest that, in actual
fact, the decolonisation of formal empire was much more costly and difficult than that of
places like Shanghai.
Writing the history of the early PRC
The founding of the PRC on the l" October' 1949 was a moment of huge significance in
China's modem history. At the same time, however, the year 1949 has been greatly over-
emphasised as a moment of historical rupture. As Prasenjit Duara has argued, scholars and
politicians have. tended to write linear, simple histories. Nationalist mythmaking has tied
history to national narratives that have obscured the true 'heterophony' of the past and have
resulted in narrow teleologies. The narrative of the CCP's revolution in China sees all events
as leading to 1949, after which everything was different.i'' Historians traditionally stopped
their research at this date, and the People's Republic became the realm of political
scientists. 57 In recent years this boundary has been eroded as historians have begun to re-
examine the early 1950s.
Scholars have sought to emphasise continuities across the 1949 divide in order to get a more
nuanced impression of the nature of the revolutionary changes that took place. 58 Paul Cohen
has argued that whatever the nature of the CCP's revolution, many of the most important
changes the party made on coming to power were not socialist or Maoist in nature, but rather
the realisation of a 'consensual Chinese agenda', which many Guomindang (or even late
Qing) administrators would have supported. These measures included the restoration of full
central government control over all of China's territories (except Taiwan, Hong Kong and
Dalian59) and the elimination of the Western presence. Alongside these changes came rapid
population growth, improvements in public health and a wide extension of literacy and
education. Many of the changes instituted by the CCP were not, therefore, entirely new or
56 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation; Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 4-5, 16, 26-7.
57 On the political sciencelhistory divide see Hans van de Ven, 'Recent Studies of Modem Chinese History,'
Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No.2 (May 1996), p. 225; Cohen, Paul A., 'Reflections,' pp. 29-35.
58 Cohen, 'Reflections,' pp. 27-37; William C. Kirby, 'Continuity and Change in Modem China: Economic
Planning on the Mainland and on Taiwan, 1943-1958,' The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 24 (Jul.,
1990), pp. 121-141.
59 On the situation in Dalian see Christian A. Hess, 'Big Brother is Watching: Local Sino-Soviet Relations and
the Building of New Dalian, 1945-55,' in Brown and Pickowicz (eds.) Dilemmas a/Victory, pp. 160-183.
pp.160-183.
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revolutionary. There were important continuities as well as important changes after 1949.60
Pre-1949 institutions and personnel had a lasting influence on Communist China and there
were even similarities between policies enacted on the mainland and on Guomindang-
controlled Taiwan.61
As well as crossing the divide, historians have also sought to readdress the early 1950s on
their own terms, asking questions such as: how did the CCP address the challenges they faced?
How did they build an effective state? Were they really as successful in changing China and
consolidating power as was once thought? How were these changes experienced by ordinary
people at the ground level? The long-standing narrative of the CCP takeover is that the
Guomindang ran a weak state that collapsed and was replaced by a strong Communist
government. The Communists were then able to build a strong state, unify the country and
complete the anti-imperialist revolution by forcing the foreigners out. In fact, the CCP's
power in the early years of their rule was much more incomplete, contested and conditional
than once thought. Compromise was necessary in order to consolidate power. The CCP's
efforts at regime consolidation and state-building were often patchy and provisional.
During the Cold War, Western 'China watchers' were forced to read political tea-leaves when
attempting to explain policy decisions. As Eric Hobsbawm suggested in 1969, those studying
communist history tended to fall into two camps: 'the sectarian and the witch-hunting.'
Hobsbawm's 'sectarians' produced uncritical accounts of revolutionary successes. 'Witch-
hunters' portrayed communist parties as 'sinister, compulsive, potentially omnipresent bodies,
half religion and half plot. ,62 Regardless of the political orientation of the author, the CCP
and other communist parties have tended to be almost universally portrayed as powerful,
efficient and ideologically coherent forces. As we shall see, the CCP may have been
militarily successful, but this did not necessarily translate into administrative success.
Stephen Kotkin's pioneering study of Soviet life and economic planning Magnetic Mountain
(1995) paved the way for new post-Cold War analyses of socialist societies as lived
60 Cohen, 'Reflections,' pp. 29-35; Esherick, 'Ten Theses,' pp. 47-48.
61 Kirby, 'Continuity and Change,' pp. 133-140.
62 Eric Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries (London, Abacus, 2007, first published 1973), pp. 12-13,267.
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realities.63 On a similar theme, the new directions embodied in the edited volume Dilemmas
of Victory (2007) are emblematic of the approaches that historians have begun to use to
address the history of the early PRe. The focus in Dilemmas is on 'the extraordinary diversity
and complexity of how individuals, families and social groups experienced the 1949-53
years. ,64 Works such as this, and James Gao's The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou (2004),
have contributed to the development of a more nuanced understanding of CCP power. Gao's
work builds on earlier analyses of Communist takeovers by G. William Skinner, Kenneth
Lieberthal and Ezra Vogel, but moves beyond their focus on politics to explore the cultural
and social implications of the takeover.F Gao demonstrates clearly the constraints placed
upon Communist cadres: the CCP had to implement gradual social transformation through
measures 'acceptable if not appealing' to the local population. In Hangzhou, Gao finds,
national concerns interplayed with local ones and long-term national policies were often
subject to local and short-term modifications out of'necessity.I"
The processes by which the CCP were able to take control over Shanghai and later transform
it have not yet been the subject of exhaustive historical enquiry. While historians such as
Elizabeth Perry and Gail Hershatter have made excellent contributions towards understanding
'New Shanghai' in terms of labour relations and social reform, an overarching framework is
still lacking/" The most frequently referenced accounts of the CCP's takeover remain Noel
Barber's irreverent The Fall of Shanghai (1979) and Paolo Alberto Rossi's The Communist
Conquest of Shanghai: a Warning to the West (1970).68 Chapter-length studies of aspects of
the takeover by Marie Claire Bergere and Frederic Wakeman Jnr. have gone some way
63 Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain; Stalinism as Civilisation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995)
see also Jochen Hellbeck, Revolution on my Mind; Writing a Diary Under Stalin (Cambridge Mass,: Harvard
University Press, 2006).
64 Brown and Pickowicz, Dilemmas of Victory, pp. 7,10.
65 G. William Skinner, 'Aftermath of Communist Liberation in the Chengtu Plain,' Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No.
1. (Mar, 1951), pp. 61-76; Kenneth Lieberthal, Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, 1949-1952 (Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press, 1980); Ezra Vogel, Canton Under Communism; Programs and politics in
a Provincial Capital, 1949-1968 (New York: Harper & Row, 1971). '
66 James Zheng Gao, The Communist Takeover of Hangzhou: the Transformation of City and Cadre, 1949-1954
(Honolulu, T.H.: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004), pp. 245-7.
67 Elizabeth J. Perry, Shanghai on Strike: the Politics of Chinese Labor (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University
Press, 1993); Perry, Patrolling the Revolution, Gail Hershatter, 'Regulating Sex in Shanghai: the Reform of
Prostitution in 1920 and 1951,' in Frederic Wakeman,_Jr., and Yeh Wen-hsin, (eds), Shanghai Sojourners
(Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Chinese Studies, 1992),
pp. 145-86. ,
68 Noel Barber, The Fall of Shanghai: The Communist Take-Over in 1949 (London: Macmillan, 1979); Paolo
Alberto Rossi, The Communist Conquest of Shanghai: a Warning to the West (Arlington, Va.: Twin Circle
Publishing Co., 1970).
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towards redressing this gap in the literature, but much remains to be done. 69 Recent
reassessments of the early 1950s have focused on state-building and administration. For
example, Ruth Rogaski has demonstrated how the Korean War germ warfare scare provided
the Chinese state with an opportunity to advance municipal hygiene in the name ofmodemity
while at the same time extending the reach of the state. 70 Strauss has shown that the
Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries (1950-1953) provided a similar opportunity."
Chinese archives and the early 1950s
The wider reassessment of the limits of the CCP's power has been driven by the new
availability of Chinese archival sources to foreign scholars. The CCP deliberately sm:ouded
themselves in secrecy. Policy was made behind closed doors before being announced through
official organs in the name of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi and other top leaders.
This degree of centralisation has previously made it extremely difficult for scholars to
explore the formulation and execution of CCP policy.
Although Chinese archives are increasingly accessible to foreign researchers, the use of them
is not unproblematic. The files of the Shanghai FAD, for example, are housed at the Shanghai
Municipal Archives, but they are inaccessible. The researcher must take a pragmatic
approach and endeavour to locate sources in the files of other departments with which the
FAD corresponded. A wealth of such material exists because all other departments had to
refer any matter involving foreigners to the FAD. Files created by the Public Utility Bureau,
for example, provide detailed insights into processes of CCP takeovers of foreign public
utility companies. As Gao has observed, the sources themselves tell stories. Grammatical
errors and incorrectly written characters belie the poor education level of many CCP cadres.
In contrast, the high-level Chinese employees of foreign companies wrote very formal letters
to the various bureaux in beautiful calligraphy. We can also tell a great deal about the
conditions of scarcity the CCP were working under by the poor quality of the paper they were
69 Bergere, Shanghai; Frederic, Wakeman, Jr., '''Cleanup'': The New Order in Shanghai' in Brown and
Pickowicz, (eds.), Dilemmas of Victory. pp. 21-58.
10 Rogaski, Ruth, Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China (Berkeley, Calif.:
London: University of California Press, 2004); Julia Strauss, 'Paternalist Terror: The Campaign to Suppress
Counterrevolutionaries and Regime Consolidation in the People's Republic of China, 1950-1953,' Comparative
Studies in Society and History, Vol. 44, No.1 (January 2002), pp. 80-105.
11 Strauss, 'Morality, Coercion and State Building.'
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using.72The FAD's work report for October and November, for example, was written on the
back of paper headed 'German Consulate General, Shanghai.' 73
CCP reports were often so full of politics and allegory that they perhaps tell us more about
the aims and worldview of the writers than they do about the objective reality. Reports tended
to reflect wider political and social truths as the cadres saw them and tended to stress
successes over failures. They were, after all, written with an audience of superiors in mind.
The usefulness of these reports is improved, however, by the CCP's proclivity towards
criticism and self-criticism which helps to expose many of the new authorities' shortcomings.
It is only through familiarity with the format of such reports and through repeated readings
that the historian can cautiously begin to access a more nuanced version of events.
High-level materials on important subjects such as foreign affairs policy remain mostly, but
not always, off limits. The archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing has now
made available many thousands of files on the early PRC. Where once historians were forced.
to rely on the printed speeches of Chairman Mao and Premier (and Foreign Minister) Zhou
Enlai, we can now access transcripts of high-level meetings where policies were discussed
and shaped before being passed to the. top leaders for approval. This helps us move away
from writing Mao- and Zhou-centred histories. The majority of these files deal with the
minutiae of foreign affairs work, but certain files can surprise. These include, for example,
the minutes of the May 1952 meeting at the Ministry to decide future policy towards the
British, discussed at length in Chapter Four. Another way in which historians may now gain
insights into the CCP's high-level policy formulation is through their conversations with
Moscow, which have become available with the opening of Soviet archives.i"
As well as having increased access to Chinese archives, historians of the early People's
Republic can now benefit from a proliferation of Chinese language secondary sources and
published collections of primary sources.P While historical writing in the PRC tends to
continue to reflect the Communist Party's views on its own historical development, recent
72 Gao, Communist Takeover of Hangzhou, p. 8.
73 Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, Beijing [MFA] 118-00046-26,
Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Shi-Shiyi Yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department for October-November], 1st - 30th November 1949.
74 See note on CWIHP above.
75 Shanghai Municipal Library, 1555 Huaihai Zhonglu, Xuhuiqu, Shanghai.
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publications such as the Shanghai Municipal Archives' Shanghai Jiefang (The Liberation of
Shanghai) (1999) and the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences' series of gazetteers on
various aspects of Shanghai administrative history are valuable resources. Of particular note
. is the Shanghai waishi zhi (Record of Shanghai Foreign Affairs) (1999).76 Autobiographies :
and biographies of important CCP leaders such as Bo Yibo (nf-~&:)and Zhang Hanfu (~j~
~) provide us with much-needed insights into the CCP's policy-making and
implementation." Much of the Chinese secondary literature is still imbued with nationalist
narratives of 'taking back' what was rightfully Chinese from the hands of foreign imperialists.
For example, Zhang Kan's short 2004 article on the elimination of foreign businesses is the
Chinese language scholarly work that has engaged most closely with this topic. Zhang's
research is empirically strong, but it remains framed within the same language encountered
within the sources from the 1950s themselves: foreign firms were the tools of imperialism
and their removal was a necessity"
On the British side, there is much to be gained from exploring newly accessible archives and
revisiting The National Archives. Permission has been kindly granted to examine the
previously inaccessible 'closure files' of Butterfield & Swire, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
John Swire and Sons (Ltd.), which was among the most important firms operating in
mainland China from its founding in 1866 until 1954.79 The HSBC Group Archives contain a
wealth of materials relating to the Bank's own situation, the wider economic and political
situation, and the positions of various private businesses, groups and individuals.f"
The end of the British presence
76 Shanghai Jiefang; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi.
77 Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [A Review of Certain Major Policies and Events]
(Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe [CCP Central Party School Press], 1991); Zhang Hanfu
zhuan bian xie zu, Zhang Hanfu zhuan.
78 Zhang Kan, Jianguo chuqi zai Hua waizi qiye gaizao chutan (1949-1962); yi Shanghai wei Ii [First
exploration of the transformation of foreign enterprises in China in the early period after the founding of the
country (1949-1962); with Shanghai as an example], Zhongguo jingji shi yanjiu, 2004 nian, di 1 qi [Researches
in Chinese Economic History], 2004, No.1.
79 Butterfield & Swire Archival Materials, John Swire & Sons Ltd. Swire House 59 Buckingham Gate, London,
SWIE 6AJ, John Swire and Sons Company Archive [JSSCA] CHINACLl to CHINACL6 inclusive.
80 Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation Group Archives, Iron Mountain building, Leven road, Poplar,
London, E14 OLL [HSBC]; Frank H. H. King, The History of the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation. Vol.4, The Hongkong Bank in the period of Development and Nationalism, 1941-1984: from
regional bank to multinational group (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), see also Patrick Brodie's
institutional history of Imperial Chemical Industries (China); Patrick Brodie, Crescent over Cathay; China and





There are few works that deal directly with the end of the British presence in China in
English. The earlier literature tends to be centred on international relations and diplomatic
history. Accounts such as Robert Boardman's Britain and the People's Republic of China,
1949-74 (1976), and Evan Luard's Britain and China (1962) dealt largely with British policy-
making, focusing on issues such as the recognition of the PReY More recent international
relations-based studies of this period have tended to move away from narrative-driven
diplomatic histories to focus more on regional power balances, including the reconfiguration
of Sino-British-American power relations.82
One of the first studies dedicated specifically to exploring the fate of British commercial
interests was Thomas N. Thompson's occasional paper China's Nationalization of Foreign
Firms: the Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-57 (1979). Thompson coined the term
'hostage capitalism' to explain the CCP's practice of keeping foreign firms in China while
squeezing them in order to gain control of their assets." While 'hostage capitalism' provides
a useful label for what happened, it does not explain how or why the CCP carried out its
polices. Thompson's line of argument strongly influenced Aron Shai's (1996) work on the
fate of French companies. Shai places a similar emphasis on foreign reactions over Chinese
actions.84
81 Robert Boardman, Britain and the People's Republic of China, 1949-74 (London: Macmillan, 1976); Evan
Luard, Britain and China (London: Chatto & Windus, 1962) see also; Jagdish P. Jain, China in World Politics:
A Study a/Sino-British Relations, 1949-1975 (London: M. Robertson, 1977); Brian Porter, Britain and the Rise
of Communist China: a Study of British Attitudes, 1945-1954 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).
82 More recent international relations studies include; Scott Kaufman, Confronting Communism: U.S. and
British Policies Toward China (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001); Edwin W. Martin, Divided
Counsel: the Anglo-American Response to Communist Victory in China (Lexington, Ky.: University Press of
Kentucky, 1986); Xiang, Lanxin, Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, 1945-1950
(London: M.E. Sharpe, 1995); Zhai, Qiang, The Dragon, the Lion & the Eagle: Chinese-British-American
Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1994).
83 Thomas N. Thompson, China's Nationalization of Foreign Firms: the Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-
57 (Baltimore: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1979), pp. 3-48; Kenneth Lieberthal, 'Review: China's
Nationalization of Foreign Firms; The Politics of Hostage Capitalism, 1949-57 by Thomas N. Thompson,' The
China Quarterly, No. 85 (Mar. 1981).
84 Axon Shai, 'Imperialism Imprisoned: the Closure of British Firms in the People's Republic of China,' The
English Historical Review, (1989), CIV(CCCCX), pp. 88-109; Axon Shai, 'Hostage capitalism and French
Companies in China; A Hidden Element in Sino-French Relations,' Etudes chinoises, vol. XII, no. 1, printemps
1993; Axon Shai, The Fate of British and French Firms In China 1949-54 - Imperialism Imprisoned (Oxford:
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The best general survey of this period is Beverly Hooper's China Stands Up (1986).
Hooper's work provides studies of the experiences of various groups of Britons, including
businessmen, missionaries and diplomats. For Hooper, two main goals drove the CCP's
policy making: these were the assertion of Chinese nationalism in the face of imperialism and
the transformation of Chinese society along Marxist-Leninist lines. This transformation
would, of necessity, preclude the survival of Western business interests in China.ss
The prospect of the return of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997 saw increased interest in
Shanghai after 1949 as scholars sought a comparison. Several books were published on the
subject. These works focused largely on diplomatic history and international relations,
approached from a British perspective. They maintained a particular emphasis on the
implications of diplomatic policies on Sino-British trade and on the position of large British
companies in China. David Clayton argued in Imperialism Revisited (1997) that the British
desire to maintain control over Hong Kong was a central factor in their policy-making
regarding China. After America decided on its policy of supporting Taiwan, Sino-British
relations were sacrificed in order to preserve good Anglo-American relations. Drawing on the
model of empire posited by P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, Clayton argued that there was a
'wider symbiosis of interest' between businessmen and policy-makers beyond this immediate
conflict of interest. The retention of Hong Kong allowed many of these businesses to
continue their trade with China in the long term.86
In China, Britain and Businessmen: Political and Commercial Relations, 1949-57 (1991)
Wenguang Shao offered an interpretation of the CCP's policies towards foreign business that
challenged Thompson's 'hostage capitalism' hypothesis. Shao argued that the CCP did not
set out to nationalise or expropriate foreign firms following the founding of the PRC. Instead,
they went to great lengths to prevent foreign capital, equipment and personnel from leaving.
Their priority was to revitalise the economy. An impossible situation was created for British
businesses by: the slowness with which policy towards them was decided; central
government control over trade and foreign exchange; deflationary measures; and a great deal
of labour unrest. All this encouraged them to quit China. Korean War-era international trade
8S Beverley Hooper, China Stands Up; Ending the Western Presence, 1948-1950 (London: Allen & Unwin,
1986), pp. 2-4.
86 David Clayton, Imperialism Revisited: Political and Economic Relations Between Britain and China, 1950-54
(Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with King's College, London: New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), pp.
123- 138, 199-208.
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restrictions sealed the decision. A desire to protect the economy and prevent sudden mass
closures meant that the Chinese authorities prolonged this process for as long as possible. The
CCP was acting in. a cautious and pragmatic way, rather than in a rash and politically-
motivated one.87 James Tuck-Hong Tang argued similarly in his Britain's Encounter with
Revolutionary China, 1949-54 (1992) that although the CCP sought to establish a
revolutionary state, they were more concerned with being recognised as the legitimate rulers
of that state than with overturning the current structure of international relations."
Between them Shao, Tang and Clayton have provided an excellent summation of the
international diplomatic and economic factors that shaped Sino-British relations in this period.
It could be argued, however, that international relations studies such as these posit an overly
narrow definition of Sino-British relations. There were always two spheres of Sino-British
interaction: one took place at the level of nations, treaties, trade and diplomacy, and the other
took place at a physical level within China.89
The withdrawal of the British has been portrayed as occurring almost in isolation from this
domestic Chinese context. Deprived of Chinese archival materials, successive Western
scholars have perhaps presented what could best be termed 'top down' narratives of events
based on archival materials created by British diplomats and businessmen. These accounts
have been augmented in some of this literature by the use of high-level announcements,
official publications and newspapers from China. These official sources present a very clean-
cut narrative. Contemporary English language accounts recycled established notions about
the inscrutability and cruelty of the Chinese and applied them to the Communists. They
appear as rather one-dimensional characters, radical ideologues who managed simultaneously,
to be both devious and calculating Orientals, and childlike, ignorant xenophobes.Y The CCP
are written about as if they were an omnipotent force, and as if they had a secret master-plan
for eradicating the foreign business presence, which they did not. The reality demonstrated in
the archival sources is much more complicated. The Communists also appear much more
87 Shao Wenguang, China, Britain and Businessmen: Political and Commercial Relations, 1949-57
(Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with St. Antony's College, Oxford, 1991), pp. 178-180.
88 James Tuck-Hong Tang, Britain's encounter with revolutionary China, 1949-54 (Basingstoke: Macmillan
Press, 1992), pp. 1-4,67-8,95-6,192,198-201.
89 Bickers, Britain in China, p. 68; Robert A. Bickers, 'Review: Imperialism Revisited: Political and Economic
Relations between Britain and China, 1950-54 by David Clayton,' The Journal of Asian Studies, No. 57, No.4
(November 1998), pp. 1115-1116.
90 Arthur H. Smith, Chinese Characteristics (Edinburgh; London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier, 1906).
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purposeful, organised, and efficient than they actually were. Chinese actions are often
ascribed simply to anti-imperialist fervour or xenophobic spite. Although the ultimate aim
was indeed to squeeze the foreigners out, policy on the ground was formed through a mixture
of experimentation, ideology and pragmatism.
Both Western and Chinese accounts of this period have presented a narrative that is too
simplistic; a sense of the real complexity of the times is lost. The new and unprecedented
degree of access to Chinese archives means that we can now approach the elimination of
British interests in Shanghai 'from the ground up.' It is now possible to build a multilayered
account using both British and Chinese sources, starting at the factory or street level and
using this as the foundation for building a local, national and international history. We can
approach the issue from the Chinese side, within a framework that takes into account the
domestic Chinese context. From the archival record, we can see that the CCP were much less
well-organised than has previously been assumed. Their resources were limited: they lacked
manpower, skills and resources and were daunted by the task that faced them. Rather than
simply being radical ideologues, we can see that the CCP adopted a patient and pragmatic
approach to dealing with the remaining foreign presence in Shanghai. This is not only a
useful insight in the field of Sino-British relations, but it also informs our overall conception
of the CCP in the early years of the PRC. They remade Shanghai and they remade China, but
they were cautious in approach because they were aware of their own limitations.
Chapter structure
The first chapter of this thesis focuses on the build up to the CCP's takeover of Shanghai,
examining the interplay between the CCP's foreign and domestic policies. At first the CCP
avoided contact with foreigners, and refused to recognise the status of foreign diplomatic
personnel, employing what Mao termed 'the diplomacy of free hands.' Having 'free hands'
meant that the Communists could dictate the nature of all interactions with foreigners.
Foreign policy was tied closely to domestic policy. As they sought to overcome economic
instability and install themselves firmly in China's major cities, they aimed to preserve the
status quo. Chinese capitalists were co-opted. Despite the fact that Mao professed a wish to
'sweep the house clean' of foreigners, for the time being CCP leaders talked of using
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'guerrilla warfare' to eliminate their foreign and Chinese urban enemies, to annihilate them
step by step, instead of fighting a costly 'war of annihilation. ,91
Foreign businesses were not immediately confiscated. In fact, they were promised protection
and support as long as they obeyed the law. Here the case of the Kailuan Mining
,Administration near Tianjin is used to demonstrate the pressures that British businesses were
placed under before the takeover of Shanghai. The leadership's planned moderation did not
always translate into policy at the ground level. Local cadres often acted much more radically
than was planned. The CCP used the experience of taking over Tianjin and of dealing with
Kailuan as a model for Shanghai. They learnt that pragmatism and realism were needed in
order to maintain economic stability. Revolutionary transformation and nationalist assertion
would have to wait. The chapter then moves on to examine the seizure of Shanghai and the
establishment of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department, the government office which
would deal with all matters that related to foreigners. Through exploring the path of the
Shanghai FAD we can gain insights into who the CCP officials were and into the difficulties
they faced.
Chapter Two addresses the cultural transformation of Shanghai. In the period after the CCP
takeover, the Guomindang bombed and blockaded the city seeking to strangle its import-
export based economy. It is argued that dealing with foreigners, while a sensitive and difficult
issue, was actually a secondary concern for the CCP compared with the challenges of
building a new municipal administration, ensuring public order and combating inflation and
unemployment. In March 1949, Mao had warned his Party about the dangers of victory
saying that after the war was won enemies without guns would try to use 'sugar-coated
bullets' to subvert the revolution.Y In order to consolidate the revolution, the cultural
influence of the imperialists had to be eradicated. The takeover marked the birth of 'New
Shanghai.' 'Old Shanghai' was vilified, as was everything belonging to it; the people and the
places as well as the city's social, political and economic milieu. 'Old Shanghai' was an
imperialist, capitalist and immoral city. 'New Shanghai' was to be a workers' paradise;
91 Chen Yi, Zhou Lin guanyu ru cheng hou ge fangmian zhengce wenti de fayan jilu gao [Minutes of speeches by
Chen Yi and Zhou Lin regarding certain policy issues], 10-11/5/49, Shanghai Shi Danganguan (Bian) [Shanghai
Municipal Archives (ed.)], Shanghai Jiefang, pp. 259-268.
92 Mao Zedong, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China,' 5/3/49 in Selected Works, Vol. IV., pp. 361-75.
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independent, productive, moral, orderly and socialist.93 The policies of the CCP towards
foreigners are explored in this chapter with a focus on their policies before and after the
establishment of the People's Republic in October 1949. The question of how to treat
foreigners was a sensitive one. When given the opportunity, the CCP made great propaganda
out of publically chastising foreign 'imperialists' and 'reactionaries' who had not yet realised
that they could no longer act with immunity because Shanghai now belonged to the Chinese.
Foreign newspapers, hospitals, religious organisations and educational institutions were
tolerated until the CCP were in a position to take them over or close them down. With the
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the elimination of these organisations accelerated. More
.subtle cultural influences were also targeted.
Eliminating foreign business concerns was a much more difficult prospect. The situation
faced by British businesses after 1949 is the subject of Chapter Three. Although many
smaller businesses were permitted to close soon after the takeover, the majority of the larger
firms either decided to stay on, or were unable to leave. There was a reasonably long period
in which British businesses remained in Communist Shanghai. What was Shanghai like at
this time and how were British businesses treated? The chapter begins with an overview of
the remaining British population and a discussion of how their lives changed under
Communism. It then moves on to explore Chinese policy towards British businesses. The
CCP's policy was to 'restrict' and 'control' foreign companies, following the same general
line applied to Chinese companies. They adopted a policy of 'squeezing' foreign businesses
in order to pressure them into submission and to break their hold on certain sectors of the
economy. The CCP-controlled unions mobilised labour against the foreign management and
their high-ranking Chinese staff. Foreign firms were not permitted to close, or to discharge
their surplus workforces for fear of mass unemployment. Various means were employed to
deny them profits, burden them with punitive tax demands, and to force them into running up
large debts. They did not intend at first to pressure them into closing, but rather desired to
keep them running so as to prevent unemployment and to acquire much-needed revenue
through taxation.
93 Chiara Betta, 'The (Re)Shaping of the Jiu (Old)- Xin (New) Shanghai Dichotomy: Foreign Devils, Urban
Myths and Popular Writings,' (Unpublished: Paper to be presented at the annual meeting of the American
Association of Chinese Studies, San Francisco, 28-30 October 2000); Chiara Betta, "Myth and Memory:
Chinese Portrayal of Hardoon, Luo Jialing and the Aili Garden between 1924 and 1995." inRoman Malek and
Sankt Augustin (eds.), Jews in China; From Kaifeng to Shanghai (Nettetal, Germany, Steyler Verlag,
Monumenta Serica, 2000). pp. 375-400. .
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The chapter then goes on to focus on the CCP's efforts to establish control over workers
within foreign factories. There were two main ways of doing this: through union work (such
as mediating in labour disputes) and through mass campaigns. They had to balance a need to
gain the support of the workers and claim revolutionary legitimacy, while also trying to
prevent overt leftism and keep factories running. It is argued that political campaigns were
carried out in a more restrained fashion in foreign businesses than in Chinese ones.
Campaigns such as the Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea and the Five Antis anti-
corruption campaign were used as 'tools' with which to pressure foreigners. Foreign
managers were subject to assaults, threats and other forms of worker action, but in general
they suffered much less than their Chinese counterparts and Chinese assistants. These
'running dogs of imperialism' were trapped between two worlds, the Chinese and the foreign.
Chapter Four moves on to discuss the events of 1952 when the CCP expropriated a number of
foreign businesses and began allowing others to close. After three years of uncertainty and
hostility, a high-level meeting was called by the CCP leadership in Beijing in the spring of
1952 to make a final decision on how to handle the remaining British companies in Shanghai.
Some leaders argued that the foreigners should be chased out as soon as possible, but they
lost out to those with a more long-term vision. The CCP were indeed intent on taking these
foreign companies' assets, but they went about this in a calculated and pragmatic way,
combining their radicalism with a cool-headed appraisal of the damage that would be done to
the Chinese economy if they took over British businesses too quickly. Companies they
wished to keep in China were encouraged and their eventual takeovers were postponed. The
policy of squeeze was adapted to deal with those which worked to the government's
disadvantage, or which were not needed. They were pressured into handing over their assets.
In all cases consideration of wider problems in the city and throughout China came first;
economic stability was paramount. This chapter then goes on to examine the circumstances
surrounding the takeovers of two British companies: the British Tram Company and the
Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company, to explore how the CCP approached the takeover
of such companies. The absolute priority of the takeover teams was to maintain production
and to ensure stable handovers.
The processes by which the majority of the larger British firms were actually able to close are
detailed in Chapter Five. Very few were actually expropriated: instead they were 'squeezed'
until they could no longer function. The majority realised that they had no future. Foreign
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businesses were denied permission to be legally sold or closed. They were then left with only
one option: to offer a Chinese Government organisation all of their assets against all their
liabilities. In this way, the CCP were able to take over a large amount of foreign-owned
property and capital, while ensuring the stability of Shanghai's economy. They had adopted a
very clever strategy for dealing with this takeover process from a position of relative
weakness. Through their policies of 'squeeze' and of forcing transfers of assets, the CCP
were able to control the pace of the British withdrawal so as to minimise its effect on the
country's economy. These transfers of assets were voluntary in nature and so the prospects
for future compensation claims were minimal. This was the end of a period of Sino-British
interaction that had lasted for over a hundred years. Several of the larger trading firms were
able to switch from a pattern of trade in China to trade with China via Hong Kong, but others
with large fixed assets lost everything. Examples of various types of firms, from large trading
establishments to smaller companies are used to illustrate the fact that there was great
diversity in the experiences of foreign firms as they moved towards takeovers. This all took
place within a shifting international environment following the Geneva Conference of 1954,
and against the backdrop of the transition to socialism in China.
Policy towards British businesses evolved over time and was shaped by the CCP's limited
resources. Their long-term goals were revolutionary and transformative, but they went about
achieving them in a pragmatic manner and with a focus on short-term economic stability. In
May 1949, this was all to come however. Communist cadres would march into the city
through its tree-lined, European-style boulevards, past English language adverts on foreign-
looking buildings, to take up their posts as the new socialist masters of this foreign-
influenced, compromised and suspect city. One question loomed large: what would become
of Shanghai under the Communists? It was a question that bore great significance,·for if
Shanghai was to be treated well, then surely so would its inhabitants be: the capitalists, both
Chinese and foreign, as well as the masses of urbanites of various social statuses. If, however,
Shanghai was to be reviled and punished for its former excesses, then the city and its
inhabitants would have to be remade anew, and there would be little hope for British
businesses.
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Figure 3: The Chinese People's Anny passes by the Park Hotel, West Nanking Road, May
1949
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Chapter 1: The 'Liberation' of Shanghai
The development of CCP foreign policy
As nationwide victory approached, the CCP became increasingly aware of the scale of the
task they faced. Simply to build the apparatus of a new state and stabilise China's economy
would require great efforts. Before any transition to socialism could take place there would
be a period of 'New Democracy' in which a more moderate policy would be followed in
order to unite the populace behind a broad set of nationalistic state-building goals.' Foreign
policy followed a similar course: long-term aims based on ideological goals, such as the
eradication of foreign influence in China, had to be approached in a more pragmatic manner.
Short-term stability was prioritised.
This chapter examines the concurrent development of the CCP's foreign policy and urban
policy over the period leading up to the takeover of Shanghai. Firstly the CCP'spolicy of
having 'free hands' in diplomacy is examined in the context of their relationships with Britain,
the USA and the Soviet Union in the lead-up to the takeover of the city. The chapter then
goes on to discuss their policies towards foreign nationals and foreign businesses encountered
in newly occupied areas. When they seized control of the area around Tianjin the CCP had to
decide on a policy towards the enormous, British-owned Kailuan Mining Administration. The
policies developed in regard to Kailuan directly informed those later employed in Shanghai.
The final part of the chapter examines the seizure of Shanghai with a focus on British reasons
for staying put and on the processes involved in the takeover from the point of view of the
Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department.
At the end of the Pacific War in 1945 it had seemed as though a revived Guomindang, backed
by the USA, would reassert its control over the Chinese mainland.' As relations between
America and the Soviet Union deteriorated after 1946 so did prospects for peace in China.'
While advocating peace talks between the Guomindang and CCP the Americans continued to
provide huge amounts of munitions and economic aid to the Guomindang, undermining their
1 Mao, 'On New Democracy,' pp. 338-84.
2 Lloyd E. Eastman, 'Who Lost China? Chiang Kai-shek Testifies,' The China Quarterly, No. 88 (Dec., 1981),
p.658.
Xiang Lanxin, Recasting the Imperial Far East: Britain and America in China, 1945-1950 (London: M.E.
Sharpe, 1995), pp. 73-4.
39
credibility with the CCP. By November 1948 the US had granted aid worth US$114,504,811
through the Economic Cooperation Administration and US$110,835,605 of military aid." The
.American role in China was characterised by the Department of State in October 1948 as
follows:
For a century American interest in China has been motivated mostly by trade and idealism. Our
idealism has manifested itself in evangelism, advocacy of the American way of life and sympathy for
China as a perennial international under-dog. S
From the CCP's point of view however, American influence was not so benign. In August
1949 Mao described America's relationship with China as one of self-interest. The Chinese
Civil War, Mao argued, was a 'war to turn China into a US colony, a war in which the United
States of America supplies the money and guns and Chiang Kai-shek the men to fight for the
United States and slaughter the Chinese people'. 6
In September 1946 Mao declared that US mediation was nothing but 'a smoke-screen',"
Mao's secretary Hu Qiaomu recalled that it was in 1946 that the CCP came to view US
imperialism as the main threat to China's independence.f Mao now envisioned the world as
being divided into 'two camps' (liang ge zhenying, r».i1'~$~). China was one of many
countries occupying the 'middle zone' (zhongjian didai, ~ fB] ttl!m). He argued that the
'middle' countries should not have to compromise their own independence to prevent
conflicts between the two super powers."
4 Xiang, Recasting, p. 74; The Peiping Chronicle, 'ECA Aid to China Tops $114 Million,' 9111148, '5000 Tons
Arms Leave For China,' 15/11148.
S National Archives and Records Administration [NARA] RG 84, Box 37, United States Policy Toward China;
A Report to the National Security Council by the Department of State, 13/10/48.
6 Mao, 'Farewell, Leighton Stuart!' pp. 433-40.
1Mao, 'The Truth About U.S. "Mediation" and the Future of the Civil War in China; Talk with the American
Correspondent A. T. Steele,' September 29, 1946, Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 109-111.
8 Hu Qiaomu, Hu Qiaomu Huiyi Mao Zedong [Hu Qiaomu Recalls Mao Zedong] (Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe
[People's Press], 1994), pp. 92-3; Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 26; Mao, 'Talk With the American
Correspondent Anna Louise Strong,' August, 1946 in Selected Works, Vol. IV, pp. 97-101.
9 Mao, 'Some Points in Appraisal of the Present International Situation,' April, 1946 in Selected Works, Vol. IV,
pp. 87-88; Zhang Baijia, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao Jangzhen de xingcheng he shishi' [The Development and
Implementation of New China's Foreign Policy]' in Guo Dehong, Hong Heguang, Han Gang (Zhu bian),
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhuanti shigao (Juan Yij, kaiguo chuangye 1949-1956 [Manuscripts on Specific
Topics in the History of the People's Republic of China, Book 1, Establishment and Beginnings 1949-1956]
(Chengdu: Sichuan Renmin Chubanshe [Sichuan People's Press], 2004), pp. 24-25.
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The 'diplomacy of free hands'
The CCP were largely left to themselves when deciding their future foreign policy. In the
years leading up to the CCP's victory in 1949 the two global superpowers, the USA and the
USSR, were reluctant to involve themselves directly in China. This gave the CCP more
freedom to act than they might otherwise have enjoyed. 10
The Guomindang won several early victories in the civil war but the tide began to turn in late
1947. By mid 1948 the Guomindang seemed to be in a state of utter collapse as the corruption,
inefficiency and factionalism that had always been present in the movement finally span out
of control. Shanghai was the centre of the storm; inflationary spirals with their roots in the
Pacific War triggered hunger, mass protests and growing disillusionment.l ' Inflation, and
their inability to control it, caused the Guomindang first their legitimacy and later the war.12
In the spring and summer of 1948 several Western governments began sounding out the
CCP.13 Such overtures were welcomed in principle but the CCP gave no concrete replies.
Foreign diplomatic personnel in the 'liberated areas' were only recognised in their capacity as
individuals, not as the representatives of their governments. This 'non-recognition' (bu
chengren, 1'~iA) policy was designed to keep the CCP an unknowable quantity and to
allow them freedom of manoeuvre; Mao described this as 'the diplomacy of free hands.'
They were not constrained, as a recognised government would have been. The Chinese told
the Soviets that relations with capitalist countries had to 'be such that at any time we could
change our point of view in the interests of the revolution.' 14 Being unknowable meant that
they could not be manipulated. Future Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai often talked about the
importance of being in the position of zhudong (3:iiJJ), meaning in the position of advantage,
deciding policy, in contrast to being beidong (t~iiJJ), literally, 'being moved,' and having to
react to the policies of others. The CCP's policy of having 'free hands' meant that they could
remain secretive, keep their intentions hidden and act effectively despite being in a position
·10 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao, 'pp. 24-27.
11 For a vivid personal account of inflation and the last days of the old Shanghai see Norman B. Hannah,
Shanghai; 'The Last of the Good Old Days,' Asian Affairs, Vol. 2, No.3 (Jan. - Feb., 1975), pp. 179-191;
Hannah tells of one American banker turning up at a costume ball wearing a suit 'fashionably tailored from
Chinese 100,000 yuan notes.'
12 Chang, The Inflationary Spiral, pp. 36, 78-85, 115; Arthur N. Young, China's Wartime Finance and Inflation,
1937-1945 (Cambridge Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1965); pp. 327-8.
13 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 26-27.
14 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin], 13/4/49.
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of relative weakness. Their policy was to be based on an underlying hostility towards foreign
influence in China but the 'diplomacy of free hands' gave the impression that the CCP may
be undecided as to their future."
Throughout the civil war period the CCP's policy towards Britain and America had been to
'to move one's mouth but not one's hands' (dong kou bu dong shou, ~D:if'~-¥). Their
rhetoric was violent but their actions were generally cautious. After the capture of Shenyang
in November 1948, contact with larger numbers of foreigners could not be avoided and it
became necessary to translate their broad foreign policy into an administrative reality on the
ground. The new Communist Mayor of Shenyang in the northeast had been severely
criticised by the Central Committee because he had communicated with the US, British and
French consuls when the city was taken over, conferring a form of de facto recognition. On
the 10th November Zhou Enlai telegrammed the Party's North Eastern Bureau, instructing
them strictly to follow the 'non-recognition' strategy.i'' A few days later Mao ordered Gao
Gang (~rxl), who was the CCP's highest official in the northeast, to do everything he could
to make Western consular personnel leave Shenyang. Rather than simply expelling the
foreigners, an inhospitable environment would be created to encourage them to decide to
leave themselves.V
The next day, all radio transmitters were seized from foreign consulates. IS The American
Consul General Angus Ward refused to hand over the Consulate's radio equipment and as a
consequence the entire US consular staff was placed under house arrest. Charges of
espionage were levelled against several of them." On 23rd November Zhou Enlai urged
restraint. He told local cadres that although the Party was indeed hostile towards Western
imperialism, the current policy was only designed to give the CCP the upper hand. Cadres
should show restraint because in the future the Communists might consider establishing
relations with Western powers.j"
IS Mao, 'Carry the Revolution Through to the End,' 30/12/48 inSelected Works, Vol. IV. pp. 299-307.
16 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 27-29.
17 Chen Jian, 'The Myth of America's "Lost Chance" in China: A Chinese Perspective in Light of New
Evidence,' Diplomatic History, Vol. 21, No.1 (Winter 1997), pp. 78, 82.
18 Ibid., pp. 78, 82.
19 Herbert W. Briggs, 'American Consular Rights in Communist China' in The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 44, No.2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 243-246.
20 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 27-29.
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The arrests served their purpose and in May 1949 the State Department made clear their
intention to close the Shenyang consulate. The Americans complained that their staff had
been denied adequate food, water and sanitation. Ward was informed in June that he and his
staff could leave, but a scuffle with a Chinese former member of staff led to the re-arrest of
Ward and four others for assault. A letter of protest from the US Consul General was ignored
by Zhou. In November the remaining consular personnel were tried, found guilty and
deported on Z?OU'S orders.21 The Shenyang model of non-recognition and hostile treatment
was replicated throughout China_22
The CCP's hostility to the Western powers was part of a wider policy which included
courting the Soviet Union. The CCP's relationship with the Soviets was a turbulent one
which had so far proved quite underwhelming. As Christian Hess's study of Sino-Soviet
relations in the port of Dalian in the early 1950s has demonstrated, relations between the two
powers were often distinctly uneasy.23 Since the CCP's foundation in 1921 numerous tactical
errors had been committed on the advice of Comintern agents. Stalin preferred the idea of a
united China to a revolutionary China and had consistently pushed the CCP towards
compromise with the Guomindang.i" Nevertheless, the Soviet model of fast industrial growth
under the aegis of a strong Party-state based on egalitarian values was very appealing,
especially to groups such as the CCP who had bad memories of dealing with Western
governments and business interests. 25 Communist revolutionaries of all countries were
inspired by the 1917 October Revolution and by the idea of internationalism. The interests of
national Communist parties were indivisible from those of the world revolution. Communist
movements across the world professed their loyalty to Moscow and to Stalin and were guided
by the Cominform. The Chinese were no different. 26
In 1948 Yugoslavia had broken away from the Soviet camp. This caused a crisis that
threatened to break the unity of the Communist bloc. The following year saw changes of
21 Zhou Enlai, 'Guanyu chuli Meijiandie an gei Dongbeiju de dianbao' [Telegram to North Eastern Bureau on
resolving the American spy case], Zhou Enlai, Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Zhongyang
Danganguan bian, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, di yi ce, 1949 nian 6 yue - 1949 nian 12 yue [Zhou Enlai's
Manuscripts Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China, Vol. 1, June 1949 to December 1949]
(Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian Chubanshe [Central Documents Publishing House], 2008), pp. 30-33.
22 Briggs, 'American Consular Rights,' pp. 243-6.
23 Hess, 'Big Brother is Watching,' Dilemmas of Victory, pp. 160-183.
24 Xiang, Recasting, pp. 156-7.
25 Darwin, After Tamerlane, pp. 473-4.
26 Hobsbawm, Revolutionaries, pp. 4-7.
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leadership in many Eastern European countries as the Soviets sought to remove those who
deviated from Moscow's policies. Even leaders who had been directly appointed by Moscow,
like Gomulka in Poland and Kostov in Bulgaria, were removed from power.27 Like Josip
Broz Tito's Yugoslavian guerrillas, the CCP did not owe their victory to Soviet support and
this made Stalin wary.28 As the Chinese attempted to demonstrate their loyalty, their attitude
towards Western powers hardened."
At the tum of the year 1948-1949 the Communist armies carried out three massive campaigns
in north China (the Liaoning-Shenyang, Huaihai and Beijing-Tianjin campaigns), effectively
destroying the Guomindang armies north of the Yangzi River.30 Relations between the
Chinese Communists and the Soviets reached their nadir in January 1949 when Stalin had
tried to force a negotiated political solution to the Chinese Civil War just as the CCP were
poised to deal the death blow to the Guomindang's armies." Stalin realised that he had
miscalculated and had gravely underestimated the CCP's potential to win power. He sent his
problem-solver, Politburo member Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, to Beijing to meet with the
Chinese leadership. The Vice Chairman of the CCP Liu Shaoqi paid a return visit to Moscow
in July 1949. Stalin apologised to Liu for his prior attitude towards the Chinese
Communists.Y
After the war was won, the CCP would set up a new national government. The CCP realised
that Western powers might choose this moment to confer recognition in an attempt to enter
into diplomatic relations. They needed to decide on a response. At a Politburo meeting in
January 1949, Mao said:
.. .it is not necessary to blindly rush to recognise the imperialists. We want to overthrow them, not
to recognise them[.] If we wish to have relations in the future we can consider this but there is no
need to hurry, the only hurry is to establish relations with the USSR and Democratic Countries.33
27 David Thomson, Europe since Napo/eon (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., ih edition 1972), pp. 830-
834.
28 Xiang, Recasting, pp. 140-169.
29 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 27-29.
30 Westad, Decisive Encounters, pp. 181-214; CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, Report on the 22 May CCP CC
Politburo Discussion, 23/5/49.
31 Xiang, Recasting, pp. 156-7.
32 Lorenz M. Luthi, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton, N.J.; Oxford:
Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 29-30; Chen Jian, China's Road to the Korean War: the making of the
Sino-American confrontation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 69-78.
33 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' p. 29.
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'Non-recognition,' said Mao to Mikoyan, 'unties our hands in relations with states' and
'gives us an opportunity to take a firmer grasp.' Recognition would only allow Western
powers to secure their vested interests in China and gain leverage over the CCp.34 It was in a
meeting with Mikoyan that Mao first used the analogy of 'sweeping the house clean':
The big house that is old China has been made too dirty, too chaotic by Western imperialism, it
needs to be swept earnestly and thoroughly, only after the house has been swept clean can we
. .. t 3Sinvtte ill gues s.
After the Politburo meeting, the Party's 'Directive on Foreign Affairs Work' (Guanyu
Waijiao Gongzuo de Zhishi, *T$'I'~I11:B~~~7F),written by Zhou Enlai and revised by
Mao was distributed. This document reaffirmed the 'non-recognition' policy and introduced
the new policy of 'lingqi luzao' (~~~~±) or 'starting a new kitchen' which stated that the
CCP did not recognise any treaties signed, or privileges conferred, by previous governments.
These two policies were aimed at beginning China's foreign affairs again from scratch on a
'foundation of equality, mutual interest and mutual respect for territorial sovereignty'
(pingdeng, huli huxiang zunzhong lingtu zhuquanjichu shang, ~~B:*IJB:*I~Uf£~Yi±;E*.R
~:PtfLt). They believed that this was the only way that they could get rid of the imbalance of
power and the vested interests that were left over from the former 'semi-colonial' state of
affairs.36 Equality in foreign affairs was considered crucial to the success of the revolution."
In June 1949 a third policy was added to form a triumvirate that remained at the core of
China's foreign policies for years to come. Mao's new confidence in the Sino-Soviet
relationship led to the announcement of the policy of 'leaning to one side' (yi bian dao, -Ul,
1i~).'Leaning to one side' meant allying closely with the USSR. In his speech he evoked the
story of Wu Song (ftt*~), one of the heroes of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) classic The
Outlaws of the Marsh (Shuihu zhuan, 7.l<WF1t). Wu Song had slain a tiger with his bare hands
34 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3111149.
3SZhang Hanfu zhuan bian xie zu, Zhang Hanfu zhuan [Biography of Zhang Hanfu] (Shijie zhishi chubanshe
[World Knowledge Press], 2003), pp. 142-3; (Jiu Zhongguo zhejian da wuzi, bei Xifang diguozhuyijinlai gao
de tai zang tai luan, xuyao renzhen chedi de dasao, da sao wan wuzi cai neng qingke rna, 18 t:j:I ~~1!f*~T.
*t~1:i*I!l~)(jlB1~t~m;tJ1J.tt:!L.f,W:t:iAAf*JJJtU~tH::l.nt::l7t~T;;t~Ei~~R').
36Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 23, 29.
37Chen, 'Lost Chance,' p. 85.
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while alone at night on Jingyang Ridge (~~~). Mao stressed that the CCP had to take a
stance against foreign, especially American, imperialists; 'the tiger ... was a man-eater,
whether irritated or not. Either kill the tiger or be eaten by him - one or the other. ,38 CCP
leader Bo Yibo (ni-~&:)later recalled that the USSR's support was a great reassurance to the
CCP, 'a giant standing behind our backs' .39
As the PLA advanced southwards, more foreign citizens and property came under their
control. The CCP had resolved as early as 1928 to nationalise foreign property in China, and
in 1949 it would perhaps have been a simple matter to announce the nationalisation of foreign
assets. Unfortunately, Mao informed Mikoyan, foreign capital was such an integral a part of
the Chinese economy that the CCP needed to take a very cautious approach to eliminating
it.40 Rash action might cause military or economic retaliation, the immediate burning of
diplomatic bridges and claims for compensation. In February 1949 Mikoyan suggested to
Zhou Enlai that the CCP should nationalise all foreign property except for American property,
as the Americans were the only ones that could realistically retaliate. Zhou replied that they
did not intend to nationalise anything for the time being." Their policy of elimination would
be a long-term one that fitted their aim of preserving short term economic stability, in order
to help reconstruct China's shattered economy.
Zhou went on to outline the CCP's future foreign policy to Mikoyan: The lives and property
of foreigners would be protected but foreign diplomatic personnel would not be recognised
and therefore would not be allowed to continue their activities. They would then be pressured
to leave the country. All foreign newspapers and journals publishing within China would be
closed. The entry of foreigners into China would be restricted and all foreign organisations
'including missionary organisations, hospitals, schools, cultural and scientific institutions,
foreign aid organisations' would be registered with a view to 'controlling and limiting their
activities.' Excess land belonging to foreign churches would be confiscated and foreigners
who broke the law or who were suspected of espionage would be deported or gaoled. Control
would be asserted over China's customs organisation and foreign ships would be denied
38 Mao, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship'; see also Niu Jun, 'The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance'
in Odd Arne Westad, (ed.), Brothers in Arms; The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963
(Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 1998), pp. 65-67.
39 Bo Yibo, Ruogan, pp. 35-45.
40 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3111149.
41 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 112/49.
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access to China's inland waterways. It had also been decided, Zhou said, to 'establish control
over foreign enterprises, banks and their accounting and in case of their breaching established
laws, to make them bear responsibility, even as far as closing [them] down.'42
Policy towards foreign businesses
With the conquest of north China all but complete, further key decisions had to be taken
regarding external foreign policy and internal foreign affairs policy. These policies were
ultimately decided within the broader context of China's domestic situation, alongside the
takeover of its large cities. The takeover of 'new areas' and large cities were sources of much
anxiety for the CCP.43Mao warned that he did not want to be like Li Zicheng (~~ ~), the
shepherd turned emperor who overthrew the Ming Dynasty only to be quickly deposed
himself. Li's ill-disciplined troops had sacked Beijing and had won few supporters amongst
the people.44When the PLA seized Luoyang O!~E)in April 1948, Mao took the opportunity
to denounce the Party's past radicalism. In Luoyang, peasant organisations were not to be
allowed into the city, workers' wages and working hours were not to be changed and
everything should be planned 'on a long-term basis.' Mao's Luoyang telegram became
required reading on urban policy along with his (equally moderate) 'Policy on Industry and
Commerce' (February 1948).45
As early as 1946 the CCP had been concerned about overt leftism in the 'liberated areas'
which had eradicated private enterprises and had placed a severe drain on the economy as
private initiative had been stifled.46 Before Beijing and Tianjin were captured Mao told Bo
Yibo of the North China Bureau that when the cities were taken, only 'bureaucratic capital'
42 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 112/49.
. 43 See for example Xi Zhongxun's (3J1Ij:rWl) report to Mao on problems encountered in northwest China in
which Xi wrote that although they had worked hard, studied the issues and sent out many experienced cadres not
a few mistakes had already been made when executing policy due to their unfamiliarity with local conditions
(for instance they had been expecting the peasants in these areas to be living in 'wretched poverty' (qiongkun,
~m) with 'no means to carry on living' iwufa shenghuo xiaqu, 7C5t;~)!1',*) but they were actually
relatively well-off) SMA D2-0-2085-46, Guanyu Xin Qu Gongzuo Wenti gei Mao Zhuxi de Baogao [Report to
Chairman Mao on the Problems of Working in the 'New Areas'], 1517148.
#Gao,lfangzhou,p.39.
45 Gao, lfangzhou, pp. 12-16, see also Mao, 'Telegram to the Headquarters of the Luoyang Front After the
Recapture of the City,' 8/4/48, in Selected Works, Vol. 4, pp. 247-9; Mao, 'On the Policy Concerning Industry
and Commerce,' 27/2/48, in Selected Works, Vol. 4, pp. 203-205.
46 William Hinton, Fanshen; A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village (Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1972, first published 1966), p. 259. .
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(guanliao ziben, ~f~~*) should be taken over. This meant enterprises operated by the
Guomindang state and the 'four big families' who were Republican China's political and
economic elite.47 Other capitalists, the 'national capitalist class' (minzu zibenjieji, ~~~*
~fl'~), should be helped to re-open their enterprises and revive production. In effect, any
capitalist willing to cooperate could be considered a 'national capitalist. ,48 Mao had said of
. the bourgeoisie in 1926:
... their right wing may become our enemy and their left wing may become our friend but we must
be constantly on our guard and not let them create confusion within our ranks.49
As the PLA approached Beijing and Tianjin, foreigners crowded onto south-bound trains and
ships. Foreigners also began to leave Shanghai. 50 There were risks involved for the CCP in
taking large cities like Tianjin. They had little experience in urban administration. This is not
to say that they lacked knowledge of urban and economic issues. Liu Shaoqi, Bo Yibo and
Chen Yun (~*~) were very skilled in these areas. It was the implementation of policy at
ground level that would prove to be the problem. In order to manage the CCP's takeover of
urban areas better, Chen Yun recommended in December 1948 that 'special takeover groups'
(zhuanmenjieshou banzi, ~n1iq~I~IT)of twenty to thirty cadres be created.I' By the time
the CCP reached Shanghai they were able to draw on the experience already gained through
taking over a host of other large cities including Shenyang, Beijing, Tianjin, Jinan and
Xuzhou.s2
47 Zhonggong Tianjin Shi Wei dangshi yanjiu shi (bian), Chengshi de jieguan yu shehui gaizao; Tianjin juan
[Takeover of Cities and Social Reform: Volume on Tianjin] (Tianjin: Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe [Tianjin
People's Press], 1998), pp. 501-4; For more on the CCP and the 'four big families' see the head of the Ch'en
family's memoir; Ch'en, Li-fu, The Storm Clouds Clear Over China: the Memoir of Ch'en Li-fu, 1900-1993
(edited and compiled by Sidney H. Chang and Ramon H. Myers) (Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution Press,
1994), p. 214. For the takeover of nearly 50 'bureaucratic capital' financial organisations in Shanghai see Wu
Jingping, Zhang Xule, 'Jieguan Shanghai Guanliao zibenjinrongjigou shulun,' [Discussion of the Takeover of
Bureaucratic Capital Financial Organisations in Shanghai] Jindaishi yanjiu [Modem History Research]
(Shanghai: 2003, No.4), pp. 113-139.
48 Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 350-351.
49 Mao Zedong, 'Analysis of the Classes in Chinese Society,' March 1926, in Selected Works, Vol. I.
so 'Over Two Hundred Foreigners Leave Here For Shanghai,' The Peiping Chronicle, 17/11148; '183 US
Citizens Leave Tientsin in 2 American Ships,' The Peiping Chronicle, 20/11148; 'US Evacuees in Shanghai
Leave Aboard "Butner," The Peiping Chronicle, 24111148;The Peiping Chronicle, 27/11148
SI Bo, Ruogan, pp. 5-9; Gao, Hangzhou, pp. 18-19.
52 SMA B1I2/3658, Shanghai Waiqiao Shiwu Chu gongzuo zongjie (chugao) [Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department draft summary of work], May 1949 to March 1950; Speech given by Deng Xiaoping to
representatives of the new Political Consultative Conference 4/8/49 'Cong dujiang dao zhanling Shanghai'
[From Crossing the Yangzi to Occupying Shanghai] in Shanghai Jiefang, pp. 1-6; for an English translation see
Deng Xiaoping, 'From the Crossing of the Yangzi to the Capture of Shanghai,' 4/8/49, Selected Works ofDeng
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Figure 4: Tianjin street scene, 1930s-1940s
Perhaps the most important experience was the takeover of Tianjin. The city had long been
amongst the most important industrial and commercial centres in north China; it was the
gateway to Beijing and at one time had been home to no fewer than nine foreign concessions.
It was, perhaps, the Chinese city that most resembled Shanghai. The concessions had already
all been returned to Chinese rule, but what the new Mayor Huang Jing (jtfIDl:) described as
the 'semi-colonial nature' of the city was still reflected in Tianjin's classical European-style
boulevards and modem industrial areas, with nearly 5,000 industrial enterprises of varying.
sizes. 53 The lessons learnt in the takeover ofTianjin would be employed in Shanghai.
53 Minutes of a report given at the Tianjin Municipal Committee Enlarged Cadre Meeting by Mayor Huang Jing,
'Muqian xingshi he women de renwu' [The Present Situation and Our Tasks], 15/3/49 and 'Tianjin Shi
Gongshang Ju guanyu fu gong fu ye wenti de baogao' [Tianjin Municipal Bureau of Industry and Commerce
Summary of the Problem of Reviving Industry and Commerce] in Chengshi de Jieguan, pp. 82-90.
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The Kailuan Mining Administration
The largest of the 216 remaining foreign enterprises in Tianjin was the Kailuan Mining
Administration (KMA), which employed over 50,000 Chinese workers in its mines near
Tangshan, northeast of Tianjin.i" The KMA was the first large British interest (actually a
Sino-British joint venture) to come under CCP rule, and precedents set here were echoed in
Shanghai.f Coal from these mines was central to the running of China's economy: In 1947
70 per cent of all Shanghai's coal came from the KMA.56
As the PLA drew closer to the mines the KMA management were approached through
informal channels. They were promised that their lives and property would be protected as
long as they maintained production and prevented disorder or sabotage. 57 The banishment of
the corrupt Guomindang was welcomed at first by the company's managers but their early
optimism soon proved misplaced. A short time after the takeover north China's economy had
deteriorated rapidly; industry was not functioning, taxes were extortionate and no wealth was
being produced. Extraordinary taxes were imposed on the KMA to support the faltering
economy. The CCP-controlled labour unions stirred up KMA's workers against the
management. 'It is still just possible,' wrote Pryor, the chief manager, 'that these various
influences have run riot and have not been guided by higher policy against us. But I think
they have, and the result anyway is the same. ,58 The British Ambassador remarked that the
CCP were succumbing to 'the temptation of easy money by taxation even at the risk of killing
the industrial goose that lays the golden egg of urban prosperity.' 59 One Foreign Office
S4 The National Archives [TNA] FO 371175930, British coal mining interests in China: negotiations with the
communists concerning the Kailan Mining Administration, 1949; S.L. Burdett, Consul General, Tianjin to
Nanjing, No. 299, 1/8/49. The spelling 'Kailuan' is used here in the text as this is the correct pinyin
transliteration of the KMA's Chinese name, (7f;~). The KMA was referred to as 'Kailan' by foreigners at the
time; the figure 216 comes Chengshi de Jieguan, p. 479.
ss Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 112-114.
S6 Shanghai Jiefang, p. 487.
S7 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; negotiations with communists concerning the
Kailan Mining Administration, 1949; Consul General Burdett, Tianjin to Nanjing, Correspondence between the
[KMA] and the Communists with a view to preservation of property, No. 506, 22/12/49; Tangshan Municipality
Military Control Commission of the North-Eastern Liberation Army, to Mr. Wei, 5/12/48.
58 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to E.1. Nathan (Chinese Engineering
and Mining Company), April 1949; Nanjing to Foreign Office, No. 522, 27/4/49, forwarding paraphrased
message to Sir R. Stevenson Nanjing from W. Pryor, 26/4/49; Sir R. Stevenson, Nanjing to Foreign Office, No.
429, forwarding message from Tianjin, 12/4/49.
59 TNA FO 371175865, British Commercial Interests in China, 1949; Embassy Nanjing, to Scarlett, Foreign
Office, No. 232, 18/4/49.
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observer sounded a further note of caution, saying that running foreign enterprises out of
business through financial squeezing and penal taxation before taking them over was
'standard practice throughout the Soviet orbit.,6o
The vitriol of the workers was directed first towards the senior Chinese staff. These 'running
dogs of imperialism' made easy targets. One after another they all resigned or broke down.
Pryor observed that Tianjin's civil society figures were 'falling over themselves to embrace
the new faith or at any rate to pretend that they are doing so' and he had no doubt that the
senior Chinese KMA staff would 'do exactly as they are told.' 61In January and April 1949
over a hundred miners died because of ventilation problems. The Chinese management took
the blame for this. After one particularly long and heated meeting, Chief Administrator Wei
Tong (Wei Zhun, I9!n~)tendered his resignation, saying that he could 'do no good and it is
horrible to have to give way all the time.' The tone and composition of Wei's letter suggests a
once proud man who had been completely broken. His letter ended, 'I am sorry my mind is
too confused to write more.,62 Once enterprises were taken over compliant, broken men like
Wei would often be kept on and their skills put to use.
In 1947 the KMA had employed more than a hundred foreigners who were mostly British
administrators and Belgian technicians. By October 1949 this number had shrunk to less than
forty, and their numbers continued to decrease.f Foreign staff were subject to a great deal of
what Pryor termed 'mental worry and tiredness,' through 'constant struggling with stubborn
and ignorant officials. ,64
In July a British employee named Woithe, the superintendent of the Linxi (**il§') power
station, was badgered into attending a meeting with workers and union representatives where
60 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; Unsigned minute written on Nanjing to Foreign
Office, No. 522,27/4/49, forwarding paraphrased message to Sir R. Stevenson Nanjing from W. Pryor, 26/4/49.
61 TNA FO 371175930, British coal mining interests in China; Extracts of letter from W. Pryor to wife dated
5/4/49-7/4/49 enclosed in The Chinese Engineering & Mining Company, Ltd., London to Foreign Office, 2/5/49;
W. Pryor to EJ. Nathan, 3117149.
62 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; New China News Agency, Beijing, 7/4/49; W.
Pryor to E.J. Nathan (Chinese Engineering and Mining Company), April 1949; Wei Tong to W. Pryor, 6/4/49.
Wei Tong's resignation was not accepted.
63 TNA FO 371175930, British coal mining interests in China; 'Communists and the Kailan Mines,' The
Economist, 15/10/49, written by Ian Morrison in Hong Kong.
64 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to EJ. Nathan, 20/5/49; W. Pryor to E.J.
Nathan,2/5/49.
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he was accused of causing the death of one of the foremen.f Apparently Woithe had scolded
this man so viciously for allowing some of the workers to leave early that he had left in
floods of tears and coughing up blood. Woithe, like many of his contemporaries, does indeed
seem to have had little respect for Chinese workers, but it appears that the man's death was
ultimately caused by tuberculosis. After being harangued for seven hours Woithe finally lost
his patience and stormed out. This triggered a surge of anger. The union demanded a full
apology. The CCP press called on workers to oppose 'the imperialism of Woithe.' For
propaganda purposes, this individual came to embody foreign aggression. He was compelled
to write a full apology before leaving China for his own safety/"
In April 1949 the KMA was barely functioning when suddenly things began to look more
promising. The long-term cause of this improvement was that, in January 1949, Zhou Enlai
appointed a small group based in Tianjin to research future policy towards the elimination of
foreign interests in China with an immediate focus on the KMA.67 In March the research
group had reported back, suggesting that the best policy would be to 'take steady steps
forward and treat each situation on its merits' (wenbu qianjin, qubie duidai fl~.tI7'M"ill, ~~IJ
)t;jffl=). Rather than immediately expropriating the mines it was decided to lay the groundwork
steadily for an eventual takeover. The immediate priorities were to maintain production, take
steps towards controlling production and sales, and to enter into a dialogue with the foreign
management. 68
The research group was led by the future head of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department
(FAD), Zhang Hanfu (~j~~). Zhang, his official biographers write, was a large, affable
man. The son of an industrialist, he was educated at Beijing's prestigious Tsinghua
University and had studied in the United States. He spoke English well and had spent more
6S TNA FO 371/75930, British coal mining interests in China; Wei Tong to W. Pryor and Yu, 3117149.
66 TNA FO 371/75930, British coal mining interests in China; Meeting of the ISth July, Evening, Report by R.
Dufrasne, Chief Mining Engineer, Tangshan, 19/7/49; Translation of a Letter from The Preparation Committee
of the Tangshan General Labour Union, and "Unchanged Imperialistic Mouth and Face," Hsin WanPao [Xin
Wanbao], 1/S/49; Letter- dated 25/7/49- from 'The whole body of workmen of the Linsi Power Plant attached to
Wei Tong to W. Pryor and Yu, 31/5/49; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 31/7/49.
67 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. lOS, 110-12; Liu Songbin, Zhongguo Gongchandang dui da chengshi de jieguan:
1945-52 [The Chinese Communist Party and the Takeover of Large Cities: 1949-1952] (Bejing: Beijing
Tushuguan Chubanshe [Beijing Library Press], 1997)., p. 300; Zhang Wenpu, 'Zai Tianjin congshi waishi
gongzuo de huiyi,' Chengshi Jieguan Qinli Ji Bian Wei Hui, Chengshi jieguan qinli ji [The Witnesses to the
Takeover of the Cities] (Beijing: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe [Chinese Culture and History Press], 1999), pp.
148-151; Chengshi de jieguan, p. 467.
68 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 112-114; TNA FO 371/75929, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to
E.J. Nathan (Chinese Engineering and Mining Company), Apri11949.
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than ten years operating underground in Guomindang 'white' areas including Shanghai and
Hong Kong before finally joining the main body of the CCP in the 'Liberated Areas' in
1948.69 Zhang's group also included Xu Yongying (f~j}d~) and Wang Chaocheng (3:~Jl~)
who also both went on to work with Zhang in Shanghai.70
In April Liu Shaoqi embarked on an inspection tour of Tianjin. Here he famously made
several speeches on urban policy that urged stability, gradualism and cooperation with
national capitalists. Liu's decision to visit the KMA demonstrated the company's importance.
Here, he stressed that although the interests of foreign capitalists were clearly in opposition to
those of the Chinese people, the 'main contradiction' was between the Chinese people
(represented by the CCP) and the Guomindang regime with their American allies. They
should work to dispel the misgivings of the British capitalists. Chinese capitalists should be
'treated as friends' (yi pengyou xiangdai, ~.:aJl~~§f,f) unless they were deliberately causing
trouble, in which case they would be 'criticised and struggled against' (piping he douzheng,
1~ti.3f~1l4$).CCP policy was to 'unite' (lianhe, ij*,~'),not to 'struggle' (douzheng, 4$).71
According to the Mayor of Tianjin the city's workers had previously 'made demands that
were far too high' (guoguo gao de yaoqiu, i1J1~ e~~ *).This had induced 'panic'
(konghuang, rs.1dm)among the capitalists; 'capitalists do not dare to manage with severity,' he '
said, 'they do not dare expel or punish workers who do not work well.' (zibenjia ye bu gan
yange de guan, bu gan kaichu huo chufa gongzuo bu hao de gongren, ~*~t!!:::f'it&Ftaa~
69 He Ming, Gongheguo Di Yi Pi Waijiaoguan [The Republic's First Generation of Foreign Affairs Officials]
(Zhongguo Dabaike Quanshu Chuabanshe [Encyclopaedia of China Publishing House], 2010), pp. 15-17, 125;
Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp.l06-7, 125.
70 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 112-114, 126; SMA B23/2/32/34, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu guanyu gongbu
Dizheng Ju, Waiqiao Shiwu Chu ganbu mingdan de wenjian [Shanghai People's Government document
announcing name list of cadres in the Land Administration Bureau and Foreign Citizens Affairs Office],
. 23/01150; Wang Chaochang was appointed head of the First Section of the Shanghai Foreign Affairs
Department in January 1950.
71 See the Military Representative (and Party Secretary) Wang Lin's (I~*) account 'Liu Shaoqi Tongzhi Yi Jiu
Si Jiu Nian zai Kailuan' [Comrade Liu Shaoqi at Kailuan in 1949], in Geming Huiyi Lu [Revolutionary
Memoirs] (Beijing, Renmin Chubanshe [People's Printing Press], 1980), pp. 1-13. Wang recalled that Liu had
stressed that they should 'Work to dispel the misgivings of British capitalists and their agents.' (duiyu Yingfang
zibenjia ji qi dailiren yao zuo gongzuo, xiaoshi (amen de yilii, ~1T~1J~*~UUtf~lIA~fij:I ii. Wifffm
ma~~f;!).
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1f, :::{'~ 7f l±l §jt ~ flj I11::::{'~T~~I A.). Liu' s presence calmed the restive mood at the
mines and across the city.72
The approach of the Communist armres towards Shanghai gave the KMA a lot more
bargaining power. The CCP were now acutely conscious of their need for a large and stable
supply of fuel. Moreover, the CCP would want to calm the fears of foreign businessmen in
Shanghai to avoid the economic chaos that would inevitably follow a panicked withdrawal.
The manager, Pryor, was able to arrange a meeting with the Minister of Industry in Beijing.
He was promised a low-interest loan, reduced taxes and better labour discipline;" The
company's London-based director E.J. Nathan observed:
The top authorities now at least appreciate that our difficulties are serious - I really think that
previously they believed we were so full of wealth and strength that we could carry on indefinitely
being squeezed lustily.74
At the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh CCP's Central Committee in March 1949, Mao
made a landmark speech in which he announced that, for the first time since 1927, 'the centre
of gravity of the Party's work' would shift 'from the village to the city.' At the same time he
called for the Party to 'systematically and completely [destroy] imperialist domination in
China.' Wherever the PLA armies overthrew the Guomindang, Mao added, 'imperialist
political domination is overthrown.' Economic and cultural establishments were to be
'allowed to exist for the time being, subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with by
us after country-wide victory.' If they could not revive China's battered economy then the
revolution would fail. Caution and compromise would be needed.P Mao's words were
echoed by Liu Shaoqi, who said;
72 On Liu's visit to Kailuan see TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to EJ.
Nathan, 14/5/49; and on Liu's visit to Tianjin see 'Huang Jing gei Mao Zhuxiji HuaBei Ju de zonghe baogao'
[Comprehensive Report from Huang Jing to Chairman Man and the North China Bureau], 22/11149, in
Chengshi dejieguan yu shehui gaizao, pp. 171-7.505.
73 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 2/5/49; Sir R. Stevenson,
Nanjing to Foreign Office, No. 429, forwarding message from Tianjin, 12/4/49; Sir R. Stevenson, Nanjing to
Foreign Office, No. 558,2/5/49, EJ. Nathan to Scarlett, Foreign Office, 116/49.
74 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China, EJ. Nathan to Scarlett, Foreign Office, 1/6/49.
75 Mao, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session', pp. 361-75.
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Our successful takeover of the cities must be followed up by their successful administration and
transformation[.] We must get rid of some of the old things - but not too many all at once-and
we should let new things grow.76
In June Zhou Enlai let it be known through indirect channels that the CCP were not planning
to seize the mines.77 The CCP leaders realised the value of a policy that allowed the mines to
keep running and contributing to the economy, rather than continuing to squeeze the
imperialists. As Pryor observed, deciding to moderate policy was one thing; implementing a
more moderate policy on the ground was quite another. Local cadres seemed to be doing their
utmost to negate the central government's decisions." The local government-run trading
company was still only buying KMA coal at four-fifths the cost of production, and the
company was forced to continue to sell it to feed their workers. In some places, the CCP-
controlled labour unions had lost all control over the workers. Pryor wrote that the eastern
mines area looked 'like a junk yard and all Chinese staff wear a hunted look.' To make
matters worse the Guomindang had blockaded Shanghai and this meant that KMA coal could
not be shipped there. By this time the KMA had lost all of its £3,000,000 capital in China."
At the end of July, a chief military representative was sent by the government, ostensibly to
liaise with and assist the management. In fact the representative established himself as a
separate authority, in preparation, Pryor believed, for an eventual takeover.l"
It was not only the case that the pragmatic policy of the central leadership was obstructed by
the more radical local cadres: a strong anti-imperialist sentiment pervaded all levels of the
CCP. This hostility led them to approach the KMA as more than an industrial concern: in one
report in the CCP's Jinbu Ribao (Progress Daily, i!!:if7 S til) the KMA was described as 'a
cogent example of the deep-rooted strength of imperialism in China':
76 Liu Shaoqi, 'Some Questions Concerning Urban Work,' 12/3/49, Selected Works ofLiu Shaoqi, Vol. 1.
77 TNA FO 371175929, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 13/6/49.
78 TNA FO 371175930, British coal mining interests in China: negotiations with the communists concerning the
Kailan Mining Administration, 1949; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 2116/49; TNA FO 371175929, British coal
mining interests in China; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 2/5/49; see also Gao, Hangzhou, pp. 16,86-7.
79 TNA FO 371175930, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 8/7/49; W. Pryor to E.J.
Nathan, 817149; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 9/8/49.
80 TNA FO 371175930, British coal mining interests in China; W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 3117149; W. Pryor to E.J.
Nathan,9/8/49.
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The light in the lighthouse at Chingwangtao [Qinhuangdao (the KMA's export port)] is
dimmed ... the decline of the KMA Empire is a part of the overall eclipse of imperialist invasion
of China in the past century.81
In his memoirs, Bo Yibo suggests that after taking Tianjin the CCP were caught, for the first
time, between workers and capitalists. They were unable to support the workers in 'struggling
against the boss' (dou laoban, 4:1H&) because they needed economic stability. The workers'
claims could not simply be dismissed, however, because the CCP needed their support.82 In
dealing with the KMA; the CCP learnt how to 'squeeze' and pressure foreign businesses, but
they also learnt the importance of economic stability. Both pragmatism and ideology were at
play.
'Semi-free hands' and a 'foot in the door'
The CCP had so far practised 'the diplomacy of free hands' but by the time they reached
Shanghai it was clear that a more practical policy would be needed. In order to keep
foreigners from causing large-scale economic instability, the CCP decided that they needed to
have 'semi-free hands.' This involved entering into some form of de facto relatioris with
Western powers but, Mao stressed, 'These relations of ours with the capitalist countries must
be such that at any time we could change our point of view in the interests of the
revolution. ,83 The leadership warned General Chen Yi (~*~Jt),whose army was closing in on
Suzhou (under a hundred kilometres from Shanghai), to show restraint towards foreigners
and to bear in mind that the CCP may still be open to establishing relations with America and
Britain if they severed their ties with the Guomindang/" This suggests that the CCP were not
as set against establishing relations with the Western powers as has previously been believed.
81 TNA FO 371/75930, British coal mining interests in China; Consul General Tianjin to Nanjing, No. 43,
10/3/49- Translation of Feature Article in the Jinbu Ribao [Progress Daily] dated 5/3/49, 'Wither the K.M.A.
Empire?'
82 Bo, Ruogan, p. 14.
83 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin], 13/4/49.
84Zhonggong Zhongyang Junwei zh ish i, Zongqianwei zan buyao qu zhan Suzhou, Kunshan zhudian [CCP
Central Military Committee Order, Frontline Headquarters temporarily not to occupy Suzhou and Kunshan,
various points for consideration], 28/4/49, in, Shanghai Jiefang, p. 247; 'We believe that if America (and Britain)
. can sever [ties with the Guomindang], we can consider the question of establishing diplomatic relations with
them' (Women renwei ru Meiguo (ji Yingguo) neng duanjie, women keyi laolii he tamen jian/i waijiao guanxi de
wenti, ftii1i)..:!!J~:m~00 (~Ji~OO) ~~WT!f!. ftfniiJ~;.{~~~QflJ! ffHt1L?I' jE**, a~iCJIf2i).
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Much debate has taken place on the subject of whether or not there was a 'missed chance' for
relations to be established between America and Communist China. This was a politically
charged debate that took place within the context of Cold War anxieties over the 'loss' of
China.85 Much was later made of the discussions that took place between the US Ambassador
John Leighton Stuart and his former student Huang Hua in Nanjing after its fall to the CCP in
late April 1949.86 Stuart was keen to improve relations between the CCP and the US, but all
of his proposals were rejected by the State Department. 87 Mao pointed out that Stuart's
conciliatory words were in stark contrast to the actions of General Douglas MacArthur.
MacArthur had recently landed two companies of US Marines in Qingdao and had
strengthened the US military presence in Shanghai. The US Government's attitude
discouraged the CCP from taking a more positive approach towards them.88
American attitudes towards the CCP did not soften in 1949. While a few voices in the State
Department spoke in favour of a drastic change in policy towards the Chinese Communists, a
break with the Guomindang was by now virtually unthinkable. Such a break would have been
a complete negation of their previous policy. Itwould, in any case, have been completely out
of step with Truman and Acheson's anti-Communism. A strong pro-Guomindang 'China
lobby' in Washington and the CCP's hostility towards American consular personnel
cemented American opposition to the CCP. 89 At this time neither side was particularly
interested in improving relations.
For the first time since the end of the Pacific War, British and American policies towards
China would radically diverge.I" Britain was keen to keep a 'foot in the door' to preserve her
economic interests throughout China and to avoid having to surrender the indefensible colony
of Hong Kong.91 The sentiment held by many in Whitehall and in Shanghai was captured
perfectly in a speech given by Lord Strabolgi to the House of Lords:
85 See Hooper, China Stands Up.
86 See Huang Hua, Qinli yu jianwen: Huang Hua huiyi lu [Personal Experiences and an Eyewitness Account;
Huang Hua's Memoir] (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe [World Knowledge Publishing House], 2007), pp. 80-
87 which was reprinted in English as Huang Hua, Huang Hua Memoirs (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
2008).
87 Xiang, Recasting, p. 189.
88 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo waijiao,' pp. 31-34.
89 See US Ambassador John Leighton Stuarts' appraisal of the situation in The Forgotten Ambassador: the
reports of John Leighton Stuart, 1946-1949 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981).
90 'British & US Attitude to China Differs,' The Peiping Chronicle, 26/11148.
91 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, pp. 123- 138, 199-208; see also Shao, China, Britain, pp. 31-4.
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We, fortunately, have not committed ourselves so seriously as our American friends to the support
of the [Guomindang]. The British have always had an excellent name in China. British commerce
was dominant there until recent years and is still of the greatest importance. British banking and
commercial methods are appreciated and admired by the Chinese. The Chinese and the British
have always got on well together, and I do not see why that state of affairs should not continue ... I
am not too optimistic about it, but, at the same time, I think it would be a mistake to take a too
pessimistic view of China's position, and to imagine that a sort of Iron Curtain is going to be
92lowered around the borders and coasts of that great country.
Shanghai Consul General Robert Urquhart was among the chief proponents of the 'open door'
policy because he considered it 'in the long run a national advantage to have a British
community in position here. ,93 At this time, around half of China's exports went through the
major British trading houses. Britain was strongly represented in other sectors too; nearly
half of all deep water frontages in the country were British owned and operated, and
companies like the China Engineering and Mining Company (the British owners of KMA)
and Shell dominated their fields.94 The under-development of wide sectors of China's
economy (it was, for example, especially dependent on foreign shipping) led many to predict
that it would be unable to survive without British trade." Urquhart also doubted whether the
CCP were up to the job of running Shanghai;
I venture to think that the Communists will lose a lot of their bounce when they have had Shanghai
on their hands for a month or two. Britain and America ought to have no difficulty in imposing
their will eventually on their bankrupt economy96
The value of British trade with China was small. It accounted for around I per cent of the
UK's total trade in 1948. In terms of the value of foreign trade per capita in January to
September 1946, Chinese trade was worth only seven shillings. This was very small in
contrast to the value of trade with the USA (£18.11s) and New Zealand (£58.18s).
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office considered the British presence in China priceless in terms
92 Hansard, Hong Kong Defences, Lord Strabolgi (Joseph Kenworthy) speaking in the House of Lords, HL Deb,
Vol. 16,3/2/49, pp. 543-5.
93 TNA FO 371175940, Position of British subjects in China: evacuation from Shanghai, 1949; Shanghai to
Foreign Office, No. 280, 30/4/49.
94 TNA FO 371175864, British commercial interests in China, 1949; 'British Interests in China,' P.W. Scarlett,
Foreign Office, 12/1/49; 'Economic Weaknesses of a Communist dominated China and the position of British
interests,' December 1948-January 1949.
9S TNA FO 371/75864, British commercial interests; 'Economic Weaknesses'.
% TNA FO 371175940, Position of British subjects in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, 15/5/49, No. 344.
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of its political importance. Around 80 per cent of this 'stake' was in Shanghai.97 This
sentiment was echoed in the head offices of the major British firms like Butterfield & Swire,
British American Tobacco and HSBC. They considered that their best option was to keep
their branches going and attempt to trade with the new government.98 HSBC's Shanghai
Manager O.H. Stacey wrote informing Urquhart that the bank's policy was to make a short-
term sacrifice in order to safeguard their long-term position;
... to stay in China and to do business under the new regime, provided we enjoy the normal
safeguards of life and property ... We have been established here for the past 85 years and have
had many ups and downs. We share with you the belief that to clear out now might result in
irreparable harm.99
At the December 1948 meeting of the British Residents' Association, Urquhart called on
British residents, except for women and children, to stay put;
... give me always the man or woman who looks twice at a rumour - and who thinks twice before
abandoning his settled ways. There is something to be said after all for the man who stays in his
rut!
... we will suffer, certainly; but China will suffer more. If any damage ensues to the industries of
Shanghai, we will suffer, yes! But our loss will be a fraction of the loss to China - to the great area
which these industries serve. These things are so fundamental - so grounded in reason and
h thei 1 . I '1100common sense t at ir ogic must sure y prevai .
97 TNA Fa 371175864, British commercial interests in China, 1949; 'British Interests in China; P.W. Scarlett,
Foreign Office, 12/1/49; 'Economic Weaknesses'.
98 John Swire & Sons Company Archive, DNOE 3, John Swire Scot letter to London Office, 20/1/49; TNA Fa
371175864, British commercial interests; 'British Commercial Interests in China: hopes for diplomatic support
in 'keeping the flag flying' in China, January 1949 [on BAT's proposed policy]; HSBC SHGI 0650.3, Private
correspondence of G. Stacey, Shanghai Manager, 1949, Letter from Chairman and Chief Manager Sir Arthur
Morse to Shanghai Manager G.H. Stacey, 19/3/49. Morse wrote; I am afraid that I do not agree with the view
that we should withhold any help [from the CCP] ... as in my opinion it would be more likely to hasten the day
when we would be completely shut out, whereas by giving help we may gain a little goodwill.'
99 HSBC SHGI 0650.3, Private correspondence ofG. Stacey, Shanghai Manager, 1949; Letter from G.H. Stacey
to Consul General Urquhart, 18/1/49.
100 TNA Fa 371175938, 'Position of British subjects in China;' Minutes of the 13th Annual General Meeting of
the British Residents' Association of China held on 16/12/48.
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'A spot ofbother'- the Amethyst incident
After seizing Beijing and Tianjin at the start of the year, the PLA had moved on to secure
almost the entirety of China north of the great Yangzi River, which divides the nation from
west to east. InApril, as Communist troops massed on the northern bank of the Yangzi and
prepared to cross, a British frigate, HMS Amethyst, was travelling up river from Shanghai to
Nanjing. On the 20th April Communist artillery mistook the Amethyst for an enemy ship and
opened fire. The Amethyst was marooned in hostile territory. Three other British ships were
fired on during two separate rescue attempts. During the incident, the Amethyst had returned
fire and, according to the CCP, had killed some 252 Chinese soldiers (a figure considered
highly dubious by the British).101
Speaking in the House of Commons Harold Macmillan described the incident as a 'catalogue
of folly'. Sending a warship to Nanjing, he suggested, had either been a remarkable act of
foolishness or a strange reversion to the 'gunboat mentality' of the past:
After all, any neutral destroyer that happened to be sailing down the channel on the morning of
"Overlord" might have run into a spot of bother. Secondly, the river route inevitably invoked the
memories and perhaps the traditions of Europeans in China when they held a position, quite apart
from Communism, which belongs to the past I 02
Despite the deaths of 32 British soldiers and the wounding of 53 others, the British hoped to
downplay the incident, so as not to jeopardise their interests in Shanghai.l'" Mao ordered that
the incident was to be used for propaganda purposes, to 'educate' the people about
imperialism, 'but it should not be inflated or intensified.' Moderation would be essential in
case it became desirable to improve relations with Britain in future.l?' Huang Hua recalled
that the CCP were more concerned with defeating the Guomindang and seizing Shanghai;
101 Hansard, China (British Policy), HC Deb, Vol. 464, 5/5/49; Hansard, Attacks on H.M. Ships in China,
Statement by Prime Minister Clement Atlee, HC Deb, Vol. 464,26/4/49; Mao Zedong, 'On the Outrages by
British Warships: Statement by the Spokesman of the General Headquarters of the Chinese PLA,' 30/4/49, in
Selected Works,Vol. IV. pp. 401-403.
102 Hansard, China (British Policy), HC Deb, Vol. 464, 05/3/49.
103 Hansard, Attacks on H.M. Ships in China, Statement by Prime Minister Clement Atlee, HC Deb, Vol. 464,
26/4/49.
104 'Zhonggong Zhongyang Junwei zhishi, Zongqianwei zan buyao qu zhan Suzhou, Kunshan zhudian' [CCP
Central Military Committee Order, Frontline Headquarters temporarily not to occupy Suzhou and Kunshan,
various points for consideration], 28/4/49, in Shanghai Jiejang, p. 248; 'should not be inflated ... • (Chujieci zuo
xuanchuanjiaoyu renmin wai. shijishang women yi bubi kuoda zhejian shi, ~~f!fJ1tfij:'§'f~~JfA~91'. ~~;f-
..t!'tmw~~'ft*jgf!f.).
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'when confronted by a wolf, one ignores the fox ... we had no time to bother with the British,
but did keep the matter on record.' 105 As both the British and the CCP were keen to avoid any
further crises, they downplayed the incident. 106
Mao used this opportunity to lay down terms for future relations with foreign governments,
most importantly the severing of all ties with the Guomindang and the removal of all foreign
military forces.l07 CCP policy was to force the British to apologise for having infringed on
Chinese sovereignty; until they had done so, the Amethyst would be prevented from leaving.
The Amethyst eventually escaped downriver on the night of the 30th July using a passenger
ship, the Liberated Jiangling, for cover. Beijing was furious with the local military
commanders, firstly for letting the Amethyst escape and secondly for firing at her as she did
so (the commanders had been under orders to let her go if she attempted to escape; a
statement would follow denouncing the perfidy of the British). Instead, their fire had justified
the escape attempt and had damaged the Liberated Jiangling.108
'Staying put' in Shanghai
In Shanghai the incident was watched carefully for signs of what was to come. A cautious
optimism remained in some quarters. As American newspaper editor Randall Gould observed,
the foreign community in Shanghai were 'veterans of many Chinese wars' and they had also
had quite enough of the Guomindang.l " This optimism was partly reinforced by a misplaced
idea that Communism would not take hold due to the xenophobic qualities of Chinese
culture.110 InGould's words;
105 Huang Hua,Memoirs, p. 125.
106 TNA PREM 8/945, 'Situation in Shanghai,' 1949; Nanjing to Foreign Office, Copy of Nanjing to Shanghai,
10/5/49; Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily], Shanghai, 3/8/49 in HSBC SHGI 0001, Summaries of news and
reports (political, economical, financial) for senior management, July-December 1949.
107 Mao, 'On the Outrages,' in Selected Works, Vol. IV. pp. 401-403.
108 Zhou Enlai, 'Zhongyang guanyu chuli 'Zishiyinghao' shijian de dianbao' [Telegrams from the Centre
regarding the resolution of the Amethyst incident], in Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol. 1, pp. 88-95.
109 Randall Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover, 1949,' Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science, Vol. 277, Report on China (Sep., 1951), pp. 182-192.
110 For instance Walter Fletcher MP wrote an article in the Sunday Express in March 1948 in which he argued
that the hard-line Moscow communists were few in number compared to the more 'traditional guerrillas' and
said that 'there seems quite a probability that out of this mess may emerge something like a permanent North
Chinese Government, not necessarily unfriendly to good relations with other foreign Powers, in that the Chinese
element would be sufficiently strong for personal profit and advantage still to take precedence over real
Communism.' Walter Fletcher MP, 'Don't worry about the break-up of China; Better off Without Chiang Kai-
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We had grown sceptical of the probability of rapid fundamental change in anything Chinese
though we were conscious that conditions had grown rotten enough to be due for drastic alteration.
But we had often been threatened with dire things which in our own cases mostly failed to
materialize. Somehow we had pulled through. It could happen again. III
The Amethyst incident scuppered the British Government's plans for a large-scale evacuation
of their nationals by sea. On the 28th April Consul General Urquhart informed the British
community that the Royal Navy had removed their ships to safety. The authorities would
arrange transportation out of the city by other means for all who applied.112 Gould and the
other foreigners were appalled by the withdrawal, but they expected no less from the British
Government, with whom the Shanghailanders had always had a stormy relationship.113
The withdrawal of the foreign naval forces from Shanghai was later described as 'the first
great victory in the anti-imperialist revolution' by the Shanghai FAD. They did not see this as
the end of the struggle however, as the imperialists 'just needed an opportunity (loophole)
and they would take advantage' (zhiyao you xi ke cheng, R~fHJjniJ*)."4
A general evacuation of British nationals from Shanghai did not take place for three main
reasons: firstly, the Amethyst incident had demonstrated that the continued presence of
foreign warships was both unsafe and provocative. lIS Secondly, there was no prolonged
period of violent disorder that would have made an evacuation absolutely necessary. The
British authorities did not want to incur the costs of planning an evacuation if there were to
shek,' Sunday Express, 5/3/48 in HSBC SHG 760.4, S/O Letters on General Subjects Between London and
Shanghai, Jan-Dec 1948.
III Randall Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover,' pp. 182-192.
112 TNA FO 371/75940, Position of British subjects in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 340, 11/5//49;
Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 259, 27/4/49.
113 Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover,' pp. 182-192.
114 SMA B 112/3658, gongzuo zongjie.
liS TNA PREM 8/945, 'Situation in Shanghai,' 1949; Prime Minister, China and South-East Asia Committee,
Norman Brook memo, 'Shanghai,' 12/5/49.
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be no refugees.i'" Finally, leading government and business figures wanted to keep 'a foot in
the door.,117
British consular officials sought to create an atmosphere of optimism. They encouraged a
resolve amongst the community to 'stay put.' One HSBC staff member recalled that he and
his colleagues had been 'keyed up' to stay on 'in the hope that something good would
happen.,118While the officials did not fear for the big British businessmen (it was rumoured
that John Keswick had a cabin reserved on every Jardine, Matheson & Co. ship leaving
Shanghai'"), the worst affected would be the 'middle people':
... smallish men who cannot afford to send their womenfolk away now privately, whose entire
fortunes are represented by their homes and jobs here, and who must hold on as long as they can
get the slightest encouragement from us to do so.120
Leaving Shanghai was not an option for the 'smallish men'. As Viscount Elibank wrote to
Ernest Bevin, 'for many, probably the majority, [their] homes are the product of many years
of labour and the only homes they know or expect to know.'l2l Nevertheless, the Foreign
Office did recognise that there were 'grave dangers' involved in leaving so many Britons
'hostage in Communist hands.,122
The officials, who wanted to stay on, were talking to the 'community leaders' who in the
main were representatives of the big China firms, who also wanted to stay on. 'Despite the
information we have given Shanghai of developments in [Tianjin]' Pryor wrote, 'they have
116 TNA PREM 8/945, 'Situation in Shanghai,' 1949; Cabinet, China and South East Asia Committee, 12/5/49;
TNA FO 371175938, 'Position of British subjects in China;' Foreign Office to Nanjing, No. 140, 3011149;
Governor Hong Kong to Ambassador Nanjing, Consul General Shanghai etc, 5/1149; It was estimated that to
house over 4,000 evacuees in Hong Kong would incur an initial cost of £1,182,735 to which would be added an
additional cost of about £14,000 a day.
117 TNA PREM 8/945, 'Situation in Shanghai,' 1949; Prime Minister, China and South-East Asia Committee,
Norman Brook memo, 'Shanghai,' 12/5/49.
lIS HSBC 16411039/C, The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Oral History Archival Project, RP
Moodie, p. 42.
119 TNA FO 371175938, 'Position of British subjects in China;' Consul General Shanghai to Foreign Office,
7/2/49.
120 TNA PREM 8/945, 'Situation in Shanghai,' 1949; From Consul General Shanghai to Foreign Office, 7/5/49.
See also TNA FO 371175940, Position of British subjects in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, 1515/49, No.
345.
121 TNA FO 371175938, 'Position of British subjects in China;' Viscount Elibank to Ernest Bevin, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, 30/12/48; for more on the 'smallish men' of Shanghai see Bickers,
'Shanghailanders,' pp. 161-211.
122 TNA PREM 8/945, 'Situation in Shanghai,' 1949; Extract, S.A.C. (49) 4th Meeting, Memorandum on
Shanghai Situation by the Foreign Secretary, 13/5/49.
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remained optimistic. I am afraid they are going to learn the hard way.,123 Pryor's grim reports
had perhaps not been given the weight they deserved; rather, they were dismissed by
Urquhart because their 'exaggeratedly gloomy idea' of the situation in Tianjin was born out
of 'isolation and the in-breeding of their ideas and fears.' 124
The 'Liberation' of Shanghai
In January 1949 after north China was lost to the Communists, the Guomindang leader Jiang
Jieshi (~1t:fi) stepped down from the presidency. He was succeeded as Acting President by
Li Zongren (*~1=).Playing for time, Li opened peace negotiations with the CCP. InApril
he was presented with an eight-point ultimatum which amounted to a demand for almost total
surrender.125 Li was constantly undermined by the 'retired' Jiang. As Jiang had already made
I
the decision to retreat to Taiwan, he could not allow Li to succeed on the mainland. Over the
next few months Li's attempts to make peace, and to stabilise the economic and military
situations, were doomed to failure.126
The CCP armies totalled over two million men, while the Guomindang had just over one
million scattered from Urumqi to Shanghai. The best Guomindang forces had already been
defeated.127 Li refused the CCP's eight points and the dice were cast. The CCP had decided
some time before to cross the Yangzi regardless of the result of the peace talks.128On the
123 TNA FO 371175930,British coal mining interests in China: negotiations with the communists concerning the
Kailan Mining Administration, 1949,W. Pryor to E.J. Nathan, 8/7/49.
124 TNA FO 371175864, British commercial interests; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 115, 22/2/49; P.D.
Coates of the Foreign Office commented 'It is greatly to be hoped that H.M.C.G. [Urquhart] is correct, but I
doubt whether he is; and if he is not his consistent playing down of the dangers of the Chinese brand of
Communism may be unfortunate in its effects on the British mercantile community in Shanghai' to which
another commentator [signature illegible] wrote 'Yes - but we can't douse his optimism from here;' TNA FO
371175864, British commercial interests; Minute by P.D. Coates written on 'Mentality and morale of the British
Business Community in Tientsin since the occupation of the city by Communist forces' 18/3/49, see same file
for quotes on 'isolation' in Shanghai Consul General to Chancery, Nanjing, No. 88,22/2/49.
125 Westad, Encounters, pp. 219-220,238-241; Spence, Jonathan D., The Search for Modern China (London:
Hutchinson, 1990), p. 486; the eight points were: 1. punish all war criminals. 2. abolish the invalid 1947
constitution. 3. abolish the Guomindang's legal system. 4. reorganise the Nationalist Armies. 5. confiscate all
bureaucratic capital. 6. reform the land-tenure system. 7. abolish all treasonous treaties. 8. convene a full
p:oliticalconference.
26 Te-kong Tong and Li Tsung-jen, The Memoirs of Li Tsung-jen (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1979), pp.
468-548. ,
127 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin], 13/4/49.
128 Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Dangshi Yanjiushi, Shanghai Shi Danganguan, Jieguan Shanghai, Shang Juan,
Wenxian Ziliao [The Takeover of Shanghai, Part 1, Manuscripts and Materials] (Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi
Chubanshe [Bejing, China Radio and Television Publishing House], 1993); On 8th April 1949 the CCP Central
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night of zo" April, the PLA's Second and Third Field Armies began to cross along a 500km-
long front. 129
The Guomindang had ordered all boats be brought to the south bank of the river, and the river
mouth was blockaded. This meant that 10,000 small boats had to be brought overland to use
in the crossing. Over six weeks a mass labour force of peasants and soldiers put an estimated
21 million man-days into this task. Within twenty-four hours, the PLA had landed 300,000
troops on the southern bank. The majority met with little resistance. Nanjing, the capital, fell
on the night of the 23rd April. Hangzhou, Wenzhou and Ningbo were taken in quick
succession and Shanghai was encircled.P"
The PLA now slowed their advance. The delay was, in Mao's words, 'so as to stir among the
inhabitants of Shanghai the hatred toward the Guomindang forces and the Guomindang
Government, and at the same time prepare ourselves better for running the city.' 131They built
up stocks of rice, cotton and coal, 'two whites and one black' (liang bai yi hei, jJJij1§" -~), to
prevent shortages.132 It was not simply a case of capturing the city. The CCP also needed to
ensure that it came into their hands intact. General Su Yu (~H~) later recalled that they
wanted to avoid turning Shanghai into an urban battlefield so as to prevent large-scale
damage to Shanghai's industry and commerce. Guomindang General Tang Enbo Uh ,!giB)
was allowed time to evacuate his troops via Wusong.133
Shanghai Bureau had told the Shanghai underground organisation that 'no matter what the result of the peace
talks, the PLA wants to cross the river immediately' (wulun hetan jieguo ruhe.fiefangjun shi liji yao dujiang, £
~ fll*!Ii JjJHw{iiJ,A!?;fjj(~Jf:ft~P~i1t7I), p. 9.
129 For a detailed account of the military manoeuvres involved in crossing the Yangzi and moving towards
Shanghai see Su Yu 'da guo Chang Jiang qu, jiefang da Shanghai' [Cross the Yangzi River, Liberate Great
Shanghai!], in Guo Jiafu, Hengdu Changjiang jiefang Shanghai: jinian Shanghai jiefang wu shi nian zhuanji
[Crossing the Yangzi to Liberate Shanghai: an album commemorating 50 years since the liberation of Shanghai]
(Shanghai Shi Xin Si Jun lishi cong kan she [Shanghai New Fourth Army Historical Collections Publishing
Group], 1999), pp. 1-19.
130 Speech given by Deng Xiaoping to representatives of the new Political Consultative Conference 4/8/49;
'Cong dujiang dao zhanling Shanghai' [From Crossing the Yangzi to Occupying Shanghai] in Shanghai Jiefang,
pp. 1-6.
131 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, 17/5/49.
132 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 30/1/49; Zhou Lin
'Jieguan Shanghai Da Shiji shi' [Definite Chronology of Events in the Liberation of Shanghai] in Zhonggong
Shanghai Shiwei dangshi Yanjiushi, Jieguan Shanghai, Xia Juan, Zhuanti yu Huiyi [The Takeover of Shanghai,
Part 2, Special Topics and Reminiscences] (Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe [Beijing, China Radio and
Television Publishing House], 1993), p. 89.
133 Su Vu, 'da guo Chang Jiang qu.fiefang da Shanghai,'pp. 12-17.
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Since the turn of the year, Shanghai had been a 'city of rumours.' One rumour that must have
particularly appealed to many among the foreign community was that Shanghai would be
internationalised once more, just as it had been in the good old days. Though briefly mooted
in the corridors of power, this idea was wholly unrealistic.P"
After the CCP troops crossed the Yangzi, the situation in Shanghai became exceedingly tense.
On 23rdApril the city was placed under martial iaw and it was flooded with unruly troops.
Discipline broke down.135 Jiang Jieshi flew briefly into the city before leaving its defence to
his generals. They swore to fight to the death even as their possessions were loaded onto
ships in the harbour.l " What Randall Gould described as a 'fantastic wooden fence' was built
around the city using conscripted labour, despite the obvious futility of the task. 137 The
harbour and airports were crowded with people making last-minute exits. One HSBC
employee recalled being telephoned one evening and told to be at the airport at 6am the next
day. Forced to abandon his car and his dog, he stood all the way to Hong Kong on the
crowded plane as if on a bus. 138
As the PLA approached, their number one priority was to ensure a quick and stable transfer
of power in both the political and economic spheres. Dealing with foreigners was one
problem among many that the CCP would face. Compared to problems such as
unemployment and the suppression of counter-revolutionary elements, foreigners were not an
immediate priority. Under the non-recognition policy, the CCP had now at least developed a
workable system for managing contacts with foreigners on the ground. In the coming months,
134 'Shanghai, City of Rumours; Tales Rehashed Become Standard Jokes: Many Caused by Wishful Thinking'
The Peiping Chronic/e, 19/11148; the idea of restoring extraterritoriality in Shanghai was actually proposed in
some quarters: Fletcher 'Don't worry about the break-up of China; Better off Without Chiang Kai-shek,' Sunday
Express, 5/3/48. Located inHSBC SHG 760.4, S/O Letters on General Subjects Between London and Shanghai,
Jan-Dec 1948.
135 For example, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer complained to the Guomindang authorities through the US Consul that
their performances were being frequently interrupted by Guomindang soldiers who barged in refusing to pay
and who scared off other customers, see SMA QI27-8-244, Songhu Jingbei Siling Bu Waishi Chu guanyu
shibing qinjin Meiguo yiyuan ji zhan minfang yaoqiu Songhu Jingbei Siling Bu Waishi Chu peichang Yingguo
yaoqiu fa huan chanye [Songhu Garrison Headquarters Foreign Affairs Department regarding soldiers forcibly
entering American hospital, and occupying private houses, British request for compensation from Songhu
Garrison Headquarters Foreign Affairs Department and request for return of property], 2115/49. Guomindang
troops also took over the China Inland Mission compound and fired a shot to intimidate a British member of
staff, see; TNA FO 371175865, British commercial interests in China, 1949; Embassy Nanjing to Foreign Office,
No. 639, 14/5/49.
136 Wakeman, Jr., "'Cleanup": The New Order in Shanghai', pp. 26-31.
137 Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover,' p. 183.
138 HSBC 16411037/C, Oral History, J.F. Marshall, pp. 28-31; King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, VolA, p. 373.
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there would be a great deal of anti-imperialist rhetoric, but this was tempered in reality by
practical concerns over the extent of foreign economic influence in Shanghai and its
interconnectedness with the Chinese economy.
The CCP were keen to avoid any potential problems the explicit mistreatment of foreigners
might bring about. 139 In order to calm the mood ahead of their arrival, the PLA disseminated
an eight-point proclamation co-authored by Mao and General Zhu De (*=f!). Point eight of
this proclamation called for the protection of the lives and property of foreigners, as long as
they obeyed the law.140 Cadres were instru~ted to 'protect law-abiding foreigners, punish
those who break the law' (baohu shoufa waiqiao, chengban bu fa fenzi, i*tJ'l ~rt~11f, 19_1)
/F rt5t.:r). 141 The CCP leaders were particularly worried that the 'imperialists' might
paralyse Shanghai by wrecking its public utilities. They did not have their own specialists
who could restore and maintain the city's infrastructure.i'f
The battle for Shanghai proper began on 12thMay. Seen through foreign eyes from the Bund,
the battle was not an impressive one. Most of the fighting took place outside the city. By the
zo" May PLA troops had both of the city's main airports surrounded. They did not meet a
great deal of resistance. Even as late as 22nd May, many CCP leaders in Beijing still could not
believe that Shanghai would be abandoned without a fight. 143 On the 24th May Guomindang
General Tang Enbo organised a victory parade through the streets of the city which drew
curious crowds. The next morning banners with slogans reading "Defeat the Communist
139 MFA 118-00046-11, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao (fu jian shier; Shanghai
Waiqiao Shiwu Chu jieguan gongzuo jianbao) [Work report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department for June-July (Appendix 12; Concise report on the takeover work of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department)], 116/49-30/11149.
140 SMA D2/0/894/6, 'Gong Jun Zongbu; baohu renmin ji waiqiao shengming caichan, xian jian zu jian xi zai
xing fenpei tudi' in Kexue Jishu Gongzuo Zhe, di san qi) [Communist Army Headquarters; Protect the lives and
property of the people and of foreigners, first reduce rents and interest and later redistribute land in The Science
and Technology Worker, Issue 3], 27/04/49; Shenbao, 'Jiefangjun Yuefa Ba Zhang,' [The PLA's eight
p,rovisional regulations], 26/5/49.
41 'Eight point proclamation,' reprinted in Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Dangshi Yanjiushi, Shanghai Shi
Danganguan, Jieguan Shanghai, shang juan, wenxian ziliao [The Takeover of Shanghai, Part 1, Manuscripts
and Materials] (Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe [China Radio and Television Publishing
House], 1993), pp. 14-16; He Zhijian, Wang Houkang, Shanghai Waishi Sishi Nian; 1949.5 - 1989.5 [Forty
Years of Foreign Affairs in Shanghai] (Gong neibu yuedu (for internal distribution only), 1990), p. 4.
142 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Filippov [Stalin], 13/4/49; CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between
Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3111149.
143 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, Report on the 22 May CCP CC Politburo Discussion, 23/5/49.
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bandits!" still hung, but it was PLA troops that marched beneath them.144 The Shanghai
campaign had lasted half as long as initially expected.v"
The majority of foreigners in China never thought much of Chinese soldiers and there was a
tendency to portray all Chinese wars with a degree of ridicule. The feeling among foreign
residents, as encapsulated in Noel Barber's The Fall of Shanghai, was that no one could
pretend that this was 'in any sense a real battle.' 146 This was not in fact a farcical war of
intrigue and posturing: it was a bloody and violent struggle. It was part of a war with a death
toll in the millions that came on the back of decades of international and domestic conflict.l'"
CCP leader Deng Xiaoping estimated that in the week-long battle for Shanghai the
Communists killed or captured 400,000 Guomindang troops, whilst 17,000 CCP soldiers
were wounded or killed. 148
HSBC employee R.P. Moodie remembered hearing a strange 'pitter pat, pitter pat,' outside
his house on Bubbling Well Road in the early morning on the 25th May. Peaking out of the
window he saw Communist troops in the street below. The next day he stayed indoors, but
the day after, he went out. '[T]he strangest thing' he recalled, 'was whereas before all the
roads were covered with Nationalist flags, this time they were all Communist flags.' The day
after that, Moodie met his first Communist. To his surprise, the former HSBC office boy
'came in with his hat on and practically told me he'd taken over!' 149
The CCP's orderly takeover of the city stood in stark contrast to the Guomindang's takeover
of the city from the Japanese in 1945. Guomindang officials from the highest ranks to the
lowest cadres had taken anything they could get their hands on. Factories which had been
closed temporarily had remained closed for months, rendering thousands unemployed. ISO The
CCP wished to avoid these kinds of mistakes. Key to the CCP's orderly takeover was not
only their cautious approach, but also the discipline instilled in individual PLA soldiers. In
144 Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover" p. 183; Westad, Decisive Encounters, pp. 248-50.
145 Deng Xiaoping 'Cong dujiang dao zhanling Shanghai,' pp. 1-6.
146 Barber, The Fall of Shanghai, pp. 144-7, 152.
147 Mao estimated five and a half million enemy casualties, CWIHP, Cable, Mao Zedong [via Kovalev] to
Stalin, 14/6/49; Westad suggests a more likely figure of between one and two million combatants killed on both
sides. See Westad, Decisive Encounters, p. 282.
148 Deng Xiaoping 'Cong dujiang dao zhanling Shanghai,' pp. 1-6.
149 HSBC 16411039/C, Oral History, R.P. Moodie, pp. 41-2; King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, VolA, p. 374.
150 Bergere, Shanghai, p. 325.
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preparation for the seizure of Shanghai, the Political Bureau of the Third Field Army
produced a document called Chengshi Changshi (General Knowledge about Cities, ~m~
iR), which was used to teach their peasant soldiers and cadres how to behave. 151 The guide
suggested that many of the soldiers lacked even the basic knowledge needed to function in
the cities, such as where to find somewhere to eat or to use a toilet. There was also genuine
concern for their safety: they could easily be run over or electrocuted.Pi In the guide,
Shanghai was portrayed as an unruly place full of 'hoodlums' (liumang, mEt3:), thieves and
drug dealers; the products of a corrupt capitalist society. 153 Cadres were warned that
Guomindang agents manipulated the dark underground world of brothels, gambling houses
and drug dens.154 Reported lapses in discipline involving cadres and dancing girls in Nanjing
made it even more important for the proper 'spirit' (jingshen, ~t$) and discipline to be
instilled before the takeover of Shanghai. 155 Despite the many evils of the urban environment,
however, the soldiers were encouraged in Chengshi Changshi to give urban China a chance.
Cities were the home of the workers and the industry that would make 'New China' strong,
the guide said: 'the new atmosphere in the cities will be established later and the cities
gradually transformed' (xin de chengshi fengqing yao yihou manman lai gaizao he shuli, *Jf
l¥J~m)XI. f¥f~£J,ffl'lIt~*&JiIflJtxt ft).156
Only cadres working in the Foreign Affairs or Public Security organs were to be allowed to
engage in any form of interaction with the foreigners. 157 Writing in July, the Political Bureau
of the Ninth Army reported around twenty incidents of contact between foreigners and
soldiers during the takeover. One such reported incident had taken place on a wet street
comer. A young sentry was sheltering from the rain when he was approached by two French
ladies who offered him an old overcoat to keep him dry. The young soldier, who had been
warned not to communicate with foreigners, repeatedly refused their offer. The ladies
persisted and eventually the soldier spoke out in frustration before walking away out into the
151 Political Bureau of the Third Field Army of the Chinese PLA Chengshi changshi [General Knowledge about
Cities], March 1949, in Shanghai Jiefang, pp. 197- 214.
152 Chengshi changshi, pp. 197- 8.
153 'Shanghai gaikuang' [Shanghai Outline] in Shanghaijiejang, pp. 12-13.
154 Chengshi changshi, pp. 209-12.
ISS SMA A4-1-1, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Zhengce Yanjiu Shi guanyu Chengshijieguan gongzuo dejingyan
baogao [CCP Shanghai Policy Research Office, Report on the Experience of Taking over the Cities], 26/6/49.
156 Chengshi Changshi, pp. 209-214.
157 'Huadong Ju guanyu Waijiao jilii de qi xiang guiding' [East China Bureau Seven Regulations on Foreign
Affairs Discipline], in Jieguan Shanghai, pp. 18-9; Liu, Zhongguo Gongchandang, pp. 301-302; Gao, Hangzhou,
pp.71-2.
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rain storm saying 'we PLA soldiers can endure hardship!' (women Renmin Jiefang Jun shi
yiguan neng chi ku de, t'<;A.B!;~~jjj(¥ ;.lik-9t fjIg~~EI¥J). The fact that the ladies were
identified as being French here hints at the allegorical nature of CCP reports. Reports were
often embellished to portray what the writers considered to be wider truths. It is unlikely that
a PLA sentry would have known what language the foreigners were speaking (if they even
existed at all).158
It was reported that scenes like this repeated themselves throughout the city. Foreigners
offered gifts of cigarettes, food and tea. Most offers were turned down, just as they would
have been had they been made by Chinese residents, This was to demonstrate the discipline,
frugality and incorruptibility of the PLA. The soldiers sang as they marched: 'revolutionary
soldiers should all remember the three great disciplines and eight points of attention'
(Geming junren gege yao laoji, san da jilii ha xiang zhuyi, ~ 1fu~ A1'1'~$ic., -=*~l!.1$
A.JYi ttg). 159The Political Bureau concluded that as it was impossible to tell from
appearances who was an 'imperialist' and who was simply acting out of altruism (shanyi de
chengxin, :&gl¥J~ 1[.'), the Communists should be constantly on guard:
... before the influence of imperialism has been completely expelled from China, the imperialists
and spies in China will constantly test us, in order to understand us and destroy us[.] We should
increase our vigilance, we should not be seduced or bewitched by them, when we have abandoned
the armed struggle in our thinking we must study this new kind of struggle. 160
The foreigners' first sight of the PLA and the CCP was a little misleading. They got the
impression that the CCP were all peasant soldiers, young, naive and rustic. This assumption
carried with it judgements both positive (as to their simplicity and straightforwardness) and
negative (regarding their intelligence and abilities). While the majority of the soldiers and
158 MFA 118-00046-01, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao (fujian shi; Di Jiu
Bingtuan Zhengzhi Bu waishi gongzuo baogao, 7yue 15 ri) [Work report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department for June-july (Appendix 10; Work report on foreign affairs work of the Political Bureau of
the Ninth Army Group, 7m July)], 116/49-30/11149.
159 Wan Zhongyuan, 'Ru cheng yihou' [After Entering the City], in Guo Jiafu, Hengdu Changjiang jieJang
Shanghai, pp. 159-163.
160 MFA 118-00046-01, gongzuo baogao (tu jian shi); 'Before the influence .. .' (Diguozhuyi de sheli wei
wanchuan bei quzhu Zhongguo yiqian, qi zai Zhongguo de diguozhuyi fenzi ji tewu fenzi shishi de zai shitan
women, yao liaojie women, pohuai women, women yao tigao jingti, bu shou yinyou guhuo sixiang shang jiechu
Ie wuzhang, yaoxuexi zhe zhong xin de douzheng, *OO±)(I'I"J~fJ*7'E~*BllJlii¥J:f:!OO£,-M, j{;:f£J:f:!OOiY-J'l'i'iOO
±)(0'-t·.&$f*0'-1·IItIl1I'1"Jf£~~fXffJ, ~TAI?ftffJ, ~:l:fftffJ, ftffJ~1!jWjW't~, /F~jt51~llil~, ,~,~
J::.MI?~7ff:t~, ~~3;I ~"" fJTiY-J4~).
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low level cadres were indeed from rural origins, they were not going to be running the cities.
It should be noted here, however, that the awkward juxtaposition of the rural CCP in urban
Shanghai has perhaps been overemphasised as a trope in both contemporary and historical
accounts. This was a city full of rural-to-urban migrants: these were not the first peasants to
arrive in Shanghai.
The CCP's administrative elite were mainly middle class and educated, with plenty of
experience of living in cities. In Beijing there were economic specialists like Liu Shaoqi, Bo
Yibo and Chen Yun in charge. There were also foreign affairs specialists like Zhou Enlai,
Wang Bingnan (3::mm), Zhang Wentian (* 1lfJ~) and Huan Xiang (1lr3f), to name but a
few. Even Mao had lived in Shanghai for a short time.161 On the regional and municipal
levels, the head of the East China Bureau Rao Shushi (m~*'x:P),Mayor Chen Yi and Vice
Mayor Pan Hannian (7*& ~) had all studied abroad and were all very familiar with
Shanghai.162 Within the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department there were Zhang Hanfu, Xu
Yongying and Yu Peiwen ()$I 7i1JX), among others. All had lived in Shanghai for long periods
and had studied in the USA.163
The Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department and the takeover of Shanghai
The Shanghai FAD cadres were tasked with managing all contact with foreigners in Shanghai,
from issuing entrance and exit permits to corresponding on matters as diverse as industrial
disputes, real estate issues and the closure of businesses. It is useful, then, to consider briefly
who the members of this department were, how they approached the foreign-influenced city,
and how they took over from the Guomindang foreign affairs apparatus. How were they
organised, and how did they establish their authority?
The staff travelled from Beijing and Tianjin by train. After only a brief rest in Nanjing, they
arrived at Danyang (ft~B).Danyang was the staging point from which the takeover of
Shanghai would be launched. Here, they were given their final briefings along with the other
cadres involved in taking over the city.164Proper preparation was considered essential. Too
161 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, 1968), pp. 158-9.
162 MFA 118-00046-11, gongzuo baogao (Appendix 12).
163 He, Gongheguo di yi pi waijiaoguan.
164 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 115.
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much haste and a lack of preparation had led to severe difficulties when taking over the city
of Wuxi (126km northwest of Shanghai) in April. There had been problems in solving
disputes between workers and management, introducing the CCP's currency and ensuring the
city's electricity supply, all of which had negatively affected the city's economy and had cost
the CCP dearly in terms of prestige.l'"
On lih May, the head of the Third Field Army and future mayor of Shanghai, Chen Vi, gave
a speech at the Da Wang temple (Da Wang miao, *::E.JiB) to several hundred cadres. He
talked for four hours on the policies to be followed during the takeover. Discipline was
crucial and, Chen said, not even 'the King of Heaven' (Tianwang Laozi, ~::E.~T) would be
allowed to offend. He also stressed to all personnel the importance of upholding the 'non-
recognition' policy. While they waited for the order to move towards Shanghai, the future
staff of the FAD spent twenty days studying politics, urban policy, economics and Shanghai's
history, as well as having language training. At points, they even took it in turns to pretend to
be foreigners in order to practice procedures for dealing with them.166
At Danyang the cadres studied a document entitled Shanghai gaikuang (Shanghai Outline, 1:
fflfll!H71), which had been prepared by the East China Bureau with materials sent from
Shanghai by underground activists.i'" The outline not only had statistics detailing the number,
nationalities and occupations of foreigners but also long lists of addresses of foreign
enterprises, their managers' names and so on. Studying this document and other materials
like it meant that the CCP were reasonably well informed as to what they would find when
they entered the city.168Shanghai gaikuang posed three main questions regarding foreigners
that would have to be answered in the coming months; firstly, 'how should we manage
foreigners and deal with the foreign population?' Secondly; 'how should we manage and
supervise foreign companies?' And finally, 'how should we deal with foreign real estate?,169
165 SMA A4-I-I, Chengshijieguan gongzuo dejingyan baogao, 26/6/49.
166 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 115-118.
167 Shanghai gaikuang, pp. 3-25; Zhou Lin, 'Jieguan Shanghai de riri yeye,'Chengshijieguan qinliji. pp. 543-4.
168 SMA YI5/1I201l593, Shanghai gaikuang; xia bian, waiqiao [Shanghai Outline, Part Two, Foreigners],
04/49; SMA Y7/1I34, Shanghai waiqiao ji shilingguan, lianheguo, Mei jun zhu Hu ge jigou (Shanghai diaocha
ziliao Waiqiao bian zhiyi) [Shanghai Foreigners and Organisations in Shanghai, Consulates, United Nations,
American Military], March 1949.
'169 Shanghai gaikuang, pp. 15-16.
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Vice-Secretary to the Shanghai Military Control Committee Zhou Lin (J~#) also made a
speech on urban policy at Danyang. He told the cadres that 'it is impossible for us to
immediately purge all the bad things' (women ye bu keneng ba suoyou huai xianxiang yixia
suqing, fl<;1f] lli/FPJ~tEffl~±1':r_w. ~- rM-t r.). So the Party's urban policy had to be one of
moderation. They had to 'struggle for the position of advantage, and avoid being manipulated'
(zhengqu zhudong, bimian beidong, $!&±iifJ, ~:$E*~iifJ). Specifically, he went on, all of
Shanghai's six large public utility companies (electricity, water, trams, gas, buses and
telephones) were currently in the hands of the 'imperialists.' It was therefore impossible to
fight a 'war of annihilation' (jianmie zhan, 7f TJ( ~) without causing economic chaos and
ultimately being defeated. Instead they would have employ 'guerrilla warfare' (youji zhan, rJff
ttr ~) against the enemy, 'annihilating him step by step' (yibu yibu de xiaomie ta, -~-~
I¥JWfTJ( fill). He concluded:
OUf policy towards imperialism is finn, thorough, but this is certainly not enough. But only if it is
also progressive, planned and suited to reality, can we arrive at complete sovereignty. We should
oppose blind xenophobia.P?
On the night of the 24th May, the FAD cadres were ordered to Danyang train station.I" By
noon the next day, they had arrived at Shanghai's western suburbs, where they rested for a
few hours. That evening, they boarded buses which had been borrowed from a public
transport company by the underground Party. 172 As the Communist troops and cadres
marched into the city centre, they were met by some sixty thousand militia: the 'People's
Peace Preservation Corps' (Renmin Baoandui, Aa;;*p:~.A).The militia had been established
in factories, schools and government organs to prevent wrecking or 100ting.173 The CCP's
170 Chen Yi. Zhou Lin guanyu ru cheng hou ge fangmian zhengce wenti de fayan jilu gao [Minutes of speeches
by Chen Yi and Zhou Lin regarding certain policy issues], 10-11/5/49, Shanghai Jiefang, pp. 259-268; 'Our
policy .. .' (dui diyi de zhengce shi jianjue de. chedi de. zhe shi queding bugou de. Danshi shi zhubu, youjihua
de yufuhe shishi de. zhe yangcai neng da dao zhuquan de wanzheng. Yaofandui mangmu de paiwai, ~*Jl..i¥J~.~g~~,mE~,~~~~~.~.m~~~~~,~*~~~~~.~~,~~~.~~~a~~
~. ~&:~ l:i 13 ~1JI:71-). Also see Zhou Lin's account of the period in Danyang and the takeover of Shanghai in
Zhou Lin 'Jieguan Shanghai da shiji shi, ' pp. 78-90.
171 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 119.
172 'Liu Xiao guanyu jieguan Shanghai zhunbei gongzuo zhi Liu Changsheng dian' [Telegram from Liu Xiao to
Liu Changsheng regarding tasks in preparation for the takeover of Shanghai], 2/5/49, Jieguan Shanghai. pp. 19-
20; For an account of the CCP underground Party and Shanghai's police see Wakeman, "Cleanup," pp. 30-31.
173 SMA A4/1/1, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Zhengce Yanjiu Shi guanyu Chengshi jieguan gongzuo de jingyan
baogao [CCP Shanghai Municipal Policy Research Office Report on Experience of Taking Over Cities],
26/6/49; Shenbao, 'Shanghai Renmin Tuanti Lianhehui, Renmin Baoan Dui Zongbu An Min Bugao,' [Shanghai
United Association of Peoples Groups, Peace Preservation Group Headquarters Announcement to Calm the
73
underground activists had positioned themselves to secure the safe handover of Shanghai's
174 hei ... . I d dimportant executive, administrative and commercial organs. T err activities me u e
hanging an enormous portrait of Mao outside the Great World entertainment complex in the
former French Concession.l f Somewhat ironically, the underground Party were based in the
tower of the Shanghai Customs House. This building was perhaps the most iconic building on
Shanghai's famous Bund, the symbolic centre of foreign economic and political influence in
China.
Figure 5: Photograph of bronze plaque on the front of Customs House, Shanghai
The People's Peace Preservation Corps and the masses celebrate the arrival of
the PLA in front of the Customs House (right) and the HSBC building.
People], 26/5/49; for more on the workers militias and their role in the following years see Elizabeth J. Perry,
'Masters of the Country? Shanghai Workers in the Early People's Republic,' in Brown and Pickowicz (eds.),
Dilemmas of Victory, pp. 69-79.
174 'Liu Xiao guanyujieguan Shanghai zhunbei gongzuo zhi Liu Changsheng dian' [Telegram from Liu Xiao to
Liu Changsheng regarding tasks in preparation for the takeover of Shanghai], 2/5/49, Jieguan Shanghai, pp. 19-
20; For an account of the CCP underground Party and Shanghai's police see Wakeman, "Cleanup," pp. 30-31.
175 A photograph of this picture being raised into position can be seen Shenbao, 'Jiefangjun Yuefa Ba Zhang,'
[The PLA's Eight Provisional Regulations], 26/5/49.
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The FAD cadres stayed the night of the 24th May at Shanghai Jiaotong University. The next
morning, they were driven into the city centre. Along the route, they were welcomed by
groups of citizens, some of whom were organised by the underground Party and some of
whom had gathered spontaneously.l'"
On the 28thMay, Shanghai was formally transferred to CCP rule. Chen Yi took over from the
Acting Mayor Zhao Zukang (~mmt). 177 Zhao had previously been the head of the Bureau of
Public Works, but he had become Acting Mayor when the former mayor had fled to Taiwan.
Zhao had neither the money nor the connections to go anywhere else.17S The CCP praised
him publically for maintaining order after the withdrawal of Guomindang troops and for
ensuring a stable handover. He was kept on in a high position by the CCP because he had
valuable skills and experience. By retaining him in place, a message was sent to Shanghai's
administrative and business elites: the CCP wanted cooperation and unity. They would
179preserve the status quo.
The threat of instability and disorder was not a false one. A few days later on 2nd June, the
withdrawal of Guomindang troops from Qingdao in Shandong province had led to a day of
looting before the CCP forces arrived and restored order. Three hundred armed firemen had
tried and failed to keep 200,000 homeless refugees in order. The refugees had pillaged
government buildings as soon as the officials had evacuated them. They looted warehouses
and cut down trees for firewood. ISO
At the handing-over ceremony, the new mayor Chen Yi chose to focus on a theme behind
which all Chinese residents of the city could unite, saying:
Over the past one hundred years Shanghai has the most intractable fortress of imperialism's
aggression towards and enslavement of the Chinese people. The liberation of Shanghai has
bankrupted the aggressive influence of imperialism in China, this is a revolutionary victory which
176 Zhang Hanju zhuan, pp. 119-122.
177 Wakeman "Cleanup," p. 31.
178 Zhao Zukang, 'Huiyi Shanghai jiefang qianhou wo de qinshen jingli,' [Remembering my personal
experience of Shanghai before and after Liberation] in Chengshi jieguan qinli ji, pp. 526-7; see also Zhao
Zukang, 'Xin sheng qianhou' [Before and after my new life], in Shanghai Zhanyi Weiyuanhui, Shanghai zhanyi
Vhe Shanghai Campaign] (Xuexiao Chubanshe [Schools Publishing House], 1988), pp. 241-247.
79 Zhou Lin, 'Jieguan Shanghai de riri yeye,' Chengshijieguan qinli ji, pp. 542-60.
1soNARARG59, Box 4194, 793.00/2-1350, American Consulate General Qingdao, No. 23; Political report
governing the period 31 May to 30 June 1949, 13/7/49.
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has turned the world on its head (tianfandifu de geming shengli, ~ 1m j:fufi ~~Jl1 ;fIJ). Today
Shanghai has already become the People's city, towering in front of the world.181
Fi
In Shanghai, as in all cities with populations of over 50,000, the CCP's first priority was to
establish a Military Control Committee (Junshi Guanzhi Weiyuanhui, * $f1f mu ~ in ~)
under the leadership of Chen Vi. The Committee was immediately under the supervision of
the CCP's East China Bureau and the CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee. The latter two
organisations were, in effect, one body, with Rao Shushi as head and Chen Yi and Liu Xiao
( )(I] a~) (the pre-takeover head of the CCP in Shanghai) as vice heads. The Control
181 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 119-122; 'Over the past...' (Shanghai shi bai nian lai diguozhuyi qinlue yu nuyi
Zhongguo ren zu 'ai wanqiang de baolei, Shanghai de jiejang, shi diguozhuyi zai Hua qinliie shili de pochan, shi




Committee's first job was to restore order. Urgent or temporary policies were announced as
Control Committee orders, while long-term policies were the purview of the civilian
Shanghai People's Government. The civilian government was formally established on the
28th May but it did not actually take over from the Control Committee until late July. It was
made up of more or less the same personnel. In the short term, the Military Control
Committee's aims were not to institute revolutionary change and to awaken the masses, but
to secure public order, ensure the continued operation of the city's public utilities, curb
inflation and make immediate improvements to living conditions with a focus on hygiene.182
The Shanghai FAD was established on the 28th May. On the 30th a small group was sent to
take over the property and archives of the Guomindang's Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Shanghai branch office and the Guomindang's Shanghai FAD.183 The FAD was originally
based at 185Yuanmingyuan Road, but it moved in August 1949 to Broadway Mansions, an
enormous art-deco building which sat at the northern end of the Bund across the Suzhou
River. In May 1951, the building's name was changed to the less bourgeois 'Shanghai
Mansions.v'" Within the new department, Zhang Hanfu was in charge of policy and planning,
while his deputy Xu Yongying was in charge of day-to-day tasks.18S
The CCP's priority was to reorganise the Guomindang's government institutions. 186
Compared to other departments, the task of taking over the old foreign affairs organs was
relatively easy: there were only two 'work units' (danwei, !f!.{ft) to be taken over with a total
of 36 staff. In contrast, the Hygiene Department had to take over seventy work units with
8,539 staff, and the Public Security Bureau 108 with 14,311 staff. Across the city 17,600
CCP cadres took over 1,397 work units with a grand total of 49,000 administrative staff.187
182Huadong Ju guanyu jieguan Jiangnan chengshi de zhishi [East China Bureau Instructions on taking over
cities south of the Yangzi River], 114/49, Shanghai jiefang, pp. 224-230.
183Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 123; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 48.
184Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 129. .
18sMFA 118-00046-12, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu ba-jiu yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for August-September], 2119/49.
186Liu Shaoqi, 'Concerning Urban Work;' see Gao, Hangzhou, pp. 80-86 for an account of this process in
Hangzhou.
181Shanghai Shi Junguanhuijieguan ge wei danwei renyuan tongji [Statistics of bogus work units and personnel
taken over by the Shanghai Military Control Commission], 30/5/49- 30/6/49, Shanghai JieJang, pp. 314-16; on
p. 314 the number of 'old staff is cited as 243,820, on p. 293 the number is 49,000; The first figure includes
large numbers of military personnel and workers. It is probable that the 49,000 number refers only to
administrative personnel; See also SMA A4-2-1, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Zhengce Yanjiu Shi guanyu Shanghai
Shi Junguanhui jieguan chuqi tongji [CCP Shanghai Research Office regarding Shanghai Military Control
Committee Statistics on Early Period of Takeover], 30/5/49-30/6/49.
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The task of taking over the Guomindang organs, reported the Municipal People's
Government, was like taking over the government of a country.i'"
In many areas, administrators and technicians were maintained in their roles so as not to
disrupt city life. Despite this, the CCP's main policy towards former staff members of
Guomindang organisations was to 'disband' (jiesan, ~Iflft) them while providing them with
short-term relief and food so as to avoid disorder. After 'training' (xunlian,VII g*) the
majority were allocated to other work, or paid off, while a few essential staff were returned to
their original organisations. The former police were kept on temporarily to maintain order.189
Bo Yibo later suggested that it had been wrong to immediately payoff 27,000 old staff in
Shanghai, as this had caused 'fluctuations' (bodong, 7Eti9J). Mao also later said that spending
so much on payoffs had been a policy mistake.P"
As the FAD was a 'newly established organ' (xin chengli jiguan, ~JTPX:fttrL~), fewer 'old
staff were retained. As a result, the incoming cadres had to learn on the job.191 The takeover
was more or less complete by 30th June. All except for two or three of the old staff were
willing to attend a month of re-education classes, but after completing this period of 'study',
only eight were selected to be kept on. The others were given a small pay-off. The CCP saw.
Foreign Affairs work as being particularly sensitive. Political reliability was essential and the
majority of the old staff were not to be trusted. Those that were retained all had valuable
skills. 192 The FAD later reported that the takeover had been relatively smooth if a little
'disjointed' (tuojie, 1mII).193
In its first incarnation the department consisted of 61 cadres, making it much smaller than
most other departments.l'" Under the leadership of Zhang Hanfu and Xu Yongying was a
188 Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu jieguan gongzuo di yi ge yue zonghe baogao [Comprehensive report on the
first month's takeover work by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government], July 1949, Shanghai jiefang, pp.
292-4.
189 Wakeman, "Cleanup," pp. 37-42.
190 Bo, Ruogan, p. 15.
191 SMA B24/2/6, Shanghai Shi Bianzhi Weiyuanhui guanyu shifu zhishu bumen zuzhi guicheng, jigou bianzhi
yijian fangan deng wenjian [Shanghai Municpality Reorgansation Committee planning documents regarding
regulations on restructuring of the organisation of Bureaux subordinate to the Municipal Government], January
- December, 1950.
192 MFA 118-00046-11, gongzuo baogao (Appendix 12).
193 SMA B1I2/3658, gongzuo zongjie.
194 SMA B23/2/42, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waiqiao Shiwu Chu tianbao de xianzhi renyuan hua mingce
[Register recording names of those currently employed in Shanghai People's Government Foreign Citizens'
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small secretariat run by former underground cadre Yu Peiwen. None of the FAD's leadership
were originally from Shanghai, but between them they had spent a great deal of time there.
Unlike other branches of the new administration, which had been stocked with recently
trained (and quite poorly educated) cadres from Shandong Province, the relatively specialised
work of the FAD drew educated cadres from diverse backgrounds.!" Two non-Party advisors
were appointed, Zheng Kangqi (~*Iim) and Xiao Jirong (Jim 5R), who had both been
employed by the Guomindang foreign affairs organs. Zheng left in 1950 to work for Shell,
but Xiao continued in the department until 1958.196 Zheng was later described as a 'useful
informant' by the American Consulate.197
The majority of the! AD cadres who had arrived with Zhang Hanfu had been students at
North China Associated University's Foreign Language Department (Huabei Lianda Waiyu
xi,'~ ~t~*71-m *), cadres in the Beijing or Tianjin foreign affairs departments, or former
staff members of Zhongguo Wengao (Chinese Articles, tp OOXfi@i), a CCP publication in
Hong Kong. They also included some former Peking University students who had fled to the
'Liberated Areas.' Approximately one third of the FAD's cadres were former Shanghai
underground Party members. These cadres tended to be a few years older than the northern
cadres and they assumed more important positions.l'"
Instilling cadres from such different backgrounds with a unity of purpose was a difficult task.
The perfect FAD cadre would have high political consciousness, experience of foreign affairs
work and experience of being in big cities. Perfect cadres were rare. 199 Those from the
'Liberated Areas' were seen to have a very high level of political awareness, but they were
severely lacking in experience of foreign affairs; those from Beijing and Tianjin had the
opposite problem. Underground cadres were experienced city-dwellers, but they displayed
Affairs Bureau], 1949; The origins, age and gender of certain cadres are not recorded in this source so the
figures given only include those people for whom detailed information was available.
195 See James Gao's excellent account of the training of the Luzhongnan Southbound cadres in Gao, Hangzhou,
pp. 42-64; 4,430 Luzhongnan cadres were allocated by the East China Bureau for the takeover of Shanghai,
Zhejiang and Fujian.
196 SMA B23/2/33/50, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu guanyu renming Xiao Jirong, Zheng Kangqi ren Waiqiao
Shiwu Chu guwen de wenjian [Document from Shanghai People's Government appointing Xiao Jirong and
Zheng Kangqi as advisors to the Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Bureau], 10/9/49; SMA B24-2-6, guanyu
Shifu zhishu bumen zuzhi guicheng.
197 NARA RG 59, Box 4198,793.0015-531, Hong Kong to Secretary of State, No. 3285, 515151;SMA B23-2-42,
xianzhi renyuan.
198 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 123.
199 MFA 118-00046-11, gongzuo baogao (Appendix 12).
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bourgeois tendencies and were potentially politically unreliable. Regardless of their various
origins, the cadres universally lacked skills and experience in administration. They would
have to learn on the job. One particular area of concern was that the foreign language
capability of even the best staff was not sufficient. Zhang stressed the importance of
improving their abilities, especially in English,zoo
In the view of the leadership, having the correct political standpoint was the most important
characteristic for a FAD worker. The picture that emerges is of a department stocked with an
enthusiastic, but poorly trained, group of cadres. With limited skills and resources it would be
tough for them to carry out their work effectively. This problem was partially avoided,
however, as the CCP developed a highly centralised system of decision-making. The practice
of 'requesting instructions and making reports' (qingshi baogao, iff 7J'1~15) before and after
taking any action meant that it was difficult for low-level cadres to commit too many
mistakes.2ol
The first task the cadres were given was to study Zhou Enlai's 'Directive on Foreign Affairs
Work.,202 Their most important task in Shanghai was to sort the 'imperialists' from the
'legitimate' foreigners and to 'eliminate' (qudiao, ~t~) the former.203This was to be done
on the basis of the CCP's principle of 'you li, you li, you jie' (:ff~, :fffIJ,:ffll) which meant
'on just grounds,' 'to our advantage' and 'with restraint.' This policy dated back to the days
of the Anti-Japanese united front.204The question of attitude was all important, the FAD
reported to Beijing; it was important to 'not to make anti-imperialism degenerate into
xenophobia (liu yu paiwai, mETM~7f-)and the protection of legitimate undertakings not to
sink into pandering to foreigners' (xian yu meiwai, ~3TW7f- )?05
Our strategy is to expose and strike at all imperialist aggression and espionage, to resolutely
uphold our sovereignty, to appropriately make use of foreign economic activities which are
advantageous to us and which do not infringe upon our sovereignty[.] Moreover we will protect
200 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp.123-4; Liu, Zhongguo Gongchandang, pp. 298-9.
201 MFA 118-00046-01,gongzuo baogao.
202 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp.123-4; Liu, Zhongguo Gongchandang, pp. 298-9; Westad, Decisive Encounters, p.
252.
203 SMA B1I2/3658, gongzuo zongjie.
204 Zedong, Mao, 'Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front,' 1113/40in Selected Works,
Vol. 2, pp. 421-30.
205 SMA B1I2/3658, gongzuo zongjie.
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the lives and property of law-abiding foreigners, punish those who break the law and to be lenient
206towards those who express regret.
According to Wang Bingnan, the head of the General Office of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, in a speech delivered in June 1950, at the time of the takeover of the major cities 'the
greatest worry of the responsible comrades in every city was chaos in their foreign affairs
work' (nashi mei ge chengshi de fuze tongzhi zui danxin zai Waijiao gongzuo shang chu
/uanzi, jj~Bt ~ 1'-~ml¥-JffJ. ~ ~;0~mJL'1:E)1..~If'Pl::t±n5LT). This was why, Wang
continued, Zhou Enlai had come up with the easily memorised 'six rules and seven points of
attention.' These rules were mainly directed towards cadres going abroad, but they also
applied to those working domestically. Under the six rules, the cadres were encouraged to
discard their 'feelings of inferiority,' (zibeigan, §J2f.~) and 'inappropriate modesty' (bu
shidang de qianxu, /Fm ~ I¥-Ji! Jl[).207 Discipline had to be strict, wrote Wang: 'even a small
amount of liberalism will invite defeat' (you yidian ziyou zhuyi dou shi yao dabao zhang de,
ff -,~ §S3±5( ~IH!~rr~j( ttl¥-J). All meetings, reports and even personal communications
had to be approved and reported on. The 'seven points' were designed to keep the cadres
honest: they were to live plainly, dress smartly and avoid alcohol. They should 'listen and
observe a lot, speak seldom' (duo ling, duo kan, shao shuo hua, $-IlJT$-~j>-m it ).208 On this
theme the FAD also stressed the importance of doing away with the 'shameful performance
of slave like countenance and fawning' (nu yan bei xi choutai, 9J(~ J2f!.~tfl:~) of the old
. d ~. 209regime towar s roreigners.
206 MFA 118-00046-01, Shanghai SM Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for June-July], 116/49-30/11149, 'Our strategy is .. .' (women de
Jangzhen shi jielu he daji diguozhuyi de yiqie qinliie jiandie, jiejue weichi zhuqian. Tongshi, dui bu sun zhuquan,
youli yu women de waiqiao jingji huodong, yuyi shidang de yunyong bing baohu shoufa waiqiao de
shengmingcaichan, chengchu yiqie weifa waiqiao, dui huiguo gaiguo de waiqiao.ze yuyi kuanda chuli, ~ffJ IY-J~~~m~~rr$mOO~XIY-J-~~~~., g~.~~.H,~~.~a,~~~~IY-J~m~_m~,~~~~IY-J~m#*~~~~mlY-J~.a~,.~-~m~~m,~~M&MIY-J~m,~~~.*~
J!I!); See also MFA 118-00046-11, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao (fujian shier;
Shanghai Waiqiao Shiwu Chu jieguan gongzuo jianbao) [Work report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department for June-July (Appendix 12; Concise report on the takeover work of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department)], 116/49-30111149.
207 MFA 102-00180-01, Wang Bingnan guanyu waijiao jilu wenti baogao [Report by Wang Bingnan regarding
discipline in foreign affairs], 517150.
208 MFA 102-00180-01, Wang Bingnan guanyu waijiao, 517150.
209 'Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfujieguan gongzuo di yi ge yue zonghe baogao' [Comprehensive Report on the
First Month's Takeover Work by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government], July 1949, ShanghaijieJang,
pp.292-4.
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As well as strictly following the 'non-recognition' policy, the FAD also stressed the
importance of research and preparation: it was 'preferable to wait than to make mistakes' as
the rhyming mnemonic had it (ning tuo wu cuo, Ttmmre- )_210As the CCP's definition of
'foreign affairs' meant everything that involved foreigners, the FAD required the cooperation
of nearly all the other government departments (including the bureaus of industry and
commerce, real estate, the courts etc).211 In order to deal with all problems involving
foreigners, the FAD had to understand all these areas. This created an enormous amount of
work for them.212Much of what foreigners came to see as obstinacy or deliberate delay was
in fact caused by the fact that the cadres always sought to act from a position of strength and
preparedness.F''' There was great potential for embarrassment if different government
organisations contradicted each other. Getting other departments to follow correct foreign
affairs protocol was a difficult task in itself.214There were also logistical reasons for delays;
there were never enough cadres and they lacked skills and resources.215
In essence the FAD cadres were erecting a facade of unresponsiveness and secrecy, built
upon the 'non-recognition policy.' Foreign diplomats would be received, but only on an
informal basis and when it suited the CCP. There was absolutely no recognition of their
official status. The privileges usually accorded to consulates, such as tax exemption, were
cancelled.t'" Vice-Head of the Tianjin FAD Zhang Wenpu (~Jt1f) recalled that when
foreign officials came to call without an invitation, the lowest ranking cadres would be sent
out to deal with them while the leaders kept out of the way.217Behind this facade the CCP
could operate more freely and avoid making commitments or committing policy errors
through undue haste. Their obstinacy and unresponsiveness gave them a certain air of
210 MFA 118-00046-11, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao (fu jian shier; Shanghai
Waiqiao Shiwu Chu jieguan gongzuo jianbao) [Work report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department for June-July (Appendix 12; Concise report on the takeover work of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department)], 116/49-30/11149.
211 MFA 118-00046-26, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Shi-Shiyi Yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for October-November], 1111149- 30/11149.
212 For an interesting overview of the CCP's conception and implementation of foreign affairs 'waishi' work see
Anne-Marie Brady, Making the foreign serve China: Managing Foreigners in the People's Republic (Oxford:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2003).
213 MFA 118-00046-12, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Ba-Jiu Yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for August-September], 2119/49.
214 SMA B1I2/257, Shanghai Shi Junshi Guanzhi Weiyuanhui guanyufabu ban/a, zhangze, wengao, tiaojian de
guiding [Shanghai Military Control Commission regulations on dissemination of procedures, rules and articles],
January 1950; MFA 118-00046-11, gongzuo baogao (fujian shier).
215 SMA A4-I-l, Chengshijieguan gongzuo dejingyan baogao, 26/6/49.
216 MFA 118-00046-01, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao.
217 Zhang Wenpu, 'Zai Tianjin congshi waishi gongzuo de huiyi,' Chengshijieguan qinliji, p. 149.
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mystery that encouraged a degree of optimism among some foreign residents over the next
few months and years. The Communists were seldom seen to be committed fully to anyone
course, so there always appeared to be the chance that they could be swayed. In May 1949
many foreign residents were willing to put up with a few uncomfortable months in exchange
for the promise of future trade. For the FAD, however, the continued presence of foreign
businessmen and diplomats was an expression of their desire to maintain their 'special
privileges' (tequan, !f,ftz). 218
The FAD reported to Beijing in March 1950 that the agents of the imperialist states in
Shanghai connived together (langbeiweijian, &~]J!J,; ~f) to have their position recognised by
every possible means.i'" From the CCP's perspective, the American diplomats in Shanghai
had been quite direct. In contrast, the British were considered to be more 'experienced and
cunning' (laotian jianhu, :15f* ~f¥*). They preferred to use unofficial channels, such as
approaching the CCP through the acting chairman of the Union Jack Club, or through a
Chinese lawyer known to John Keswick. Approaches were also made through W.C.
Gomersall, a textile mill owner (of whom more will be said later). All of the above were told
to act as though they had not been in contact with the Consulate General. In the early days
Consul General Urquhart was keen to make advances in the hope that the CCP might become
more positively inclined towards the continued existence of foreign business.22o The
Communists remained unconvinced, as can be seen from a FAD report to Beijing in summer
1949 that stated that the shared aim of the British and the Americans was to 'oppress us, to
put us on the back foot and make us bow our heads, to preserve the fruits of their aggression
and carry out trade' (Ying Mei dui women de zhengce jiben xiangtong, qi mudijun wei wapo
wo rang wo rangbu ditou, zai baochi qi qinliie guoshi qianti xia, jinxing maoyi, ~~X1;ail)(
Jff£*tl3~, ~ §1¥J:l$jJ,;)]i iti;ftil::$- f~!k, l£*fif~~~*~ MtN:T, illrrm Jb ).121
218 MFA 118-00046-01, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao.
219 SMA B 112/3658, gongzuo zongjie.
220 TNA FO 371175865, British commercial interests in China, 1949; Consul General Shanghai to Foreign
Office, No. 445, 10/6/49.
221 MFA 118-00046-0 I, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao.
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Conclusion
As the CCP consolidated their hold on the city they approached the remaining foreigners in
much the same way they approached wider political and economic problems. Policy towards
foreign affairs, both within China and internationally was developed in conjunction with the
wider processes of the takeover of China's cities. Long-term nationalist and socialist
revolutionary goals based on ideology were held in abeyance, while pragmatism and short-
term stability were prioritised under the banner of New Democracy. The elimination of
foreign political, economic and other influence was certainly the CCP's aim, but for now the
CCP had at least constructed a system of dealing with foreigners within China, based on the
'non-recognition policy,' which allowed them 'semi-free hands.' Refusing to declare their
position' on foreign interests in China openly and to enter into some form of formalised
relations meant that the CCP could operate from a position of strength.
British businessmen and policy makers refused to close the door to China as they hoped for
some form of political and commercial relations. As the case of KMA demonstrated, they
could be both hostile and encouraging towards foreign business when it suited them. Their
attitude towards the future of foreign businesses in China was perhaps more flexible in
practice than has once been thought, but it remained thoroughly hostile in principle. The
Foreign Affairs Department prepared for the takeover thoroughly and established procedures
for dealing with foreigners that allowed them to operate on their own terms and not rush into
situations for which they were unprepared. As we shall see in the following chapter, once the
CCP had established their control over the cities they began to transform them. In Shanghai
this meant beginning the process of eradicating the remaining foreign political, economic and
cultural influence and transforming Shanghai from an 'imperialist city' into a Chinese and
socialist one.
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Chapter 2: Transforming Shanghai
'Old' and 'New' Shanghai
The takeover of Shanghai and the establishment of the People's Republic of China marked
the birth of 'New Shanghai' and 'New China.' 'Old' Shanghai was vilified, as was everything
belonging to it: the people and the places as well as the city's social, political and economic
milieu. I Shanghai was denigrated by the incoming CCP as the "fortress bridgehead' of
imperialist aggression in China' (diguozhuyi qinliie Zhongguo de 'qiaotou haolei, ,*00 3::)t
1~ III! If!00 aq' f!f ~ ~ 1k ')_2
Special anniversary publications have been compiled by the CCP to mark every significant
five- and ten-year anniversary from the first to the sixtieth year of 'New' Shanghai. In these
publications 'New' Shanghai has been presented quite uncritically as a workers' paradise:
independent, productive, moral, orderly, hygienic, and socialist. 'Old' Shanghai was an
imperialist, capitalist and immoral city. These publications have charted the transformation of
life in the city, the receding influence of the imperialists and the eradication of old social
evils.3 The old Guomindang regime had tried and failed to channel Shanghai's energies away
from drugs, gambling and prostitution, and towards national construction and self-
cultivation." The CCP, like Communists elsewhere, believed in the proactive, authoritarian
exercise of power by a Leninist vanguard party to destroy old inequalities and to create the
conditions for the birth of a utopia. Eliminating the foreign presence was one part of their
planned transformation.
IBetta, 'The (Re)Shaping'; Braester, Yomi, "'A Big Dying Vat": The Vilifying of Shanghai during the Good
Eighth Company Campaign,' Modern China, 31, 4 (2005), pp. 411-447
2 Shanghai gaikuang, p. 3.
3 See for example (though there are many more available); Jiefang Ribao She, Shanghai jiefang yi nian, 1949-
1950 [The first year of liberated Shanghai] (Shanghai: Jiefang Ribao She [Shanghai: Liberation Daily
Publishing House], 1950); Shanghai jiefang shi nian bianji weiyuanhui [Ten Years of Liberated Shanghai
Editorial Committee] Shanghai jiefang shi nian [Ten years of liberated Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai Wenyi
Chubanshe [Shanghai: Shanghai Arts and Culture Publishing House], 1960); Xu Deming, Shanghai huihuang
wushi nian: qingzhu Shanghai jiefang 50 zhou nian [Shanghai's glorious 50 years: Celebrating the fiftieth
anniversary of the liberation of Shanghai)] (Shanghai: Shanghai Jiaoyu Chubanshe [Shanghai: Shanghai
Educational Publishing House], 1999); Guo Jiafu, Hengdu Changjiang jiefang Shanghai: jinian Shanghai
jiefang wu shi nian zhuanji [Crossing the Yangtzi to liberate Shanghai: an album commemorating 50 years since
the liberation of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shanghaishi Xin Si Jun Lishi Cong Kan She [Shanghai:
Shanghai New Fourth Army Historical Collections Publishing House], 1999).
4 Frederic Wakeman Jr., 'Licensing Leisure: the Chinese Nationalists' Attempt to Regulate Shanghai, 1927-49,'
The Journal of Asian Studies, 54, No. I, (February 1995), pp. 37-8; Hershatter, 'Regulating Sex'), pp. 145-86.
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In 'New China,' 'Old Shanghai' would continue to be maligned as an exploitative place
dominated by foreign imperialists.i Perhaps the most visually stimulating portrayal of 'Old
Shanghai' can be found in the 1965 film version of the revolutionary opera 'The East is Red'
(Dongfang Hong, *n-tl). In an early scene the viewer is shown Shanghai under darkened
skies; workers load Chinese silk onto a foreign ship as an arrogant white imperialist and his
Chinese toughs abuse them," Even as late as 1980, pre-'Liberation' Shanghai was described
in children's books as an evil place, a place of 'foul wind and bloody rain [this is a set phrase
implying a reign of terror], a place of darkness' (xueyu xingfeng, yipian heian, .Itn.f:F:iniJXl, -
Jt ~1I!).7 Shanghai as a compromised, semi-colonial city held a special place in the CCP's.
conception of century characterised by 'national humiliation' (guochi, OOIf1l:). The discourse
of 'national humiliation' is a constantly recurring theme in Communist historiography ..
designed to chastise imperialism, promote Chinese nationalism and highlight the CCP's
achievements in ending the cycle of shame. How did the CCP seek to establish their New
Shanghai in contrast to the humiliations of the past?"
This chapter explores the period after June 1949 with a focus on the CCP's eradication of the
non-economic aspects (that is, the political, cultural, religious aspects) of the foreign presence
in Shanghai. It begins with a brief introduction to the concept of 'New Shanghai' before
moving on to chart the main events of this period, including the Guomindang blockade and
bombing of the city. Shanghai was at the forefront of Sino-foreign relations. Events at the
international and national levels, including the establishment of the People's Republic on l "
October 1949 and the withdrawal of the American presence from China, informed events on
the ground in Shanghai and were shaped in turn by events in Shanghai. In the foreground was
the issue of whether diplomatic relations would exist between Britain and China, and whether
British interests had a future in Shanghai. A cultural shift was signalled by the punishment of
British and American citizens by the Chinese authorities for real or perceived misdemeanours.
The CCP used these opportunities to demonstrate that foreigners were no longer immune
S Betta, "Myth and Memory. '
6 Dongfang Hong [The East is Red] (Beijing: August 1st Film Studio, 1965).
7 Jiefangjun Shanghai Jingbeiqu, Jiefang Shanghai de Gushi [PLA, Shanghai Garrison, The Story of the
Liberation of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shaonian Ertong Chubanshe [Shanghai: Juvenile & Children's Publishing
House], 1980), p. 10.
S William A. Callahan, 'National Insecurities: Humiliation, Salvation, and Chinese Nationalism,' Alternatives:
Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No.2 (Mar.-May 2004), pp. 199-218; Paul A. Cohen, 'Remembering and
Forgetting National Humiliation in Twentieth-Century China,' Twentieth-Century China, Number 2, April 2002,
pp. 1-39(39).
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from Chinese justice in an independent and sovereign Shanghai. The chapter concludes by
examining the CCP's policies towards foreign cultural interests in Shanghai from 1949 into
the early 1950s. This was a period of transformation: the CCP sought to establish their
authority in the city by gaining control over civil society, both Chinese and foreign. Foreign
newspapers were closed and foreign films were banned. As nationalism and anti-imperialism
intensified foreign cultural organisations were progressively closed or taken over.
Many foreigners believed that, like the incoming revolutionaries of the past, the CCP would
be corrupted, exhausted, and absorbed by the decadent city. The CCP's attitude towards
Shanghai had been shaped by their troubled relationship with the city; the Party had held its
First Conference in Shanghai's French Concession in August 1921, but they had also suffered
their greatest defeat there at the hands of the Guomindang in 1927. After the 1927 purge, the
CCP were effectively banished to the countryside," The CCP were well aware of the potential
for the spiritual pollution of their cadres and it was a source of great anxiety.!" Their mission
was, therefore, to transform the city's social milieu through various proactive measures. Their
intent was marked by a symbolic and literal clean-up of the city that took place within the
first two weeks after the takeover: the hygiene department removed tens of thousands of
tonnes of waste from the city's streets.f ' Thousands of vagrants and pickpockets were
rounded up to be 'reformed' and 'transformed into normal working people.' Many were sent
away from Shanghai back into the hinterland.F The once decadent and depraved 'Great
World' (Da Shijie, *t!t~) entertainment complex, with its freak shows, pickpockets, and
9 On the founding of the Party see Tony Saich, (ed.), The Rise to power of the Chinese Communist Party:
documents and analysis (Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1996), pp. 11-18; Hans J. Van de Ven, From Friend to
Comrade: the Founding of the Chinese Communist Party, 1920-1927 (Berkeley; Oxford: University of
California Press, 1991). On the 1927 purge see Frederic Wakeman, Jr., Policing Shanghai 1927-1937 (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1995), pp. 122-3; Smith, A Road is Made; and Harold R. Isaacs, The Tragedy of
the Chinese Revolution (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2nd rev. ed, 1961), pp. 110-119.
10 Hannah, 'Shanghai,' p. 188; 'Nearly all agreed that, as in the past, the new revolutionary force would begin to
dissolve once it had occupied Shanghai, which in the past had exhausted, corrupted, and absorbed many
conquering warlords. Indeed, one felt it simply had to happen that way; for if it did not, that would be the end of
Shanghai.'
IIThe CCP claimed in internal reports that 65,000 tonnes were cleaned away, and in a newspaper that 35,000
tonnes were cleared. See Shi Renmin Zhengfu jieguan gongzuo di yi ge yue zonghe baogao [Comprehensive
Report on the First Month's Takeover Work by the Shanghai Municipal People's Government], 07/49, Shanghai
Jiefang, pp. 292-4; Shanghai Xinwen Ribao [Daily News, *fil~ I':HIl], 8/6/49, cited in HSBC SHGI 0001,
Summaries of news and reports (political, economical, financial) for senior management, Jul-Dec 1949.
12 Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily, Mtnr8tll], 16/12/49, cited in HSBC SHGI 0001, Summaries of news and
reports (political, economical, financial) for senior management, Jul-Dec 1949; see also Wakeman, "Clean up,"
pp.47-8.
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pimps was made, to quote one pro-CCP source, 'clean and orderly.' 13 Prostitution was
cracked down on through a series of increasingly severe measures aimed at breaking the
power of the pimps and 'reforming' prostitutes." Two years later Shanghai was described by
American observers as being 'both smart and clean.' 15
In March 1949Mao had warned his Party about the dangers of victory, saying that, 'After the
enemies with guns have been wiped out, there will still be enemies without guns.' These
enemies would try to use 'sugar-coated bullets' to subvert the revolution. For Mao, the
revolutionary seizure of power was 'only the first step in a long march of ten thousand Ii.'
The last few decades would 'seem like only a brief prologue to a long drama.' In order to
consolidate the revolution, the remaining cultural influence of the foreign imperialists had to
be eradicated:
Old China was a semi-colonial country under imperialist domination ... This imperialist
domination manifests itself in the political, economic and cultural fields. In each city or place
where the [Guomindang] troops are wiped out and the government is overthrown, imperialist
political domination is overthrown with it, and so is imperialist economic and cultural
domination. But the economic and cultural establishments run directly by the imperialists are
still there, and so are the diplomatic personnel and the journalists recognized by the
[Guomindang]. We must deal with all these properly in their order of urgency. Refuse to
recognize the legal status of any foreign diplomatic establishments and personnel of the
[Guomindang] period, refuse to recognize all the treasonable treaties of the [Guomindang] period,
abolish all imperialist propaganda agencies in China, take immediate control of foreign trade and
reform the customs system - these are the first steps we must take upon entering the big cities.
When they have acted thus, the Chinese people will have stood up in the face of imperialism. As
for the remaining imperialist economic and cultural establishments, they can be allowed to exist
for the time being, subject to our supervision and control, to be dealt with by us after country-
wide victory."
13 Yang Li-Hsin, 'Formerly a hang-out for racketeers- 'The Great World'- is now a popular entertainment
centre,' China Monthly Review, Shanghai, June 1953, pp. 74-77; for an irreverent Western account of the Great
World in its prime see Maurine Karns and Pat Patterson, Shanghai; High Lights, Low Lights, Tael Lights
(Shanghai, The Tridon Press, 1936), pp.7 -8; The 'Great World' was run from 1931 by prominent Green Gang
leader Huang Jinrong, see Wakeman, 'Licensing Leisure,' pp. 26-7.
14 Wakeman, 'Licensing Leisure,' p. 37; Christian Henriot, "La Fermeture": 'The Abolition of Prostitution in
Shanghai, 1949-58,' The China Quarterly, No. 142 (Jun., 1995), pp. 467-486; Hershatter, 'Regulating Sex in
Shanghai,' pp. 145-86.
IS NARA CREST CIA Archive, Information Report; Present State of Shanghai's Foreign Community/Business
Conditions!Appearance of City, 6/11151.
16 Mao, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session,' pp. 361-75. A li is a Chinese unit of measurement equal to
about 500km.
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Economic crises and unemployment could only be solved by long-term economic stability:
consumerist materialism would have to be replaced by industrial production. In 1953 the
local authorities wrote a report that reflected on Shanghai's transformation from a 'paradise
of the bourgeoisie' (zichanjieji de /eyuan, i1iF~ft~ag*lZ9) with a 'semi-colonial' and
'comprador odour' (maiban qiwei, ~~~P*) into a 'productive city' (shengchan chengshi,
~F:l1itm). According to the report, light industry and commerce predominated in 1949. The
city's single largest industry was the textile industry which accounted for a third of all
factories (some 5,000 in total) and nearly half of all employment. The famous Nanjing Road
and Avenue Joffre (now Huaihai Road, 5t~ta~)were lined with fashionable shops, cafes,
dance halls, and jewellery stores with 'glittering jewels that delighted the eyes' (linlang
manmu, I#!R;(Jij §). All this co-existed alongside the most desperate poverty. The city's
decadent character and the dominance of foreign enterprises in many economic sectors, had,
in the opinion of the CCP, led the city to have had an 'abnormal development and unhealthy
appearance' (jixing jazhan he bu jiankang de xianxiang, W~tF~~ Ii~Il~ 11Jm agIJ\! ~ ).
Shanghai was therefore considered to be 'not a productive city, rather . . . a' model
consumerist city that serves the bureaucrat, comprador, landlord and imperialist.v'" Over the
next few years the CCP placed a great deal of emphasis on transforming production to 'serve
the working classes' (wei gongren jieji fuwu, 7:1IA~ft~~&$), in line with a shift to heavier
industry. Luxury consumer items became ever more scarce: shops closed, or adjusted to the
new realities by selling revolutionary items such as the simple clothing that became known in
China as 'Sun Yat-sen suits' and in the West as 'Mao suits.' Expensive hotels and apartment
buildings became government offices.I8
Sites of former 'imperialist influence' were occupied or demolished. In August 1951 the
Shanghai People's Government announced that they would be taking over the site of the
ninety-year-old racecourse to build a huge 'People's Square' and park. The racecourse was
one of the pre-eminent symbols of foreign influence in China. It had, the CCP said, corrupted
the people of Shanghai, luring them into gambling away their hard-earned money.i'' As well
17 SMA BI82-1-461-187, Shanghai ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi;' 'Not a productive city... ' (Yinci Shanghai bu
shi yt ge shengchan chengshi, er shi yi ge dianxing de wei guanliao, maiban, diguozhuyi fuwu de xiaofei xing
chengshi, ~!lt..t;~~~-1-~1"i}ilm, ji'ij~-1-Y4~a{_J7iJ~~. ~W-. m~~~HlB~·a{_J;~i!'tii}ilm).
18 Ibid.
19Ma Tao-Hsien, 'Foreigners' Old Race Course is now People's Square; Sign of the Times,' China Monthly
Review, Shanghai, October 1952, pp. 371-4; The site had also been used by Japanese and US Army units
stationed in Shanghai; for an historical overview see also Xiong Yuezhi, 'From Racecourse to People's Park and
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as having been established by 'British imperialist gold diggers' to exploit the naivete of
Chinese gamblers, observed the Chinese press., the racecourse had been used as a billet by
Japanese and American troops during and after the Pacific War. After 'Liberation' it had
been reopened as a club, where Chinese youth had been tempted to spend 'long hours of
dissipation.V" At the ground-breaking ceremony the vice-Mayor, Pan Hannian, made a
speech claiming that the old and the immoral was being done away with in favour of creating
a new and healthy Shanghai. The square would become a centre for revolutionary activity
and anti-imperialist rallies:
Everyone knows that this ground has been branded with the indelible mark of the big powers'
aggression against China ... this piece of land which has been occupied by the imperialists for over
90 years has returned to the embrace of the people of Shanghai. .. it is to be used by the people of
Shanghail'"
Similarly, the stadium for greyhound racing in the former French Concession became the
'Shanghai Cultural Plaza' and was used to hold political rallies.,22 The Aili Garden, the
private playground of the Hardoon property dynasty, became the site of the enormous 'Sino-
Soviet Friendship Building. ,23
People's Square: the historical changes and the symbolic meaning,' Frontiers of History in China, 2008, Vol. 3,
No. I, pp. 101-116.
20 The Shanghai News, '''Race Course" - Yesterday & Today,' 6/9/51.
21 Zhou et al, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 322; 'Everyone knows that. .. ' Shei dou zhidao, zhe kuai tudi shang youzhe
lieqiang qinliie Zhongguo de wushu laoyin ... zhe kuai bei diguozhuyi zhe qinzhan jiu shi duo nian de tudi
zhongyu hui dao Ie Shanghai Renmin de huaibao, yongyuan wei Shanghai Renmin ziji suoyou, wei shanghai
Renmin suo yong le! ifU~~llji, ~±~±±th..t{:j§'9IBs1~1H~q:.lEa~7GJ&~~p... ~±~~&:mOO.i:J(~f~~1t.+s~a~±±t!!~T @J£IJ7..tffijA ~It;r-i§, j}di!j] ..tifeA ~ ~ 2pJj{:j, j] ..tit} A ~pJj ffl7 !).
22 SMABI82-1-461-187, Shanghai ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi.
23 Shanghai de Gushi [Story of Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe [Shanghai People's
Publishing House], 1963), pp. 42-7; Betta, '(Re)Shaping,' pp. 4-5.
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'The ambition of the imperialists cannot be killed': inflation and blockade
The eradication of the non-economic aspects of the foreign presence took place in a period of
great instability and uncertainty. Managing foreigners was one of the most sensitive issues
the CCP faced, but there were other, far more pressing problems at hand. Their immediate
priority was to calm the populace, and to restore order. They then had to revive the economy,
check the rampant inflation in the city, calm the mood of over half a million workers, and
come up with a plan to assist a further quarter of a million unemployed. Furthermore, the
eyes of the world and the rest of China were upon them, watching to see if they were capable
of running a large developed city_24There were two main sources of instability: the ongoing
inflationary crisis, and the civil war.
Inflation
Inflation had been a severe problem in Shanghai since the Pacific War. Average prices in
August 1945 were 2,500 times higher than pre-war levels. The Guomindang regime failed to
restore economic stability. The financial crisis that brought down that government had
peaked in late 1948 when prices were a further 2,500 times higher again than the August
1945 level. In October 1948 a new currency was introduced and Jiang Jieshi's son Jiang
Jingguo (;jl~£OO) led a campaign for currency stabilisation that, in the words of one banking .
official, 'more or less terrorised [Shanghai] into a state of monetary equilibrium.' Ultimately,
however, these efforts failed, and the inflationary spiral began once more.25
Shanghai became a town of barter and exchange. Criminals and corrupt officials abounded.
Many ordinary people were obliged to engage in various illegal practices simply to survive
(such as the possession of foreign currency). According to the local authorities' 1953 report
on the transformation of Shanghai, the city had many factories that were 'buying nothing and
selling nothing' (mai kong mai kong, ~~~~). They existed solely as fronts for the owners
24 Zhou Enlai, Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Zhongyang Danganguan bian, Jianguo yilai Zhou
Enlai wengao, di san ce, 1950 nian 7yue -1950 nian 12 yue [Zhou Enlai's Manuscripts Since the Founding of
the People's Republic of China, Vol. 3, July 1950 to December 1950] (Beijing, Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,
200S), p. 366.
25 Chang, The Inflationary Spiral, pp. 79-S5, 363; Young, China's Wartime Finance, pp. 327-S.
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to hoard raw materials, speculate and acquire foreign exchange." Shortly before the takeover
of the city, Consul General Urquhart described the economic situation as follows:
There are many who fear that the economy of Shanghai ... will not long stand the strain. There are
no markets, no confidence, the ordinary leaders and managers have gone and unemployment must
. 27increase.
The success of the CCP's revolution depended on restoring economic order. From the end of
May to early June waves of inflation continued to erode the value of the CCP's new currency,
the Renminbi (Peoples Currency). It seemed that the CCP might have as little success as the
Guomindang: between the end of May and mid July the price of goods increased nine-fold.
By September, prices had fallen slightly, butcompared to prices on the 30th May, the price of
rice had risen by 150 per cent, and flour by 82 per cent.28
The currency was eventually stabilised in the spring of 1950 as a result of the CCP's
economic and political measures.F' Probably the most important of these was the CCP's
fierce crackdown on speculators. On 8th June 1949 plain-clothes Public Security Bureau
cadres and garrison soldiers surrounded the city's currency exchange and arrested large
numbers of those found inside. On 1st December six counterfeiters (allegedly Guomindang
agents) were paraded through crowd-lined streets on their way to the execution grounds."
The second reason for relative stabilisation was that the CCP facilitated the supply of food
and raw materials into the city, increasing supply to meet demand. Economy campaigns, and
the fact that a tenth of the pre-' Liberation' population had been 'dispersed and had left the
city' (shusan li bu, iIJ:n~~:t~) meant reduced pressure on resources. Finally, Parity Deposit
Units (zhe shi chuxu, tfi~fit~) were issued instead of cash wages to guarantee workers a
standard of living based on the price of essential commodities." The China Association,
26 SMA B 182-1-461-187, Shanghai ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi.
27 TNA CAB 2113273, China: recognition of Communist Central Peoples' Government, 1949 May-1957
February; Consul General Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 315, 7/5/49 forwarding addressed to Nanjing, No.
127,7/5/49.
28 Shanghai jingji shang de zhongyao wenti gaishu [Overview of Important Economic Problems in Shanghai],
September 1949, inShanghaiJiejang, pp.475-83.
29 Gao, Hangzhou, pp. 94-7; The Shanghai News, 'China Scores Victory in Curbing 12-Year Inflation,' 2119/50.
30 Wakeman, "Cleanup," p. 47.
31 Shanghai jingji shang de zhongyao wenti gaishu, pp. 475-83.
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which represented the interests of British businesses, described the Units as an 'unusual (but
extremely realistic) currency system.,32
The Civil War and the blockade
The Civil War continued in South China well into 1951. The relatively smooth takeover of
major cities, such as Chengdu and Guangzhou (which both fell in December 1949), belied the
difficulties the CCP would continue to face as they struggled to deal with guerrilla resistance
in unfamiliar territory.v' On the 20th June the Guomindang Government announced through
its propaganda organs that they were imposing a blockade of all major ports on the east China
coast. On the 21 st June a British steamship, the Anchises, was bombed by Guomindang-
piloted, American-built PSI Mustangs in the Huangpu River. Four of the crew were killed.
The British Government had not been formally notified of the Guomindang's intent to
impose a blockade, and the attack was described by them as 'entirely unwarranted. ,34
The formal blockade was announced on the 26th June. The British saw this as the folly of a
doomed government, an entirely negative measure designed to cause suffering that was
useless from a strategic point of view. Furthermore, it seriously imperilled the 'open door'
policy. Even Consul General Urquhart in Shanghai had to admit that if the British population
there had been told that they would have faced a recriminatory blockade, 'many more would
have left and taken with them what they could of their assets. ,35 Shanghai was dependent on
imports." The blockade meant that Shanghai was completely cut off from the raw materials
needed for industry (such as Kailuan coal) and basic foodstuffs. China's under-developed and
war-damaged interior could not provide an alternative."
32 TNA FO 371183272, China Association Annual Report, 1949-1950, Annual Meeting, 3/5150.
33 Jeremy Brown, 'From Resisting Communists to Resisting America: Civil War and Korean War in Southwest
China, 1950-51,' in Dilemmas of Victory, pp. 105-129; see also Skinner, 'Aftermath of Communist Liberation,'
f,p.61-76.
4 See comments by Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Christopher Mayhew in Hansard, 'Attack on
British Ship, China,' HC Deb, 2116/49, vol. 466, cc34-5.
35 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal in Communist China, Nationalist Blockade of port of Shanghai and
Commercial community, 1949; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 586, 2117/49; W. Strang to Prime Minister,
29/7/49.
36 TNA FO 371175864, British commercial interests in China, 1949; Major General R.C. Money, Ministry of
Transport to P.D. Coates, Foreign Office, 10/2/49, internal disruption and economic backwardness had Money
argued, meant that 'the world has learned to do without Chinese produce, including Chinamen.' .
37 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal in Communist China, Nationalist Blockade of port of Shanghai and
Commercial community, 1949; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 586, 2117/49; W. Strang to Prime Minister,
29/7/49.
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The Guomindang's blockade produced a tense atmosphere in the city. It was seen by the
Shanghai FAD as part of a wider campaign to secure foreign interests in Shanghai by making
life difficult for the CCP:
The ambition of the imperialists cannot be killed; we should heighten and strengthen our hard
work against them. The utmost fantasy of the imperialists from start to finish is to use violence to
destroy our revolution."
If the blockade were not lifted, Urquhart informed the Foreign Office, it would have been as
if a 'death sentence' had been passed on half the firms in Shanghai, and a slow 'sentence of
extinction' for the others.i" To cover expenses, their head offices were forced to remit large
sums' at an 'unrealistic' rate of exchange (around £360,000 every month).40 Closing down
would mean huge payouts to Chinese employees, the loss of physical assets and financial
reserves. Furthermore, the Shanghai British Chamber of Commerce reported, 'the labour
situation is ugly and forced closing could give rise to very serious trouble. ,41Some companies,
such as British American Tobacco, were already considering halting remittances of capital
and closing their Chinese subsidiaries.Y
The CCP held all the cards in deciding the future of British nationals and assets in Shanghai
and Hong Kong. They would also decide future political and economic relations between the
two countries. So, Urquhart argued, it was up to the British to make the effort to break the
blockade. For years, he said, the British had protested their neutrality but had been the CCP's
" ,43tacit enemy.
38 SMA BI-2-3658-1, Shanghai Waiqiao Shiwu Chu gongzuo zongjie (chugao) [Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department draft summary of work], May 1949 to March 1950; 'The ambition of the imperialists ... '
(diguozhuyi zhe de yexin shi bu hui si de, women ying tigao yu guangda women de null. Diguozhuyi zhe de zui
gao huanxiang shizhong shi yi baoli cuihui wo geming, ~@ij1:)t:ifa~JflL.\~:i!'~9EB~, f:lHf1mt!l'5J~1*.m~M~.~@ij1:)t:if~~.~.~.~~~~mm •• ~.
39 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal; W. Strang to Prime Minister, 29/7/49.
40 TNA CAB 2113273, China: recognition; Cabinet: Recognition of the Chinese Government; Memorandum by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (49) 214, 24/10/49; Cabinet: Recognition of the
Chinese Government; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (49) 248,
12/12/49; Cabinet: Recognition of the Chinese Government; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (50) 73, 20/4150.
41 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal; W.J. (Tony) Keswick, China Association, to Prime Minister Atlee,
1118/49; Copy of telegram from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to the China Association, .London,
received 11/8/49.




The British were committed to two incompatible policy directions; in the China area they
were 'keeping a foot in the door,' but their paramount global concern was to work with
America in order to preserve their global influence. By July 1949 the Americans had already
decided that there would be no profitable future for business in China and that the CCP were
hostile to foreigners in principle as well as in practice. They were reluctant to push the
Guomindang to give up their blockade. " The British business community in Shanghai
appealed strongly to the British Government, saying that it appeared 'that our interests are
being subordinated to American policy which, from our angle, appears to be merely to
evacuate.' The businessmen hoped that an end to the blockade would enable them to
demonstrate their worth to the new Chinese government. 45
Although they considered the blockade illegal, the British could do nothing. They could not
risk a confrontation with the Guomindang or a falling out with America by unilaterally
breaking the blockade." Furthermore, many at the Foreign Office were doubtful about how
long any Chinese 'door' would remain open. It could be assumed that the CCP planned to
eventually eliminate British mercantile interests in Shanghai. It was not worth subordinating
long-term policies to short-term risks.47
In June, Mao wrote to Stalin explaining that while he fully expected the 'imperialists' to
continue their blockade, it would have little effect on China's economy as a whole, they
would aim for self-sufficiency wherever possible and minimise their dependence on
imports." From August to November, around twenty factories were moved from Shanghai
into the Chinese interior.t" Deng Xiaoping suggested that:
44 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal; Sir F. Hoyer Millar, Ambassador, Washington to Foreign Office, No,
3654, 2117149, W. Strang to Prime Minister, 29/7/49; On the American policy towards the blockade see
Woolsey, L. H., 'Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government: The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 44, No.2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 350-6.
45 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal; W.]. (Tony) Keswick, China Association, to Prime Minister Atlee,
1118/49; Copy of telegram from the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce to the China Association, London,
received 11/8/49; Hooper, China Stands Up, p. 104.
46 TNA PREM 8/943, Distribution of Coal; Sir F. Hoyer Millar, Ambassador, Washington to Foreign Office, No,
3654, 2117/49, W. Strang to Prime Minister, 29/7/49; On the American policy towards the blockade see
Woolsey, L. H., 'Closure of Ports by the Chinese Nationalist Government,' The American Journal of
International Law, Vol. 44, No.2 (Apr., 1950), pp. 350-6.
47 TNA FO 371175866, British commercial interests; M.E. Dening to Sir W. Strang, 29/7/49, record ofa meeting
between Minister of State and representatives of the China Association. .
48 CWIHP, Cable, Mao Zedong [via Kovalev] to Stalin, 14/6/49.
49 Jiefang Ribao [Liberation Daily, M~ 13tin 4/11/49 and Xinwen Ribao [Daily News, *fillij 13tiX], 2817149,
cited in HSBC SHGI 0001, Summaries of news and reports (political, economical, financial) for senior
management, Jul-Dec 1949.
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Although the blockade has caused us more than a few problems, it also has a beneficial side. Even
without the blockade we still have many unsolvable problems. so
The 'beneficial' aspect Deng mentioned was that although the British opposed the blockade,
the Americans were tacitly supporting it; local opinion could easily be turned against them.
The Shanghai FAD summed up the situation as they saw it by saying:
... the struggle in foreign affairs in the 50 days following the liberation of Shanghai has been one
part of the Shanghai people's anti-imperialist struggle. This struggle is one of preserving special
privileges or opposing imperialist aggression. Today this struggle is focused on opposing the
blockade.sl
In April, the Guomindang were forced to end their blockade as they withdrew from the
strategically important Zhoushan archipelago. The arrival of two British ships in late May
represented the return of normal shipping to Shanghai. 52
Shanghai was China's most economically important city and it was within striking distance
of Taiwan. It was, therefore, an obvious target for bombing by the Guomindang's airforce
using their American-made 'planes. There were over a hundred raids before mid-March 1950.
The provenance of the 'planes was a tangible reminder of America's failed policy of support
for the Guomindang; it also implied that the Americans condoned the bombing and was a
great propaganda coup for the CCP. The bombing was sporadic, small in scale and generally
quite ineffective, but it remained lethal nonetheless. 53 In one fairly typical raid, two fighter
planes strafed a passenger train at Chenju Station, killing three and injuring eleven. 54 On 6th
February 1950 the American-owned Shanghai Power Company was bombed. The Shanghai
so Deng Xiaoping 'Break the Blockade Imposed by the Imperialists,' 19/7/49, Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping,
Vol. 1.
51 MFA 118-00046-01, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo .baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for June-July], 1sI June 1949- 30th November 1949; 'The struggle
in foreign .... (Shanghai jiefang 50 tian lai waishi douzheng, zheng shi Shanghai renmin fandui diguozhuyi
douzheng zhi yi fangmian. Shi weichi tequan yu fan di qiniie de douzheng. Jintian ze jizhong yu fan fengsuo de
douzheng ... ...t.;tU~~50 ~~IH~.4~. IE~...t.;iij.A.~&~;f*~::E~4~z-1-JJiJij. ~~fUH~,*Jl.!:5&
*f~IIIU~4~. ~~91'J~tp-ri1t~!:5&iH~HI~4~ ... ).
S2 Hooper, China Stands Up, pp. 83, 108.
53 TNA FO 371183344, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading conditions and positions of British firms in
China, 1950; Brieffor the Secretary of State's Meeting with China Association Deputation on Thursday 16/3/50.
S4 Da Gong Bao (j;: iHIX), 4/11149 and Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily, M~ 13tIX), 2111149 cited in HSBC
SHGI 0001, Summaries of news and reports (political, economical, fmancial) for senior management, Jul-Dec
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FAD saw this as further proof of the fact that the imperialists.intended to destroy Shanghai's
economy. They reported that they were not surprised that the Americans, acting through the
Jiang Jieshi regime, would stoop so far as to bomb their own enterprises. 55 This raid caused
between five hundred and one thousand casualties. 56
To ensure that the city ran smoothly and without interference from 'imperialists,' the
authorities strengthened their control over the foreign public utility companies in an effort to
make the foreign management 'bow their heads, listen to orders and not dare to disobey' (shi
waiqiao fushou ting ling, bu gan weikang, 1t?I'11f1R'ri~~·WT~=1'~i~H1i:).57In March, a group
of Soviet experts arrived to help strengthen the city's air defences and within a few months,
the frequency of air attacks decreased. 58
The 'non-recognition policy'
The blockade and bombing formed the backdrop to a period of uncertainty in which foreign
diplomats and businessmen sought to establish some form of contact with high-ranking CCP
leaders. Shanghai was home to 31 diplomatic organs of foreign powers (including consulates
general, embassy branch offices and so on) as well as numerous international organisations
and relief organisations such as the Economic Cooperation Administration and International
Refugee Organisation.i'' Attempts to make contact were always rebuffed. The CCP refused to
recognise the official status of foreign representatives in the absence of diplomatic relations.t''
This meant that they could continue to have 'semi-free hands.' Mao stated in March 1949 that
the CCP's policy was as follows:
Weare willing to establish diplomatic relations with all countries on the principle of equality, but
the imperialists, who have always been hostile to the Chinese people, will definitely not be in a
ss SMA B 1-2-3658-1, Gongzuo zongjie.
S6 A figure of 1,000 is given in TNA FO 371183344, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading conditions
and positions of British firms in China, 1950; Brieffor the Secretary of State's Meeting with China Association
Deputation on Thursday 1613/50. Elizabeth Perry cites figures from Chinese sources that claim 500 casualties,
with 600 injured and 50,000 rendered homeless, see Perry, 'Masters of the Country,' p. 71.
S7 SMA B 1-2-3658-1, Gongzuo zongjie.
58 Li Luo ($:;!), 'Er, liu hongzha hou de Shanghaifankong xi douzheng' [The Struggle Against Air Raids in
Shanghai after the 6th February Bombing], in Guo, Hengdu Changjiang, pp. 314-7; TNA FO 371183346, British
Commercial Policy in China: Trading Conditions and Positions of British Firms in China, 1950; China
Association Bulletin No. 47, 20/4/50.
S9 Zhou et ai, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 309.
60 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 128
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hurry to treat us as equals. As long as the imperialist countries do not change their hostile attitude,
we shall not grant them legal status in China."
Non-recognition was a blanket policy. Not even Soviet diplomats were to be formally
recognised before the establishment of diplomatic relations. The FAD strongly reprimanded
the Shanghai Cultural and Arts Department when it invited Soviet representatives to a
ceremony commemorating the 'Liberation' of the north-east in the name of the 'People's
Government' instead of in the name of the Party. The invitation had to be withdrawn, which
was a source of great embarrassment.f
Despite being determined to apply the non-recognition policy strictly and universally, the
CCP's newly close relationship with the USSR was extremely important to them. During a
conversation with Kovalev in early May 1949, Mao had likened imperialism to a lion: the
head and body of the lion, the strongest parts, had been firmly bound by the USSR with the
help of the Eastern bloc countries, while the CCP had
... pinched the lion's tail and are trying to cut it off. We suppose that the cutting of the tail will in
turn weaken the power of the imperialists, concentrated in the head of the lion."
The terms of this relationship were worked out from June to August 1949 in a series of major
talks in Moscow between Stalin and a secret Chinese delegation led by Liu Shaoqi. In these
talks the Soviets agreed to a quick recognition of the future CCP government and a massive
programme of economic aid and technical assistance.t" Soviet support reassured the CCP and
they saw no need to rush to secure recognition from Britain and the other Western powers.f
The CCP's imagining of imperialism in China as the 'lion's tail' was apt. In post-1949 China
there was no single strong imperialist hegemony to be attacked, merely the remnants of an era
only just ended when foreign powers had dominated the Chinese economy and had bullied
her politically. The imperialism targeted by the 'worldwide revolution' was American
61 Mao, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session,' pp. 361-75.
62 MFA 118-00046-12, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Ba-jiu yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for August-September], 21/9/49.
63 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, 17/5/49.
64 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo Waijiao,' pp. 34-5.
65 Gong Li, Mao Zedong yu Meiguo: Mao Zedong dui Mei Zhengce sixiang de guiji [Mao Zedong and America:
the Trajectory of Mao Zedong's Policy Towards America] (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe [World Knowledge Press],
1999), pp. 20-23.
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imperialism; Britain was reduced to the role of 'running dog.' America was the most
influential power globally. In Shanghai however, it was the remnants of British influence, the
businesses, organisations and individuals, which were the most apparent, and that needed to
be dealt with.
The future for British firms in China did not look bright. In their annual report for 1949, the
China Association provided a bleak appraisal of the events: the year had seen 'crisis after
crisis, and no end is yet in sight.' They appreciated fully that 'the chances of survival of
private enterprise - except in special cases - are remote.' While some optimists hoped that
what they saw as an intensely xenophobic country would reject the foreign communist creed,
the China Association was not hopeful:
That the new order came to power under the banner of an alien political creed seems to be of
secondary importance in a country as vast and primitive, and culturally independent as China:
what is more important is that the new hierarchy is intensely more nationalistic, and more ruthless
and efficient in enforcing its will, than any Chinese Government of modem times.66
The blockade, the China Association believed, had damaged Britain's interests, and had
hardened Chinese hostility towards Britain. Some, like Ambassador Sir Ralph Stevenson,
maintained that 'the ignorance and inexperience of the Peking authorities may be a more
important factor than their intense suspicion and anti-British bias.' As such, they argued that
what was needed was a quick improvement in Sino-British relations and increased contacts
with high-level leaders.f"
America had shown itself to be openly hostile to the CCP, but from early on it was clear that
the British held different views. Indeed, within the British establishment there was a spectrum
of different opinions on the future of British interests in China. As early as September 1949,
the Shanghai FAD noted that the British were displaying a much friendlier attitude, and were
willing to stay under the right conditions. British diplomatic representatives were similarly
eager to make and maintain contact (and thereby preserve their interests, the CCP argued),
whereas the Americans were now attempting to contact them less frequently. Protests from
the American Consulate now usually came after matters had been resolved, rather than during
66 TNA FO 371183272, China Association; Annual Meeting, 3/5/50.
61 TNA FO 371175866, British commercial interests; Sir R. Stevenson, Nanjing to Foreign Office, 1382,2/9/49.
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the process of resolution, suggesting that they had lost faith in dialogue and were now only
protesting for the sake of form, The US were calling for their nationals to leave the country,
and this, along with attempts by British and American businesses to close factories or reduce
their staffs, were seen as a deliberate attempt to cause trouble for the CCP, to 'incite
disharmony' (tiaobo, MH~t)and 'manufacture instability' (zhizao bu an, *IJ~~~).68
In September, the British Consul General in Tianjin, S.L. Burdett was asked by a Chinese
business contact, Wang Zhenbo (zJHS), to prepare a memorandum on the British presence
in China, to be delivered to Wang's government contacts in Beijing. Burdett chose to
emphasise the lack of contact between both sides as a particular source of dissatisfaction,
saying that over the past several months only Pryor of the Kailuan Mines had maintained
regular contact with CCP leaders:
With that one exception British subjects are at the mercy of minor officials, by whom the majority
of them have been treated with suspicion, contempt, and ill-disguised hostility. Their liberty is
restricted and their requests are usually refused or ignored and are not infrequently answered with
threats."
With officials unable to make contact in anything other than their capacity as private
individuals, Urquhart looked towards the business community, and John Keswick of Jardine,
Matheson and Co. in particular. It was not only the size, historical legacy and current
importance of his business that made Keswick important. Urquhart wrote of him;
... there is not a man in these parts of John Keswick's stature. He is head and shoulders above any
of the others here and withal a very pleasant fellow.
Yet Urquhart was also wary of Shanghai businessmen. They had a reputation for being 'a
fairly unscrupulous bunch,' and he had been specifically warned to be careful of Keswick,
who in the next few months was to prove 'very naughty indeed. ,70
68 MFA 118-00046-12, gongzuo baogao, 21/9/49.
69 TNA FO 371175867, British commercial interests in China, 1949; S.L. Burdett, Consul General Tianjin to
L.H. Lamb, Nanjing, No. 375, 14/9/49 forwarding memorandum by Burdett given to Wang Zhenbo.
70 TNA FO 371175868, British commercial interests in China, 1949; Consul General Urquhart, Shanghai to
Peter Scarlett, Foreign Office, Confidential Letter, 2/11149. Keswick had also once had to be persuaded by the
Ambassador not to try to become the mayor of Shanghai, see TNA FO 371175868, British commercial interests
in China, 1949; Consul General Urquhart, Shanghai to Peter Scarlett, Foreign Office, Confidential Letter,
2/11149; 'This is, of course, by no means the first time I have had to stand my ground with John Keswick. The
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The trouble had begun in September 1949 when Keswick held two meetings with Zhang
Hanfu of the FAD, and was also able to meet Mayor Chen Vi. These meetings had gone well.
Keswick found both Zhang and Chen friendly and well-disposed towards the idea of trade
with Britain. Keswick had described the British in Shanghai to Zhang as like men waking in
the night without a light 'and trying to feel our way around the furniture in the room. What
we [need is] more light so that we could have more understanding.V' Soon afterwards the
Chinese suggested that Keswick might be invited to head a British business delegation to
Beijing to meet with the Minister of Industry and Commerce for the north China People's
Government, Yao Yilin (9jHtx~*), to discuss the current situation and future prospects. This
news was greeted with much excitement among British officials, who hoped that their 'open
door' policy might be paying off.
When, sometime later, nothing seemed to have happened, they began to worry. According to
Urquhart's rather shocked reporting of events, Keswick had made the invitation a personal
one, and had kept his plans secret. He was seen to be deliberately excluding others in order to
take the 'inner track' and land valuable contracts (the news was only leaked when Keswick's
wife mistakenly mentioned it to John Kenyon of Patons & Baldwins Ltd.). This would have
been damning enough, Urquhart wrote, but Keswick had also sought to delay the visit, as 'his
firm had been "making a killing" in Canton [Guangzhou]', where the retreating Guomindang
were making good use of Jardine Matheson's ships, wharves and warehouses. Keswick,
Urquhart reported, 'complacently agreed that it was so; that when the rats were scuttling was
the time to rake the shekels in.' He wanted to keep Yao 'dangling on a string until the Canton
situation had cleared up.' To the dismay of the British officials, the invitation was eventually
withdrawn. In October 1949 the question of recognition had arisen and had complicated
matters. Nothing could now be done until diplomatic relations existed between the two
countries. In missing this opportunity for his own firm and for British business in general,
first crisis occurred when John was carried away by Mayor K.C. Wu and was filled with ideas of standing as
temporary mayor after the nationalists had to leave, holding the city as a sort of international responsibility. The
Ambassador fortunately came down and warned him off that one.'
71 TNA FO 371175867, British commercial interests in China; Record of interviews between Chairman of the
British Chamber of Commerce Shanghai and Director of Foreign Affairs Bureau and the Mayor of Shanghai, at
which position of British interests in China was discussed; Copy of a letter from Mr. Keswick to Mr. Mitchell of
the China Association dated 28/9/49; Hooper, China Stands Up, p. 101.
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Urquhart suggested, 'Keswick has allowed rather a lot of people to see that his feet are, after
all, of clay.' 72
While Keswick was in Urquhart's bad books, another businessman named William Charles
Gomersall was endearing himself. InNovember 1949, the director of the Manchester-based
Calico Printers Association Ltd. ordered the Shanghai manager of its troubled subsidiary, the
China Printing and Finishing Co., to close down and, if necessary, to give the plant to the
Chinese Government. The Foreign Office considered this proposal 'madness' and urged strict
secrecy because 'extremist Communists would be delighted to think that fruit so rich ...
should fall into their hands so easily.' Gomersall stepped in to lease the plant for ten years,
providing finance to resume production.P
Gomersall had originally gone out to China with Jardine Matheson, but had broken away in
1928 to form his own company, the China Engineers.I" He was a somewhat divisive figure
and was greatly disliked by Keswick. In Urquhart's view, Gomersall had been too
independent to stay at Jardine Matheson, where it was 'said that only 'yes-men' can expect
advancement.' Keswick arranged to keep him out of the British Chamber of Commerce by
threatening to resign as Chairman should Gomersall be admitted. As Keswick remained the
'big man in Shanghai', the majority of other Chamber members fell in to line.75
Both Gomersall and Urquhart considered that the best policy was to win the CCP over by
demonstrating both their positive intentions and their usefulness to the Chinese. In order to do
this, Gomersall proposed an enormous expansion of the company's business in Shanghai.
This included provision for £1,000,000 to be spent on the construction of China's first rayon
mill. He finished his proposal with these words;
72 TNA FO 371175868, British commercial interests; Consul General Urquhart, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No.
923, 31110/49; Consul General Urquhart, Shanghai to Peter Scarlett, Foreign Office, Confidential Letter,
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In conclusion we are anxious to serve the Chinese government and people. It is a function of the
merchants to provide for the needs of the State ... It will be a great privilege if we can use that
confidence to promote and develop new industries for the service of the people and government of
China.76
In a later meeting at the Foreign Office, Gomersall reportedly said that the CCP were 'very
suspicious,' but also that Britain had done little to counter such suspicions. They had been
damaged through association with American hostility towards 'New China.'77 His proposal
for increased investment was apparently 'met with unanimously unfavourable reactions from
all the departments consulted.' When British resources were overstretched throughout Asia
there could be no justification for sending' good money after bad' .78
The establishment of the PRe
The establishment of the People's Republic of China was announced in Beijing on 1st
October 1949. The Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellites quickly recognised the
new regime. 79 Soviet aid and expertise could now flow openly to the CCP without
controversy. 'New China' would be a 'New Democracy,' 'a 'People's Democratic
Dictatorship' with the CCP as the vanguard party. New Democracy, a concept first discussed
by Mao in 1940, called for a period of transition in which a broad national consensus would
prevail and economic reconstruction would be emphasised. Explicitly communist or socialist
goals were postponed.f"
The concept of New Democracy was imported from the USSR: consensus, camouflage and
gradualism were urged on the Chinese by Soviet advisors. The Soviets had learnt from their
own experience of seizing power as a minority faction. They had fought a long civil war to
secure their very survival. The economic basis of New Democracy bore many similarities to
the period of the 'New Economic Policy' in Russia (1921-28), when Lenin sought to correct
76 TNA FO 371175868, British commercial interests; Consul General Urquhart, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No.
1036,2/12/49. Original emphasis.
77 TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading Conditions and Positions of British Firms
in China, 1950; Foreign Office Minute, Dening, 29/4/50.
78 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading conditions and positions of British firms in
China, 1950; I.S.H. Shattock Memorandum, 5/5/50, on Board of Trade to Shattock, 3/5/50; G. Bown, Board of
Trade to Shattock, Foreign Office, 3/5/50.
79 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 310.
80 Mao, 'On New Democracy,' pp. 338-84; Mao 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship'; Kirby, 'Continuity
and Change,' pp. 133-5.
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the Bolsheviks' previous radicalism and to undertake more moderate change under state
capitalism. New Democracy in China was not a corrective measure, but a long-term
strategy.i'
New Democracy included a political element largely missing from the Russian model. New
Democracies were installed throughout Eastern Europe in the wake of the Red Army in 1945.
Takeovers were camouflaged so that local citizens and Western governments were unclear as
to what was happening. The Communists, with their ruthlessness and Leninist discipline,
quickly overcame the disorganised, liberal opposition. The opposition were picked off one by
one, using what the Hungarian Communist leader Matyas Rakosi called 'salami tactics.' East
German Communist leader Walter Ulbricht summed up these camouflaged takeovers, saying
'It's got to look democratic, but we must have everything in our control.,82 In China, famous
democrats like Song Qingling, the well-loved and respected widow of Sun Vat-sen, were
brought into the government. Song's endorsement carried a lot of weight at home and abroad,
but Mao described her in private as 'fully subordinate. ,83
The new government produced a new provisional constitution called the 'Common
Programme' (Gongtong Gangling, ~ Iii]~1XJ~Yi).Opposition to imperialism was enshrined in
Article 3 of this document, which said: 'the People's Republic of China must abolish all the
prerogatives of imperialist countries in China.'84 A new Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
established. The Ministry was to be headed by Zhou Enlai with Zhang Hanfu as one of three
Vice-Ministers. His position in Shanghai was taken by Huang Hua, who had been running the
Nanjing FAD.8s
81 North, Robert C., 'The NEP and New Democracy,' Pacific Affairs, Vol. 24, No.1, (March 1951), pp. 52-60.
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8S MFA 102-00147-01, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiao Bu renyuan peibei caoan [Draft allocation of
cadres for Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC]. 19/10/49; SMA B24-2-6, Shanghai Shi Bianzhi Weiyuanhui
guanyu Shifu zhishu bumen zuzhi guicheng, jigou bianzhi yijian fangan deng wenjian [Shanghai Municipality
Reorganisation Committee Planning Documents Regarding Regulations on Restructuring of the Organisation of
Bureaux Subordinate to the Municipal Government], January-December 1950; Zhang Hanfu did not formally
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Zhou relied on a close group of associates with military backgrounds to run the Ministry in a
highly centralised manner. All major decisions were made by him in consultation with Mao.
He built a PLA 'in civilian clothes' which conceptualised diplomacy as being one front in the
struggle against imperialism.t" Below the high-level military figures, the Ministry's cadres
were relatively inexperienced. Only 68 of the 248 cadres were classed as 'old cadres'; the
other 180 were 'new cadres' who had joined after August 1945. A full 23 per cent of the
cadres had at one time been members of 'reactionary organisations' (including the
Guomindang). As a group, they were relatively well educated (157 of them had studied at
university and 127 could speak English).87
In his speech inaugurating the new Ministry on 8th November, Zhou portrayed a world split
into two camps: the 'peaceful' camp led by the USSR, and the aggressive, imperialist camp.
'The imperialists see us as enemies,' Zhou declared 'we should similarly see imperialism as
the enemy and oppose it.' He also stressed however that they could also make use of relations
with imperialist countries. In any case, he suggested (referring to Lenin's theory of
imperialism), that imperialism was 'dying capitalism.' It was a 'paper tiger' (zhi laohu, m~
m), over-stretched, out-dated and due for collapse. Zhou called on the cadres to help speed
its demise/"
On his arrival in Beijing, Zhang Hanfu was charged with leading a small group that would
decide how best to eliminate the remaining foreign presence in China. His experience in
Shanghai and with the Kailuan mines made him the perfect man for the job.89 As with
begin work in Beijing until December 1950 as both he and Huang Hua had to first finalise their affairs in their
respective posts.
86 Liu Xiaohong, Chinese Ambassadors; the Rise of Diplomatic Professionalism Since 1949 (London:
University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 12-15.
87 MFA 102-00147-03, Waijiao Bu ganbu tongji biao [Statistical chart of Ministry of Foreign Affairs cadres],
9/12/49.
88 MFA 102-00147-04, Waijiao Bu chengli da hui buzhi jihua, hui jilu [Plan for arrangement, and minutes, of
meeting on the establishment of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs], 6/11149-8/11149; Zhou Enlai, 'Xin Zhongguo
de waijiao' [New China's Diplomacy] in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu, Zhou En/ai waijiao
wenxuan [People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Selected Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai]
(Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe [Central Documents Publishing House], 1990), pp. 1-7; 'the imperialists see
us as enemies' (Diguozhuyi shi dishi women de, women tongyang ye yao dishi diguozhuyi, fandui diguozhuyi, *
OO~s(~~~,!Uifna~. :ftffJriiH$t!H~~t~.*OO~s(. &~;j"*OO~s() Zhou was referring to V. I. Lenin,
Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism: a Popular Outline (London: Martin Lawrence, 1934, first
EubJished Petrograd, 1917).
9 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 126, 144; it was important to consult also with the various Ministries and Bureaus of
trade, security and so on at central and local levels, see MFA 102-00147-05, Huan Xiang tiyi zuzhi shewai wenti
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Kailuan, stability was paramount. The CCP had much more to lose by forcing the issue than
they had to gain by taking over a large number of foreign enterprises all at once. Besides, as
Zhou said, the Chinese were in a position of strength: the imperialists had 'nothing they can
do against us' (tam en dui women meiyou ban/a, 'E:1fD1ft1f];5i~~)*).90
The mood in Shanghai seemed to have settled, to a degree, after the founding of the People's
Republic. The FAD was relatively pleased with its progress. They had managed to avoid any
major problems, the leaders reported, but they still faced two main difficulties: firstly, that the
tasks they faced were vast and their goals unclear; and secondly that their cadres did 'not
have 'high ideals' (lixiang biaozhun di, !1~.EtfiF it itt ). 91 They noted that after the
establishment of the new government the amount of daily contact that they had with
foreigners had decreased. Fewer foreigners were now trying to close their factories and so
there were fewer labour disputes to be settled. This indicated to them that foreign businesses
wanted to persevere.Y
Neither Britain nor America was willing to renounce their former policies towards the CCP;
Britain wished to maintain a 'foot in the door' and the Americans remained hostile to the idea
of a Communist China. The Shanghai FAD reported that as early as the summer of 1949 they
had been purposefully trying to manipulate the 'contradictions' between the British and the
Americans." The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, was in favour
of recognising the CCP as soon as possible in order to secure the strategic position of Hong
Kong, to keep Communism from penetrating Malaya, Singapore and the rest of the region,
and to secure the British business presence in China. Too long a delay in recognition, he
yanjiu xiaozu wenti jt zhengfu dui ci wenti de yijian [Huan Xiang suggestion on question of forming a small
research group for dealing with matters involving foreigners and government's view of this matter], 20/11149-
20/12/49.
90 Zhou Enlai, 'Xin Zhongguo de waijiao' [New China's Diplomacy] in Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Waijiaobu, Zhou En/ai waijiao wenxuan [People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Selected
Diplomatic Works of Zhou Enlai] (Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe [Centtal Documents Publishing House],
1990), p. 5.
91 SMA B24-2-1-85, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Junshiguanzhi Weiyuanhui Waiqiao Shiwu Chu zuzhi
guicheng (caoan) [Shanghai People's Government Foreign Citizens' Affairs Department Organisation
Regulations (draft)], 20/10/49; The number of cadres had risen to 106 by November 1950, SMA B24-2-6,
Shanghai Shi Bianzhi Weiyuanhui guanyu Shifu zhishu bumen zuzhi guicheng, jigou bianzhi yijian fangan deng
wenjian [Shanghai Municipality Reorganisation Committee planning documents regarding regulations on
restructuring of the organisation of bureaux subordinate to the Municipal Government], January-December
1950.
92 MFA 118-00046-26, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Shi-Shiyi Yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for October-November], 1111149-30/11149.
93 MFA 118-00046-01, gongzuo baogao, 30/11/49; Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou En/ai wengao, Vol. 3, pp.
642-3.
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argued, would make the CCP even more ill-disposed towards Britain and tie them closer to
Moscow. Though America would not look favourably on recognition, Bevin feared that
without it, British interests might simply have to be surrendered. Recognition would not
make the CCP the rulers of China, he commented, for they were that already; it was simply
an acknowledgement of that fact, conveying no sense of approval. The British Government
recognised the People's Republic on the 6th January 1950.94
The CCP, for their part, were in no rush to establish relations with the British, or with any
other 'imperialist' power." A series of conditions had to be fulfilled before relations could be
established with any country. Firstly, all ties with the Guomindang had to be severed.
Secondly, the CCP had to be convinced of their 'friendly attitude.' Finally, relations had to be
'on an equal footing, mutually beneficial, and based on mutual respect' {zunshou pingdeng,
huli huxiang zunzhong, )l~.!J!.~.B:~IJ.B:*!r~~).96 John Hutchinson was sent to Beijing as
charge d'affaires to begin negotiations. The Chinese would refer to him only as the 'British
Negotiating Representative' (Yingguo tanpan daibiao, ~OOi~*IH-c~), a title that conveyed
no recognition of his diplomatic status. After the outbreak of the Korean War, he and his staff
were marginalised as negotiations ground to a halt. Relations at the charge d'affaires level
were only established in 1954 following the Geneva Conference and the armistice in Korea.
Full diplomatic relations were not established until 1972.
The main reason for the delay was that the CCP were unimpressed by Britain's 'unfriendly
attitude.' This unfriendliness was made manifest through the participation of British troops in
the Korean War, Britain's abstention from votes in the United Nations aimed at ejecting the
Guomindang (to allow in the Communists), and their participation in US-led trade sanctions
on strategic exports to China." All that was to come: China's initial reluctance to establish
relations was based on the situation in early 1950. At this time, Britain was seen as complicit
in the blockade of Shanghai, and attempts by British businessmen to close factories or reduce
94 TNA CAB 2113273, China: recognition; Cabinet: Recognition of the Chinese Government; Memorandum by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (49) 214, 24/10/49; Cabinet: Recognition of the
Chinese Government; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (49) 248,
12/12/49; Cabinet: Recognition of the Chinese Government; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (50) 73, 20/4150.
95 Mao, 'Report to the Second Plenary Session,' pp. 361-75.
96 MFA 102-00235-01, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo duiwai zhengce [The Foreign Policy of the People's
Republic of China (Outline)], 01101151-30101151.
97 Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou En/a; wengao, Vol. 3, p. 358.
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workforces were seen by the Shanghai FAD as deliberate attempts to 'manufacture instability'
(zhizao bu'an, itIJJi[~~).98 The Shanghai FAD saw Britain's rumblings about recognition
as a 'smokescreen' (yanmu, ~1liI.)to hide their real intent, which was to preserve their
··1 99pnvi eges.
Britain was caught between its desire for improved relations with the Chinese and its
paramount policy of preserving the Anglo-American alliance. This contradiction in British
policy was highlighted when the British were called to settle a dispute between American and
Chinese interests. When the People's Republic was established, seventy aircraft belonging to
two Guomindang agencies (the China National Aviation Company and the Central Air
Transport Corporation) were based in Hong Kong. In November 1949, the directors of the
two companies flew to Beijing and announced that the 'planes now belonged to the People's
Republic. In December, however, the planes were sold by the Guomindang Government in
Taiwan to Civil Air Transport Inc., an American company represented by Lieutenant General
Claire Chennault.
In April 1950, the Chief Justice of Hong Kong ruled that the 'planes belonged to Beijing.
American representatives in London then suggested that that post-war aid to Britain might be
imperilled by such a decision. 100 In light of this, the British Government instructed the
Governor of Hong Kong to detain the 'planes, 101 After much legal wrangling, the 'planes
were eventually handed over to the Americans in 1952.102 This overtly political decision did
little to convince the Communists that Britain was a friendly power.
98 MFA 118-00046-12, gongzuo baogao, 21/9/49.
99 MFA 118-00046-26, zonghe baogao, 4/11149.
100 TNA Fa 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China 1950: Trading conditions and positions of British
firms in China, 1950; China Association Bulletin, No. 50, 20/3/50; James T. H. Tang, 'From Empire Defence to
Imperial Retreat: Britain's Postwar China Policy and the Decolonization of Hong Kong,' Modern Asian Studies,
Vol. 28, No.2 (May, 1994), pp. 329-330; for an overview of the legal aspects of the Hong Kong aircraft dispute
see Aristeides Papadakis, 'The Chinese Aircraft in Hong Kong,' The International Law Quarterly, Vol. 4, No.2
(Apr., 1951), pp. 159-177.
101 TNA Fa 371193126, Civil aviation in and through Hong Kong; legal dispute over disposal of Chinese
aircraft originally belonging to the China National Aviation Corporation (CNAC) and Central Air Transport
Corporation (CATC) in Hong Kong, claimed by the Communist Government of China; American company's
claim on the basis of part ownership ofCNAC, 1951; Statement of the Present Position of the Chinese Civil
Aircraft in Hong Kong; R.F.G. Sarell, 16/2/51, Minute.
102 TNA Fa 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China 1950:; China Association Bulletin, No. 50,20/3/50.
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Three months after they had proffered recognition and relations had still not been established,
the British began to worry. Bevin believed that American policy (or absence of a policy other
than to 'let the dust settle') towards China had harmed their interests. Itwas an election year
in America and the Democratic administration was under attack from Republican critics, who
seized on the 'loss of China' to Communism as proof of the administration's weakness.l'" At
the end of July 1949 the.American Ambassador left China. His departure was facilitated by
the CCP, who wanted to ensure that he left without incident.!" InAugust 1949, the US State
Department published a White Paper on China intended to quiet its critics by damning the
Guomindang. The Americans were hamstrung in determining their future policy by their
outright hostility to the CCP.105
In July 1949, the American Consulate in Shanghai was besieged and later occupied by Sikh
former employees of the US Navy, who demanded improvements to their terms of severance.
The American ambassador ascribed the 'near-anarchic' conditions to either a lack of control
by the CCP or to their direct connivance.l'" This, coupled with the detention of the consular
staff in Shenyang and the arrest of their Vice Consul in Shanghai (discussed in the next
section), made Washington fear for the safety of their diplomats and citizens in China.
American citizens were encouraged to leave the country.
In January 1950, the Beijing Military Control Committee requisitioned the former US
barracks in Beijing and all American co~sular personnel were withdrawn in response.l'"
Relations reached their nadir in December 1950 when, following China's entry into the
Korean War, the American Government froze all Chinese assets in America (US$105.4
million). This effectively ceased economic interaction between the two countries. The
Chinese responded by seizing an estimated US$196 million of American assets in China.lOS
.103 TNA CAB 21/3273, China: recognition; Cabinet: Recognition of the Chinese Government; Memorandum by
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (50) 73, 20/4/50.
104 Zhou Enlai,Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol. 3, pp. 64-7, 641.
lOS Xiang, Recasting, p. 226
106 FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates in Areas Occupied by the Chinese Communists, pp. 1187-1199;
Correspondence between Consulate General Shanghai, Embassy Nanjing and State Department; see also, Briggs,
'US Consular Rights,' pp. 246-7.
107 Hooper, China Stands Up, p. 179; TNA CAB 2113273, China: recognition; Cabinet: Recognition of the
Chinese Government; Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs [Ernest Bevin], C.P. (50) 73,
20/4/50.
108 Richard T. Devane, 'The United States and China: Claims and Assets,' Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 12 (Dec.,
1978), pp. 1267-79; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 51; Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol.
3, pp. 656-702-3; Shao, China, Britain, pp. 61-3.
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Military control was put in place over the strategically important American-owned Shanghai
Power Company and Shanghai Telephone Company. This was not ended until 1954 when
they both became state-owned enterprises.v" Local military governments took control over
American property and enterprises.'!" On his arrival at the Shanghai Power Company, the
military control commissioner was met with celebratory firecrackers. Speeches were made in
which the union promised increased vigilance against saboteurs. III From May 1951, the
frozen American assets were formally taken over through requisition, purchase or being
placed under government custody by decree. By the end of 1952, 240 American firms had
been disposed of, representing 94.5 per cent of the total American capital assets in China.II2
America's withdrawal from China was portrayed by many in America as a 'lost chance,' but
it is clear that by this time both parties were already firmly committed to diverging courses
and mutual hostility.i'?
With the withdrawal of the Americans and the increased tensions caused by the Korean War
came the progressive dismantling of the foreign cultural (or non-business) presence in
Shanghai and across China. It is towards the elimination of this part of the foreign presence
from 1949 into the early 1950s that this chapter now turns, beginning by addressing the ways
in which the CCP demonstrated to foreigners that things had changed in Shanghai.
109 SMA A38-2-6-3, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei guanyu tongyi Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu
'guanyu qian Meishang Shanghai Dianli Gongsi yu Shanghai Dianhua Gongsi de jieshujunguan wenti' de pifu'
[CCP Shanghai Committee agreement to Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Bureau's approval
'Regarding the question of ending military control over the former American owned Shanghai Power Company
and Shanghai Telephone Company'], 1954. Through organisational changes the two companies had in reality
become state owned enterprises in all but name before 1954. See also The Shanghai News, "Everyone on the Job"
now in Shanghai Power Co.,' 2/2/51 for a propagandistic account of the atmosphere in the power plant
following the takeover.
110 Devane, 'The United States and China,' pp. 1267-1279; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 51; Zhou Enlai,
Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol. 3, pp. 656,702-3; Shao, China, Britain, pp. 61-3.
III The Shanghai News, 'Power Co. workers welcome Control Commissioner Chen,' 1I1I5l.
112 Shao, China, Britain, p. 73; Zhou et ai, Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 315-16.
113 Hooper, China Stands Up, p. 60; see also Chen Jian, 'The Myth of America's "Lost Chance'";
Westad, 'Losses, Chances, and Myths,' pp. 105-115.
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"You should not treat us with the same attitude you had towards us in the past":
'educating' foreigners in 'New Shanghai'
Several foreigners were arrested by the CCP in the early period following the takeover. They
dealt with these cases in a manner which was intended to set an example to other foreigners
and to establish their nationalist and anti-imperialist credentials. Foreigners, they said, were
no longer immune from Chinese law. The CCP argued that even though the system of
extraterritoriality (under which foreigners in China had been subject to the laws of their own
countries and tried in consular courts) had been abolished in 1943, an assumption of
immunity from Chinese justice still prevailed. The Guomindang had, it was said, failed to
defend Chinese sovereignty and had pandered to the foreign imperialists. 114 The CCP would
transform Shanghai from a playground for foreigners into a sovereign Chinese city. The CCP
were certainly anxious to demonstrate their new attitude towards foreigners, but it should also
be remembered that they relied on foreigners to give them the opportunity to do so. The
Political Bureau of the 9th Army reported that soon after their entry into the city the behaviour
of foreigners had quickly improved, but there had still been cause to discipline them because
they were:
... accustomed to behaviour that oppressed the people, they often explode and beat people, don't
follow our government's orders and even go so far as to insult our soldiers. liS
The first major case arose on 21st June 1949, when a British employee of the British-owned
Shanghai Electric Construction Company (the British Tram Company) named Bill Matheson
allegedly assaulted a Chinese worker named Wang Zhenguo (It~~). Matheson had worked
for the company for 25 years. According to one employee, he was 'hated to the bone'
(henzhirugu, 't~ZA~) by the Chinese employees of the company because of his imperialist
114 MFA 118-00046-11, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu liu-qi yue gongzuo baogao (fu jian shier; Shanghai
Waiqiao Shiwu Chu jieguan gongzuo jianbao)[Work report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
Department for June-July (Appendix 12; Concise report on the takeover work of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens
Affairs Department)], 1SI June 1949- 30th November 1949.
liS MFA 118-00046-10, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Chu liu-qi yuefen gongzuo baogao (fujtan shi), 116/49-30/11149;
Di Jiu Bingtuan Zhengzhi Bu Waishi Gongzuo Baogao, 15/7/49; Wo ge bu duizijinru Shanghai yilai, you 5 yue
26 ri qi dao 7 yue 10 ri zhi de 45 tian zhong. [Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department Work Report for
June-July (Appendix 10) 116/49-30/11149; The 9th Army Group Political Bureau Foreign Affairs work report,
15/4/49; From the entry of our forces into Shanghai, from 26th May to 10th July]; ' ... accustomed to behaviour ... '
(Suiran bi Jiang guan shiqi shi dada de jianshao le, danshi xiguan Ie yapo renyuan xingwei, shishi hui baoda da
ren bu zunshou zhengfu de faling, shenzhi wuru wojunren, .$.~~bil-gIl1M~**~~)Jt~7. 19~;3:Jffl7lli
mA~~ff~. 1l11l1~~anA~~~aft~~.. .I~Wft.~.
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attitude.l'" Wang had asked Matheson for sick leave, reported the CCP's official Shanghai
newspaper, the Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily, ~ib. E3 til):
Matheson said to him arrogantly, "you have to work even if you are sick. If you don't work, you
will not get your pay." Wang said "You should not treat us with the same attitude you had towards
us in the past." On hearing that, Matheson started to display his skill in boxing and struck Wang a
violent blow on his head. One of Wang's front teeth was knocked off, his lips bruised, and his face
bled profusely. His uniform as well as the clothes of an interpreter (Mei Wenliang, )g>z:: ~), were
smeared with blood. Though Wang tried his best to dodge, yet the Britisher continued the attack
and struck him again on his forehead, whereupon Wang was further wounded and at last fainted.
Matheson dragged him out of the office and the plight of the victim was distressful beyond
description.
The newspaper reported that Matheson had previously assaulted another worker, named Shu
Guiqing (~f~9I!1l), but the Guomindang had not held him to account.1l7 Following the
incident, Matheson had apparently claimed immunity from arrest because he was a British
national.l'" In the newspaper's allegorical reporting, Matheson as an individual embodied
imperialism as a concept, and the CCP were quick to be seen to punish him. Through
Matheson's actions the imperialists had been proved violent and irrational: they were clearly
unwilling to give up their old status peacefully. If Matheson represented imperialism, then
Wang represented the Chinese people. Union representatives were reported as saying:
The assaulting and insulting of the worker of the Shanghai Tramway Company by Matheson
should be regarded as tantamount to the assaulting and insulting of all the workers in Shanghai as
well as the insulting of all the workers in China.
In the newspaper's reporting of this case it was the response of Wang's fellow workers that
prompted the CCP to action. While Matheson was taken away by the police (and later
116 MFA 118-00046-08, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Chu liu-qi yuefen gongzuo baogao (fujian bay, 116/49-30/11149
{Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department Work Report for June-July (Appendix 8)].
17 'British-Owned Shanghai Tramway Company Employees Demand Punishment of British Inspector for
Beating up Workers,' Jiefang Ribao, 21/6/49 reprinted in 'Chinese Press Review', Shanghai (translations done
by the American Consulate in Shanghai, No. 916, June 21, 1949, p. 12); see also Zhou Erfu, 'Chen Yi tongzhi
jiekai xin Shanghai lishi di yi ye' (Comrade Chen Yi opens the first page of New Shanghai's history) in
Chengshi Jieguan Qinli Ji, pp. 572-4; this quite recently published secondary account is fairly typical of the
still quite ideologically tinged accounts of this period prevailing in China, Wang's condition is described
evocatively as 'badly mangled' (xuerou mohu, .Itn.~~~*IiII). The characters of this set phrase literally mean 'a
confusion of blood and flesh.'
118 'Various circles continue to protest against Shanghai Tramway Company Assault Incident; Demand
Punishment of Matheson,' Jiefang Ribao, 23/6/49, Chinese Press Review (Sh.) No. 918, 23/6/49, p.8.
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released on bail), the company's 300 Chinese workers 'spontaneously' held a meeting to
discuss the incident and call for an apology. In re-arresting Matheson on the 23rd June, the
CCP were therefore seen to be exercising the will of the people. While popular revulsion
towards the reported assault would not be surprising, the 'spontaneity' of these protests seems
very artificial.119
On taking him into custody the CCP found that Matheson took an 'arrogant' (aoman, ~It')
attitude. He completely denied having hit Wang. They began by 'forcefully educating' (you
liliang de jiaoyu, ~ j] _;_a~~1f) him in CCP policy, stressing that 'any imperialist who
committed a wrongdoing and who refused to repent had to be punished, no-one could be
spared' (duiyu renhe diguozhuyi fan le cuowu bu si huigai zhe dou yao jiayi yanli de zhicai,
juebu rao ren, jtT1f1ilJ*~~~~~ 7t:~,'i~Hm~:ll~B~1JD"')'Fma~*IJ~, 1~~t~A).120
The British Consul was denied access to Matheson because his official position was not
recognised.V'
The translator, Mei, was interrogated several times. He continuously protested Matheson's
innocence, saying that in fact, Wang had tom Matheson's tie and had tried to bite him,
injuring himself in the act. Mei's defence of the imperialist brute was described in reports
sent to Beijing as 'shameless' (wuchi, 3Clflt) and he was branded a 'running dog' (zougou, :iE
~~). The affair concluded on the 8th July with Matheson being released after making a
statement of regret. 122 He was promptly dismissed. Wang was paid compensation.v"
119 'British-Owned Shanghai Tramway Company Employees Demand Punishment of British Inspector for
Beating up Workers,' Jiefang Ribao, 2116/49 reprinted in 'Chinese Press Review,' Shanghai (translations done
by the American Consulate in Shanghai, No. 916, p. 12); 'Clerical Staff and Workers of Shanghai City Transit
Company and Shanghai Telephone Company Demand Severe Punishment for Matheson,' Jiefang Ribao,
22/6/49 reprinted in Chinese Press Review (Sh.) No. 917, p.l.
120 MFA 118-00046-08, gongzuo baogao, 1/6/49-30/11149.
121 Hansard, 'British Subject, Shanghai (Imprisonment),' HC Deb 18/7/49, vol 467, cc965-6.
122 MFA 118-00046-08, gongzuo baogao, 1/6/49-30/11149.
123 'Matheson arrested for assaulting tram inspector,' Shang Bao [Shanghai Chamber of Commerce Organ],
26/6/49, Chinese Press Review (Sh.) No. 920, p.14; 'Shanghai Tramway Company Tenders Apology to Clerical
Staff and Workers; Matheson Discharged,' Da Gong Bao, Shanghai, 317149, Chinese Press Review (Sh.) No.
925, p.9.
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Figure 7: Bill Matheson apologises to Wang Zhenguo
Hungarian historian Istvan Rev has argued that being seen to rectify past injustices was
central to establishing the legitimacy of communist governments. People involved in 'show
trials' represented whole political classes, defined by their relationship to the state, and to the
current moment in history. All classes and groups were assigned either positive or negative
historical and social roles. It was not only in China that Western nationals were imprisoned
by Communist authorities. It was estimated that over forty British nationals had been arrested
in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and elsewhere in the communist world between 1945
and 1950. The most famous of these was Edgar Sanders, a British businessman who was
arrested in Hungary on espionage charges. He was sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment,
but he served only three. 124 In punishing British nationals in this way, justice, propaganda and
state legitimacy were all combined. The brief incident involving Matheson at the British
Tram Company was inflated to represent one hundred years of Sino-British relations:
Matheson represented aggressive, bullying imperialism and Wang represented the Chinese
124 Istvan Rev, 'In Mendacio Veritas (In Lies there Lies the Truth),' Representations, No. 35, Special Issue:
Monumental Histories (summer, 1991), pp. 1-20; Hansard, Eastern Europe (Imprisoned British Subjects), HC
Deb, 14/6/50, vol. 476 cc186-7; Hansard, Hungary (British Subject, Sentence), HC Deb, l3/3/50, vol. 472 cc23-
4W.; Vera Pecsi, 'The Standard Electric Trial,' The Hungarian Quarterly, Vol. XLII No. 162, Summer 200l.
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people. It was not uncommon for working-class white males to act violently against Chinese
subordinates (indeed, the case was very much in the pattern of the Woithe case discussed in
Chapter One), or even to consider themselves racially or socially superior, but it remains
likely that the extent of both the assault and the scale of popular anger were greatly
d 125exaggerate .
In early December 1949 a similar case occurred in Beijing. A middle school teacher named
Miss B.F. Rudd was accused of insulting, and spitting on, several Chinese students, one of
whom had spat on her classroom floor. In a similar pattern to the Matheson case, there was a
'spontaneous' outcry from local schools and popular institutions and Rudd was suspended
from teaching. The head of the European section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Huan
Xiang C~ ~) suggested that she be made to apologise in front of the students, and that if she
refused to do so, she be arrested and held for four days. He said that he thought it preferable
to use her as an example rather than actually punish or detain her. Eventually she apologised
and left China.126
On the afternoon of the 6th July an enormous parade was held in Shanghai to mark the
'Liberation' of the city and to commemorate the Lugouqiao Incident (Lugouqiao shibian, Ii
~t]{jf*~) which marked the start of China's 1937-1945 war with Japan. This parade was an
huge affair, watched by some 1.5 million people. 127
125 TNA FO 371175942 Position of British subjects in China: Evacuation from Shanghai, 1949; Foreign Office
Minute, 23/7/49, British Communities in China: Recommendations for the speech of the Secretary of State; the
Foreign Office commented on this case: 'There is however a marked tendency to magnify any incident in which
foreigners are involved, as in the recent case of Mr. Matheson, a British subject employed in Shanghai, who was
arrested and confined for three weeks on a petty case of alleged assault.' For another example see the case of the
Chief Engineer Oxnard who was arrested for assaulting a Chinese crew member in July 1950; TNA FO
369/4437, China: arrest and detention of British subjects, 1950; Arrest of Chief Engineer of S.S. Lansdowne at
Taku Bar, Consul General Tianjin to Foreign Office, 4/7/50.
126 MFA 118-00342-01, Guanyu Beijing Yingguo ji Jiaoshi Rui Delan wuru xuesheng an de chuli shi [Regarding
the resolution of the case of British teacher Rudd bullying students in Beijing], 7/12/49-9/12/49; TNA FO
371183513, "Trial of Miss B.M.F. Rudd on charges of insulting behaviour to students,' 1950; W.G. Graham,
British Consulate-General, Beijing to Embassy, Nanjing, 3/1/50; W.G. Graham, British Consulate-General
Beijing to Charge d'Affaires ad interim, Nanjing, 20/1/50; Rudd was quoted as saying 'After introspection and
education, I have discovered my conceited attitude and ill-directed thoughts. I further have discovered that the
source of my reactionary thinking was the contempt for the Chinese people entertained by the imperialists. '
127 Braester, "'A Big Dying Vat," p. 414.
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Figure 8: Two unidentified foreign men face trial in a Shanghai court
File name reads 'Shanghai Military Control Committee declares 'sentence of
deportation for imperialists"
During the parade, the American Vice Consul William Olive was arrested and charged with
disobeying the police. Allegedly, Olive had ignored traffic policemen and had obstructed the
parade route. Olive had been driving on one of Shanghai's main roads before being diverted
down a side street by soldiers. Finding the narrow street blocked by carts, he sounded his
hom. A group of heavily armed soldiers appeared. Apparently angered by the sight of
Chinese coolies making way for a foreign imperialist, the soldiers sent Olive back to the main
road. He was again halted. The same soldiers reappeared and continued to harangue him. 128
Faced with what they termed Olive's 'extremely arrogant attitude' (taidu shifen aoman, ~Jt.
+~'i!H~)the police took him to the Tilanqiao (t.1Hi~Hf)Police Station where he refused to
state his name or nationality. As they had no clear instructions on how to deal with these
matters, the local police sent for instructions from headquarters. While waiting for a reply it
was decided to put Olive temporarily in a holding cell. He resisted. He lost his balance,
knocked over an ink bottle and accidently struck a soldier. The police said that he had beaten
the soldier 'in a barbarous manner' (yeman da ren, !f~n )..).129
128 Foreign Relations of the United States, Problem~ of United States Consulates [FRUS], pp. 1220-2, John
Cabot to Secretary of State, 917/49.
129 FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates, p. 1221 ; MFA 118-00046-03, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwuchu
liu -qi yuefen gongzuo baogao (Fujian san) Weilianmu Oulifu wei jing an [Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs
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The scene was witnessed by a Sikh guard from the Italian Consulate named Boor Singh, who
later related the course of events, as he witnessed them, to Olive's consular colleagues. Olive
had, Singh said, hit the front counter two or three times with his hands in indignation at
having been arrested. He was a consular official, and his traffic violation was not his fault.
After Olive had hit the counter, one of the guards had moved to restrain his arm. Olive
grabbed at the items on the counter, splashing ink over his face and over the guard's uniform.
At this point, blows were exchanged. He was knocked to the floor, handcuffed and kicked.
One of the officers drew his gun and threatened to shoot, at which point Olive, begging for
mercy, was thrown bodily into a cel1.130Once he was in the cell he relented and told them his
name and official position. l3l Under the non-recognition policy, his position was not
recognised. When a few of his consular colleagues went to the police station to free him, their
position was also not recognised. They were detained and humiliated in front of a large crowd
by a 'loud and aggressive' Communist cadre before being allowed to leave.132
The next day, Olive was questioned, and unlike Matheson, he apologised straight away for
having lashed out, though according to the questioners he still 'tried to put the responsibility
on us' (hai xiang ba zeren tui gei women, ~!~m~HfttH*:mifJ).After a long struggle in
which 'his imperialism had been attacked' (fa de diguozhuyi shoudao daji, 1i!!~~*OO3::)(7f
~Ei5t~ljtrm), Olive agreed to sign a statement admitting his guilt. Logically this was the only
way he could escape the situation. He was made to draft four different statements and was
photographed.V' He had been forced to maintain a painful crouched position with guns
pointed at him for hours on end, kept in a solitary confinement cell, subjected to a 'farcical
trial' and given only a little bread and water.134
The CCP leaders wished to avoid a major dispute with a foreign government and so the
police were instructed to deal with Olive using more 'lenient measures' (kuanda ban/a, 1[*
1'1-5*:). The next morning, the police reported in internal documents, they were less severe as
Department Work Report for June-July (Appendix 3) [Case of William Olive disobeying the police], 116/49-
30/11149.
130 FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates, pp. 1202-6, 1337, John Cabot to Secretary of State, 717149;
1227.
131 MFA 118-00046-03, Weilianmu Oulifu weijing an, 116/49-30/11149.
132 FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates, pp. 1202-6, John Cabot to Secretary of State, 7/7/49.
133 MFA 118-00046-03, Weilianmu Oulifu wei jing an, 116/49-30/11149.
134 FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates, pp. 1220-2, John Cabot to Secretary of State, 917149.
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they 'educated' tjiaoyu, ~~) him, and allowed him to wash and smoke. He was asked to
apologise to the man he hit, pay compensation and thank the government for their lenient
treatment before being allowed to leave on the 9th July.135 His statement of regret was
published in all the major newspapers the next day. 136The CCP made a point of
demonstrating to the city's Chinese residents that unlike the subservient Guomindang, the
CCP were willing to stand up to foreign imperialists. Mayor Chen Yi commented that the
Olive case demonstrated that 'no matter if they are an American or a Briton, if they violate
China's laws in China, they can be punished!,137
Whereas in Shenyang the position of other American consular personnel had previously not
been recognised, the Communists had now gone so far as to arrest and physically assault an
American official. The American Consul General reported to Washington that 'this grim
> affair impressively confirms my conviction that no American is now safe in China.'138 The
doctor who examined Olive found eighteen separate instances of physical violence caused by
beating with rifle butts and kicking. He also found Olive to be traumatised by his feelings of
humiliation because he had been forced to sign a confession. The doctor advised he 'be
removed soonest and placed in area free from any traces of Chinese or Communism.' 139
Olive was removed from China as soon as possible; his next posting was to Jamaica.l'"
In China, as elsewhere in the Communist world, the legal system was used to make political
points, imbuing it with an element of tragic farce. Politics and propaganda took priority over
actual guilt or innocence (though in all the cases above the CCP did have some cause to take
action). The point of the Communist way of doing things was not to find the truth and deliver
justice, but to demonstrate the power of the state and to teach political lessons.!" The Olive
case was again used for political purposes in 1963 when the incident featured in the
propagandistic film Sentinels Under Neon Lights.142
135 MFA 118-00046-03, Weilianmu Oulifu wei jing an, 116/49-30/11149.
136 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 310.
137 Zhang Hanfu zhuan bian xie zu, Zhang Hanfu zhuan [Biography of Zhang Hanfu] (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe
[World Knowledge Press], 2003), pp. 127-8 (buguan Meiguoren Yingguoren, zai Zhongguo weifan le Zhongguo
de faling.fiu zhicai ta! ::J'~~OOA.~OOA.. i£t:p OOii~1!7 t:pOOa~5!~. ~JtiM$lfth!).
138 FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates, pp. 1199-1223, John Cabot, to the Secretary of State, 9/7/49.
139 Ibid., p. 1227.
140 Ibid., p. 1235-6; Ambassador Stuart to the Secretary of State, Nanjing, 18/7/49.
141 Rev, 'In Mendacio Veritas,' pp. 1-20.
142 Braester, "'A Big Dying Vat," p. 439.
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Foreign newspapers and films
The CCP viewed news and its dissemination as a tool to be employed not only in shaping the
ideological climate, but also as means to achieving specific political goals. The 'CCP, like
other communist parties, sought to eliminate dissonant voices from the public sphere and to
monopolise the supply of information. In October 1949, the Shanghai People's Government
News Department defined their three main tasks as follows: firstly, to receive journalists and
explain the CCP's policies to them; secondly, to distribute important announcements by the
government; and thirdly, to check published newspapers and magazines as well as correcting
drafts before publication to remove 'inappropriate aspects' (bu tuodang zhi chu, :::f'3t ~ Z.
~).143 There was little distinction made between the methods of producing news and those of
producing propaganda.
In March 1949, two months before the takeover, there were 49 newspapers and 302
magazines (of various qualities) being published in Shanghai. Between 500,000 and 700,000
newspapers were being sold every day.l44 There were three foreign newspapers remaining
after the takeover: the British-owned North China Daily News ('the Old Lady on the Bund')
and two American-owned papers, the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury and the China
Monthly Review.145 All of these papers had been struggling to survive under the weight of
inflation and Guomindang censorship.i''" While the Guomindang had censored and licensed,
the CCP would employ more direct means of control. Newspapers had little or no editorial
freedom and those that could not be controlled would be closed. On the 28th May the new
authorities issued instructions on the operation of all newspapers. Among other points, the
reporting of military secrets, the spreading of rumours, and libel of the new regime were all
143 SMA B24-2-1-85, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Junshiguanzhi Weiyuanhui Xinwen Chu zuzhi guicheng
(.caoan) [Shanghai People's Government News Department organisation regulations (draft)], 20/10/49.
44 'Shanghai gaikuang,' p. 14.
145 For a general historical outline of newspapers in Shanghai see Shanghai Xinwen Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui
[Record of News in Shanghai Compilation Committee], Shanghai Xinwen Zhi [Record of News in Shanghai]
(Shanghai, Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House],
2000).
146 Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover,' p. 182; on Guomindang censorship see TNA FO 953/577, Quarterly
reports from Shanghai, 1949; Information Department of the British Embassy, Report for the quarter ending 30th
September 1948; Report for the quarter ending 30th December 1948; and Wakeman, 'Licensing Leisure,' pp. 29,
33.
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forbtdden.r'" Shanghai papers owned by the former government or the 'four big families'
were taken over and their plant was used to produce the CCP's own papers.l'"
On the 15th July, the news organisations attached to the British and American Consulates
General in Shanghai were ordered to close.149 The British service's role had been to advance
Britain's standing in China through the dissemination of positive news, showing films,
providing reading materials and organising events such as photography exhibitions. ISO The
CCP Central Committee had described these foreign news agencies in January 1949 as 'one
of the most important weapons of the imperialists in distributing reactionary propaganda' and
their news output was banned in all 'liberated' areas.l5l They saw the foreign information
services as propaganda organs, and perhaps this view was valid to a degree, for while the
British consciously avoided attacking communism in their propaganda, they did seek to
'advertise' the 'benefits of existence in a genuine democracy' so as to 'induce thoughtful
• , 152companson.
After the establishment of the PRC, all foreign journalists from non-recognised countries
were prohibited from working in China.153 With the closure of foreign news agencies and
information services, the New China News Agency (Xinhua Tongxunshe, fifi$iiifl.*±)
became the sole provider of news content (with help from the Soviet TASS agency). The
Communists argued that only the Chinese Government could provide news that 'suited the
Chinese people's best interests' (fuhe Zhongguo renmin de /iyi de, 1-1*~OOA.~a~~iUaa~)
and that was free from the imperialists' 'rumour mongering, smear and slander' (zaoyao,
147 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 48-50; He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 10.
148 Neil L. O'Brien, An American Editor in Early Revolutionary China; John William Powell and the China
Weekly/Monthly Review (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 182-3.
149 TNA FO 953/579, Closing down by communists of British and United States Information Services in China,
1949; Consul General, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 564, 15/7/49.
ISO TNA FO 953/577, Quarterly reports from Shanghai, 1949; Information Department of the British Embassy,
Report for the Quarter Ending 30th September 1948; Report for the Quarter Ending 30th December 1948. In the
quarter ending 30th December 1948 films loaned by the information department were seen by a total audience of
616,522 people.
151 SMA D2-0-671-1, Zhongyang dui Diguozhuyi tongxunshe chuli de zhishi [CCP Central Committee
instructions on dealing with imperialist news agencies], January 1949; 'one of the most important weapons .. .'
(Diguozhuyi guojia de tongxunshe, shi diguozhuyi jinxing fandong xuanchuan de zui zhongyao de wuqi zhi yi ... ,
*OO.:E,)too~a~~mu. ~*OO.:E,)tlttfr&iiJJ1ffU~~m~a~1EtHz.- ... ).
152 TNA FO 1110/194, China: consideration of recent developments; UK policy, 1949; Sir R. Stevenson,
Nanjing to Foreign Office, No. 36, 17/1/49; D. MacFarlane, First Secretary (Information), Embassy, Nanjing to
Information Research Department, 25/1/49; TNA FO 1110/195, China: consideration of recent developments;
UK policy, 1949.
153 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 49.
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wumie,feibang, i§ig, j'5~, ~~i~).One CCP report noted that Chinese liberal intellectuals
and bourgeois elements (ziyou zichan jieji, ~ ill~F~frm.) may think the coverage provided
by New China News too sparse, too slow and not 'to their tastes' (bu he tamen de kouwei, ::f'
~Q1tP.in a~IJp,*), but the government's aim was to present news to the broad masses of the
k 154wor ers.
None of the foreign newspapers lasted long in the intense political climate of early
Communist Shanghai. They were also hit by declining circulation figures as the foreign
population departed. On the 14th June, the editor of the Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury
Randall Gould was involved in a dispute with the paper's union. When he refused the
workers' demands and attempted to leave the building, Gould found his exit blocked. He was
then locked in his office. In a rage, he then threatened to close down the paper until order was
restored. Eventually, representatives of the General Labour Union arrived and negotiated
Gould's release, in exchange for his promise that the paper would open as normal the next
day and that he would participate in a dispute resolution process. The next day, with
negotiations due to start, the paper's staff protested at a news article penned by Gould
bemoaning the lack of a government standard for a new wage formula. Gould refused to have
the paper's contents dictated to him by the union and ordered it be printed 'as was' before
leaving for horne. Just as the Communists had taken control over the Chinese press, so he
believed, they had now gained control over the paper's previously well-behaved staff.
As he could not operate independently, he announced his resignation from the post of editor
and the closure of the printing press, effective on the 18t July. Over the next several weeks,
Gould and the other foreign staff were vilified in the Chinese press, locked in their offices,
and harassed in the streets. He was then accused of injuring four workers who were
'presenting their grievances' at his horne. In fact, it was they who had sought to storm the
house. Like Matheson, Olive and the others, Gould was forced t~ issue an apology. The
workers eventually agreed to a pay-off, the paper was closed, and he left Shanghai. ISS
154 SMAD2-0-671-1, Zhongyang dui Diguozhuyi tongxunshe chuli de zhishi.
155 Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover,' pp. 185-190; FRUS, Problems of United States Consulates, pp.
1170-1, 1180-1, 1192-6; 'Zhongyang guanyu Da Mei Wan Bao tingkan shi gei Shanghai Wei de dianbao' [CCP
Central Committee telegram to Shanghai Committee regarding the issue of the Shanghai Evening Post and
Mercury ceasing publication], 3016/49, inZhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol. 1, p. 38.
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Shortly after the trouble at the Post began, Shanghai's oldest foreign newspaper, the North
China Daily News, published a front-page story stating that the Guomindang had laid mines
in the river and that all shipping had ceased. The story was based on reports from river pilots
who had apparently seen Guomindang ships laying mines. Shipping had indeed been stopped
several hours before the News was published, but when it was discovered several days later
that there were in fact no mines and that the halt had been unnecessary, the paper's editor R.T.
Peyton-Griffin was held to account. He was forced, in the familiar manner, to make a
personal apology on the front page of his newspaper. From then on, the paper was forced into
self-censorship.U" On the 1st September 1949, Peyton-Griffin applied to be allowed to close
the News.1S7 The apology and his submission to censorship were very much seen as a
personal humiliation for Peyton-Griffin, who was in ill-health after having suffered a serious
accident. He died in December 1950. After two years of censorship and labour disputes, the
News was eventually permitted to close in April 1951.158
The editor of the only remaining foreign paper, the China Monthly Review, John William
Powell, took a different tack entirely. Powell was critical of the way the Post and the News
had not adapted to new circumstances. He believed that his paper could serve as a bridge for
mutual understanding between China and the West and he lobbied hard for the American
Government to recognise New China. Powell's sympathetic attitude towards the new regime
and his leftist views left him open to attack from anti-Communists, both in Shanghai and at
home. When he returned to America, he was caught up in the anti-communist fervour of the
early 1950s. The 'Red scare' had been intensified by the apparent 'brain-washing' of
American paws in Korea (whose pro-Communist and anti-war messages he had published).
He faced trial for aiding the enemy with his reporting of the alleged use of bacterial warfare
by the American military in North Korea and China.1s9
Just as foreign newspapers were closed down, so were foreign films eventually exorcised
from the cultural sphere. Shanghai was famous for its many cinemas which had brought
Hollywood (and Pinewood) fashions and culture to the city's streets. Foreign films were not
immediately cracked down upon by the CCP; between April 1949 and November 1950, some
156 Gould, 'Shanghai during the Takeover,' p. 187.
157 'The North China Daily News,' The Times, 2/9/49.
158 'Another Chinese Blockade Warning,' The Times, 25/6/49; 'Obituary; Mr. R.T. Peyton-Griffin,' The Times,
30/12/50; 'North China Daily News; Publication Ceases After Over 100 Years,' The Times, 7/4/51.
159 O'Brien, An American Editor, pp. 125-146, 174, 251-2, 279-80; 'Review to Close After Next Issue; Note
From the Editors,' China Monthly Review, June 1953.
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646 British and American films were shown to a total audience of 14,505,773.160 The CCP
were anxious to provide an alternative to these immoral and propaganda-filled foreign films
and so new regulations emerged in April 1950, on restricting the influence of British and
American films in Shanghai, which stated that at least a quarter of each cinema's monthly
programme had to be devoted to Chinese or Soviet 'progressive films' (jinbu dianying, lltt17
It!~). The advertising of foreign features in the media and on the streets was carefully
restricted. Showings of foreign and pre-1949 films were reduced, while post-1949 and Soviet
films were actively promoted.i'" That same month, the CCP strengthened control over the
film industry making it clear to all concerned that cinema was no longer simply about
business or art, but rather a highly politicised medium, subject to strict ideological censorship.
The Film Bureau issued regulations stipulating that all scripts had to be approved before films
could be produced. In July an advisory committee was established to police the industry.162
New Chinese films were moral in tone: one Beijing shop worker (very possibly fictional) was
reported in the Chinese press as saying 'Nowadays films teach people how to be good
persons. They are not like the old pictures that dealt with crime and the extravagant living of
rich people and foreigners.' 'Seeing a new motion picture,' enjoined a (equally likely to be
fictional) schoolteacher, 'is as valuable as having a lesson in school. ,163
This change can be clearly seen in the pages of the CCP's English language newspaper The
Shanghai News, which ran from June 1950 to December 1952. Early issues of the News
contain adverts for a range of films, from Rita Hayworth in 'Blood and Sand' to the 1945
Chinese classic 'Dream of the Red Chamber' (Hong Lou Meng, tlf~~) and the Soviet
'Quadruple Wedding' ('A Super USSR Musical Comedy!'). Western films later disappeared
as Soviet and post-1949 or apolitical pre-1949 Chinese films came to dominate. An
advertisement for the new film 'Chinese People's Victory' (Zhongguo Renmin de Sheng/i, r:p
160 SMA Bl72-1-35, Shanghai Shi Wenhua Ju guanyu ben shi 1949 nian - 1951 nian ge yingyuan shangying
yingpian, guanzhong renshu de tongji baobiao [Shanghai Culture Bureau statistical report fOnDS on films shown
in every cinema and number of viewers between April1949 and June 1951], zi 1949 nian 4 yue zhi 1950 nian
11 yue 14 ri zhi Shanghai Shi ge dianyingyuan shangying Ying Mei pian mei bu cishu, guanzhong renshu tongji
biao [Statistical chart showing frequency and number of viewers of British and American films projected in
Shanghai cinemas between April 1949 and November 1951). .
161 SMA BI72-1-29, Dui jinyibu xianzhi Ying Mei yingpian dejuti yijian [Concrete proposals on progressively
restricting British and American films], 25/4/50.
162 Yingjin Zhang, Chinese National Cinema (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 189-198.
163 The Shanghai News, 'Chinese People Love Their New Films,' 26/9/51.
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00A ~ a~u.~Il) in October 1950 announced it to be 'the first picture of a high artistic
standard and a political and educational significance that ever appears on the screen!' 164
Figure 9: The Shanghai News, 'Chinese People's Victory,' 5110/50
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In June 1950, The Shanghai News advised readers to revisit the entertainment pages of
Shanghai's pre-'Liberation' newspapers and to compare them with the papers of the day.
Where once they were overrun with Betty Grables and Errol Flynns, the News observed, now
Chinese movie-goers were flocking to see patriotic Chinese pictures such as '1,000,000
Troops Crossing the Yangtze,' 'Eight Brave Girls' and 'The Life History of a Peking
Policeman.' Alternatively, there were wholesome Soviet pictures such as 'The Country
Teacher,' and 'The Gorky Trilogy.' The percentage of admissions for American and British
films fell from 46.9 per cent of ~otal admissions in November 1949 to 28 per cent in May
1950. This change was not the product of coercion, the article maintained, 'but by penetration
164 The Shanghai News, 'Current Chinese Movies,' 25/6/50, 'Blood and Sand,' 1417150,'Dream of the Red
Chamber,' 5/8/50, 'Chinese People's Victory,' 5/10/50.
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through study groups and political awakening on the part of the people themselves. 'All this
goes to indicate,' the article continued,
that even the sub-colonial urbanites in Shanghai have undergone a thorough overhauling, that they
have forsaken Hollywood and all that goes with it, its make-beliefs, its compradore culture, and-
what not.165
When Chinese troops entered the Korean War against American-led United Nations forces in
October 1950, the CCP took the opportunity to 'purge' (suqing, J.¥.t~l) foreign films from
Shanghai's cinemas. They capitalised on the momentum of the country-wide campaign to
'Resist America and Aid Korea' (kang Mei yuan Chao, #i:~fitE}) (of which more will be
said in the next chapter) to make the prohibiting of these films seem as though it was in
response to popular outcry from the youth of the city. It was said that the youths' 'hostility
towards American imperialism had been awakened' (qi yu dui Meidi de chouhen, ~T3tt~
*a~11l.'tN).The Shanghai Cultural Bureau sent speech-making teams out to speak to the
city's youth at mass meetings at factories and schools on the need to 'liquidate' (qingsuan,~l
.) aggressive American cultural imperialism and to criticise the 'poisonous ideology'
(youdu sixiang, fi./~'~.El)in American films.l'" By the end of the year, CCP cultural leader
Guo Moruo reported that imperialist films had been 'eradicated' from Shanghai.167 After this
date, although the cinemas retained their glamorous names, the titles of films they showed
became more incongruous, as evidenced by the advert for the film 'Thoughts' Problem'
(Sixiang wenti, 1~,~.EliO]~) which appeared under the starred banner of the 'Golden Gate'
theatre.l'"
165 The Shanghai News, 'Current Chinese Movies,' 25/6/50.
166 SMA BI71-1-33-29, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Wenhua Ju Dianying Shiye Guanli Chu guanyu zhaokai
zuzhi suqing Mei di yingpian buliang yingxiang yanjiang hui de tongzhi [Shanghai People's Government
Cultural Bureau, Film Industry Management Bureau Notification on convening and organising of meeting for
speeches on purging the harmful influence of American films], 29/11150.
167 SMA B 1-1-1996, Zhongyang Zhengwuyuan guanyu waiguo jintie ji waizi jingying de wenhua jiaoyu jiuji
jiguan ji zongjiao tuanti Jangzhen de jueding [Central State Council decision on policy towards foreign
subsidised and foreign managed cultural, education, and relief organisations and religious groups], January 1951;
Guo Moruo (~B~~), Guanyu chulijieshou Meiguojintie de wenhuajiaoyujiujijiguanji zongjiao tuanti de
Jangzhen de baogao [Report on the policy of dealing with and taking over American subsidised cultural,
education, and relief organisations and religious groups], 29/12/50.
168 The Shanghai News, 'Thoughts Problem,' 22/10/50.
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The elimination of religious, educational and cultural organisations
In January 1949, Zhou Enlai told Mikoyan, the Soviet representative in Beijing, that when the
CCP took over, foreign missionary organisations, hospitals, schools, cultural and scientific
institutions and foreign aid organizations would be 'registered', and control over them would
be strengthened. Foreign lives and property would be protected, but church lands would be
confiscated. Most importantly, religious teaching would have to be on a voluntary basis and
not forced on students, and the heads of cultural organisations would have to be Chinese.l'"
Mao noted in December 1949 that;
As for the foreigners' spheres of influence, the British predominate in investments in the economic
and commercial sectors, while the Americans lead in the sector of cultural-educational
• • 170orgamzations.
The CCP had intended a policy of more gradual transition to Chinese ownership, but the
outbreak of the Korean War quickened the process. The general economic situation,
compounded by freezing of US assets in China, meant that the majority of US-subsidised
relief organisations faced dire economic circumstances. The elimination of these
organisations became part of the campaign to 'Resist America and Aid Korea.' The campaign
aimed to break any remaining cultural and emotional ties with America, so the eradication of
'imperialist propaganda organs' was crucial.!"
Takeovers usually followed set patterns. For example, in October 1950 the authorities took
over the Shanghai Country Hospital, which had been formerly administered by the British-
dominated Shanghai Municipal Council. On the day before the takeover, the director of the
hospital was invited to the FAD and told the reasons behind the move. A group of Hygiene
Department cadres led by a representative from the Military Control Committee would take
over the administration of the hospital, but the original staff would all stay in place. Only
later would the hospital come directly under the control of the municipal government under a
169 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Zhou Enlai, 2/1/49.
170 CWIHP, Conversation between Stalin and Mao, Moscow, 16/12/49.
171 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo de waijiao', p. 38; SMA Bl-1-1996,fangzhen dejueding, January 1951; Guo Moruo,
Guanyu chuli jieshou Meiguo jintie de wenhua jiaoyu jiuji jiguan ji zongjiao tuanti de fangzhen de baogao
[Report on the policy of dealing with and taking over American subsidised cultural, education, and relief
organisations and religious groups], 29/12/50; for more on the Campaign to Resist America Aid Korea's effect
on private charities in Shanghai see Nara Dillon, 'New Democracy and the Demise of Private Charity in
Shanghai,' in Dilemmas of Victory, pp. 88-90.
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new name, the East China Hospital. The authorities' reports emphasise that stability was all-
important; this was very much a top-down take over. The masses would only be mobilised
and 'educated' (by union representatives brought in from the Hospitals Union) once the new
authorities were familiar with the running of the hospital. Foreign staff were to be allowed to
remain at their posts. The one condition was that they should renounce their privileged rates
of pay and accept equal pay with the Chinese staff. Most had already applied for their exit
permits. Foreign and Chinese patients were no longer to be treated separately. Military
imperatives also drove the CCP to seize control over the Jesuit-run Xujiahui meteorological
observatory in December 1950.172
In early 1951, the Ministry qf Education decided that all schools must be run by Chinese
organisations. Following this decision, the State Council announced measures for dealing
with organisations that relied on foreign (especially American) subsidies.m The Shanghai
FAD established a special office to coordinate the 'registration' and elimination of these
bodies.174 Through 'registration' the CCP sought to monitor foreign-run and foreign-
subsidised organisations in the cultural, religious, medical and educational spheres, to restrict
their actions and tum them into private or state-run Chinese organisations if they could not
run themselves.!" A total of 666 organisations were registered, and among these 545
I72 SMA B242-1-187, Shanghai Shi Weisheng Ju guanyujieguan Hongen yiyuan de baogao yu pifuji laiwang
wenshu [Shanghai Hygiene Department report and approval for taking over the Shanghai Country Hospital and
correspondence on this issue] January 1949-December 1950; MFA 110-00162-07, Guanyu Shanghai Hongen
Yiyuan jieguan caoan de pishi [Approval of plan to take control over the Shanghai Country Hospital, 26/8/50;
Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 50-1.
173 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo de waijiao', p. 38; The Shanghai News, 'Decisions on U.S. Subsidised Cultural,
Educational, Relief Organisations, Religious Bodies,' 111151, 'Clarification of Registration of Foreign-
Subsidised, Operated Cultural, Religious Bodies,' 25/1/51, 'Foreign Subsidised Colleges to be Made
Independent,' 27/1/51.
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Jangzhen de guiding, *-f-~Iltl§t~~)!Ma13tit~1f~~fJl*&~~~,,*a11.J~a1m.~) and 'Articles
on the taking over of foreign subsidised and foreign managed cultural, educational, and relief organisations and
the registration of religious groups' (Jieshou waiguo jintie ji waizi jingying zhi wenhua jiaoyu jiuji jiguan ji
zongjiao tuanti dengji tiaolie, tl~HI'~i~M&$'I,~g~z.3tit~1f:f:i~fJl*&*~~,,*~i.c~HIl); He et
al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 19.
175 SMA BI-I-1996, fangzhen de jueding, January 1951; Jieshou waiguo jintie ji waizi jingying zhi wenhua
jiaoyu jiuji jiguan ji zongjiao tuanti dengji tiaoli [Regulations on registering foreign subsidised and foreign
capital managed cultural, and educational organisations and religious groups], 29/12/50; Guo Moruo, Guanyu
chuli jieshou Meiguo jintie ... , 29/12/50; Zhengwuyuan Wenjiao Weiyuanhui [State Council Cultural and
Educational Committee], Jieshou waiguojintieji waizijingying zhi wenhuajiaoyujiujijiguanji zongjiao tuanti
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received foreign funds. Of this number, 121 were actually managed by foreigners; 263 relied
on US funds; and 32 on British. The majority of these were closed down or turned into
Chinese-run organisations in 1951. Five foreign-run universities and three higher education
colleges were all taken over between February and April 1951.176The management of seven
schools for foreign children was also taken over in 1951, including the Shanghai British
School.177
The CCP's Shanghai gaikuang (Shanghai outline) described foreign religion as a 'powerful
weapon of imperi~list aggression against China' (diguozhuyi qinliie Zhongguo de youli wuqi,
Wi 00 ::E>t..1~~ $ 00 a~~ tJ ita) which had been 'poisoning' the minds of the Chinese
people since 1690. As well as running churches, religious organisations also administered
(directly or indirectly) four universities, 105 middle schools, ten medical organisations, and
four seminaries.178
The Communists differentiated between Catholics and Protestants. Catholics were seen to be
the more 'reactionary' in their beliefs and practices, but looking at their backgrounds,
Anglophone Protestants were more obviously the agents of British and American
'imperialism.,179 Speaking in July 1950, Wang Bingnan of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
spoke of the need to establish firm policies with which to get rid of foreigners 'according to
the concrete situation, step-by-step, and in a planned manner' (anzhao juti qingkuang, you
buzhou de, youjihua de, t~ R« J1l i* t~I.R,I ~ iI7 ~~a~I ~ i.t ~Ija~). He took religious
personnel as his example, saying that during the land reform movement in north-east China,
missionaries had been treated like landlords. Their lands had been redistributed and many
were killed. In future, said Wang, the CCP would separate genuine missionaries from
dengji shishi banfa [Measures for implementing the registration of foreign subsidised and foreign capital
managed cultural, and educational organisations and religious groups].
176 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 324-8.
177 SMA BI05-1-263, Shanghai Shi Jiaoyu Ju guanyu yanjiu ruhe zhixing guanli waiqiao zinii xuexiao zanxing
banfa de jingguo baogao [Shanghai Education Office; Report on research into provisional methods for
administering foreign children's' schools], August 1951-0ctober 1951; SMA BI05-1-351, Shanghai Shi Jiaoyu
Ju, Huadong Jiaoyu Buchaofa ge ji jiaoyu xingzheng bumen guanli waiqiao zinii xuexiao zanxing banfa gui Guo
Haiqiao xuesheng ru xue zanxing banfa [Shanghai Education Office, East China Education Bureau sending
provisional measures for administering foreign children's schools to all executive organs and provisional
measures on enrolment of returned overseas Chinese students], April-August 1951; see also Gao Qian, 'Qingchu
diguozhuyi zai jiaoyu jie de canyu shili de douzheng' [The struggle to eliminate the remaining imperialist
influence in the educational sphere] in Shanghai Jiefang Chuqi de Shehui Gaizao Weiyuanhui [Social Change
in Early Liberated Shanghai Committee], Shanghai Jiefang Chuqi de Shehui Gaizao [Social change in early
liberated Shanghai] (Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe [CCP Party History Publishing House], 1999), pp. 212-9.
178 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 18.
179 SMA Y15J1/201l593, Shanghai gaikuang.
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imperialists. Those who wanted to leave would be allowed to do; those who asked to enter
would be refused. In this way the missionary population would decline.I'" In practice
however, the process was not so smooth.
The CCP had learnt early on that missionaries were not like other foreigners. Businessmen,
for example, would simply leave once their businesses became unprofitable or were taken
over. Many missionaries had lived in China for decades, were advanced in age and were
willing to be martyred for the cause. This made them very resistant to persuasion or
intimidation. Through their religious and secular activities, they held great influence over
local populations. In Shanghai, there were 44,000 or more Catholics and more than 30,000
Protestants.Y' In the process of expelling Catholic missionaries from China, the CCP often
resorted to fabricating espionage plots or other salacious charges.182 Among the most
notorious of these was the accusation that Catholic orphanages systematically murdered
Chinese children.183 The vast majority of charges were completely unfounded, but there were
cases where Catholics actively resisted the CCP. In Jinan, the capital of Shandong Province,
the CCP believed that Catholics missionaries had been involved in organising armed
resistance against them. After 'Liberation,' the CCP complained that every time they held a
public meeting the Catholics would hold one too.184
In May 1950, prominent Chinese church leaders, led by Wu Yaozong (:~i'tl*) were
encouraged to sever their ties with missionaries and form independent church organisations.
180 MFA 102-00180-01, Wang Bingnan guanyu waijiao jiliJ wenti baogao [Report by Wang Bingnan regarding
discipline in foreign affairs], 5/7/50.
181 SMA YI5/1/201l593, Shanghai gaikuang.
182 SMA D2-0-539-31 Guanyu Jinan Shi waiqiao gongzuo de baogao (dangnei ziliao, di yi qi) [Report on
Foreign Affairs work in Jinan (internal Party document, part 1)], 25/5/49; see also the section entitled 'Daji yi
zongjiao zuo yanhu de fangeming fenzi' [Attacking the counterrevolutionaries shielded by religion], in Shanghai
Gongan Ju Gongan Shi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui [History of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau Compilation
Committee], Shanghai Gongan Ju Gongan Shi [History of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau] (Shanghai:
Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House],
1998),pp.111-7.
183 Zhonghua Renmin Jiuji Zonghui [Chinese People's Relief Administration], Diguozhuyi Canhai Zhongguo
Ertong De Zuixing [The Crimes of the Imperialists Slaughtering Chinese Children] (Zhongguo Renmin Jiuji
Zonghui [Chinese People's Relief Administration], 1951); this was due to the Catholics having encouraged
many parents and communities in impoverished areas to give over their children to orphanages, especially those
who were ill, so that their souls might be saved even if their bodies were not. Their mission was first to try to
save their earthly bodies, and then their souls, but conditions and medical treatment in the orphanages were
often not much better than in the villages. The Shanghai News, 'An Appeal to Mothers; A Report on US-Run
Catholic 'Slaughter House' Orphanages in China,' 24/8/51; This report stated that documents had been found in
an American orphanage in Hubei stating that 40,000 orphans' souls had been saved by the orphanage between
1920 and 1940 and now only about 120 remained. It was alleged that only one in 459 children sent to the
orphanage survived. .
184 SMA D2-0-539-31 Guanyu Jinan Shi.
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That summer the CCP stepped-up their anti-missionary propaganda. Many foreign
missionaries were placed under virtual house arrest while they awaited permission to leave
China. Many were gaoled and mistreated; others, such as the Vatican's representative
Anthony Riberi, were deported.l'" The Catholic Church attempted to counter the CCP's
accusations through pamphlets, but publications directed toward public opinion were not
sufficient to counter the CCP's well-directed campaign.l'" The CCP-directed movement
gathered pace, and in October 1950, the 'Three Selves Movement' was formally announced.
This movement called for Chinese religious organisations to be 'self-governed, self-
sustaining and self-propagating' (zizhi, ziyang, zizhuan, ~ 5~. ~ ~. ~ 1t-). 187 Chinese
Christians were promised freedom of religion once the foreigners had departed and
Christianity had been freed from its long association with imperialism.l'" They had little
alternative but to follow the CCP's line.189
In November 1950, the CCP leadership approved plans to control strictly the movement and
activities of missionaries using measures designed to monitor foreigners, but taking these
measures to the extreme.l'" By the end of 1952 the formal influence of foreign Churches in
China was well and truly broken.!" In 1953 there began another mass movement which
aimed to 'Attack and expel the Imperialists within Catholicism' (dajiji quzhu Tianzhujiao nei
de diguozhuyi fenzi, n*&~~~~.:E~p;ja~*~.:E~~T). Chinese religious personnel
and believers were encouraged to:
... unite with the whole people of Shanghai and struggle resolutely against the imperialists, every
follower of Catholicism in China, as a Chinese person, should love their country first, as a pure
believer, they should not allow themselves to be used by imperialism as tools reeking of blood
used for aggression against their own country.
185 John W. Masland, 'Communism and Christianity in China,' The Journal of Religion, Vol. 32, No.3 (July
1952), pp. 198-206.
186 SMA U10l-O-196-1, Tianzhujiao xiaocezi: Gongjiao yu diguozhuyi [Catholic Pamphlet: Catholicism and
Imperialism], 1951; this pamphlet posed and answered a series of questions such as 'Do Catholicism and
imperialism have mutual interests?' 'Why do Catholics not have to rely on imperialists?' 'Can Catholicism be
used as a weapon by imperialists?' and 'Did Catholicism enter China along with imperialism?'
187 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 324-5.
188 The Shanghai News, 'Chinese Christians Announce New Direction of Endeavours' and 'Patriotic Movement
of Christians,' 26/9/50.
189 John W. Masland, 'Communism and Christianity in China,' pp. 198-206.
190 Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol. 3, p. 513.
191 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 324-5.
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In this way, Chinese Catholics were 'educated' into severing their remaining links with
foreign missionaries, who faced a fresh wave of imprisonments and deportations.P''
Conclusion
Foreign cultural, religious and educational organisations were dealt with fairly soon after the
takeover of China, as part of the wider transformation of the city. The CCP created a strong
dichotomy between 'old,' imperialist Shanghai and the 'new,' socialist Shanghai. Under the
veil of nation building and New Democracy, authoritarian means were used to establish
control over both Chinese and foreign elements of Shanghai society. Foreign influence over,
and 'propagandising'. towards, Chinese students, believers, and ordinary people (such as
cinema-goers) could not be tolerated as it offered a dissenting (and foreign), voice just as the
new regime sought to establish itself and cement its revolutionary legitimacy. It was
imperative, therefore, to eliminate foreign newspapers and films. The transition from old to
new was not only made in the abstract sense and in the cultural sphere: the CCP also acted to
demonstrate the nature of the new order through not recognising representatives of foreign
powers with whom the Chinese did not yet have diplomatic relations, and by punishing
foreigners who were perceived to act in an arrogant manner. The CCP's treatment of
Matheson and Olive was intended to demonstrate that foreigners could no longer assume
immunity from Chinese law in Shanghai, while simultaneously teaching broader anti-
imperialist lessons.
This removal of foreign influence from the city had long been desired, but the coming of the
Korean War undoubtedly accelerated the process as the Americans withdrew and their assets
were seized. Foreign capital, as we shall see in the following chapters, was dealt with rather
192 SMA A48-1-90-122, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Qing Gongye Weiyuanhui Xuanchuan Bu guanyu daji he
quzhu Tianzhujiao nei diguozhuyi fenzi de xuanchuan tigang [CCP Shanghai Light Industry Committee
Propaganda Bureau; Outline of propaganda work for the struggle to attack and eliminate imperialists within
Catholicism],20/6/53; ' ... unite with the whole people' iTianzhujtao nei de yi qie aiguo de shenzhi renyuan he
guangda jiaotumen, yinggai he quan Shanghai renyuan tuanjie qilai he diguozhuyi fenzi zuo jianjue douzheng,
mei yige Zhongguo de Tianzhu jiaotu, zuo wei yige Zhongguoren lai shuo, shouxian ying ai ziji de guojia,
zuowei yige chunzheng de jiaotu lai shuo, ye bun eng tingren ziji suo zai de jiaohui bei diguozhuyi ying lai zuo
wei xuexing de qinliie ziji de guojia de gongju, ~~~p;]a{_J-tJ]~OOa~~$JmAvHI]J*~fi1flmi~~I]:i:..t
.A~~~g*~*OO~~~~~~~4 •.• -~$OO~~~~~. ~~-~$OOA*m .• ~m~
~2~OO •. ~~-~N~~~~*m. ~~n~A~2ffl~~~~.*OO~~ffl*~~aM~~~~
2a{_JOO.a{_JI.Jl.);SMA A22-1-118, Zhonggong Xuanchuan Bu dajiji quzhu Tianzhujiao nei de diguozhuyi
fenzi [CCP Shanghai Propaganda Bureau; attack and drive out imperialists within Shanghai Catholicism],
12/6/53.
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differently; as Mao said to Mikoyan in January 1949, foreign capital was 'closely intertwined'
with Chinese capital. The CCP had resolved at the Sixth Congress, which was held in
Moscow in 1928, to confiscate all foreign capital and property, but while this decision
remained in force, 'its implementation must be carried out in more flexible forms.,193 In a
later conversation, Mao told Mikoyan that in order to destroy the enemy, one should grow
strong economically' and this meant not taking any risks in taking over foreign companies
too hastily.194 The next chapter examines the position of British businesses in 'New'
Shanghai under the Communists in the period before their eventual closure or withdrawal.
193 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 3111149.
194 CWIHP, Memorandum of Conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong, 5/2/49.
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Chapter 3: British Business in Early Communist Shanghai
The CCP were keen to demonstrate quickly that Shanghai had changed. While they had
moved quickly to eradicate the foreign cultural presence, a number of factors led them to take
a more long-term approach towards foreign businesses.' The civil war was yet to be won and
the economy was still in chaos. The last thing the Chinese needed was to act rashly and cause
more instability. Their priorities in Shanghai were to rein in inflation, to prevent further
unemployment and to establish control over the city and its population. Under the New
Democratic economy the government's stated policy was to cooperate with both Chinese and
foreign capitalists - as long as that was, the capitalists acted in accordance with the 'interests
of the people.f In practical terms however, labour had to be appeased and taxes had to be
extracted. These pressing issues would take priority over the centre's planned moderation.
Reflecting in 1955 on the experience of their company since 1949, Butterfield & Swire
identified three distinct periods in the life of British business in Communist Shanghai; their
periodisation roughly reflects the shape of the following three chapters. The first period,
between May 1949 and the end of 1952, was termed 'the period of consolidation.' This
period roughly corresponds to the contents of this chapter. Chapters Four and Five reflect the
two latter periods discussed below. In the 'period of consolidation' the biggest problem
facing the British, aside from the Guomindang's blockade, was that Shanghai's labouring
class had been
... given its head and encouraged, in recompense for its support of the People's Government to
extract all it could from capitalist employers by making as much of a nuisance of itself as it could.'
From the end of 1952 to the autumn of 1953 came what Butterfield & Swire termed the
'period of control.' The CCP were now firmly established in Shanghai; and 'and thereafter
labour ceased to be king.' Labour discipline, even in foreign firms, was much improved. In
these months the biggest problem for foreign businesses was the 'official squeeze' put on
them by the government. The third period was termed 'the period of impatience,' and was
1 Hooper, China Stands Up, pp. 85-7.
2 Wu Li, 'Jianguo chuqi de jingji geju he guomin jingji de huifu' [The Economic Conditions and the Restoration
of the National Economy in the Early PRC], in Guo et al, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanti Shigao, pp.
75-6.
3 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, Memorandum from Butterfield & Swire, Hong Kong to John
Swire and Sons, Ltd., London, 30/12/55, pp. 1-3.
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considered to have lasted from the government's announcement of its plan for the 'transition
to socialism' in autumn 1953 to the surrender of Swire's assets at the end of 1954. By this
time the CCP had consolidated control over foreign businesses and 'could hardly wait to
. h ,4acquire t em.
In the 'period of consolidation', British business was dealt with within the context of an
enormous transformation of the city's Chinese economy. This chapter begins with a profile of
the foreign community in Shanghai after May 1949, focusing on the decline in the foreign
population. Those remaining lived increasingly claustrophobic lives, constrained by measures
put in place by the new authorities. Their social world contracted upon itself as the population
declined. Clubs and societies closed: bored, frustrated men and women waited for permission
from the Communists and from their directors to depart for home. The chapter then moves on
to discuss the predicament of British businesses in Shanghai. The Communists had definite
plans for reshaping Shanghai's economy on their New Democratic model. While British
businesses were promised protection, they were also 'squeezed' in a variety of ways to
extract revenue. One particular problem that foreign companies faced was that of labour-
capital relations. The last two sections of this chapter consider labour disputes and mass
movements within British companies and questions whether they were subject to the same
pressures as Chinese companies, or whether matters were more severe. What does the CCP's
treatment of British companies tell us about their long-term plans? How did they find a
balance between revolutionary change and short-term stability?
The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 intensified the situation in the city. The North
Korean People's Army's initial victories were reversed by a huge counter-offensive by
American-led United Nations troops who advanced ever closer to China's border. The
Chinese were not eager to join the war; they sought a period of stability in which to begin the
reconstruction of the national economy. Just two weeks before Chinese troops entered the
conflict, the CCP had expressed their reluctance to get involved to Moscow. They feared that
their 'entire plan for peaceful construction [would] be completely ruined.f Soviet pressure,
4 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 1-3.
S CWIHP, Ciphered telegram from Roshchin in Beijing to Filippov [Stalin], 3/10/50; conveying message from
Mao to Stalin, 2/10/50; Zhou Enlai said that China needed three to five years of peace in which they would
reduce military expenditure and invest in education and construction but 'the enemy will not let us do this' (dan
diren bu rang women zheyang zuo, i.§.~A:::f'itftim~*~ft&); Zhou Enlai, 'Kang Mei Yuan Chao, Baowei
Heping' [Resist America Aid Korea, Protect Peace], 24/10/50, Zhou En/ai Waijiaowenxuan, pp. 28-33.
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and the fear of an American presence on their doorstep, persuaded them to change course.
Chinese troops crossed into Korea on 19th October." After several offensives and counter
offensives, the two forces became locked in stalemate from July 1951 until armistice talks
began in July 1953.7
The negotiations for the establishment of Sino-British relations in Beijing had ground to a
halt. Charge d'affaires John Hutchinson was replaced by Lionel H. Lamb. Lamb found his
ability to influence affairs in Beijing severely constrained by the Chinese Government's
refusal to answer his communications.! Tom between their policy of keeping an 'open door'
to China and preserving the strategic alliance with the US the British opted for the latter."
They joined the war, refused to champion the PRC's right to a seat in the United Nations, and
agreed to extensive trade embargos against China. This left the British in Shanghai in a state
of limbo. The Chinese were unimpressed by London's willingness to follow America, and
their generally 'unfriendly attitude.' 10 Within China anti-Western attitudes and rhetoric
hardened. In January 1951, Zhou Enlai affirmed that the CCP were fully committed to their
alliance with the USSR, saying: 'if we don't want to lean towards imperialism, then we must
lean towards socialism, there is no third (middle) road.' 11
Following the departure of the Americans in early 1950, 'foreign businesses' effectively
meant 'British businesses' to the CCP.12In the period 1949-1952 the CCP lacked a definite
6 CWIHP, Ciphered Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov (Stalin), 14/10/50, re Meeting with Mao Zedong, 13/10/50;
CWIHP, Ciphered Telegram, Fyn Si (Stalin) to Kim II Sung (via Shtykov), 13/10/50. Chen Jian, 'The Sino-
Soviet Alliance and China's Entry into the Korean War' (CWIHP Working Paper 1), (Woodrow Wilson
International Centre for Scholars Washington, D.C.: June 1992), pp. 29-34.
7 CWIHP, Ciphered telegram, Filippov [Stalin] to Mao Zedong, 5/6/51.
8 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 54-9.
9 Xiang, Recasting, pp. 219-22, 227-30, 243.
10 Zhou Enlai, 'Chinese People Will not Tolerate Aggression,' World News and Views, 14/10/50, Vol. 30, No.
41; see also various communications from the Chinese Government to the British in which Britain's 'unfriendly
attitude' was cited as a serious problem between the two countries; MFA 110-00012-02, Wo kangyi GangYing
dangju xianzhi Zhongguo ji ren yu Gang de huihan, [Correspondence on restriction of Chinese people entering
Hong Kong by British Hong Kong authorities], 5/7/50-5/8/50; MFA 116-00010-02, Kangyi Xianggang dangju
kouliu wo zai Gang feiji de xinwengao [Press release protesting detention of Chinese planes in Hong Kong by
Hong Kong British authorities], 17/5/50.
11 MFA 102-00235-01, duiwai zhengce; 'If we don't want to lean towards ... ' (bu dao xiang diguozhuyi jiu shi
dao xiang shehuizhuyi, di san tiao lu (zhongjian lu) shi meiyou de, ~1ftljcJ*OO3:.)'(~.Jt~1JIJjcJU~3:.),(. m=:
~~ (9J f8]~Hi~J1Ha~),for more on the 'two camps' theory see also Zhou Enlai, 'Jintian guoji shang de
zhuyao maodun shi zhanzheng yu heping wenti' [Today's Most Important Contradiction in the International
Sphere is the Question of Peace and War], 5/6/53, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan.
12 MFA 118-00014-07, Wo Waijiao Bu zhaoji youguan bumen kaihui shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs assembles all relevant bureaux to meeting to discuss the problem of the withdrawal
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policy for dealing with them. Two orders had been given: ~o new foreign businesses should
be allowed in China; and at that in most respects they should be treated the same as Chinese
companies. The dominance of foreign businesses over strategic economic sectors (such as
public utilities, oil, steel and coal) was considered completely unacceptable. This did not yet,
however, amount to a plan for wholesale closure or nationalisation.P The difficulties faced
by foreign companies in the early years instead resulted not from deliberate plans to close
them down but from the wider economic crisis, combined with the innate hostility of local
government officials towards them. The CCP had initially attempted to deal methodically
with the foreign presence in China; however, the outbreak of the Korean War meant that they
had to speed up the pace of change and take more definite steps.i" The war did not cause a
major change in policy towards foreign businesses, but it did speed their demise.P
At some point in 1950 an informal 'policy of squeeze' (ji de Jangzhen, t*~{_Jn~t) was
developed, under which the CCP would use economic means to apply pressure to foreign
businesses. At a meeting ofCCP leaders in Beijing in May 1952 Guan Datong (~*~), the
head of the Central Government's Foreign Capital Enterprises Supervisory Bureau
(Zhongyang Waizi Qiye Guanli Ju, ~9c?I'~1t~~IIJaj), explained that the policy had
been to prevent foreign businesses closing in order to keep their capital and assets within
China, with a view to an eventual takeover. After all, he said, in the long run, we 'want to
take more money' (yao naqu geng duo de qian, ~~~j!~ ~{_Jii).They had prolonged the
existence of some, while speeding the demise of those which were no longer needed. The
elimination of British businesses could not be dealt with in isolation, Guan stressed: it had to
be considered alongside domestic problems such as unemployment, appeasing the working
classes and accumulating tax revenue.l" With the transition to socialism in 1953; the policy of
'squeeze' would evolve into an effective means of pressuring foreign businesses into closing
down.
of British merchants], 24/5/52-30/5/52; 1952 Man 5 Yue 30 Ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyi fayan jilu,
Waijiao Bu Oufei si yi ke [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Europe and Africa Bureau, First Section, Minutes of
meeting on the problem of British merchants], 30/5/52.
13 Wu, 'Jianguo chuqi de jingji geju,' pp. 75-6.
14 Zhang, 'Xin Zhongguo Waijiao,' p. 39;
IS Xiang, Recasting, pp. 242-3.
16 MFA 118-00014-07, Yingguo shangren cheli wenti.
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The foreign population of Shanghai, 1949-1954
After May 1949, the foreign population of Shanghai shrank rapidly. Within a year, two-thirds
of the foreign population had departed. Many of those who had departed early had not been
long-term residents of Shanghai; among them were large numbers of stateless White Russian
and Jewish refugees.!" Between 1950 and 1954 the population decreased by between one and
three thousand people each year. By the mid 1950s most foreigners from 'imperialist' and
'capitalist' countries had departed. Soviet advisors became the most numerous foreign group
in Shanghai. After the Soviet experts were withdrawn in the late 1950s, only a few hundred
foreigners would remain to experience the tumultuous decades that followed.l''
Table 3: Foreign population of Shanghai, 1949-1959
Year Foreign Population Year Foreign Population
1949.6 32,045 1954 2,983
1949 28,683 1955 3,199
1950 11,939 1956 2,553
1951 8,842 1957 2,100
1952 6,769 1958 1,461
1953 4,657 1959 955
Source: Adapted/rom table showing foreign population 1949-1993 in Zhou et al.,
Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 345.
The withdrawal of foreigners was slow at first as people waited for the dust to settle.
Following the American Government's call for its citizens to withdraw in the summer of
1949, the rate of departure increased significantly.!" The majority of those who applied to
leave in this period were former diplomatic personnel who had been made redundant through
17 Marcia Ristaino, Port of Last Resort: Diaspora Communities of Shanghai (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2001), pp. 265-72.
18 Zhou et al, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 345.
19 MFA 118-00046-17, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu ba-jiu yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for August-September], 21/9/49; MFA 118-00046-17, Shanghai
Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Ba-Jiu Yue gongzuo baogao (fu jian si; zi Hu shenqing chujing waiqiao de fenxi) [Work
report of the Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for August-September (Appendix 4; analysis of
foreign nationals applications to leave the country from Shanghai)], 21/9/49.
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the CCP's non-recognition policy, and the wives and families of those who were committed
• 20to staying,
With the Guomindang's blockade of Shanghai ongoing, it was not until September 1949 that
a ship, the General Gordon, was able to reach the port. It left carrying 1,218 persons.i' When
the Americans closed their consulates in March 1950, the General Gordon was set to return
to collect them. This time negotiations for safe passage with the Guomindang and the
Communists failed. The threat of mines in the Yangzi estuary meant that the shipping
company was reluctant to sail. 22 In late April, 680 American and European citizens left
Shanghai on special non-stop trains to Tianjin, to board the ship at Tanggu (i)!)t).23 CCP
cadres on the spot noted that the foreigners complained loudly at having to go via Tianjin.i"
A few weeks later the blockade was lifted and foreigners were once more able to arrive and
depart through normal channels." The only problem lay in obtaining permission to do so.
The Shanghai FAD welcomed the departure of the foreigners, but they noted in reports to
Beijing that ve.ry few foreigners involved in what they considered to be 'Anglo-American
imperialist investment and economic aggression' tYing Mei diguozhuyi touji ji jingji qinliie,
~~*OO.i:)(ti~~p~£m1~am) and 'cultural aggression' (wenhua qinliie, )c1t1~am), had
so far applied to leave. Even though foreigners seemed to be flooding out of the city, the
FAD believed that this did 'not really prove that the imperialists [would] voluntarily abandon
their vested interests and special privileges.' This, they said, was 'absolutely impossible.v"
20 MFA 118-00046-17, gongzuo baogao (fujian si), 21/9/49.
21 Hooper, China Stands Up, pp. 78-80; The ship's name was ironically evocative of the British legacy in China,
bearing the same name as General Charles George 'Chinese' Gordon, who had led the Qing Empire's Ever
Victorious Army against the Taiping Rebels in 1863. It was however named after an American General of the
First World War- see Dictionary of American Fighting Ships Online, 1959-1991; AP 117 General W.H. Gordon:
URL: http://www.hazegray.orgldanfs, accessed 16/3/11.
22 Hooper, China Stands Up, p. 79-83; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 49;
23 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 50, 339-41; MFA 118-00078-02, Gedeng hao cheqiaojingguojianbao
[Concise reports on process of evacuation of foreign nationals on the 'General W.H. Gordon'], 28/5/50-31/5/50.
24 MFA 118-00078-02, Gedeng hao cheqiao jingguo jianbao, 28/5/50-31/5/50; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi,
~p. 339-41.
S Hooper, pp. 83, 108.
26MFA 118-00046-12, gongzuo baogao, 21/9/49; MFA 118-00046-17, gongzuo baogao (fujian si); 'did not
really prove ... ' (shishi bing bu zhengming diguozhuyi Jiang zidong fangqi qi ji de liyi yu tequan. Zhe shi jue bu
hui de, pJT J;.{~'if ~ Wi l!13:J(~I]ffl P1*Jl.,~4H '1fitfff' ~I]ffl~:tt fcj~ Xli] ~ ~±l $PJl. ~*A ~.:.t*ttt?~fff~
~z~D~. m~Jr~~*::F~iEPJl*l!13::~:j%~HJJ~1f:ft~~~f']M.Ej1H~. )g~~~~~m.
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Foreigners in Shanghai, 1950
Table 4: Foreigners in Shanghai by nationality, November 1950
Nationality Male Female Total Percentage of Total
British 664 651 1,315 11
French 282 283 565 4.7
German 241 192 433 3.6
Japanese 280 185 465 3.9
Other' 1,529 1,249 2,678 22,4
Portuguese 580 548 1,128 9.5
Stateless 437 453 990 8.3
Stateless (White Russians) 389 612 1,001 8,4
USA 118 118 236 2
USSR 1,438 1,690 3,128 26
Total 5,958 5,981 11,939 100
'Source: Table adapted/rom SMA BI-2-58328
In November 1950 the CCP registered all the foreigners in Shanghai. They recorded a total of
11,939. There were 1,315 people counted as 'British', of whom many were in fact from the
wider British empire.i" The British were the largest single group from an 'imperialist' and
'capitalist' country. The presence of foreigners from around forty different countries,
including former Sikh policemen, White Russians and thirty former Nazis, as well as
thousands of Eurasians and 'Portuguese' from Macao, bore testimony to Shanghai's position
27 Including nationals of the following countries: Albania, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel,
Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxemburg, Mexico, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the
Philippines, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Turkey, Vietnam and Yugoslavia.
28 SMA BI-2-583, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Junguanzhi Weiyuanhui Waiqiao Shiwu Chu (shou wen zhe-
Shifu Bangongting), cha fu ben shi waiqiao qingkuang you, 1951 nian 12yue 10 ri, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Guoji
fenlei tongji biao, 1951 nian, 11 yue, 15 ri [Shanghai Municipal People's Government Foreign Affairs
Department (to the Shanghai People's Government's administrative office), on investigating situation of
foreigners in the city, 10/12/51, Table of foreigners in Shanghai by nationality, 1511151].
29 SMA BI-2-3658, Shanghaishi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu, Shanghai Shi waiqiao gaikuang [Shanghai
People's Government, Situation of Foreign Nationals in Shanghai], 3111152, p. 9; for the regulations under
which they were registered see The Shanghai News, 'Registration of Foreign Nationals from Nov. 1-30,'
25/10/50.
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within global networks of empire, war and migration.l" In the whole of China in March 1951,
there were 26,813 foreigners from 'imperialist' and 'capitalist' countries.l'
Shanghai's foreign population in 1950 were engaged in a multitude of occupations: there
were diplomats and businessmen, dancing girls and criminals; 129 were diplomatic staff
affiliated with consuls and embassies; 730 were involved in religious professions; a further
730 were management personnel in industry or commerce; 3,428 were manual workers,
office workers or professionals; 4,830 were women, children and students; and 2,034 were
unemployed.Y





Former (non-recognised) Diplomatic Commercial representatives 3
Representatives: 163 Dependents 25
Fonner Consular officials 24
Fonner Consulate employees 77
Industry and Commerce: 787 Brokers! Agents 62
Commercial capitalists 34
Industrial capitalists 4




Office Workers/Staff, Shop workers 116
Workers/Functionaries: 1,507 School workers 7
Office workers in foreign citizens' organisations 2
Office workers in private companies 1,180
Office workers in public companies 136
Real estate managers 48
Responsible persons at research centres 1
30 SMA B 1-2-3658, waiqiao gaikuang, 3111152, pp. 9, 17;
31 Liang Zhikou, 'Jianguo Chuqi Waiqiao Guanli Gongzuo Shuping' [Commentary on the work of managing
foreign nationals in the early years of the nation], Dangshi Zhongguo Shi Yanjiu [Contemporary China History
Studies] (July 2006, Vol. 13, No.4), p. 48.
32 SMA BI-2-3658, waiqiao gaikuang, 3111152, p. 9.
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News journalists/editors etc 26
Nurses and Midwives 81
Other technicians 85
Pharmacists 14
Private (home) teachers 172
School teachers 129
Social organisation workers 75
Prostitutes/Madams 3





Students: 902 Middle school students 424
Primary school students 442
University students 36




Refugees (displaced persons) 2
Secondary Landlords 16
Unemployed 1,057
Unemployed (who had lost their job) 386
Women and Children: 3,728 Children 1,134
Housewives 2,594








Source: Adapted/rom SMA Bl-2-3658, waiqiao gaikuang, 3111/52, p. 9.
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Foreigners in Shanghai, 1951
From December 1950 to the end of December 1951, the foreign population of the city had
decreased to 8,842. Some 55 per cent of the British community had chosen to depart. Those
Britons who remained represented the main foreign commercial presence in the city. The
FAD noted that there would only be a significant decrease in their numbers when their
businesses were closed.P
Table 6: Reduction of foreigners of selected nationalities, November 1950 to December 1951
Nationality Nov 1950 Dec 1951 Reduction Percentage reduction
British 1,315 594 721 54.7
French 565 265 300 53.2
German 482 312 170 35.3
Indian 320 245 75 23.4
Italian 212 130 82 38.6
Portuguese 1,128 487 641 56.8
Spanish 217 154 63 29.1
Stateless 1,952 1,587 365 18.7
USA 236 87 149 63.1
USSRIRussian 3,128 2,653 475 15.2
Total 9,555 6,514 3,041 38.8 (Average)
Source: Adapted/rom SMA B1-2-3658, waiqiao gaikuang, 311l/52, p. 17.
In August 1951 the CCP's various organs began a massive survey of Shanghai. CCP cadres,
activists and students registered the details of every household, as well as every industrial and
commercial enterprise. The survey also recorded the numbers of foreigners living in each
district. When compared to figures from 1947 we can see quite clearly the effect of the
foreign withdrawal on the demographics of certain areas. The foreign population in Changshu
district reduced from 11,370 in 1947 to 2,063 in 1951; from 9,017 to 2,102 in Lujiawan; and
from 3,557 to 178 in the North Sichuan Road area.34 In the three areas in which the foreigners
33 SMA B 1-2-3658, waiqiao gaikuang, 31/1/52, p. 17.
34 These figures are taken from the series SMA A4-2-11 to A4-2-29 (excluding A4-2-21, 22, 25, 26, 27 which
are unavailable); A4-2-11 Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Zhengce Yanjiushi guanyu Yangpu qu jiben qingkuang
diaocha [CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee Research Office investigation on the basic situation in
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were most numerous (for which there are records), Changshu, Lujiawan and Hongkou,
foreigners made up only 1 per cent, 0.6 per cent and 1.1 per cent of the total population
respectively. In many areas, foreigners had all but disappeared."
The Shanghai authorities were 'impelling foreigners to leave' (cushi waiqiao chujing, 1lE1i91'
iff :±j±,l) according to instructions given to them from the Central Committee. In 1951
encouraging Americans to leave had been their priority; only 87 remained at the end of the
year and of these 34 were only waiting for their exit visas to be approved before departing.
The FAD reported that:
According to the Centre's instructions, the citizens of America, Britain and other imperialist
capitalist countries remaining in China, should, except for those individuals being intentionally
detained, basically all be impelled to leave in 1952 (anzhao Zhongyang zhishi. Dui canliu wo guo
MeiYing deng diguozhuyi zibenzhuyi guojia qiaomin, chu you yizhi de baoliu gebie wai, ying cushi
zai yi jiu wu er nian jiben shang quanbu lijing, t~~«!:f:l*tli7F,~1Ji'€IHJW!I~~W*@).:E~~
*.:E~OO.ffl~,.~.R~§M~~~, g~~~-A~=~~*~~e.~~
In order to achieve this goal the authorities planned to speed the closure of foreign businesses
and to intensify the 'Three-Selves Movement' in the religious sphere. This would remove the
incentive for the majority of foreigners to stay. Administrative devices would also be
employed. For instance, a significant number of residence permits were due to be renewed in
February and September. Foreigners could be made to leave if their permits were not
extended. Those foreigners whose continued presence was considered useful to the economy
would have their permits renewed for a year to 'dilute' (chongdan, ,Itt )~) the negative
economic effects that might accompany the withdrawal of large numbers of foreigners.37
Yangshupu district], October 1951. The remaining files in this sequence refer to the following districts: A4-2-12,
Yulin; A4-2-14, North Sichuan Road; A4-2-15, Hongkou; A4-2-16, Beizhan; A4-2-17, Zhabei; A4-2-18,
Huangpu; A4-2-19, Laozha; A4-2-20, Xincheng; A4-2-23, Songshan; A4-2-24, Luwan; A4-2-28, Changning;
A4-2-29, Changshu; Figures for 1947 can be found in: SMA YI5-1-201-593, Shanghai gaikuang; xia bian,
Waiqiao [Shanghai Outline, second volume: foreigners], Apri11949, pp. 591-2.
3S SMA A4-2-17, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Zhengce Yanjiushi guanyu Zhabei Qu Jiben Qingkuang Diaocha
[CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee Research Office Investigation on the Basic Situation in Zhabei District],
15/11/51.




'For the last one hundred years' wrote Mayor Chen Yi u75in November 1949, Shanghai had
been a 'nest of reactionaries and imperialists' (diguozhuyi fandong pai de laochao, * l¥l.:i:)(
&rJJ5ma~~:m). It was an 'international metropolis with frequent comings and goings' (guoji
jian wang lai pin/an zhi dushi, l¥l~;Rf8]flJ~~ffi.~zAfWm). In future, movement in and out of
the city would have to be controlled strictly." In March 1950 the Shanghai FAD reported
their concerns about the effects of the departure of such a large number of foreigners to
Beijing. They wanted foreigners to leave, but they also wanted them to do so in an orderly.
manner, ensuring that their enterprises and organisations were not simply abandoned. Further
delays in the issuance of exit permits were caused by the FAD's limited resources and lack of
experience. In order to solve this problem, the FAD planned to have workers in each business
hold their foreign bosses accountable." With restrictions placed on their movement, the FAD
reported, 'the imperialists, would be no longer able to [use the economic circumstances] to
spread disorder' (diguozhuyi zhe yi wusuo liyong lai jinxing daoluan, *l¥l.:i:)(;lf9.J']CpJT*'J
m*itHT1£3liL).40
In July 1949, the Public Security Bureau announced that they would start accepting
applications for exit permits. They stated that applications would be approved as long as the
applicant had no outstanding debts, ongoing civil disputes or criminal cases pending." Entry
and exit to Shanghai was conditional on the approval of the FAD, though individual decisions
were often made by Zhou Enlai himself.f
38 SMA B 1-2-294, Shanghai Shi Gongyong Ju, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waiqiao Shiwu Chu deng dan wei
guanyu waiqiao chujing guanli wenti de zhishi [Instructions to the Shanghai Public Utility Bureau, Shanghai
People's Government Foreign Citizens' Affairs Bureau and other work units on the departure of foreigners],
November 1949- March 1950, pp. 7-9.
39 SMA BI-2-3658-1, gongzuo zongjie; MFA 118-00046-12,gongzuo baogao, 21/9/49.
40 SMA BI-2-3658-1, gongzuo zongjie.
41 MFA 118-00046-17, gongzuo baogao, 21/9/49; MFA 118-00046-11, gongzuo baogao (fu jian shier), 1/6/49- .
30/11149; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 49, 338.
42 For example, on the 29th October 1949 Zhou Enlai personally approved the entry of 7 foreigners. They were
British and French employees of the Shanghai Waterworks Company and the French tram company who were
accompanied by their wives; Jianguo yilai Zhou En/ai wengao, Vol. 3, July 1950 to December 1950, p. 477, see
also pp. 610-11 for a separate group of British and Indian citizens approved for admission in December.
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A large number of Chinese capitalists had abandoned their assets and fled to Hong Kong or
Taiwan.43 This did not set a precedent for foreign interests. The movement of foreign
businessmen was more tightly controlled. Each business, Chinese or foreign, had to nominate
a 'responsible person' ifuzeren; ~ ~ A), who was to be held personally responsible for the
business. Foreign 'responsible persons' could not leave Shanghai until a government-
approved replacement was nominated.t" To be allowed to leave, foreigners had to present a
document guaranteeing that production would not be affected by their departure." Electric &
Musical Industries Ltd. (EMI) discovered this in May 1950. EMI were tired of sending good
money after bad and so they decided not to remit any further funds into Shanghai. They
discharged their local agent with a view to abandoning their assets. The agent wrote back,
informing them that abandonment did not absolve liability. He, as the 'responsible person',
would be held personally responsible. They would have to close the factory formally,
according to the desires of the Chinese authorities."
One case of successful abandonment occurred in 1950 when Pryor, the manager of the
Kailuan Mining Administration, left for Japan to negotiate for future exports and never
returned. The Administration's mining permit, which had been issued by the former
, government, was due to expire in November 1950. After Pryor's departure the Chinese
trustees requested that the mines be put under government custody. The government took full
control in 1952.47
43 SMA A4-1-11, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Wei Yanjiu Shi, Shanghai Shi Laodong Ju guanyu 1949 nian, 1950
nian laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao [CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee Research Bureau, Shanghai
Labour Bureau, report on labour-capital dispute resolution in 1949-1950], 1950; Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu
Laodong Ju, guanyu laozi guanxi de buchong baogao [Shanghai People's Government Labour Bureau,
supplementary report on labour-capital relations], 18/5/50; TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in
China: Trading conditions and positions of British firms in China, 1950; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 502,
14/5/50.
44 TNA FO 371/83347, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 502, 14/5/50.
4S MFA 118-00046-17, gongzuo baogao (fujian si), 2119/49.
46 TNA FO 371183348, British Commercial Policy in China; Trading conditions and positions of British firms in
China; Electric & Musical Industries Limited to N.C.C. Trench, Foreign Office, 25/5/50; Benson, EMI (China)
to Electric & Musical Industries Limited, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 564, 31/5/50; Electric & Musical
Industries Limited to Benson, EMI (China), Foreign Office to Shanghai, No. 541, 10/6/50; Benson, EMI (China)
to Electric & Musical Industries Limited, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 608, 15/6/50; Electric & Musical
Industries Limited to Benson, EMI (China), 19/6/50.
47 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 116-18; TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading
Conditions and Positions of British firms in China, 1950; Note of a Discussion with Mr. Nathan about the
Position of the Kailuan Mining Administration, held in the Foreign Office on the 30th March.
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Before the abandonment, the Administration had approached the Chinese authorities, asking
them to take over the company's assets in exchange for discharging their liabilities. This
approach alarmed Foreign Office observers who saw it as 'a bad bargain.' 'Any sign of
weakness in China' one observer noted, 'would prejudice the position of British concerns all
over the world.' Particularly worrying were the implications this might have for British
interests in Iran, Malaya and elsewhere in the formal and informal empire where post-war
British influence was encountering nationalist opposition. The Foreign Office hoped that the
Chinese would have to either ease the pressure on foreign firms or take them over with
compensation. The Chinese would in fact take a third route."
Figure 10: Celebrations at the takeover of the Kailuan Mining Administration (1)
48 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading Conditions and Positions of British firms
in China, 1950; Record of a Meeting held in the Foreign Office on the 30th March to discuss the position of
British Firms in China.
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Figure 11: Celebrations at the takeover of the Kailuan Mining Administration (2)
Figure 12: Celebrations at the takeover of the Kailuan Mining Administration (3)
)
There was nothing new about the exit permit system. Even before the takeover, foreigners
had been required to apply for exit permits, without which they would be unable to purchase
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tickets for their passage out of the city." The CCP turned this system from an administrative
procedure into a strategic tool for controlling the movement of specific foreigners. The
archival records in London and in Beijing are full of examples of people who waited for years
to receive their exit permits without being informed of the reasons for the delay. 50 For
example, an American national named William Christian, of the British American Tobacco
Company, first applied to leave Shanghai in April 1951. His application was still not
approved even after BAT (China) was closed down in 1952 and the 66-year-old had suffered
a severe heart attack. British diplomats made representations to the Chinese in 1953, asking
them to end his 'physical and mental sufferings' and to allow him to return home. His exit
visa was finally approved after the Shanghai FAD pointed out to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs that although he was being detained over a 'political problem', the last thing they
wanted was for him to die in China.t'
Despite the presence oflarge numbers of cases like Christian's in the archives, the number of
foreigners in Shanghai did decrease quite quickly. Cases such as this were the exception
rather than the rule.52 Nevertheless, the actual process of applying for exit permits remained
tedious and difficult for all.53 The detention of British businessmen in Shanghai through the
use of exit permit procedures has been portrayed by historians and contemporaries as
'hostage' taking. 54 Writing from Beijing in February 1953, Leo Lamb pointed out that the
situation was actually a little more complicated. Many businessmen realised that the only way
to get out of China was to close their companies or transfer their assets into Chinese hands;
49 See the advice of Randall Gould's wife Dorothy to newcomers in Dorothy Gould, Do's and Don'ts For
Foreigners Coming to Shanghai Today (Shanghai: The Mercury Press, 1947), pp. 5-6.
so MFA 118-00014-01, Yingguo tanpan daibiao Lan Laina chenshu Yingguo shangren zai Hua maoyi shoudao
xianzhi shi [British Charge d'Affaires ['Negotiation Representative'] L.H. Lamb statement that trade of British
merchants in China is being restricted], 12/4/52; Letter from L.H. Lamb to Zhang Hanfu, 12/4/52; For infraction
of human rights see; TNA FO 676/492, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954; S. Schiffmann, Behr &
Mathew Ltd., Shanghai to A. Veitch, Consul General Shanghai, 4/2/54.
51 MFA 118-00471-04, Yingguo tanpan daibiao chu guanyu qing pizhun Shanghai Yizhong Gongsi guyuan
Meiguo qiaomin Ke Tezhen Juju chujing shi, zhi Waijiao Bu de zhaohui ji guanyu gai an de chuli shi [British
Charge d'Affaires' ['Negotiation Representative's'] Office regarding request for approval for employee ofYee
Tsoong Tobacco Company Christian and wife to leave the country, diplomatic note to Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and [details of] resolution of this case], 2114/53-16/6/53; TNA FO 676/494, Foreign business interest in
China: British American Tobacco Co Ltd, 1954; H.V. Tiencken, BAT (China) to Foreign Nationals Section of
Public Security Bureau, Shanghai, 7/5/50.
S2 MFA 118-00046-12, gongzuo baogao, 2119/49; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 345.
S3 Hooper, China Stands Up, pp. 78-80
S4 See for example Thompson, China's Nationalization.
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once they had done so they were free to leave. 55 Other companies refused to transfer their
assets and wished to either persevere in the hope of better times, or to force the government
to expropriate their assets to lay the groundwork for a future compensation claim. Shanghai
managers were therefore often detained in China as the result of their own directors'
1·· 56po teres.
Entry permits were also hard to obtain. Once foreigners were inside China, they were obliged
to register for a residence permit (juliuzheng, ~MiiE).57 In this way, the CCP were able to
monitor the numbers, nationalities and occupations of the foreign population and to
increasingly restrict their freedom of movement. The registration of foreigners was part of
much wider development of the hukou (P D) household registration system through which
the government was able to control the movement of China's vast population. 58 Foreigners
had to request permission to be allowed to travel away from Shanghai. They were not usually
allowed to travel to more than one destination, or for longer than two weeks. 59 In December
1950 the manager of the International Export Company requested to be allowed to go to
Xuzhou to procure wool. Zhou Enlai wrote to the head of the Shanghai FAD saying 'for
foreigners to go into the interior and purchase supplies is disadvantageous to us', so the
request was denied.t"
ss TNA FO 3711108082, Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; direct approaches
by British firms to the Central Government of China, 1953 (part 1, pp. to 59); Lamb, Beijing to Foreign Office,
No. 112, 16/2/53.
56 See for example the case of S. Schiffman, the Shanghai manager of S. Behr and Mathew discussed in Chapter
Five.
57 SMA Bl·I·1l59, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Gonganju, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu
guanyu ni ding Shanghai Shi waiqiao hukou guanli zanxing banfa (eao an), [Shanghai People's Government
Public Security Bureau, Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Department, regarding the
establishment of measures for management of 'household registration' of foreigners (draft)], 3/2/51.
58 Cheng, Tiejun and Selden, Mark, 'The Origins and Social Consequences of China's Hukou System,' The
China Quarterly, No. 139 (Sep., 1994), pp. 644.53.
59 Shanghai GonganJu Gongan Shi Zhi, p. 283 see also Liang, 'Jianguo ehuqi waiqiao guanli,' p. 50.
60 Zhou Enlai, Zhonggong Zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, Zhongyang Danganguan bian, Jianguo yilai Zhou
Enlai wengao, di san ce, 1950 nian 7 yue -1950 nian 12 yue [Zhou Enlai's Manuscripts Since the Founding of
the People's Republic of China, Vol. 3, July 1950 to December 1950] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe,
2008), p. 662.
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The Shanghai News and foreign life in Communist Shanghai
Lists of names of those who had their exit permits approved were printed in the government's
official English-language newspaper The Shanghai News. They were eagerly awaited by
those foreigners who felt themselves to be trapped in limbo. The News was established in
June 1950 and was intended as a means of communicating the government's rules and
regulations to foreigners and to help the 'English-reading public to acquire an understanding
of the new Shanghai and of the new China. ,61 In its earliest issues the newspaper focused on
positive messages regarding the Communists' successes, with headlines such as 'Shanghai's
New Day Has Dawned' and 'Industry and Commerce of Shanghai during the Last Year.'
These worthy pieces sat side-by-side with the cinema advertisements discussed in Chapter
Two. The content of the News become more vitriolic and scathing as the Korean War
intensified and the atmosphere in Shanghai became increasingly politicised.
The attitude of most foreigners towards The Shanghai News tended to reflect their attitude to
'New Shanghai' more widely. The paper had been conceived of as a means of
propagandising towards foreigners, but the British community in Shanghai soon grew bored
of its shrill tone. There was an enormous gap in understanding between its Communist
editors and foreign readers.f If it were not for the publication of the exit permit lists the
paper would have scarce have been bought at all.
During the Three Antis Campaign, many of the educated English-speaking staff of the News
were accused of 'degenerate bourgeois thinking' (zichajieji dejuxiu sixiang, ~F~ft~a~mK
t1j'}[H~).63In October 1952 further concerns were raised about the strength of the Party's
control over the News. The editorial board had not kept up with the political movements
sweeping across Shanghai. They had a 'severely bureaucratic working style' (yanzhong
guanliaozhuyi zuojeng, F:m:rg1~.3::~ i~JXI.).64 Given the authorities' concerns about the
political reliability of The Shanghai News it is perhaps not a coincidence that the paper was
61 Shanghai Xinwen Zhi, p. 260; The Shanghai News, 'To Our Readers' [Announcement in First Issue], 10/6/50.
62 The Shanghai News, see for instance the paper's coverage of the Korean War in January 1951 which featured
several articles by controversial pro-Communist British journalist Alan Winnington.
63 SMA B35-2-112-1, Shanghai Xinwen 'San Fan' Yundong Zongjie baogao (caoan) [Summary report of the
'Three Antis' Campaign in The Shanghai News (Draft)], 1952.
64 SMA A22-2-73, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Dangdaihui shang guanyu 'Shanghai Xinwen' gongzuo wenti
de tian [Shanghai People's Government Party Congress proposal on work problems at 'The Shanghai News'],
21110/52-24/10/52.
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closed in December 1952.65With the closure of the News, remarked one former resident of
Shanghai, the English-reading community were deprived of their 'last remnant of 'cultural
breakfast food. ,,66
Shanghai was changing. The drastic decline in the number of foreigners and the CCP's moral
approach to urban governance had serious impacts on the social scene. Before the Communist
takeover foreign social life had centred around the city's various sporting and social clubs.
By the end of 1951, the majority of these clubs had closed because of the departure of so
many of their members and the imposition of high taxes and other pressures by the
authorities.Y With people seeking to escape all liabilities which might delay their exit, it was
difficult to find people to serve as the 'responsible person' for clubs and societies and to be
personally accountable for their finances and closure. With the dramatic fall in their
membership the British Residents' Association, British Women's Association, national
societies (St. George's, St David's etc.), the British School and Chamber of Commerce,
which had previously been such fixtures of community life, all closed. Sporting and cultural
organisations (the rowing club, amateur dramatic society etc) followed suit. The Bowling
Club was doing well, it was said, because it was the sole male-only venue left in the city.68
As clubs closed, the buildings that housed them found new purposes. The iconic Shanghai
Club became the International Seamens' Club.69 In 1953, the Hung Jao Golf Club and the
Country Club closed, leaving the French Club as the only remaining social venue. The
changeovers could sometimes lead to farcical or surreal situations. For example, the French
Club hosted one last party before it was taken over on New Year's Day 1954. Having seen in
the New Year in style, the revellers trooped out at 2am dressed in their finery, while
Communist cadres in blue cotton 'Mao suits' filed in carrying artworks. In the morning, the
6S The Shanghai News, 'Notice,' 28/12/52; Shanghai Xinwen Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui [Record of News in
Shanghai Compilation Committee], Shanghai Xinwen Zhi [Record of News in Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai
Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House], 2000), p. 260; The
official record states that this decision was taken due to declining sales and was also so that the publishing plant
could be used to publish the periodical 'China Reconstructs' (Zhongguo Jianshe, ~ [@~ii) in Beijing.
66 NARA RG 59, Box 4203, 793.00/1-2253, Consul General Zurich to Department of State, No. 240, 22/1/52;
Peripheral: News Items From China.
67 NARA CREST CIA Archive, Information Report; Present State of Shanghai's Foreign Community/Business
Conditions/Appearance of City, 6/11151.
68 TNA FO 3711108089, British institutions in Shanghai, many in process of dissolution, 1953.
69 SMA BI82-1-461-187, Shanghai ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi, 25/4/53, pp. 187-190; Bickers, Britain in China,
pp.241-2.
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club would reopen as the People's Art Gallery" Most foreigners admired the new order in
the city, the clean streets and honest (if unfriendly) officials, but the loss of the legendary
gaiety of 'old Shanghai' was much lamented.
As their favourite bars, clubs and entertainment venues were closed one by one, foreigners
found themselves living increasingly boring and claustrophobic lives. They became
introverted. They hosted ever-more elaborate dinner parties at their homes, which were spoilt
only by the tedious repetition of well-worn conversations among a shrinking social circle;
'Who had got an exit permit? Was there any sign of hope on the horizon?,71
One particular topic of complaint was that the price of imported foreign commodities was
very high and home comforts became ever more difficult to find. 72 This was particularly
keenly felt with alcohol. Social life revolved around drink, but whiskey and gin, as well as
other such luxuries, became prohibitively expensive." Scotch whiskey reached US$15 a
bottle and the foreign community had to tum for the most part to vodka and gin distilled
locally by the EWO Brewery.i" The parties at which the alcohol was consumed changed in
other ways too. It seems that the Communist takeover and reduction of the foreign population
had a levelling effect socially. One HSBC bank employee recalled that for the first time their
property department's engineer was invited to parties, where 'once upon a time no one would
have dreamt of inviting the Bank's engineer to a party. ' 75
Struggling to support itself, the once-exclusive Palace Hotel had now opened its doors to all
with signs on its windows informing customers 'Cheap Lunches Served Quickly' and 'No
Tips.' 'Come and be a High Class Man - Dine at the Park Hotel' read another. The most
famous Chinese restaurants, the Golden Gate, Ham Kuo and Hung Lin displayed similar
signs. 'Coolies and labourers' reported an American intelligence agent, 'can be seen sitting in
the Park Hotel lounge, and when they argue with the hotel's well-to-do guests, as they often
70 HSBC 16411005/C, Burch, Francis Richard, pp. 94-6; King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation,
Vol.4, p. 381.
71 Humphrey Trevelyan, Worlds Apart; China 1953-55 U.S.SR. 1962-65 (London; Macmillan Ltd., 1971), pp.
15,20,51-2,55-6.
72 NARA CREST CIA Archive, Information Report; Present State of Shanghai's Foreign CommunitylBusiness
Conditions/Appearance of City, 6/11151.
73 Captain W.J. Moore, Shanghai Century (Ilfracombe, Devon: Arthur H. Stockwell Ltd., 1966), pp. 125, 136.
74 NARA CREST CIA Archive, Information Report; Present State of Shanghai's Foreign CommunitylBusiness
Conditions! Appearance of City, 6/11/51.
7S HSBC 16411016/C, O.P. Edwards, p. 95; King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Vol.4, p. 375.
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do, the police do not intervene.' Although many of the city's nightclubs (including the Park
Hotel, Ciro's, the French Club and the Palace Hotel) remained open for some time, liquor
was banned and the walls were covered with posters admonishing customers to be moral
• • 76citizens.
Doing business in Communist Shanghai
The New Democratic economy
Approaching the task of running China's economy in May 1949, Mao (rather coarsely)
likened the CCP to a 'a girl who, when marrying, knowing that she will have to bear children,
but not knowing how it will be, she still knows that it will be inevitable and so [she] marries.'
They knew the 'general direction' they wanted to take, but were not sure exactly how to
achieve their goals. Stalin's representative in Beijing, Kovalev, bemoaned the CCP's lack of
economic expertise; the central government's 'economic centre,' he reported to Moscow, had
been almost entirely planned by him.77
New China's economy was to be 'New Democratic,' meaning that for the time being socialist
transformation would be postponed and capitalism encouraged. The CCP lacked the capital,
cadres, experience and resources needed to revive the national economy without help from
capitalists.i" Efforts were made to encourage 'national capitalists' (any Chinese capitalist
.willing to cooperate) to stay in Shanghai." The urbane Vice Mayor Pan Hannian courted the
city's capitalists, promising them protection, loans and profits." Historians have long seen
this New Democratic stage as little more than a cover for the Communists' real intentions.
They suggest that the Communists had no intention of allowing private enterprise to continue
to exist for more than a few years. Bennis Wai-yip So has argued to the contrary that, 'there
was no hidden Party agenda to nationalise the private sector before 1953.' The CCP, he
argues, believed that China needed more capitalism, not less. Capitalism was seen as a
chaotic and unequal system, so it would have to be strongly regulated. They intended to use
76 NARA CREST CIA Archive, Information Report; Conditions in Shanghai, 3118/50.
77 CWIHP, Cable, Kovalev to Stalin, 17/5/49.
78 Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou Enlai wengao, Vol. 3, p. 369.
79 Zhou Erfu, 'Chen Yi tongzhijiekai xin Shanghai lishi di yi ye' in Chengshijieguan qinliji, pp. 576-9; See for
example the case of Liu Hongsheng in Sherman Cochran, 'Capitalists Choosing Communist China; the Liu
Family of Shanghai, 1948-56,' in Dilemmas of Victory, pp. 359-86.
80 Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 350-5.
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economic planning and regulation of the market to help grow the private sector and develop
the economy, while avoiding wide-scale nationalisation."
They were initially even reluctant to form state-private joint enterprises, for fear of alarming
capitalists who might see this as a step towards nationalisation.V Such enterprises were only
to be created in cases where the company had previously been part-owned by 'bureaucratic
capitalists' who had fled, or to ensure the smooth running of companies considered crucial to
the 'people's livelihood'Y'
Enterprises, such as banks, railways and airlines, whether Chinese-owned or foreign-owned, which
are either monopolistic in character or too big for private management, shall be operated and
administered by the state, so that private capital cannot dominate the livelihood of the people: this
is the main principle of the regulation of capital. 84
The Centre's policy was seen as appeasement by some local cadres, but in June 1950 Mao
exhorted them to 'not hit out in all directions.' They had to 'struggle against [the national
bourgeoisie] on the one hand and unite with them on the other.,8s In the months that followed
the private sector gradually recovered. Capitalists were allowed to make significant profits
and in 1951 production was 60 per cent higher than in 1949.86
The CCP sought to make use of the private sector. The problem came when they failed to
understand the dynamics of capitalism. In order to eliminate the chaos of capitalism, the CCP
placed increased controls over the supply of raw materials and the purchase of finished
products. This turned private factories into little more than state contractors.V Attempts to
81 Bennis Wai-yip So, 'The Policy-Making and Political Economy of the Abolition of Private Ownership in the
Early 1950s: Findings from New Material,' The China Quarterly, 2002, No. 171, pp. 682-703; Gao, Hangzhou,
pp.76-9.
82 See for example the correspondence between Zhou Enlai and Bo Yibo in Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou
Enlai wengao, Vol. 3, pp. 45-6 in which Bo recommends that the CCP show restraint towards taking over,
purchasing or investing in foreign ftrms to avoid the appearance that they were 'taking advantage' of the
capitalist's difficulties (chengrenzhiwei, *A.z.fB).
83 So, 'The Policy-Making,' pp. 682-703.
84 Mao, 'On New Democracy,' pp. 338-84.
8S Mao, 'Don't Hit Out in All Directions,' 6/6/50, Selected Works, Vol. V, pp. 33-6.
86 Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 354-5; see also Deng Xiaoping, 'The Situation Following our Triumphant Advance to
the Central Plains and our Future Policies and Strategy,' 25/4/48, Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Vol. 1; in
which Deng stated 'While opposing proftteering and monopoly, we should still allow businessmen to make
money. Without speciftc policies practical problems cannot be solved.'
87 On state control over the management of resources see Toby Ho, 'The Suppression of Private Entrepreneurs
in China in the 1950s,' Risk Management, Vol. 2, No.2 (2000), pp. 29-38.
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develop the private sector failed in the absence of a market economy. CCP leaders like Zhou
Enlai knew that there was a contradiction between state planning and private enterprise. By
September 1950, however, it seemed as though the state sector was already leading the way
in many areas: private capitalism was serving state capitalism and was moving away from its
former chaotic state.88
Seen in this light, the transition to socialism in 1953 was a pragmatic decision taken in late
1952, based on the misconception that the state sector was superior to the private.I" The
position of foreign companies in Shanghai was similar to that of Chinese companies; the CCP
were hostile to them in principle and intended to eliminate them in the future, but were
willing to make use of them for the time being. This was particularly true in economic sectors
such as shipping and trade where China's own resources were severely underdeveloped.
Foreign business in New Democratic Shanghai
At the time of the Communist takeover in 1949 there were around 1,000 foreign enterprises
in China employing 120,000 Chinese workers. 50 per cent of these were funded with British
capital.i" In June 1950, there were 685 foreign businesses remaining in Shanghai employing
nearly 50,000 Chinese workers." Of these enterprises, 185 were British (27 per cent), 155
American and 41 French. Capital from these three countries alone accounted for 91.4 per cent
of the total foreign capital invested. They held 99 per cent of all real estate occupied by
foreigners and employed 95.5 per cent of the total number of Chinese workers employed in
all foreign firms.92
88 Zhou Enlai: Jianguo yilai Zhou En/ai wengao, Vol. 3, p. 368.
89 So, 'Policy-Making,' pp. 682-703.
90 Wu, 'Jianguo chuqi de jingji geju,' pp. 75-6.
91 He et ai, Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 12.
92 Zhou et ai, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 314.
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Table 7: Foreign businesses in Shanghai, June 195093
No. Per Chinese Per Capital Per Real Estate Per
Enterprises cent Workers cent (10,000 RMB) cent (mu)94 cent
British 185 27 29,313 61 3,700 34.8 7,224 65
French 41 6 3,836 8 2,863 26.9 633 5.4
USA 123 18 12,773 26.5 3,162 29.7 3,102 28
Swiss 35 5 801 1.7 533 5 45
USSR 128 18.7 410 0.8 14 0.1 4 1.6
other" 173 25.3 961 2 369 3.5 127
Total 685 100 48,094 100 10,641 100 11,135 100
Source: Adapted from Zhou et aI, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 315.
Foreign firms dominated whole sectors of the commercial economy, including banking,
finance, insurance and real estate." The import and export trade was largely controlled by the
great foreign 'hongs' [merchant houses]: Jardine Matheson & Co. and Butterfield & Swire.
These important companies also acted as general agents for a multitude of industrial and
commercial enterprises. Butterfield & Swire were agents for the China Navigation Company,
the Blue Funnel Line, various insurance companies, and the Taikoo Sugar Refining Company.
They managed Holt's Wharf and the Orient Paint Colour and Varnish Company. They were,
also associated with a trading company named Swire & Maclaine. Butterfield & Swire and
their affiliates employed a total of 1,054 Chinese workers.l"
In industry, whole sectors were dominated by foreign companies and their well known brands.
Products from the EWO Brewery, China Soap Company and the Yee Tsoong Tobacco could
be found as far away as Tibet. The majority of Shanghai's public utility companies were
foreign-owned, a legacy of the city's foreign administration. Foreign companies produced 91
per cent of all power in Shanghai, Along with was 76 per cent of the gas and 71 per cent of
93 Zhou et al, Shanghai waishi Zhi, p. 315.
94 One mu is equal to 666m2•
95 'Other' here includes enterprises owned by nationals of the following 27 countries- Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Korea, Japan, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Pakistan, Panama, the Philippines, Poland, Portugal
and stateless people.
96 SMA B 1-2-3658-1, gongzuo zongjie.
97 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 4-5.
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the water. The Shanghai Electric Construction Company (hereafter referred to as the British
Tram Company) operated the major tram routes that served the heart of the city.98
The blockade of Shanghai and the ongoing inflationary crisis seriously damaged the position
of foreign businesses. Most firms had to remit large sums of money in order to keep
businesses going. In late 1949 and early 1950 British firms were sending an estimated
average of £ 150,000 monthly at a very unfavourable rate of exchange.f" In April 1950,
industrial concerns began to face new problems emerging from what John Kenyon, the
Shanghai manager of the textile manufacturers Patons & Baldwins, called 'an overdose of
deflationary medicine.' lOO Deflationary measures meant that those who had incurred debts
during the period of inflation found their scheduled repayments out of proportion with their
incomes. As the currency depreciated, loans did not write themselves down accordingly.!"
The industrial sector was hit particularly hard; deflation reduced commodity prices, which in
tum reduced the incentive for production: lower production meant lower wages and a further
fall in demand. In order to meet their tax obligations, many companies were offering their
goods and stocks for sale at less than the price of manufacture, but as everyone was under the
same pressures, there were no buyers. A few small enterprises, such as the Bakerite
Chocolate Shop and the Paramount Ballroom, had already been forced to close down. 102 The
People's Bank and Chinese People's Insurance Company took the majority of business in
banking and insurance, which left foreign firms with much reduced incomes. By May 1950
the number of foreign insurance companies operating in China had reduced from 70 to 27, of
which 20 were British.103
98 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 12.
99 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading Conditions and Positions of British firms
in China, 1950; Meeting held in the Foreign Office on 3/4/50 to discuss further the position of British firms in
China; British Chamber of Commerce Memorandum; 'The Present Position Facing British Firm in Shanghai
and the Problem of Retrenchment.'
100 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 377, 15/4/50.
101 TNA FO 371183348, British Commercial Policy in China; N.C.C. Trench, Minute 117/50 on Shanghai to
Foreign Office, 565, 9/6/50; TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading conditions and
positions of British firms in China, 1950; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 502, 14/5/50.
102 TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading Conditions and Positions of British Firms
in China, 1950; China Association Bulletin, No. 47, 20/4/50.
103 Shao, China, Britain, p. 51.
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Taxes were particularly high because the new government suffered from a shortage of
funds.l04 Moreover, the tax system had been created from scratch and so it was, perhaps
understandably, full of uncertainties. Butterfield & Swire complained that they were often
forced to over-pay first and try in vain to reclaim the surplus later. Between 1951 and 1953,
their subsidiary the China Navigation Company paid over £10,000 a year more to the Tax
Bureau than it should have, but the money was never returned. Income Tax was 'often an
unknown quantity' based on a perceived 'ability to pay' rather than on actual business
conducted or profit made. There was also the problem that tax payments made were not
considered final. Assessments from previous years could always be reopened. New laws and
regulations were often imposed retroactively to extract new sums. According to Butterfield &
Swire, their Chinese staff served as informers and alerted the Tax Bureau to missing sums. lOS
Though many foreign firms felt that they were being unjustly treated, the British
representative in Beijing pointed out that:
... in matters of taxation all our evidence is to the effect that Chinese capitalists (and indeed even
industrial workers as well as peasants) are taxed to the utmost possible limit; insofar as closing
down factories and reduction of staff is true, Chinese employers are at least as rigorously treated as
foreign employers, receiving Government permission for such retrenchment no more readily and
being equally obliged to come to terms with their workers as a necessary preliminary.l'"
The British representative had a point: rather than simply punishing foreign capitalists, in the
early period the CCP were in fact trying to raise revenue through punitive taxation. Later
'crippling taxation' (sunshui, 19!~5t)would be used as a more deliberate means of 'squeezing'
foreign capitalists.i'"
One of Butterfield & Swire's key complaints in business affairs was that, despite the fact that
there were regulations and laws in place to decide labour disputes, tax evaluations and legal
affairs on a fair and 'impartial' basis, all too often they were 'manipulated to suit political
convenience.,108 In order to meet tax demands, foreign companies had three options: to
increase earnings; to decrease expenditure or sell assets; or to draw on reserves in China or
104 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 45-8.
lOS JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 24-9; TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in
China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 317, 114/50.
106 TNA FO 371/83347, British Commercial Policy in China; Beijing to Foreign Office, No. 473, 5/5/50.
107 MFA 102-00235-01, duiwai zhengce, 01101151-30/01151.
108 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 24.
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held overseas by the head office. The most desirable of these was retrenchment, and yet
foreign firms found the procedures for retrenchment 'theoretical only.' All attempts to reduce
production or disperse the workforce were refused by the authorities.l'"
Butterfield & Swire's attempts to increase their earnings also ended in disappointment. In
1951 the government trading corporations (established to place control over foreign trade into
government hands) began to expand their operations.i'" The new corporations needed storage
space, and so demand for Swire's warehouse space increased. Rather than allow the company
to become profitable, the Shanghai authorities took steps to prevent them from acquiring new
sources of income and to force a decline in their existing income. On several occasions Swire
carried out expensive repairs to warehouses in preparation for a lease to be signed only to
have the transaction cancelled. III
Swire were frequently denied permission to sell off unneeded assets, and when permission
was given to sell there was no guarantee that it would not later be revoked. In one case they
were even ordered to pay compensation to the buyer for 'loss of profit.' Incidents like this
convinced them that;
... there could have been no conceivable reason for such obduracy, except that of preventing the
firm easing its financial position, unless it was that the Chinese hoped to get it all for nothing when
the plum was ripe ... and it would have been a brave official who would have sanctioned the sale
of anything for which he might be taken to task later.112
Swire's management found their position frustrating. Very seldom could they 'penetrate the
outer screen of young student apprentices' at various bureaux and meet with someone in a
position of authority.IIJ The CCP maintained this screen in order to continue to control the
nature and extent of contacts with foreigners.I'"
109 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy inChina; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 317, 114/50.
110 For more on these state trading organisations see Kenneth Wang, 'Foreign Trade Policy and Apparatus of the
People's Republic of China,' Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 38, No.2, Trade with China (Summer-
Autumn, 1973), pp. 196-8.
III JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 30-5.
112 Ibid., pp. 21-2.
113 Ibid., p. 39.
114 Zhang Wenpu, 'Zai Tianjin congshi waishi gongzuo de huiyi,' Chengshijieguan qinli ji, p. 149.
159
All Shanghai government organisations were ordered to consult with the FAD before
interacting with any foreigner. liS In May 1951 after several breaches of foreign affairs
protocol the Shanghai Government laid out four rules for communicating with foreigners.
The first rule stated that no one was to approach foreign organisations without prior approval.
The second was that when approached by foreigners, cadres and officials were to report
immediately to the foreign affairs organs. 'Dealing with matters that relate to foreigners, the
Municipal Government wrote, 'requires caution' (youguan shewai shijian zhi chuli, xuyao
jinshen, ~ ~)~91'~1tfz~HI. ~~i.i,tJi).1I6 Presenting a united front was essential in
order to keep policy-making secret and to present foreigners with/aits accomplis.1I7
British companies saw their problems within a legal and financial framework, and with a
focus on their own specific affairs; the Communists, on the other hand, were inclined to look
at the wider economic situation, and to do so from a highly politicised perspective.
Differences between Chinese and British legal norms concerning the concept of legal liability
further complicated this situation. In British company law, parent companies were considered
completely separate to subsidiary limited liability companies. In contrast, a British diplomat
noted, the Chinese were inclined to see such companies as 'separate baskets among which the
same wealthy proprietor has divided his eggs hoping to preserve some intact in case of
disaster.' Once the subsidiary companies were drained of resources, parent companies or
other subsidiaries could be held responsible. I IS
The fact that the same person could be a director of the parent company and of the subsidiary,
and yet still view them as separate entities further complicated matters in the minds of the
115 SMA BI-2-257, Shanghai Shi Junshi Guanzhi Weiyuanhui guanyufabu ban/a, zhangze, wengao, tiaojian de
guiding [Shanghai Military Control Committee regulations on dissemination of procedures, rules and articles],
January 1950.
116 SMA BI-2-427, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu chuli dui waishi shixiang gezhong guiding [Shanghai
People's Government various regulations on dealing with foreign affairs], 1951; this letter is an undated draft;
MFA 118-00046-12, gongzuo baogao, 21/9/49; SMA BI72-4-115-8, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu guanyu
fengling zhuanzhi dui youguan waishang huo waiqiao zhi jiaoshe wangfan ji chuli shi xiangwu xu zunshou
waishi jilii yu waishi lianxi banli de tongzhi [Notification from Shanghai People's Government ordering that
when communicating with or dealing with foreign companies or individuals foreign affairs discipline must be
followed, and that affairs should be dealt with in cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Department], 23/6/51.
117 SMA BI-2-427-1, Shanghai SM Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyujianyijinhou dui waiqiao tongzhi han
shang buxu zhengming chaosong ge youguan bumen de han [Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs
Department letter suggesting that from now on notifications sent to foreigners should not include the names of
related departments being copied in], 19/4/51.
118 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Beijing to Foreign Office, No. 473, 5/5/50.
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Communists.i'" At EWO Brewery's annual general meeting in 1950, John Keswick (who was
Chairman of EWO Brewery's board) stated that the brewery's general managers (Jardine
Matheson, of which he was a director) would not under any circumstances provide finance or
take responsibility for its liabilities. He pointed out that the brewery was in fact owned by
some 622 Chinese nationals holding 860,275 shares and 153 foreign nationals owning
539,735 shares.l2o
Keswick was also one of the directors of the Shanghai & Hongkew Wharf Company. When a
dispute over a proposed wage reduction occurred in August 1950, the workers of that
company refused to negotiate with anyone but Keswick in his capacity as a director of
Jardine Matheson. The Wharf Company's reserves were exhausted, but Jardine Matheson's
were not. Keswick pointed out that the Wharf Company was a limited liability company, the
superintendent of which was fully empowered to deal with their complaints. The workers
countered as follows;
Some of our members in the three wharves have been working under the banners of Jardines for 50
years. In their mind they know only the Taipan [boss] of Jardine ... the Wharf employees have
only Jardine, Matheson & Co. in their mind. We know that there is an independent company called
the Shanghai & Hongkew Wharf Co., but we have no direct connection with that company.V'
British business was therefore subjected to a variety of different pressures. Many of these
pressures were the product of the economic crisis that affected the whole city; others came
about through policy decisions calculated to apply pressure to them.
119 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Beijing to Foreign Office, No. 473, 5/5/50.
120 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Beijing to Foreign Office, No. 612, 19/5/50;
Extracts from a speech made at annual general meeting ofEWO Breweries Ltd. by Chairman John Keswick.
121 SMA B 128-2-366, Shanghai Shi Ying shang Gonghexiang Matou Yihe Gongsi guanyu zhigong gongzi fuli
wenti laozi zhengyi shenqing shu ji Shanghai Shi Laodong Ju tiaojie baogao [Shanghai British Shanghai &
Hngkew Wharf Company application regarding workers's wage and welfare problem and Shanghai Labour
Bureau Mediation Report], 1950; Shanghai Wharf Union to Jardine, Matheson & Co. Ltd., 2217/50; John
Keswick, Jardine, Matheson & Co. Ltd. to Shanghai Wharf Union, 2/8/50; Labour Unions of Shanghai
Hongkew Wharf Co. Ltd. to John Keswick, 10/8/50; John Keswick, Jardine, Matheson & Co. Ltd. to Shanghai
Wharf Union, 22/8/50; Jardine, Matheson & Co. Ltd., to the Shanghai Foreign Affairs Bureau, 28/8/50.
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Labour disputes
The CCP and Shanghai labour, 1949-54
During the Civil War, the CCP had been weak in urban areas. In 1949, over 80 per cent of all
Party members were classed as peasants, and in the East China area, only 414 of34,835 Party
cells were based in factories.122 Addressing this problem in March 1949, Liu Shaoqi admitted
that the Party was alienated from the urban working class. On entering the cities, he said, they
would have to 'maintain the workers' living standard', 'conduct intensive education among
the workers on a broad scale' and 'get them organised.' 'In this way' he continued, 'we can
get a grip on the industries and the cities.' 123
To guarantee stability, the CCP's initial policy was to keep the old system in each business in
place with the workers receiving the same wages.124 In some cities, it was reported, workers
complained that nothing had changed, saying: 'under the rule of the Guomindang we were
oxen and horses, and now we are horses and oxen.' 125 A balance had to be struck, noted the
East China Bureau, between supporting capitalists to revive production and not leaving the
workers 'like children without a mother' (laofang xiang meiyou niang de haizi yiyang, "R-n
The early 1950s have traditionally been presented as a golden age of cooperation between
labour and the consolidating state. Elizabeth Perry has argued that, in fact, the CCP never
successfully brought labour under control. As late as 1957, workers in state and state-private
joint enterprises in Shanghai were protesting, striking and even attacking Party cadres.127
State efforts to co-opt workers were much more effective with skilled workers in state-run
enterprises who represented model proletarians. Low-skilled workers in private consumer
industries (such as dock workers, textile workers and manufacturing workers) were
considered less reliable. Robert Cliver has demonstrated that in the long term, a divisive
122 CWIHP, Report, Kovalev to Stalin, 24/12/49.
123 Liu Shaoqi, 'Some questions concerning urban work.'
124 Huadong Ju guanyu jieguan Jiangnan chengshi de zhishi, 114/49, Shanghai Jiejang, pp. 224-30.
125 Deng Xiaoping, 'Outline for the Report at the meeting on urban work convened by the Southwest Bureau of
the CCP Central Committee,' 21.12.50, Selected Works ofDeng Xiaoping, Vol. 1.
126 SMA A4-1-1, Chengshi Jieguan Gongzuo de Jingyan Baogao, 26/6/49; on the CCP's establishment of
control over workers in Tianjin see Lieberthal, Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, pp. 55-77.
127 Elizabeth J. Perry, 'Shanghai's Strike Wave of 1957,' The China Quarterly, No. 137 (Mar., 1994), pp. 1-27.
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tension developed between the CCP's ideological aspirations regarding the empowerment of
labour and the pragmatic necessities of state-building and economic development. 128
The Shanghai Labour Bureau (Shanghai Laodong Ju, .t.~m~MJaj) considered that there
were three distinct periods of labour-capital relations between May 1949 and late 1950. In the
first period, from the takeover of Shanghai to the bombing of the city on the 6th February
1950, labour-capital relations were very antagonistic. This was, it was reported, because 'the
worker classes had suffered long-term oppression' from the capitalists (gongren jieji shou Ie
changqi yapo, IAJ1tmtist7iEimffia). They had no means of 'suppressing their hatred
towards the capitalists' (dui zifang de fenhen wu fa yizhi, )t1~na~'t.~f't&ft5ttrpiM).Steps
were taken towards establishing stronger union organisations and raising the workers'
political consciousness but it was 'hard to avoid over-the-top actions from occurring'
(nanmianyou guohuo xingdong defasheng, xl~ f:i 11* ffijJ a~~~).
The capitalists did not help themselves, the Bureau complained. They held 'old viewpoints'
(jiu guandian, IBx!.\Lg) and employed 'useless old methods' (meiyong de jiu fangfa, 59:ffl a~
IB135!) to try to solve problems: 'all of their administrative efforts descended into chaos'
(yiqie xingzheng, yi xianyu wenluan zhuangtai, -t}]fTlESl:. ?)\~fiT*!L~~). The CCP
were a politically-minded organisation that relied on a mixture of ideology, mass
mobilisation and pragmatism to solve problems. These methods clashed considerably with
those of the legalistic capitalists, both Chinese and foreign. Circumstances improved slightly
after the announcement of the 'Provisional Procedures for the Resolution of Labour-Capital
Disputes in Private Enterprises' in August 1949Y9
Under the 'Provisional Procedures', capital and labour had to attempt to resolve any problems
themselves before taking them to the Labour Bureau for mediation. 'Labour-capital
128 Robert Cliver, 'Minzhu Guanli: the democratization of factory management in the Chinese revolution,'
Labor History, Vol. 50, No.4 (November 2009), pp. 410, 413, 424.
129 SMAA4-l-l1, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; Laodong Ju tiaozheng ke 1949 nian teshu zhengyi tiaojian
shuoming [Labour Bureau Adjustment Office 1949 special dispute resolution conditions explanation], 3/2/50;
Cong laozi duili dao laojang zhudong tuanjie zifang mianxiang shengchan [From labour and capital in
opposition to labour actively uniting with the capitalists to face towards production]; The 'Provisional
Procedures .. .' (guanyu siying qiye laozi zhengyi diaochu chengxu zanxing banfa, *Tfk~:(t~~~~i$( iJ!.I~
'~J¥UfT&J.)!). See also Shanghai jingji shang de zhongyao wenti gaishu [Outline of important economic
problems in Shanghai], September 1949 in Shanghai Jiefang, pp. 492-4.
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consultative conferences' (laozi xieshang huiyi, ~~t1J.rm~i.~) were established in each
enterprise.V'' After a minimum number of negotiations through consultative conferences,
unresolved cases could be taken to the Labour Bureau for mediation (tiaojie, lJ!]M), and if
that failed, arbitration (zhongcai, 11F ~). The arbitration committee's decision could be
appealed in the Shanghai People's Court and again in the Supreme Court.l3l
The head of the Labour Bureau, Ma Chunji (Q,fiH15), noted that, of the 4,436 cases brought
to the Bureau between June and November 1949, some 323 had been particularly serious.
The main issues to be resolved were requests by workers for improved conditions (52 per
cent) or to be allowed to 'return to work' (jugong, ~I) after having been dismissed (28 per
cent). Workers in both foreign and Chinese enterprises employed various techniques to
pressure the management. The most prevalent form of worker action was to 'baowei' (ErIE),
meaning to surround or 'lay siege to' the management, detaining them in their offices. This
technique was used in 34 per cent of all the disputes brought to the Bureau. Other methods
included strikes and wrecking. Most baowei actions carried the implicit threat of violence,
but actual violence was also not uncommon.P'' From January 1950 to April 1950, the Bureau
had to deal with a further 8,283 disputes, of which 541 were classed as 'serious.'l33
Labour-capital relations remained strained in the second period of labour capital relations
following the February bombing. This period was marked by increasingly frequent requests
from capitalists to reduce wages or close down their businesses. According to the Bureau,
with the threat of closure, 'workers began to realise the severity of the difficulties, the factory
had to exist and only then would they have a guaranteed livelihood' (gongren kaishi renshi
kunnan de yanzhongxing, bixu gongchang cunzai, ziji shenghuo caiyou baozhang, IA*~~
l.A. i.RIE5tt a~F!1! ,ti:, ~,~.ViI r ff.?:E, ~ 2 ~ 5!;;t ~ 1*~~).l34Workers in foreign
130 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; buchong baogao, 18/5/50.
131 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao.
132 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; teshu zhengyi tiaojian.
133 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; buchong baogao, 18/5/50; on 'Return to work' ifugong)
disputes see Shanghai Junguanhui guanyu fuye fugong jiufen chuli zanxing banfa [Shanghai Military Control
Committee temporary measures for resolving return to business, return to work disputes], 19/8/49, in Shanghai
Jiefang, pp. 388-91; see also Shanghai Laodong Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui [Record of Labour in Shanghai
Compilation Committee], Shanghai Laodong Zhi [Record of Labour in Shanghai] (Shanghai, Shanghai Shehui
Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House], 1998), pp. 479-84.
134 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; teshu zhengyi tiaojian, 3/2/50; laofang zhudong tuanjie
zifang.
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enterprises were generally better paid than those in Chinese enterprises and they feared losing
these better paid jobs. 135
The third period came after the Third Meeting of the Shanghai Peoples Representative
Conference in November 1950. Measures were announced at the conference for improving
labour-capital relations. Official rhetoric went from supporting workers' struggles against
capitalists to 'actively uniting with the capitalists to overcome difficulties in production'
(zhudong tuanjie zifang kefu kunnan weichi shengchan, .:Ez:JJm~~1.J~~Ii~~1HfU~~;O=).
As the CCP's hold over the workers strengthened, they were increasingly able to control their
behaviour. Workers were encouraged to accept worse conditions while 'the capitalists'
confidence in production was restored' (zifang huifu shengchan xinxin, ~1.J'~![~;O=1~
IL' ). 136 Despite all the rhetoric, however, 'unity' between labour and capital was not
forthcoming.
Labour disputes in foreign companies
In principle, foreign firms were subject to exactly the same labour regulations as Chinese
companies. The wording of the regulations was considered by Butterfield & Swire to be
'neither inadequate nor unfair.' 137 The two principles ostensibly guiding the Labour Bureau
were 'mutual advantage to labour and capital' (laozi liang li, ~ ~ ~ ~IJ) and 'treating
everyone the same' (yishitongren, -*m~1=).The government had decided that foreign firms
were to be treated the same as Chinese firms. In practice however, foreigners were not only
'capitalist exploiters,' they were also 'imperialists', and so a sterner approach was adopted
towards them. 138 While the Labour Bureau could, theoretically, find in favour of the
capitalists in labour disputes, there was little incentive for them to do so. Allowing capitalists
135 Shanghai Laodong Zhi, p. 510; Interview by author with Yao Kang, former Director of Butterfield and Swire,
14/7/09; 'they knew that if they made noises and fought then they were shooting themselves in the foot. It was
worse for the Chinese. '
136 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; teshu zhengyi tiaojian, 3/2/50; laofang zhudong tuanjie
zifang.
137 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; British Chamber of Commerce Memorandum; the
present position facing British Firms in Shanghai and the problem of retrenchment; see also JSSCA COMP129
J.A. Blackwood to Masson, Shanghai, February 1950.
138 SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; Guanyu muqian waishang laozi zhengyi qingkuang de
baogao [Report regarding present labour-capital disputes in foreign enterprises].
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to reduce surplus staff or cut wages would only arouse labour's hostility.139 The wider
political and economic situation demanded that the CCP appease labour. Foreigners were, in
any case, believed to have deep pockets."?
The CCP also wished to utilise labour as a tool specifically directed against foreign
enterprises: first to bring them to heel, and later to take them over. In July 1949 Stalin had
advised Liu Shaoqi as follows:
Require each foreign enterprise to implement the labour laws strictly as a method for struggling
with them. At present, you don't want to expropriate the Chinese affairs of each imperialism [sic.],
don't rush into taking any other measures, wait a bit and see what happens.!"
This did not mean that the CCP always used labour as a tool to pressure foreign firms: the
reality was more complicated. One example of this was the case brought by relatives of a
worker named Wang Ancai (5I.~:;t) against the Blue Funnel Line shipping company (Alfred
Holt and Company), who were represented in Shanghai by Butterfield & Swire. Wang had
been employed by a labour contractor who had absconded before the arrival of the
Communists. In July 1949, Swire had been obliged to add 111 workers engaged by the absent
contractor to their payroll.142 Two months later Wang had died of an illness and his relatives
had come to Shanghai to request 'comfort money' (fuxujin, tJt,t.!ln~).
The union considered Wang's employment by the contractor tantamount to employment by
the Blue Funnel Line; they demanded the family receive the equivalent of one month's wages
for each of Wang's eight years of employment. Swire claimed that Wang had only been their
direct employee for two months, but offered two months wages as a conciliatory gesture. The
two parties could not agree, so the case was referred to the Labour Bureau. The Bureau
recommended that Swire should pay three months wages and two months extra to cover
funeral expenses. The relatives accepted this judgement, but Swire refused to pay. As this
139 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 10.
140 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; British Chamber of Commerce Memorandum; the
present position facing British Firms in Shanghai and the problem of retrenchment; SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen
qingkuang de baogao; waishang laozi zhengyi qingkuang; MFA 118-00046-26, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu,
Huangpu [two characters illegible] Weiyuanhui Waiqiao Shiwu Chu shi yuefen gongzuo zonghe baogao
[Shanghai People's Government, Huangpu [two characters illegible] Committee, Foreign Affairs Department
comprehensive report for October], 4/11149.
141 CWIHP, Cable, Liu Shaoqi to Mao Zedong, 1817149.
142 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 9.
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was seen as an attempt to evade responsibility, the Bureau increased the basic payment to five
months plus two months for funeral costs and three months' more for the cost of delays,
making a total of ten months. Swire requested arbitration.143 The Bureau's arbitration
committee awarded a total of twelve month's compensation.l'" Itwas more important for the
local authorities to be seen to be holding Swire to account than to pay close attention to
technicalities.
If the CCP wished to simply use labour as a tool to pressure foreign capitalists then the
Bureau's decision should have met with unanimous approval. Instead they were quite
severely reprimanded. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had urged the Bureau to be cautious
saying, 'one side in this case is foreign, when executing arbitration you should not only
implement labour policy, it is also necessary to show appropriate consideration for the
international effects, it should be fair and reasonable.' 145 Huang Hua of the Shanghai FAD
suggested that the ten months' compensation money proposed at the mediation stage was too
blatantly unfair: 'the government's prestige has already been damaged to a degree' (zheyang
zhengfu weixin sui yi shou yiding sunshi, ~ *f iES{ Jff ~ f~a8 ¥t - )E 1~~). 146 It was
important, Zhou Lin, the Secretary General of the Shanghai People's Government, told the
Bureau, not to set precedents that might come back to haunt them in this moment of
economic crisis. 'At the same time,' he. continued, they should also avoid making foreign
143 SMA B 128-2-390, Shanghai Shi Junguanhui guanyu Taigu gongsi daili Lanyancong matou gongren siwang
fuxu jiufen de han ji Shanghai Shi Waishi Chu, Shi Laodong Ju de yijian, baogao [Shanghai Military Control
Committee letters on comfort money dispute over death of Butterfield & Swire managed Blue Funnel Line
wharf worker and Shanghai FAD and Shanghai Labour Bureau opinions and reports], 1950; Taigu gongsi daili·
Lanyancong matou gongren Wang Ancai yinbing siwang fuxu an baogao [Report on Butterfield & Swire
managed Blue Funnel Line wharf worker Wang Ancai death due to illness compensation payment].
144 SMA BI28-2-390, gongren siwang fuxu jiufen; Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Laodong Ju Zhongcai
Weiyuanhui Zhongcai shu [Shanghai People's Government Labour Bureau Arbitration Committee Arbitration
Decision].
145 MFA 118-00347-02, Waijiaobu yu Laodong Ju guanyu Shanghai Lanyancong matou gongren WangAncai
bingsifuxu an zhongcai wenti de wang/ai han [Correspondence between Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Labour
Bureau on problems of arbitration over compensation for death due to illness of Shanghai Blue Funnel Line
wharf worker Wang Ancai], 25/5/50- 31/5/50. 'One side in this case .. .' (ben an zhi yifangmian wei waiqiao, wo
zai zhixing zhongcai shi budan ying zhixing laodong zhengce, qie xu shidang zhaogu guoji yingxiang, yao
gongping heli, *~z-jj7iJ~I'fif. 1":E~t.MT{~~II1::f'mmztAfT~TJJjE.H~.. §JvU~~lH«miOO~ff,J~~!DJ.~0
lfL~!I).
146 SMA BI28-2-390, gongren siwangfuxujiufen; Huang Hua, Shanghai Military Control Committee Foreign
Affairs Department to Zhou Lin, 12/5/50.
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businesses 'believe that we are finding excuses to oppress them' (miande waishang yiwei
women shi jiekou yapo, §M~91\ftij1-~~fiif1~f:DffiiS.).147
Different parts of the Shanghai government had different priorities; the blatant 'squeezing' of
foreign companies was not necessarily the CCP's uniform policy. They needed to maintain
stability and at least an appearance of legality: 'The attitude of the workers is basically
legitimate,' wrote the Shanghai FAD in an unrelated report to Beijing, 'but there have been
demands that have been too high and there has been behaviour which has been overtly
deviant [from policy]' (laofang taidu jiben shang shi heli de, dan ye you yaoqiu guo gao,
xingdong guofen de pianxiang, :H1J15Jl¥*_t~~!I~~. f8t!!~~*i1~. frMi1~
~~{' icJ).148
In a different case in June 1950, the Shanghai & Hongkew Wharf Company reached an
agreement with its staff to reduce wages by a third as business was stagnant. The original
wage rate would be restored once business had improved.v" InOctober, the company's union
appealed to the Labour Bureau to help them to get the original rate restored and to get a
guarantee that they would receive their customary year-end bonus. ISOThe management
rejected both demands. Business had only improved slightly and they were still relying on
their reserves to pay wages.ISIThe arbitration committee forced the workers to abandon their
request for a return to the original wage rate, but promised them the payment of their bonus,
The bonus had never increased in years of profit, so why should it decrease now?lS2
147 SMA BI28-2-390, gongren siwang fuxu jiufen; Zhou Lin, Shanghai Military Control Committee, to Ma
Chunji, 17/5/50; SMA B 1-2-382, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu guanyu matou gongren yin bing siwang fuxu
han, baogao [Shanghai People's Government letters and reports on compensation for death of dock worker
through illness], May 1950.
148 MFA 118-00046-11, gongzuo baogao (fu jian shier).
149 SMA B 128-2-366, Shanghai Shi Yingshang Gonghexiang Yihe Gongsi guanyu zhigong gongzi fuli wenti
laozi zhengyi shenqing shu ji Shanghai shi laodong ju tiaojie baogao [Shanghai British Merchants Shanghai &
Hongkew Wharf Company, Jardine Matheson petition regarding labour capital dispute over wages and welfare,
and Shanghai Labour Bureau mediation report], 1950; G.D. Grant, Superintendent, Shanghai & Hongkew
Wharf Co., 19/5/50 to the Labour Bureau.
150 SMA BI28-2-366, Gonghexiang Yihe Gongsi guanyu zhigong gongzifuli wenti laozi zhengyi shenqing shu;
Zhongguo Haiyuan Gonghui [China Seamen's Union] to Labour Bureau, 24/10/50.
151 SMA BI28-2-366, Gonghexiang Yihe Gongsi guanyu zhigong gongzifuli wenti laozi zhengyi shenqing shu;
China Seamen's Union Shanghai & Hongkew Wharf Company branch to China Seamen's Union East China
Committee, 4/11/50; Shanghai & Hongkew Wharf Co., to the Bureau of Foreign Affairs, 21111150.
152 SMA BI28-2-573-4, Shanghai Shi Laodong Ju Zhengyi Zhongcai Weiyuanhui guanyu Yingshang
Gonghexiang matou gufen youxian gongsi Shanghai fen gongsi laozi shuangfang jiufen de zhongcai jueding shu
[Shanghai Labour Bureau Dispute Arbitration Committee decision regarding arbitration in British Shanghai &
168
The company appealed the decision, but the Supreme Court upheld it. The Court was keen to
stress that, as the bonus would be paid based on the lower salary rate, they were 'showing
appropriate consideration' (yuyi xiangdang de zhaogu, T~:,{ t§ ~ E9 ~.~rm) to the
management.IS3 The CCP and the foreign capitalists had fundamentally different conceptions
of what was 'fair': the foreigners based their judgement on law, the CCP on politics and
pragmatism. While foreign businesses felt that they were unfairly discriminated against, the
Chinese were chastised by Moscow in December 1949 for treating foreign and Chinese
capitalists the same.IS4
In a 1950 report on disputes in foreign firms, the Labour Bureau linked the situation to the
wider political climate, saying, 'because at present the urgency of the international system is
being reflected in labour-capital relations in most foreign firms, the struggle is relatively
intense.' ISS In the eyes of the Bureau, the foreigners were doing everything in their power to
evade their responsibilities.P" Chen Yi commented that they refused even 'reasonable
requests' (heli yaoqiu, *II~*) from the workers and sought to evade government
regulations.V" Foreign capitalists were further accused by the Bureau of adopting an
'uncooperative attitude' (bu hezuo taidu, ~*1'F~Jl): they 'scorned' (qingshi, ~~t~)the
unions and were unwilling to' come to consultative agreements with the workers.IS8 CCP
cadres at the British Tram Company complained that the foreign capitalists 'sought loopholes
Hongkew Wharf Company labour-capital dispute], 3/2/51; SMA B128-2-366, Gonghexiang Yihe Gongsi
guanyu zhigong gongzifuli wenti laozi zhengyi shenqing shu; Haiyuan Gonghui Zhang Yaohui tongzhi yu zifang
tanhua jilii [Minutes of discussion between Comrade Zhang Yaohui of the Seamen's Union and the capitalists],
7/12/50.
153 SMA B 128-2-366, Gonghexiang Yihe Gongsi guanyu zhigong gongzi fuli wenti laozi zhengyi shenqing shu;
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Huadong fen yuan minshi panjue [Supreme People's Court, East China branch, civil
dispute judgement], 17/5151.
154 CWIHP, Report, Kovalev to Stalin, 24112/49.
ISS SMA A4-1-11, laozi jiufen qingkuang de baogao; waishang laozi zhengyi qingkuang; 'because at present the
urgency ... ' (muqian youyu guoji jushi de jinji, fanying zai waishang de yi ban laozi guanxi shang douzheng shi
bijiao jianrui de, ElM'EE-rOO~;f,Fci!lia~~~,&~i£$'I\ftlia~-~!t~~*~.t4~~~t$Q~ma~).
IS61bid.
157 Chen Vi, Wei dapo diren fengsuo kefu kunnan zhengqujingji haozhuan he huifu er fendou- zai Shanghai Shi
Gongren Daibiao Dahui shang de zhengzhi baogao [Struggle to smash the enemy's blockade, overcome
difficulties to improve and revive the economy- political report given at the Shanghai Workers' Representatives
Conference], 4/2/50, in Shanghai gongyun zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui [Shanghai Workers' Movements
Compilation Committee], Shanghai gongyun zhi [Record of Workers' Movements in Shanghai] (Shanghai:
Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences Publishing House], 1997).
158 SMA A4-1-11, laozijiuJen qingkuang de baogao; waishang laozi zhengyi qingkuang.
169
and incited the workers' against the union (zuan kongzi, tiaobo gongren, t~:£T, ~~~I
A).159
Baowei; worker actions in foreign firms
Foreign managers found negotiations with unions and workers very draining.l'" HSBC were
relatively lucky in that the head of their union was the former office boy. He was moderate in
approach and 'dictated the terms for all the others.' The problems HSBC experienced came
from the inclusion of night watchmen in the union's ranks. These men were much more
militant than the bank workers, many of whom had enjoyed good relations with the foreign
management. The watchmen were, one employee remembered, 'very bolshy.i'?' 'You'd talk
for hours and hours,' HSBC's negotiator Francis Burch recalled, 'and you knew you would
never resolve anything.' 162
Physical assaults on foreigners were rare, but they did occur from time to time, usually in
connection with labour disputes. Managers, particularly those in industrial concerns with
large redundant work forces, were more prone to threats, harassment and intimidation. One of
the most popular methods of harassment was to baowei managers, detaining them in their
offices. The case of Victor Allington, manager of the printing company Millington Limited is
representative of the wider situation. Allington was in charge of 160 restive workers and the
company's reserves had long run dry. They were heavily in debt and behind on tax payments.
In April 1950, he was assaulted twice with fists and sticks. The workers were angry because
Allington had proposed that the factory be closed or handed over to their control. They
wanted improved conditions under the status quo. Allington also suffered 'repeated
humiliations' by union officials in front of the men.163
159 SMA A59-1-63-34, Shanghai Shi Zheng Gonghui guanyu Yingdian qingkuang de baogao [Reports by
Shanghai Government and union on situation in the British Tram Company], 1950.
160 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 10.
161 HSBC 16411039/C, Oral History, R.P. Moodie.
162 HSBC 16411005/C, Oral History, Burch, Francis Richard; King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation, VolA, p. 388.
163 TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 396,
20/4/50; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 432, 27/4150; TNA FO 369/4455, China: assaults and attacks on
British subjects, 1950.
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In the same month, trouble also broke out at the Shanghai Ice and Cold Storage Company. On
the morning of 18th April, the British Vice Consul G. Tarr was telephoned by the manager
Langford, who reported that he was being detained in his office. On arriving at the office Tarr
found Langford sitting at his desk. Around him, 23 ex-employees;
... were shouting, opening and shutting windows, sitting on the desk, fingering the papers ...
interfering with telephone conversations by disc0!IDecting the wire or pulling the instrument away,
singing songs, etc.
The angry workers were contract labourers who had worked seasonally for Shanghai Ice,
packing eggs for export. The blockade had left the company with no avenue for exports, and
so 784 workers had been dismissed. In October 1949, they had been paid dispersal money on
the condition that they make no further claims. Now they wanted Langford to pay for them to
be transferred to the company's Tianjin factory: he refused as there were no vacancies.
Hundreds of angry workers picketed the Shanghai factory for several weeks. Langford
complained that the company's union, the Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, and the
Labour Bureau were all under the influence of the workers, and that they preferred to threaten
than to help.164 ,
Perhaps the most alarming feature of these events, commented Consul General Urquhart, was
that they occurred only weeks after the state-run China Egg Products Corporation had signed
an agreement with Langford's company that would eam the Chinese £3,800,000. This
company was one of the few which had managed to obtain such a contract.165 If this was how
a company whose business Beijing had courted was to be treated, how would those deemed
unwanted fare? Langford passed Tarr a letter to the mayor requesting his assistance. In the
letter, he pointed out that there was no way he could fulfil the contract while trying to solve
these labour problems. The workers would not let Tarr leave with the letter.166
164 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart, Shanghai to Hutchinson, Beijing, No.
78, 19/4/50; Copy of Minute by Mr. G. Tarr to Consul General, 19/4/50; Langford to Chen Vi; 13/4/50; Hooper
makes brief reference to the incidents at Millington and Shanghai Ice; Hooper, China Stands Up, pp. 91-2.
165 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart, Shanghai to Hutchinson, Beijing, No.
78,19/4/50; Langford to Mayor Chen Vi, 13/4/50; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 460, 4/5/50.
166 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart, Shanghai to Hutchinson, Beijing, No.
78,19/4/50; Copy of Minute by Mr. G. Tarr to Consul General, 19/4/50.
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Langford's Chinese assistant manager, Mr Chen, was also being detained. Chen had been
brought to the office in the early hours. The workers were demanding the he confess to
translating 'against their interests' at a union mediation meeting. Langford, Tarr and Chen
'were subjected to a barrage of insults shouted at close range from all directions.' After
several hours, Langford requested to be allowed to visit the lavatory. According to Tarr, one
worker stood up in middle of room and shouted "Is Mr Langford to be allowed to go to the
lavatory?" to which all replied: "No." To Langford's great embarrassment the workers began
making insulting remarks, and brought him a bucket. 'Thereupon' Tarr recalled, 'the Chinese
workers exchanged a whole series of remarks aimed at us as to just how foreigners relieved
themselves and how amusing it would be to watch them do so.' This was very humiliating.
Only after Tarr threatened to complain to higher authorities were they permitted to use the
actual lavatory.
In the afternoon, mediators from the Labour Bureau, Public Security Bureau and the
Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions arrived. The shouting died down at once. After many
more hours of inconclusive negotiations, Tarr and Langford were finally allowed to leave.167
A few days later, Langford was again detained and assaulted by the workers.i'" The frustrated
workers, Consul General Urquhart wrote, 'damned the local police, the Shanghai Federation
of Trade Unions and the Labour Bureau representatives to their faces and said they would
make Langford pay.' Their attitude was 'a challenge in effect to the authorities.' Three of the
ringleaders were later arrested.l'"
Opinion amongst foreigners was divided as to whether the CCP were unwilling or simply
unable to control Shanghai's workers. The higher authorities' rhetoric was very conciliatory.
They wanted to encourage business, but placating Shanghai's famously militant labour force
was no easy matter. Urquhart believed that the leaders had 'subordinated everything to the
prosecution of the war' and so cared little about what was going on in Shanghai's businesses,
Chinese or foreign. They were 'thoroughly hostile and harsh in pursuit of two immediate
objectives, namely to raise taxes and keep labour quiet.' The attitude of the Shanghai FAD,
167 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart, Shanghai to Hutchinson, Beijing, No.
78, 19/4/50; Copy of Minute by Mr. G. Tarr to Consul General, 19/4/50.
168 TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 242, 26/4/50;
Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 434, 27/4/50.
169 TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 460,4/5/50.
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through which all communication had to pass, he concluded, was 'obstinately hostile.' 170 This
was not only the case in issues involving foreigners. In most areas of policy implementation,
local cadres took a more radical approach than the central government.Y' The British decided
therefore to bypass the 'bungling' local officials and appeal directly to Zhang Hanfu in
Beijing.l72
While the British complaint was not formally acknowledged, it was perhaps not a
coincidence that soon afterwards a representative from the Ministry of Commerce arrived in
Shanghai. Beijing was obviously concerned that the valuable contract with Langford would
be undermined. The representative assured Langford that he would have no further trouble
from his workers. Following another investigation by the central authorities, Allington was
also apologised to and several Millington workers were punished.V'' Foreign observers
largely assumed that the Party and the unions worked in unison, and that the Party's hold
over the workers was absolute after a few months.174 In fact, as this incident showed, the
situation on the ground was rather more complex.
The uneasy relationship between the Communist cadres and the workers was further
demonstrated when, in June 1950, the CCP members in Shanghai's foreign-owned public
utilities were instructed to make their Party membership public. Compared with Party
branches in private industries, the Party was relatively well established in the public utility
companies. Yet even here cadres were described as lacking experience and being
'disconnected' (tuojie, HR11) from the masses. CCP cadres in the Shanghai Waterworks
Company reported that in 1950 'the Party's influence was not strong' (dang de yingxiang bu
da, :R:B~~~~!DJ~*).All eleven cadres had begun work there between late 1948 and early
1949, and had seized control of the union at the time of the takeover in May 1949. The main
complaint they received from the workers was that certain cadres 'looked down on the
170 TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 410, 22/4/50;
TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 515, 18/5/50.
171 Lieberthal, Revolution and Tradition in Tientsin, p. 41.
172 TNA FO 371/83347, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 460, 4/5/50;
Beijing to Foreign Office, No. 452, 3/5/50; Beijing to Foreign Office, No. 499, 8/5/50; Beijing to Foreign Office,
No. 500, 8/5/50.
173 TNA FO 371183348, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 614, 16/6/50;
TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 516, 18/5/50.
174 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 9.
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masses' (kanbuqi qunzhong, ~:::{,~i¥~).175 Cadres in the British Tram Company feared
Guomindang agents harming them or their families. Many would rather leave the Party
(tuidang, il!:R:) than operate publically.i"
Unions were in the contradictory position of nominally representing the interests of the
workers, while being classed as 'mass organisations' under the direct leadership of the CCP.
Union representatives faced the danger of siding too heavily with the workers and being
called ultra-Left 'syndicalists' or of trying to restore order and being charged with Rightist
'bureaucratism.,177This anomalous position led them to become weak institutions that were
unable to satisfy the workers or .the state.178CCP cadres at the ground level were not just
unwilling to control labour: they were also unable. Their inability to control the workers was
probably the more important factor in the ongoing labour disturbances in British enterprises.
'Running dogs'
Throughout Shanghai's history the foreign presence in the city had relied on the cooperation
of a large population of English-speaking Chinese people who lived, in a sense, between two
worlds: the Chinese and the foreign.179These worlds were delineated along lines of language,
culture, and all too often, racial prejudice. Becoming more westernised, it was suggested by
many contemporary observers, made a Chinese person less Chinese, just as foreigners who
'went native' were seen to be deracinated.V"
175SMA A59-1-l55, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Bu suoshu danwei guanyu
gongkai dang de gongzuo, tongzhi, jihua, baogao, zongjie [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee
Organisational Bureau to all work units regarding the work of making the Party public, notices, plans, reports,
summaries], 1950.
176SMA B261-2-273, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi Dang Zongzhi (Yingdian) guanyu dang de
gongzuo jihua [CCP Shanghai Tram Company Party Central Branch (British Trams) plan regarding Party work],
June 1950; Yingdian zhibu guanyu gongkai dang zhi gongzuojihua, Wu Shuji [~~~] plan for work of making
Party public in British Trams Branch], 29/5/50; SMAA59-l-l55, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye
Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Bu suoshu danwei guanyu gongkai dang de gongzuo, tongzhi, jihua, baogao, zongjie [Notices,
plans, reports, summaries on making Party public in work units under the CCP Shanghai Public Utility
Enterprises Committee's Organisation Department], 1950.
177Perry, 'Masters of the Country?' p. 68; Cliver, 'Minzhu Guanli,' p. 416.
178Cliver, 'Minzhu Guanli,' p. 416.
179Bickers, Scramble/or China, pp. 102-3.
180See for example the case of Harold Acton who lived on the outskirts of the British community in Beijing;
Acton had 'resolved to keep aloof from Europeans who did not share my enthusiasm for China, which at that
time meant the majority,' his compatriots' ... viewed me as another regrettable case of "a chap going native"
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In post-1949 Shanghai there were many Chinese people who worked for foreign companies
and spoke fluent English. They mostly fared very badly in the nationalistic climate of 'New
Shanghai' as the Sino-foreign grey area they inhabited contracted and was eventually
eliminated. The difference between the educational backgrounds of these westernised men
and the majority of CCP cadres is conveyed starkly to the historian through the language and
presentation of contemporary sources. Butterfield & Swire's Chinese managers wrote
extremely formal letters to the authorities in beautiful calligraphy, while grassroots
Communist cadres wrote untidily and made frequent mistakes.
Swire were extremely concerned over the fate of their senior Chinese staff. Once the
company closed they would be forced to register as unemployed. The registration process
included a lengthy investigation into their pasts, as well as compulsory criticism and self-
criticism sessions. They feared that these men would be labelled as counter-revolutionaries or
spies. They would always remain under suspicion. At the very least they would be denied
good jobs and the chance to join union-based welfare schemes to secure healthcare and
education for their children.
Writing in 1955, the British Consul General Fred Garner disagreed with Swire's analysis. He
suggested that their anglicised Chinese staff would not be 'subjected to actual persecution' as
the authorities would want to make use of them. At worst, they would receive low status jobs
and be at the back of the back of the queue for welfare benefits. He refuted suggestions that
they might be allowed to leave to Hong Kong ('impossible'), or kept on retainers ('it was not
8.&S. that started the revolution!'). 'We also have to remember', he concluded, 'I think, that
the Chinese are great actors and quite expert at adapting themselves to different
circumstances. They would have to learn the language of the revolution, he said: '''When the
wind blows, the grass bends." It was believed that representations by the British on behalf of
these men would do no good and would perhaps worsen their situation.l'"
and ... 'believed that Peking insidiously rotted the mind'; Harold Acton, Memoirs of an Aesthete (London:
Methuen, 1948), pp. 32-7, 380. See also Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 68, 82-7.
181 TNA FO 676/525, Foreign business interest in China: Butterfield and Swires, 1955; I.K. Swire, London, to
C.T. Crowe, Foreign Office, 4/3/54; F.F. Gamer, Consulate General Shanghai to W.I. Combs, Embassy, Beijing,
No. 153,5/5/55.
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Gamer's view was over-optimistic. For example, while things had been bad for Mr. Langford
at Shanghai Ice, they had been much worse for his assistant Mr. Chen. Langford was detained
during his normal working hours; Chen was dragged to the office at 3.30am.182 The actions of
Chinese workers towards foreign managers were alarming, but much less restraint was shown
towards Chinese capitalists and the high-level Chinese employees of foreign firms.183 In
April 1951 one of Patons & Baldwins' sub-mangers was executed, along with his whole
family, in front of a crowd of 15,000. This execution was ostensibly part of the Campaign to
Suppress Counter-Revolutionaries. According to the company's Shanghai manager, however,
it had been ominously preceded by almost a year of 'full dress' attacks on him with 'under
the guise of production.' He had clearly been singled out as an enemy of the workers.184
Foreign managers were eventually able to close their businesses and leave China, but their
Chinese assistants were tied to the business and to Shanghai.
Another man trapped in the middle was Linson Dzau (Cao Linsheng, ~~~). Dzau was
born to the one of the richest families in China, and educated in the United States at
Columbia University and West Point. He was an experienced diplomat who had been present
at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and he had come to be one of the most important
Chinese businessmen in Shanghai.l'" Coincidentally, he had also been at one time Zhang
Hanfu's teacher at Tsinghua University.l'" Dzau represented several British and American
firms in their attempts to deal with the Chinese Communists. One of these firms was W.C.
Gomersall's China Engineers.
182TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart Shanghai to Hutchinson, Beijing, No. 78,
19/4/50; Copy of Minute by Mr. G. Tarr to Consul General, 19/4/50.
183See for example the case of Mr. Wang of the China Chemical Company in Lieberthal, Revolution and
Tradition in Tientsin, pp. 126-42. Wang was subjected to three months of attending 'study groups' during the
Five Antis Campaign that lasted 13 hours a day. He was completely ostracised from his workers, even though
most of them were his relatives.
184TNA FO 676/499, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1954; C.T. Crowe, Foreign
Office to H. Trevelyan, 1917154; Patons & Baldwins Limited Memorandum handed to Mr. Morgan Phillips,
617154; Manager to Head Office, 21/7/50; Manager to Head Office, 30/4/51.
185TNA FO 371183344, British Commercial Policy inChina; Shanghai to Hutchinson, Nanjing, No. 24, 11/1/50.
186NARA RG 59, Box 4210; Shanghai to Secretary of State, No. 820,24/2/50.
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Figure 13: Linson Dzau
In late 1949, Dzau had been invited to Beijing to discuss business by his Tsinghua University
fraternity brother Dr. Ji Chao ding (ji ~R~El~), who was now an important figure in the
Financial and Economic Affairs Committee. He later reported to the American Consulate in
Shanghai that at first he had been received cordially, but was later manoeuvred into being an
'informer' on foreign business. After ten days of formal interviews at the Finance and
Economic Committee headquarters, he was taken to the Political and Legal Affairs
Committee headquarters, where the interviews were long and 'unfriendly.' He was accused of
being a 'running dog' of foreign capitalists. On complaining of this treatment to his friend Ji,
he was told that there had been bad reports about him. Even Ji could not save him from
punishment if he did not clear his name. Believing his end to be near, Dzau wrote a long
letter to Ji refuting the allegations against him, arguing that he was working for a strong
China and affirming his faith in democracy. IS? At this time, he also wrote an evocative letter
to Gomersall that gives some idea ofthe atmosphere in Beijing:
187 NARA RG 59, Box 4210; Shanghai to Secretary of State, No. 820, 24/2/50.
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Most of the time has been occupied with surveys of all foreign investments in China and attitudes
towards individual foreigners. They work thoroughly with historic facts of each foreign firm. I am
asked many questions and Iendeavour to help constructively or to remove prejudice. I feel at times
that some institution should pay me for the sleepless nights and the hours of discussions in smoky,
drafty [sic.] rooms requiring at all times nerve-mind balancing feats to be able come out still as a
Chinese befitting their conception of a Chinese and yet fair to foreigners without appearing at any
time a 'running dog' of imperialists and capitalists ... Imay say with a little feeling of boastfulness
that I have exerted great influence for: moderation of action, politically speaking, and for a
reasonable basis of co-operation with Western business-men.
Dzau was not impressed by the Communists' 'confused thinking ... at the present stage too
much emotion is mixed up in the issues.' 188After the interviews he was treated to a series of
'indoctrination lectures' on the evils of imperialism.Y" What would become of this
Anglophone man whose background so clearly did not suit the new political climate in
Communist China? His exact path is difficult to trace, but archival sources suggest that he
experienced a period of prolonged rootlessness as he sought a stable existence.
In February 1950, Dzau had talked to the American Consul in Shanghai about making contact
with the anti-Communist 'ten sword' and 'red spear' societies, who were 'his boys' and had
asked whether American intelligence agencies still operated in Shanghai. The Consul set little
store in his intrigues, as Dzau was known to deal 'in the rumour market.,190 He appeared
again a year later in Hong Kong, where he was apparently working with the working with
General Zhang Fakui (~it~:~)to support anti-Communist guerrillas in south-west China. He
was one among many who attempted to establish some form of 'third force' movement, as an
alternative to both the Guomindang and the CCP. 19l Penniless, he later left Hong Kong for
Macao. There, he worked eighteen-hour days teaching, to earn money to send to his wife and
children who remained in China. He wrote of this time:
I suffered extreme depressions, almost lost my mind ... Faith in Christ's word and a resolve to
work to the brink of exhaustion, forgetting losses of the past, praying that Mai and the children be
188 TNA FO 371183344, British Commercial Policy in China; Urquhart, Shanghai to Hutchinson, Nanjing, No.
28, 12/1150; letter from General Linson Dzau to Gomersall, 4/1150.
189 NARA RG 59, Box 4210; Shanghai to Secretary of State, No. 820,24/2/50.
190 Ibid.
191 NARA RG 59, Box 4197, 793.00/2-651; Memorandum of Conversation, Politico-Economic Conditions in
China, interview with Mr. Robert Henry, 6/2/51.
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granted exit ... was my only remaining strength ... Teaching absorbed all of my efforts leaving no
time for correspondence, reminiscences or regrets.
Several years later, Dzau was helped by his former West Point classmates to set up a private
preparatory academy named Linson College, where he was eventually joined by his wife and
grandchild.192 Although Dzau's life story is perhaps atypical because of his background and
connections, it remains illustrative of the plight of those who did not fit into the new political
and social order and whose stories are more difficult to trace. As Chinese nationalism
intensified, people like Dzau who lived in the intermediate zones of the Sino-British and
Sino-foreign world of the Treaty Ports proved to be neither Chinese enough in the eyes of the
,Communists, nor foreign enough to have an obvious exit route. They were forced to make
difficult choices: they could choose to stay and adapt to new conditions; flee into exile and
uncertainty; or set themselves up in direct opposition to the new regime, on the mainland or
in Taiwan.
Mass campaigns in British businesses
As we have seen, the CCP were by rio means confident of their control over workers in
Shanghai's factories and businesses, foreign or Chinese. They initiated a series of political
campaigns in order to strengthen their grip and to channel the masses' energies towards
revolutionary and economic goals.!" Campaigns aimed both to radically transform the old
society and to preserve the revolution against Thermidorian reaction. 'Mass line' mobilisation
techniques that had been successful in the CCP's rural base areas were transferred to the
urban environment.i'" While the efficacy of the campaigns in turning people into committed
Communists is in doubt, they were certainly effective in a practical sense.195
The first major campaign was the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries, which
began in October 1950.196 The campaign emerged from real concerns about New China's
192 Linson Dzau obituary, Assembly, Association of Graduates United States Military Academy, June 1978, pp.
128-9.
193 Richard Gaulton, 'Political mobilization in Shanghai, 1949-1951', in Christopher Howe (ed.), Shanghai:
Revolution and development in an Asian metropolis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1981), pp. 47-8.
194 Mark Selden, The Yenan Way in Revolutionary China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971),
f.p.274-6.
9S Gaulton, 'Political mobilization,' pp. 47-8, 51, 57-65.
196 For a study of how this campaign unfolded at ground level in Tianjin see Lieberthal, Revolution and
Tradition in Tientsin, pp. 101-118.
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internal and external safety, but it also aimed to mobilise popular support behind the new
government.l'" It was carried out in a highly public manner to demonstrate the power of the
new govemment.l'" While this campaign had little direct effect on foreigners, it was made
very clear that the Communists were willing to use ruthless violence to secure the revolution
against 'reactionaries' and the agents of imperialism.l'" Executions were ordered by quota_2°o
According to CCP figures nearly 3,000 'enemies of the state' were executed in Shanghai in
1951. The Guomindang claimed 300,000. Yang Kuisong cites a figure of 712,000 executions
across China_201
'Resist America, Aid Korea'
In late 1950, the Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea (kang Mei yuan Chao yundong,
t1i: ~ 11 ~J1 )E TJJ) was initiated across China. Over 2,000,000 people took part in
demonstrations against American imperialism in Shanghai.202 Inorder to maximise its impact,
the Campaign was carried out in all workplaces and public places. In the foreign-owned
public utility companies, the Campaign was stated to have three main goals. The first of these
was to instil a sense of national pride amongst the workers and to sever any emotional ties
they had with America and the, West. The second was economic: the workers were told to
conserve resources, improve production and 'cherish [their] tools' (aihu gongju, ~N?IJ:t).
The third aim was to strengthen the Party's contro1.203
197 Strauss, 'Paternalist Terror,' pp. 98-9.
198 Yang Kuisong, 'Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries,' The China Quarterly, 193,
March 2008, pp.105-6, 120-1.
199 In his July 1950 instructions on the suppression of counterrevolutionaries, Zhou Enlai linked the presence
and perseverance of Guomindang agents to the external threat of imperialism; Zhou Enlai, Jianguo yilai Zhou
Enlai wengao, Vol. 3, pp. 87-9.
200 Yang, 'Reconsidering,' pp.120-I.
201 For the CCP's figures see Strauss, 'Paternalist Terror,' p. 87; For the Guomindang figure see Bergere,
Shanghai, p. 359; Yang, 'Reconsidering,' pp.105-6, 120-1.
202 Zhou et ai, Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 50-1.
203 SMA A59-1-253-3, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu Kang Mei Yuan Chao
Yundong de zongjie [CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee, Public Utilities Committee, summary of the
Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea], 1953; Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao
yundong zongjie [Public Utilities Committee Summary of Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea]; SMA
CI-2-105, Shanghai Shi Gonghui guanyu Shanghai Gonghui kang Mel yuan Chao baojia weiguo he kaizhan
zengchanjieyuejuanxian xiuding aiguozhuyi gongyue de tongzhi, baogao [Shanghai Union notice and report on
Shanghai Unions' Campaign to Resist America Aid Korea Protect Homes and the Nation, initiate economising,
contributions and signing of patriotic conventions], 9/12/50-13/8/51.
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As discussed in Chapter Two, this concerted attack on the remnants of American influence in
Shanghai targeted cultural and educational institutions and American cultural imports. Over
the years British, French and Japanese culture had all been influential in shaping the city's
cultural landscape, but either side of the 1937-1945 war with Japan, it was American culture
that had dominated: Buicks had lined the streets; Hollywood films had drawn the biggest
crowds and encouraged glamorous imitators; the international crowd had danced to American
jazz provided by Whitey Smith and others; and every night, drunken American seamen had
brawled in the infamous 'Blood Alley.,204These transplanted aspects of optimistic, decadent
and hedonistic American culture had suited Shanghai's post-war boom uniquely. In Shanghai
and further inland, more staid American missionaries had established a network of schools
and hospitals that were supported by close emotional ties to church communities across
America_205
Less obvious forms of American cultural influence were also attacked. In the late 1940s,
many Shanghai youths had come to define themselves as 'little aeroplanes' (xiao feiji, IJ\ ~
*11). These youths were the Chinese equivalent of American bobby-soxers: young teens
known for their wild dancing. The 'little aeroplanes' wore knitted sweaters inscribed with
their names or phrases such as 'I Love You.' By January 1951 this group had been made the
target of a concerted press campaign which had accused them of immorality, robbery and
rape.206
The CCP were extremely effective propagandists and they used all available forms of
communication to spread their messages. During the Campaign, more conventional
propaganda techniques were supplemented by the use of drama troupes and the appropriation
of traditional forms of entertainment such as street singing. Traditional singers would travel
from place to place, performing in tea houses and inns; as the vast majority of Chinese were
illiterate, they provided an accessible and entertaining means of spreading anti-American
messages. Street singers were encouraged to sing simple songs, provided to them through the
Communist-controlled guilds of entertainers, in easily understood local vernacular. One
ballad noted by American sources and written in Shanghai dialect, was 'Tear up the Paper
204 Karns and Patterson, Shanghai: High Lights; Hannah, 'Shanghai,' pp. 179-191.
20S J.A.G. Roberts, China Through Western Eyes: the Twentieth Century (Stroud: Alan Sutton, 1992).
206 NARA RG 59, Box 4197 793.00/11-150 to 793.00/2-2851, Consulate Hong Kong to Washington;
Observations on the effect of Communist Rule and the Russian Invasion of Shanghai by Mr. Albert Fraleigh,'
6/1/51.
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Tiger', which included the line 'class controversies in imperialist America are like paper
holding fire; one day the revolutionary conflagration will bum imperialism to death' (which
presumably was catchier in the original Chinese)_207
Newspaper cartoons were also powerful propaganda tools. A study by American intelligence
officials in November 1950 found that the three most frequently recurring themes of cartoons
were: the glory of 'New China'; the 'Liberation' of Taiwan; and the threat posed to world
peace by American imperialism. Of all cartoons analysed on international themes, 48 out of
82 reflected anti-American themes; the most prominent being criticisms of the America's
continued support for the Guomindang, its rearmament of Japan, its atomic diplomacy and its
war-mongering. These cartoons, it was noted, were obviously greatly influenced by the
Soviet humour magazine Krokodil_2°8
The campaign took place in all companies. At first it was reported that things were going
exceedingly well in the city's foreign-owned public utility companies.P" Younger workers
were particularly enthusiastic in setting up 'pickets' (jiucha dui, ~4~ ~A) to protect their
enterprises from the threat of enemy agents or internal wrecking.i'" Vast sums were collected
in war donations. On 4th March 1951, over seventy per cent of the city's public utility
workers took part in a rally against the rearmament of Japan."! Activists and influential 'old
workers' (lao gongren, ~IA) were mobilised, and 'recollection and denunciation meetings'
(huiyi kongsu hui, @]'I'Z.f~W~) were held.2l2 Since 'Liberation,' attendance at mass meetings
in the British Tram Company had been very low, averaging only three to four hundred of the
207 NARA RG 59, Box 4211, 793.00118-150 to 793.00116-2551, Chinese Communist use of street singers in
their Anti-American Campaign, 3111151; Li T'ieh-chih 'Tear up the Paper Tiger,' Xinhua Book Company,
(Shanghai: December 1950) (20,000 copies).
208 NARA RG 59, Box 4211,793.00118-150 to 793.00116-2551, Consulate Hong Kong to Washington, Chinese
Communist Newspaper Cartoons, 24/11150.
209 SMA A59-1-3-2, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu kang Me; yuan Chao
yundong de baogao [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee report on Campaign to Resist America and Aid
Korea],4/4/51.
210 For more on worker pickets see Perry, 'Masters of the Country,' pp. 69-77; for more on mass campaigns and
the linking of national goals to political mobilisation and the eradication of undesirable features of the old
society see also Ruth Rogaski's analysis of the 1952 Patriotic Hygiene Campaign that was linked to the War in
Korea
211 SMA A59-1-3-2, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao
yundong de baogao [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee report on Campaign to Resist America and Aid
Korea],4/4/51.
212 SMA A59-1-253-3, guanyu Kang Mei Yuan Chao Yundong de Zongjie; Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu
kang Mei yuan Chao yundong zongjie.,
182
3,256 workers, but during the Campaign, this figure doubled. This success was attributed by
the Public Utility Committee to the workers having 'received in no small measure the
oppression of imperialism, they have a real class hatred' (gongren shenshou diguozhuyi yapo,
you shishi de jieji chouhen, I A 5* ~ * 00~ >t..lli i§ , ~ ~ ~ a~Bfr~ fir. 'tN). 'Only a
movement of this type' the Committee reported, 'could widen and deepen' this feeling,
... turning it into a mass patriotic movement, laying bare the hatred and fear of the bullying and
oppression of the imperialists, which had previously been buried in [the workers '] hearts.213
Global issues were tied to problems at the factory level. The Campaign in Shanghai was
linked to the wider (Soviet-inspired) World Peace Movement.i'" In March 1950, the World
Peace Council in Stockholm began a global movement to sign a petition for world peace.i"
Work units across Shanghai competed to get signatures; young activists from the British
Tram Company harassed passengers into signing their petitions en route to work.216 By
October, it was reported that across China some 190,000,000 signatures had been
collected.217 In 1952, public utility workers were encouraged to sign 'patriotic conventions'
(aiguo gongyue, ~~1};},J), pledging to improve production. In this way, the work of each
individual and each enterprise was tied to the wider political and military situation_218
Linking the politics of the factory to the war in Korea was not without risk. Morale
plummeted after the American-led United Nations forces landed at Inchon and pushed the
North Korean forces back towards the border with China. Cadres in the British Tram
213 SMA A59-1-3-2, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao
yundong de baogao; 'Only a movement. .. ' (zhi yao zhe yang yundong cai neng guangfan shenru, bian wei
qunzhongxingde aiguo yundong, jiang guoqu maicang zai neixin dui diguozhuyi changqi yapo he wuru de
chouhen hejukong baolu chulai, R1:f~~~3EfJJ:;t~gj5f~A, :t7:JMA't1a~~OO3EfJJ, ~u~~~1:Ep;j
11:'-~;HfOO3:.)t*AAffii!HIl1~~a~fll:tm.fll'ta~~~I:fH~); SMA A59-1-253-3, guanyu Kang Mei Yuan Chao
Yundong de Zongjie; Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhuiguanyu kang Mei yuan Chaoyundong zongjie.
214 The Shanghai News; 'Slogans for Peace Publicity Work,' 4/7/50; Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 51; He
et ai, Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 23.
215 For more on the World Peace movement see Phillip Deery, 'The Dove Flies East: Whitehall, Warsaw and the
1950 World Peace Congress,' Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 48, No.4, 2002, pp. 450-1; see
also The Shanghai News, Song Qingling, 'China Signs For World Peace,' 18/6/50. .
216 SMA A59-1-63, Yingshang Shanghai Dianche Gongsi zhibu gongzuo baogao (fujian san) [British
Shanghai Tram Company branch summary of work (Appendix 3)], 1950.
217 TNA FO 371183333, China Peace Committee Stockholm appeal: 190 million signatures: communist inspired,
1950.
218 SMA A59-1-3-48, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu ge danweijiancha xiuding
he zhixing aiguo gongyue de baogao [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee report on each work unit
examining, revising and carrying out patriotic conventions], 26/10/51.
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Company reported that the workers were afraid of the outbreak of a Third World War, the
return of the Guomindang, and the dropping of a nuclear bomb on Shanghai. Political
activists implored Party cadres: 'When you go, don't abandon us, you must take us with you'
(nimen zou de shihou buyao juanqi women dai women yiqi zou, 1fF1f1jg~~a111.~::f'~m~~
1f1~*~1f1_~jg).219
The Campaign had obvious successes in terms of increasing production and political
education. Yet cadres still found cause to complain that, despite all of their mobilising efforts
a large proportion of the Tram Company's workers remained apathetic.22oThis problem was
echoed at the Shanghai Waterworks. Here, cadres complained that the workers 'consistently
maintained a very 'tranquil' attitude' (yizhi baochi zhe hen 'pingjing'de taidu, -j[1*f~~
~&'3¥m.'~~~Jl)_221
The Three and Five Antis Campaigns and the 'supervision' of British companies
In autumn 1951, Beijing announced the need for further economies to fund the war in Korea.
Economy campaigns in the northeast of the country exposed severe corruption involving CCP
officials. In response Beijing initiated a nationwide campaign against corruption, waste and
'bureaucratism' in December. This evolved into the 'Three Antis Campaign' (san fan
yundong, :='&illiJJ). This campaign aimed at 'purging the corrosive influence of capitalist
thinking towards our Party' (suqing zibenzhuyi sixiang dui dang de qinshi, ~;~~*3::>(,~
f!~1:R:~~1~t!ll)_222Outside the Party the campaign was taken to the masses as the 'Campaign
to Increase Production and Economise' (zengchanjieyue yundong, ±~tcTa~lliiJJ)_223
219 SMA A59-1-253-32, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Gongyong Shiye Dang Weiyuanhui kang Mei yuan Chao
yundong chubu zongjie [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Party Committee preliminary summary of Campaign to
Resist America and Aid Korea], 22/2/51; SMA A59-1-253-3, guanyu Kang Mei Yuan Chao Yundong de Zongjie;
Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao yundong zongjie.
220 SMA A59-1-63, Yingshang Shanghai Dianche Gongsi zhibu gongzuo baogao (fujian san).
221 SMA A59-1-253-36, Shanghai Zilaishui Gongs; guanyu kang Mei yuan Chao qingkuang de baogao
[Shanghai Waterworks Company report on Campaign to Resist America and Aid Korea], 1953.
222 SMA A38-1-168-78, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei guanyu kaizhan jingjian jieyue, Jan tanwu, Jan langfei, Jan
guanliaozhuyi douzheng he zhishi [CCP Shanghai Municipal Committee instructions on beginning the struggle
for economising, anti corruption, anti waste and anti bureaucratism], 29/12/51.
223 SMA A38-1-168-52, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei guanyu zai guoying gongying gongchang zhong kaizhan
qunzhongxing jiancha langfei yundong yu kaishi jinxing zengchan jieyue 'yundong de zhishi (caoan) [CCP
Shanfghai Municipal Committee draft instructions on beginning mass movement to investigate waste in state
and public enterprises and instructions on beginning economy campaign], 1951.
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Like all other government departments, the Shanghai FAD was mobilised to take part in the
economy campaign.i'" First, a mass meeting was held at which examples of waste and their
causes were discussed and criticised. Cadres were lectured on the 'arduous style of work'
(jianku zuofeng, ~&=a= it JXL)of the 'old Liberated Areas', and were criticised for small
wastages, such as leaving lights on when leaving the office, or washing with a whole tub of
warm water.225 In a first round of small group meetings, the leaders criticised 'defects in their
working style caused by bureaucratic thinking' (zuojeng shang cunzai zhe guanliaozhuyi
deng maobing, itJXL...tff.f:E~~f~~$(W=€(piJ). In the second round, cadres were invited to
engage in 'quite pointed criticism' ijiao jianrui de piping, ~~~tjUI~t~tl¥)of the leadership.
Later, they were to direct criticism towards themselves.v'"
Eradicating corruption within the Party was not enough. The CCP's cadres were, it seemed,
being corrupted by the 'bourgeois-capitalist' milieu of the cities. The environment in which
the cadres operated would have to be transformed too. In January 1952, the Five Antis
Campaign (wu fan yundong, 3i&iEM) was launched against bribery, tax evasion, theft of
state assets, cheating on labour or materials, and stealing state economic intelligence. The
Three Antis had aimed at rectifying the Party and the government, but the Five Antis
Campaign was directed outwards towards the society that surrounded them. The Shanghai
Federation of Trade Unions organised 'tiger beating' (dahu, trm) teams to teach union
cadres and workers how to investigate their companies' accounts, organise struggle meetings
and elicit confessions. Shanghai's capitalists were terrified. Many committed suicide.227 .
The CCP used campaigns as a way of pressuring foreign capitalists. Why, top leaders asked,
should the CCP be 'generous to foreigners and ungenerous to Chinese' (hou yu Wai, bo yu
Zhong, ~ .y71'li.y ~ )?228 In February 1952, the central government had realised that the
224 SMA B13-2-41-12, Waishi Chu Jingjian Jieyue Yundong de qingkuang baogao [Foreign Affairs Department
situation report on the Economy Campaign], 27/12/51; In Shanghai the economy movement was led Vice
Mayor Pan Hannian who wielded considerable influence at that time, see; SMA B22-2-64, Shanghai Shi Renmin
Zhengfu guanyu chengli jingjian jieyue weiyuanhui bing you Pan Hannian deng 16 ren zucheng weiyuan de
wenjian [Shanghai People's Government document regarding the establishment of the Economy Campaign
Committee comprised of 16 members including Pan Hannian], 8/11151.
225 SMA BI3-2-41-12, Waishi Chu jingjian gongzuo de baogao [Foreign Affairs Department report on
economising work], 27/12/51.
226 SMA B 13-2-41-12, Waishi Chu Jingjian Jieyue Yundong de qingkuang baogao.
227 Dillon, 'New Democracy,' p. 92; Dillon gives a figure of 48 suicides and 34 unsuccessful attempts.
228 MFA 118-00014-07, Yingguo shangren cheli wenti.
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'fierce' (menglie, ~l?!!)campaign could not but affect foreign enterprises, so a few rules
were laid down. It was decided that foreigners should be generally exempt from mass-led
'confession movements' (tanbai yundong, ±gS illiJJ). They could, however, be made to
understand that if confessions were forthcoming, punishments would be lighter. Five Antis
work in foreign enterprises was to be taken steadily and all charges were to be based on firm
evidence. Crimes that were discovered, it was stressed, should be dealt with according to the
law rather than through mass-led campaign methods. This represented the imposition of a
series of restraints that did not exist in most Chinese firms.229 Despite these restrictions,
several foreign managers were forced to make confessions before mass meetings, an
experience described by one as a 'very scary affair' in which they lost 'all personal
dignity. ,230
Workers took advantage of the anti-corruption campaign to punish capitalists. They
appropriated the language of campaigns to push for long-desired improvements in salaries
and conditions?3l The movement had a very negative effect on production: at The Shanghai
News, for example, a third of the staff were taking part in the Three Antis Campaign (rather
than working as usual) at anyone time.?" After the city's economy was nearly completely
derailed in late February, the government took firmer contro1.233The effect on production had
been so great that there were over three times as many labour-capital disputes arising from
capitalists stopping production or not paying wages in 1952 than in 1951.234From then until
the summer, the campaign took a more orderly form, trained work teams carried out
investigations and supervised the capitalists. By then, more than 10 billion Renminbi had
been raised through fines and the capitalists' authority had been completely undermined.235
229 MFA 118-00009-01, Zhongyang guanyu waishang, waiqiao bujinxing 'sanfan,' 'wufan' yundong de zhishi
[Instruction that foreigners and foreign businesses are not to be involved in the 'Three Antis' and 'Five Antis'
Movements], 10/2/52-25/2/52.
230 MFA 118-00014-10, Yingguo Shangren zai wo 'san fan' 'wu fan' zhong de taidu he suo tichu de wenti
[British businessmen's attitude towards and issue raised about our 'Three Antis' and 'Five Antis' Movements],
23/5/52, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs attributed these comments to a man named Robinson of one of Jardine
Matheson's subsidiary EWO companies.
231 Dillon, 'New Democracy,' pp. 90-8; Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 357-63; Perry, 'Masters of the Country?' pp. 62,
68.
232 SMA B35-2-112-1, Shanghai Xinwen 'san/an' yundong zongjie baogao (eaoan) [Summary report of the
'Three Antis' Movement in The Shanghai News (draft)], 1952.
233 Dillon, 'New Democracy,' pp. 90-8; Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 357-63.
234 Shanghai Laodong Zhi, p. 482; There were a total of 15,344 disputes, 3.48 times as many as the total for
1951.
235 Dillon, 'New Democracy,' pp. 90-8; Bergere, Shanghai, pp. 357-63.
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By May 1952, the Ministry of ForeignAffairs considered that the Five Antis Campaign had
induced the desired effect on British businessmen in Shanghai; they were 'deeply panic-
stricken' (shengan konghuang, 5*~~dm).236 The Ministry now feared that the workers were
going too far. 'Overly leftist moods and actions' (guozuo qingxu yu xingdong, llli:1~m~H
TJJ) were not approved of. Across China local government officials and union members were
instructed to assemble the workers of foreign enterprises and to calm their mood. In future,
'gentler forms of struggle' (qing huan de douzheng xingshi, ~£tl~~4~ff~it) would be
employed with 'supervision' (jiandu, llilWl) of capitalists coming from the government and
unions, rather than from the workers. Moderation was urged on local government officials,
who were instructed to 'repeatedly explain the Party and Government's policy towards the
question of supervising foreign companies, to settle the mood and overcome disorder' ifanfu
jiangming dang he zhengfu duiyu jiandu wenti de zhengce, anding qingxu, kefu hunluan, Ii
1li# PI}R:~lliElJff },t-=f lliltf IDJ ~ ~~ iEl*, ~ ~1~m, RmU~!L)_237
Later that month, the question of how best to conduct the Campaign within foreign
enterprises was discussed at a major meeting ofleaders from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs,
Finance, Industry and Commerce and other related bodies in Beijing. They decided to
continue carrying out Five Antis activities in foreign firms, and using this as a way to
exercise more control over them through the unions. Mass agitation would be kept in check;
there was, however, greater potential for harmful effects than for possible gains. It was also
suggested that if the workers 'rose up' in foreign enterprises it would make them more
difficult to take over later (zhigong qilai bu fangbian zhangwo, ImI~*:::J'1J~:4tW). The
Campaign was to be used as a carefully directed 'tool' (gongju, IJt).
A number of firms would be targeted specifically, in order to frighten the rest into conformity.
Five Antis work groups would enter factories under the guise of higher level union
representatives to form 'mass work groups' (qunzhong gongzuo zu, I¥~I i'F~.EI.).The mass
aspects of the campaign were to be directed away from foreigners and towards their Chinese
236 MFA 118-00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo Shangren jieshu zai Hua maoyi wenti [Regarding the problem of
British businessmen ending trade inChina], 23/5/52; MFA 118-00014-10(1) Yingguo Shangren zai wo 'sanfan '
'wufan' zhong de taidu he suo tichu de wenti, 23/5/52.
237 MFA 118-00009-01, Zhongyang guanyu waishang, waiqiao bujinxing 'sanfan, ' 'wufan' yundong de zhishi;
Gao ge di guanyu Waishang 'wufan, ' jiandu shengchan, laozi guanxi wenti de zhishi [Instructions on the Five
Antis and foreign businesses, supervision of production and labour-capital disputes in various regions], 10/5/52.
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'running dogs.' Labour was to be stirred up in industrial concerns but not in trading
companies; industrial concerns were not needed in the long run, but trading companies
formed a necessary link to the wider world.238
The Five Antis campaign had sincerely damaged the hopes of British businessmen. After
workers began Five Antis 'investigations' in his enterprise, even the 'always proactive'
(yixiang jiji, - icH.RfJ1.) Gomersall, one Ministry of Foreign Affairs observer wrote, had
'recently and suddenly expressed that he had lost confidence' in the future of his enterprise in
China (zuijin tu biao sangshi xinxin, ~)ff~~-at~1~/1)).z39 The British charge d'affaires
Leo Lamb reported to London that it was 'impossible to give a credible description of the
dislocation and despair caused by this movement. ,240
Mass campaigns were used as political tools and in British businesses they were used to
achieve economic ends. Workers were stirred up in order to apply pressure to British
managers. Yet the CCP did not want to simply fire up the workers and set them loose: actions
had to be coordinated and targeted to achieve the maximum effect and to avoid unintended
consequences such as assaults or deaths. In leading the workers in the struggle against their
imperialistic foreign bosses, the CCP were able to secure a greater degree of revolutionary
legitimacy, while further consolidating their control over workers in companies that they later
hoped to take over.
238 MFA 118-00014-07, Yingguo shangren cheli wenti.
239 MFA 118-00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo Shangren jieshu zai Hua maoyi wenti [Regarding the problem of
British businessmen ending trade in China], 23/5/52; fujian san, Yingshang jieshu wenti [Appendix three,
problem of closure of British businesses], 23/5/52.
240 TNA FO 3711105188, China: annual review for 1952; L.H. Lamb, Beijing to Anthony Eden, Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, Foreign Office, 18/2/53.
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Conclusion
In the years following the CCP's takeover of Shanghai, the foreign population declined
dramatically in number. Those who remained did so largely to safeguard businesses and
property. After the withdrawal of the Americans, 'foreign businesses' in Shanghai effectively
meant British businesses. As the political climate in Shanghai became increasingly intense, so
did foreigners' lives become more miserable: the trappings of foreign social life, the
dancehalls, clubs, bars and sporting venues closed and re-opened as healthy venues for
Shanghai's new socialist citizens. While the CCP sought to reduce the foreign population of
the city, the actual process ofleaving China was fraught with difficulties and delays.
These difficulties were compounded by the vicissitudes of doing business in Shanghai. The
CCP did not have a master-plan for taking over foreign businesses from the very beginning.
They 'squeezed' them financially to break their grip over sectors of the Chinese economy and
to raise revenue. This squeeze was tied into the wider processes of change affecting Chinese
capitalists. It was important to keep foreign firms operating and to forbid them to make
retrenchments: ,the authorities particularly wished to avoid an increase in unemployment.
Labour-capital disputes were a particular source of problems for foreign capitalists. Local
government and union officials had little reason to find in their favour at the expense of the
workers they were trying to win over. Foreigners argued their cases in terms of commercial
law, while the CCP were more inclined to make decisions based on the political climate.
Although foreign staff were often harassed, and sometimes assaulted, they suffered less than
their high-level Anglophone Chinese assistants.
Mass mobilisation techniques were employed to persuade the workers to act against the
foreign management. As the CCP took a firmer grip over the workers, their anger became
increasingly channelled and used as a 'tool.' Throughout the period, higher level officials
sought to moderate the actions of the more radical cadres below them. They did not want to
wage total war on foreign capitalists. Radicalism had to be tempered by 'pragmatism. The
leadership preferred a drawn-out struggle in which they could make use of the capitalists
when it suited them. The next chapter examines the early attempts of foreign businesses to
.withdraw from China and the methods by which the Communists took over and transformed
British businesses.
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Chapter 4: Takeovers and Requisitions
Britain's policy from 1949 to 1952 had been to keep 'a foot in the door', to wait out the
revolutionary storm and to try and establish a working relationship with the Chinese. They
desired the establishment of diplomatic relations because they were concerned for the
security of Hong Kong and because they wanted to try to preserve British assets in Shanghai.
This policy was compromised by their desire for close cooperation with America in global
affairs, which led them to military involvement in Korea and to joining a strategic embargo
against China. The Korean War put a halt to negotiations towards the establishment of
diplomatic relations. The animosity between them never quite came to a head, however, as
both sought to avoid any major crises. For their part, the Chinese sought to 'attack America
and draw in Britain' (da Mei la Ying, rr ~~'y: 9~;)in order to play on their conflicting
interests.I
By 1952, British firms in China had increasingly begun to despair of their future prospects
and the majority were considering withdrawal. Itwas estimated that, by October in that year,
British firms had remitted a total of over £6 million into China just to keep their companies
going.j Pressure also built from the Chinese side to accelerate the departure of foreigners; the
Shanghai FAD's task for the year 1952 was 'to continue to carry out the limiting and purging
of the cultural, political, economic, and other influence of imperialism in China (especially in
Shanghai)' ijixu guanche xianzhi de suqing diguozhuyi zai Hua (tebie zai Shanghai) de
wenhua, zhengzhi ji jingji dengfangmian de shili, ~~!~m-~)]~&*IJa~~;l;:~il~~~1'£$ (~~
~IJ1'£..tjfJt)a~3tit, iE~j~J.)H£rn=~1nma~Y1n). 3
This chapter examines the early stages of the withdrawal of British firms, with a particular
focus on the fortunes of the Swire group. Firstly, the international and local context is
established with a focus on the American-led strategic embargo and the closure of Vee
IMFA 118-00014-07, Wo Waijiao Bu zhaoji youguan bumen kaihui shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti
[Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls meeting of relevant bureaux to discuss problem of withdrawal of British
businessmen], 24/5/52-30/5/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyi fayan jilu, Waijiao Bu
OuFei Si Yi Ke [First Section of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Europe and Africa Department 30/5/52 record of
meeting on problem of British businessmen].
2 'Many Difficulties in the Far East,' The Times (Annual Financial and Commercial Review), 13/10/52, p. xxviii.
3 SMA BI3-2-41-12, Waishi Chu Jingjian Gongzuo de Baogao [Foreign Affairs Department report on
economising work], 27/12/51.
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Tsoong Tobacco. Previously unused materials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs archive in
Beijing are then used to explore the events of the spring of 1952 when the British tried to
speed the withdrawal of their businesses, and the Chinese sought to develop counter-
measures. The CCP were very secretive, so the sources presented here (which focus on a
policy meeting held at the Ministry in May) offer a rare glimpse of the processes of high-
level central policy making. _
Following this, two case studies are used to examine the ground-level processes surrounding
the takeover of British firms. These are the expropriation of the Shanghai Electric
Construction Company (hereafter called by its more commonly used name; the British Tram
Company) and the 'transfer' (zhuanrang, *~it) of the assets of the Orient Paint, Colour &
Varnish Company, a factory managed by Butterfield & Swire. How did the Chinese prepare
to take over a British company? What were their priorities when doing so? How did they
attempt to transform these companies in the short and long terms once they had been taken
over? And how did foreign managers and Chinese workers respond?
The strategic embargo
In the early Cold War period, it became increasingly common for international trade to be
used as a weapon. In December 1950, the United States froze all Chinese assets and
prohibited trade with China through US ports. The British did not impose a formal embargo
at first, and wavered as to the degree of severity with which export controls towards China
should be implemented. They did not want to jeopardise the position of British businesses in
China. It was hoped that by continuing to trade with the Chinese they could be made less
reliant on Moscow. Nevertheless, from early 1949 onwards, the British often tried to impose
restrictions on strategic goods behind the scenes. The Chinese trade was ultimately less
important than Britain's long-term security goals and the strategic alliance with America."
In late 1949 and early 1950, the Americans persuaded Britain and other European countries
to tighten trade controls against Communist countries. They reinforced the message by
threatening to end Marshall Aid. Britain hoped to keep these export controls (which were
mainly directed towards the USSR and Eastern Europe) separate from those directed towards
4 Shao, China, Britain, pp. xiv, 61-8.
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China. The outbreak of the Korean War caused them to fall into line. The British embargo
was strengthened after United Nations resolutions in February and May 1951 branded the
Chinese an 'aggressor' in the Korean War and endorsed a strategic embargo. All this was met
with dismay from British businessmen in Shanghai. Exports to China from the UK fell from
over £10 million in 1950 to £3 million in 1952. The total value of Sino-British trade had
climbed to almost £14 million in 1950, but by 1952 it had fallen to £7.6 million.'
The industrial goods China needed most (and which had traditionally been imported from
Britain) were considered to have strategic value and so were subject to the embargo controls."
After the 1951 United Nations resolutions, China turned to the Soviet Union and its satellites
more and more often for trade. Between 1945 and 1949 trade with these countries had
accounted for less than 1 per cent of China's total foreign trade; by 1951 it had risen to 61 per
cent, and by 1953 to 75 per cent."
In April 1952, the World Peace Council organised the Moscow Economic Conference.! There,
a Chinese delegation led by Dr. Ji Chaoding met with a delegation of left-leaning British
businessmen and MPs. They concluded a deal worth £10 million to both sides." The Chinese
were pleased to have bypassed the old Shanghai-Hong Kong trading firms by opening a new
avenue of trade. This weakened the bargaining position of 'old China hands,' like Jardine,
Matheson & Co. and Butterfield & Swire.i" The Conference, and the deals made there, did
not meet with the approval of the British Government. 11 This hostility was born of a Cold
War era anti-Communism, and a close association with the interests of the China Association
and its 'old China hands.' 12 As one Chinese commentator observed, this agreement had
'rather shocked the British merchants in Shanghai, but they also felt rather jealous' (Shanghai
Yingshang powei zhendong, dan po gan cu yi, .t~fJj~~~ji~1irJJ, 1.§~ji~!:~).13
S Shao, China, Britain, pp. 61-8, 84-108.
6 The Times, 'Many Difficulties in the Far East; Withdrawal from China,' 13/10/52.
7 Shao, China, Britain, p. 68.
8 'International Economic Conference opens session in Moscow,' The Shanghai News, 5/4/52; 'China &
International Economic Conference,' The Shanghai News, 6/4/52.
9 The Times, 'Many Difficulties in the Far East'; Ji Chaoding led these talks but the overall head of the Chinese
delegation was Nan Hanchen (f.fj;Jl.~).
10 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyi fayan jilu.
11 Hansard, 'International Economic Conference, Moscow,' HC Deb, 7/5/52, Vol. 500, p. 380.
12 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 129-30, 144, 148-54.
13 MFA 118-00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo shangrenjieshu zai Hua maoyi wenti [Regarding problem of British
businessmen finishing trade in China], 23/5/52; fujian er, Yingshang jieshu wenti [Appendix two, Problem of
192
Despite a considerable degree of official obstruction from the British Government (which
included the refusal or delay of export licenses and visas), this controversial new group
succeeded in conducting a number of deals over the next few years. This group eventually
evolved into the less politically sensitive '48 Group of British Traders with China.' 14 The 48
Group, who styled themselves the 'Icebreakers', maintained direct trading links with China
throughout the decades that followed and led important trade missions to China in 1953, 1954,
1964 and 1970.15
The 'transfer' of the Vee Tsoong Tobacco Company
The strategic embargo and the deadlock in Korea exacerbated the tensions already present
within Sino-British relations. British firms in China continued to suffer from a depressed
market, arbitrary taxation and not being permitted to cut costs. Firms responded to these
challenges in different ways. In August 1951, Yee Tsoong Tobacco, a wholly owned
subsidiary of British American Tobacco (China), requested that the government find a
Chinese state or private organisation to take over all of its assets in exchange for all of its
liabilities.l" The outright transfer of their Shanghai assets to the government-run Shanghai
Tobacco Corporation established a precedent that later came to be known as the 'Yee Tsoong
model' on which the future closure of the majority of the larger British businesses was
basedY
Yee Tsoong had been in trouble even before the CCP came to power. After 1949, however,
the company found itself in the worst possible position: it relied wholly on the government
tobacco monopoly for supplies of raw materials and was forced to maintain a low output
under a national quota system, while government enterprises competed for its consumers.
Deflation and depression led to a dramatic decline in sales. The company had a large
British businesses closing], 23/5/52; MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijianji Zhang Hanfu
Jubuzhang de shengming [My opinion [Huan Xiang] on the withdrawal of British businessmen and Vice
Minister Zhang Hanfu's statement], 1/5/51-31/7/52; Statement on Lamb's note of 19/5/52 by Huan Xiang,
517152.
14 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 129-30, 144, 148-54.
IS Percy Timberlake, The Story of the Icebreakers in China (London: The 48 Group Club, 1994), pp. 15-22,31-6.
16 MFA 118-00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo shangren jieshu zai Hua maoyi wenti;fujian er.
17 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 124-8.
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redundant labour force (7,500 workers in Shanghai alone) and high tax burdens." In April
1950 the board decided to cut their losses. Although their assets far outweighed their
liabilities, they could not justify remitting more money into China with little prospect of
retums.l"
The prospect of this perceived 'surrender' alarmed British Government representatives in
China, but even Consul General Urquhart, who had previously been the most vocal champion
of the 'stay put' policy, had to admit that he could see no other action for the firm to take.
The argument that things would get better should they just wait a while longer might be
convincing in London, he argued, but it rang hollow in Shanghai. If there was no
improvement soon, he suggested, the British in Shanghai should 'write off our assets and
concentrate on getting our people out before pressures become intolerable. ,20
'Surrender' on the Vee Tsoong model was seen by the Foreign Office as having potentially
disastrous international implications. They hoped that they could encourage the Chinese to
either relax their 'squeeze' on foreign firms or expropriate them outright, paying appropriate
compensation. They feared a dangerous prece~ent being set. At this time, British
policymakers were particularly concerned with the situation in Iran.21 The nationalistic
Iranian Government led by Mohammed Mossadegh nationalised the strategically important
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951. This sparked what became known as the Abadan crisis.
From 1951 to 1953 the British and the Iranians were locked in a standoff over the ownership
of the Abadan refinery, the largest oil refinery in the world. The crisis ended with a coup
d'etat organised by Britain and America. The events in Iran and in China demonstrated a
worrying trend: as her military and political prestige declined in the post-war world, so did
18 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No, 287, 24/3/50, P.D.
Coates Minute on the above, 28/3/50; TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to
Foreign Office, No. 410, 22/4/50; Note of a Discussion with Mr. Oppenheim about the position of the British
American Tobacco Company inChina, held in the Foreign Office, 4/4/50.
19 TNA FO 371183345; British Commercial Policy in China; Note of a Discussion with Mr. Oppenheim about
the position of the British American Tobacco Company in China, held in the Foreign Office, 4/4/50.
20 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No, 287, 24/3/50, P.D.
Coates Minute on the above, 28/3/50; TNA FO 371183346, British Commercial Policy in China; Shanghai to
Foreign Office, No. 410, 22/4/50.
21 TNA FO 371/83345, British Commercial Policy in China; Note on a Discussion with Mr. Nathan about the
Position of the Kailuan Mining Administration, held in the Foreign Office on the 30th March; Record of a
Meeting held in the Foreign Office on the 30th March to discuss the position of British Firms in China.
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Britain's ability to secure its formal and informal spheres of influence in which commerce
was conducted.f
Soon after British American Tobacco made the decision to close Yee Tsoong the British
Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai began preparing a memorandum which argued that there
was no future for foreign firms and that those which were able to should withdraw as soon as
possible. BAT suggested that when it came to a 'showdown' the firms 'should all act
together.' Disunity amongst the British businessmen only allowed them to be played off
against each other. 23 Opinion was divided as to whether they should surrender their assets so
easily. The main split in the Shanghai business community remained that between John
Keswick of Jardine Matheson and W.C. Gomersall of China Engineers.r" Gomersall was
committed to persevering in China for as long as possible as his finn had large fixed assets in
Shanghai. The tension between these two had also undermined plans in 1949 for a 'British
Guild', which would represent all of the British firms to allow them to use their combined
strength to improve their position. Keswick and Gomersall would not work together, and so
there could be no united action_25
Other firms also disagreed with BAT's transfer deal. John Kenyon, the manager of Patons &
Baldwins, argued that his company was better prepared than most to tough out what could
tum out to be merely a difficult interim period. They had gained much goodwill by sinking
post-1945 profits into a new 'welfare building', with a nursery, clinic, library, and canteen.
Patons were in a very different position to BAT, whose financial position did not permit
delay. Manufacturers like Kenyon had different aims to traders like Keswick. Kenyon argued
that Keswick's policy was 'to force the pace [of closure of industrial concerns] so that he can
shed his unprofitable subsidiaries whilst trying to retain the remainder of his [trading]
22 For more on Iran and the Abadan Crisis see Mostafa Elm, Oil, Power, and Principle: Iran's Oil
Nationalization and its Aftermath (Syracuse, N.Y: Syracuse University Press, 1992).
23 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; British American Tobacco Company Limited,
Memorandum, 6/4/50; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 300,27/3/50.
24 TNA FO 371183344, British Commercial Policy in China; Hutchinson, Nanjing to Foreign Office, No. 166,
19/1/50 forwarding addressed to Nanjing telegram No. 222 of 31112/49 containing message from Burdett,
Tianjin to Urquhart, Shanghai; Urquhart to John Keswick, Confidential Letter, 2/12/49; Shanghai to Hutchinson,
Beijing, 1111150,No. 24.
2S TNA FO 371183344, British Commercial Policy in China; Robert Urquhart, Shanghai to Stevenson, Nanjing,
Confidential Letter of 6/12/49; Robert Urquhart to John Keswick, Confidential Letter, 30/11149.
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interests.,26 Some industrial firms were in a better position than others. These tensions within
the business community been exposed in May 1950 when the British Chamber of Commerce
in Shanghai called for a general cessation of remittances, with the aim of forcing the issue of
closure. Initially many firms were in favour of this united step, but the scheme collapsed
when a few firms (including China Engineers) decided not to participate, unwilling to
sacrifice their assets for the sake of others.27
For the Chinese, there were several advantages to dealing with British companies through
'transfers' on the 'Yee Tsoong model.' Through these transfers, they acquired the complete
assets of a company. In the majority of cases assets far outstripped liabilities. There was the
added advantage that with this form of takeover, firms did not have to be closed for even a
single day, meaning that widespread unemployment was avoided. British companies were
'squeezed' into a position of weakness so as to encourage them to request the transfers
themselves. The Chinese were then able to play the role of benevolent facilitators, simply
helping the British withdraw. As the firms requested the transfers and signed legal transfer
agreements, their grounds for future compensation claims were diminished. Furthermore, the
'squeezing' process and the takeover negotiations could be prolonged or sped up according to
the Shanghai authorities' economic and political requirements. The CCP's anti-imperialist
credentials were established through the takeover of British companies, but with minimal
economic disruption. The transfer of Yee Tsoong set a precedent upon which all other
transfers were based, but in 1952 most of the larger firms had still not decided to close. The
majority were keen to persevere in their attempts to secure some form of compensation for
their considerable assets.
, 26 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China; Robert Urquhart, Shanghai to Hutchinson, Beijing,
9/3/50; Kenyon, P&B to Robert Urquhart, Shanghai, 9/3/50; TNA FO 371183347, British Commercial Policy in
China; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 494, 1115/50.
27 TNA FO 371183347 British Commercial Policy in China; N.C.C. Trench, Foreign Office, Minute 3/5/50.
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The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the closure of British firms
In October 1950, Zhou Enlai called a meeting of the national foreign affairs apparatus at
which the government's preliminary policy towards foreign businesses had been set out. At
both this meeting and at a subsequent meeting in 1953, it was stressed that foreign firms
would be dealt with along the principles laid out in Zhang Hanfu's March 1949 report on
Kailuan, 'treating each situation on its merits and taking steady steps forwards' (qubie duidai,
wenbu qianjin, jg~IJ)t1~~.~,gil7Mit!).z8The actual processes by which the majority of the
larger British firms would be eliminated remained to be worked out, however. Materials from
the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide a rare glimpse of high-level CCP
policy-making below the level of Mao, Zhou and the other top leaders. As the CCP took
pains to act in a coordinated, centralised manner, and because they went about their policy-
making in a very secretive way, the processes of debate and consultation are usually obscure.
As we shall see, increased access to central sources demonstrates that CCP policy was often
much more contingent and pragmatic than was once thought.
A Ministry of Foreign Affairs memorandum from early May 1952 took stock of the situation
of British firms in China: From June 1950 to December 1951, the memorandum said, the
number of British firms in China had declined from 188 to 144.19The majority of those that
had closed were smaller companies. There were now very few companies remaining outside
Shanghai: thirty remained in Tianjin, nine each in Guangzhou and Hankou and a few in
Beijing, Qingdao and Nanjing. Apart from Gomersall's China Engineers, who had
'expectations for great profits' (you hou li ke tu, fl~~IJ~I!l), the memorandum continued,
the position of the British firms was uniformly bad. The large international trading firms and
their associated insurance companies, wharves, shipping companies and warehouses had
already 'generally begun to wilt' (xianyu pubian wei, ~~Ff~Mi!~).30
On the 12th April 1952 the British charge d'affaires in Beijing, Lionel H. Lamb, presented
Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu with a formal note expressing concerns about
28 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 144-9.
29 The Times, 'Many Difficulties in the Far East; Withdrawal from China,' 13/10/52.
30 MFA 118-00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo shangrenjieshu zai Hua maoyi wentii fujian er.
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the difficulties faced by British firms." Lamb complained of six main problems: individual
managers being held personally responsible for the policy and actions of their companies;
increasing restrictions on the entry and exit of foreign staff; the cancellation of contracts by
Chinese Government trading organisations even though raw materials had been paid for;
'taxation and legal judgements which both appear[ ed] to be discriminatory against foreigners;'
fear of arrest and detention of British subjects incommunicado and without charges being
proffered; and 'pressure by labour unions and reluctance of local authorities to give any
protection to firms.' 'If this situation continues', Lamb concluded, 'it can only result sooner
or later in the elimination of British business interests in China to the detriment of friendly
relations between China and the United Kingdom. ,32
Lamb wrote again in May with a note that was to prove extremely important in shaping the
CCP's policy towards the future of British businesses. The increasing extent to which state
organisations were taking over industry and commerce, Lamb wrote, was eliminating the
need for British firms in their present forms. The majority of British firms, he continued, felt
'that they can no longer operate satisfactorily in China and can serve no useful purpose in
future.' They therefore wished to sell or to close down. On a more optimistic note, Lamb also
reported that many of the trading concerns would wish to adapt their models to continue
doing business.r' This later became known as switching from trading in China to trading with
China." Lamb requested that the Chinese help firms to close, by approving the termination of
redundant staff, issuing exit permits to foreign nationals and arranging transfers of assets.35
The British Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai wanted a much stronger note calling for
state-to-state negotiations for a collective withdrawal, but the British Government had been
unwilling to pursue this.36
31 MFA 118-00014-01, Yingguo tanpan daibiao Lan Laina chenshu Yingguo shangren zai Hua maoyi shoudao
xianzhi shi [British Charge d'Affaires ['Negotiation Representative'] L.H. Lamb statement that trade of British
merchants in China is being restricted], 12/4/52; Letter from L.H. Lamb to Zhang Hanfu 12/4/52; MFA 118-
00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo shangren jieshu zai Hua maoyi wenti; fujian er.
32 MFA 118-00014-01, Yingguo tanpan daibiao Lan Laina chenshu Yingguo shangren zai Hua maoyi shoudao
xianzhi shi.
33 MFA 118-00014-03, Yingguo tanpan daibiao Lan Laine lai han tan zai Hua Yingshang cheli shi [British
Negotiating Representative Lamb's letter on subject of withdrawal of British merchants from China], 19/5/52-
24/5/52.
34 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 42-3.
35 MFA 118-00014-03, Yingguo tanpan daibiao Lan Laine lai han tan zai Hua Yingshang cheli shi.
36 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 131-2.
198
Lamb's note was followed by a statement by Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs made in the House of Commons on the 20th May 1952. Eden echoed Lamb's
concerns. He felt that Britain had done all it could: 'trade is a two-way traffic' he said, 'and,
if people do not answer one's communications, one cannot get very far.' He also stressed
however, the desire of many of the firms to continue trade with China in a new form.37
The head of the Europe and Africa Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Huan
Xiang (N! ~), was ·the first to deal with Lamb's message. After reading it, he wrote a
memorandum in which he described the state of foreign business. Over the last two years, he
wrote, under the CCP's 'policy of 'squeeze" (ji' de zhengce, 'fir a~iE.5l:m),the 'management
problems' of the industrial concerns had 'increased daily' (jingying kunnan rizeng, ~£~~9.t
13±~). The trading companies and banks had 'sunk into stagnation' (xianyu tingzhi, ~nT1~
~*).All had large numbers of redundant staff and were almost completely reliant on
remittances from overseas to continue." Yee Tsoong Tobacco had requested a transfer of
assets in August 1951, but the others, Huan wrote, 'had continued to hesitate to make a
decision as they are unwilling to abandon their 'chicken ribs" ['chicken ribs' is a set-phrase
meaning something of dubious worth that one remains reluctant to abandon] (dan yijilei nan
she, gu yizhi chouchu weijue, 19 J-~~ MJ9.ttf, !i- j[ ~ lli* iR:). 39 The Ministry now
needed to decide on a response to Britain's demarche.
The May 1952meeting
Itwas decided that an extraordinary two-day policy meeting would be held at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, beginning on the 30th May. The meeting was chaired by Huan Xiang. The
most pressing item on the agenda was to make a decision on the attitude and countermeasures
to be adopted towards any attempted collective withdrawal of British firms. Representatives
of all government bodies relating to foreign affairs and economic matters were invited. These
included cadres from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Central Finance Committee and the
Bureaus of Trade, Transportation, Private Enterprise, and Foreign Capital Enterprises, as well
37 Hansard, 'British Firms, China (H.M. Government's Note), HC Deb 20/5/52, vol. 501 pp. 265-70.
38 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfufubuzhang de shengming; Huan
Xiang, Guanyu zai Hua Yingshangjijiang dapi jieshu guantuan shi [Huan Xiang, Regarding the imminent mass
withdrawal of British merchants from China], 22/5/52.
39 Ibid.
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as others from the Customs, People's Bank, General Labour Union, and the Shanghai, Tianjin
and Beijing FADs.4o
Guan Datong (~*IEJ) of the Central Finance Committee was among the first to give his
opinion. He argued for a continuation of the current policy, saying that the idea of a 'united
withdrawal' of British businesses was simply a diplomatic strategy; in reality firms would
still have to close individually in accordance with the law. Here Guan admitted that 'in the
past detaining British businessmen was a political consideration' (guoqu liuzhu Yingshang,
shi cong zhengzhi shang kaolii, l1:~'€IHt~iilL ~)')"iESl:5t:t...t~J$).41From an economic
point of view, he said, the reality was that 'we want to take more money' (yao na qu geng
duo de qian, ~*~j!~agii), especially foreign exchange. This sentiment was echoed by
Jiang Ming (UPfj) of the Trade Bureau, who said 'we should not let Sterling leave' (bang bu
rang qu, i~:::f'il~). In all cases, Guan stressed, the wider economic context was the most
important factor to be considered: it was especially important to prevent further
unemployment, to protect the workers' welfare and to extract tax revenue. Finally, he
concluded, there would be political consequences if British property remaining in China was
taken over immediately; or, if the British were allowed to withdraw en masse, Britain's future
Far Eastern strategy might fall into line with that of America. Their policy should be to
exploit divisions between the two, to 'attack America and draw in Britain' (da Mei la Ying,
n~t.!i:~).42
Jiang Ming spoke next. He suggested that as Britain still held Hong Kong the impact of a
British withdrawal on China's trade would be minimal (Yingshang chechu Zhongguo, women
de shengyi keyi shuo buhui shou shenme yingxiang, ~iilHt&lli~OO. f.lHna~~~~l;.{iJt:::f'
~~ft~~~pjo]). They could adopt an attitude of 'neither being hot nor cold' (bu leng bu re,
40 MFA 118-00014-12, Wo guanyu Yingguo shangren jieshu zai Hua yewu de duice yu dui waishang 'wufan'
gongzuo de zhishi [Instructions on countermeasures against the closing of British merchants' affairs in China
and instructions on 'Five Antis' work in foreign firms], 24/5/52-31/7/52; Duiyu Yingshangjituanjieshu yewu
ying cai de taiduji duice ni zhaoji huiyi tao/un you [On the attitude and countermeasures to be adopted toward
the group closure of British firms, plan to call meeting to discuss], 24/5/52.
41 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheliyijianji Zhang Hanfufubuzhang de shengming; From
Huan Xiang to Zhou Enlai 19/6/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyijiyao [Minutes of
meeting of30/5/52 on problem of British firms].
42 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyifayan jilii.
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~;t~7.~) towards the remaining British businesses: neither begging them to stay nor
pushing them out. With their new links made through the Moscow conference, they now had
two sets of British businessmen with whom to trade. 'We do not,' Jiang continued, 'want to
attack them [the trading firms in Shanghai], it is they that want to leave. We only want to
attack their monopolistic aspect' (Women bushi yao da ta, shi ta ziji yao piaozou. Womenzhi
da ta longduanyi mian, fJHn~£~n1m, £1m~2~~.M~. ftmRnfm~Wi-m:i).43
The head of the American and Australasian Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ke
Bainian (*ilJ*s4:) agreed, saying that it had long been their policy to retain a few foreign
trading enterprises, but that no concrete measures had yet been put in place. He called for this
policy to be implemented more uniformly and effectively. They especially needed to retain
the shipping companies and banks.44There were different ways to encourage the foreigners to
leave or stay and this was not a zero-sum game: they could retain some and speed the demise
of others.45
Huan Xiang then addressed the issue of policy toward foreign industrial concerns, saying 'we
do not need to be polite towards factories' (gongchang buyao keqi, Ir~~~Et). In a
statement that would have surprised the British businessmen in Shanghai, the representative
of the Shanghai FAD, Shen Shilian said that, 'in the past we only actively squeezed Yee
Tsoong, we have not actively squeezed the others' (guoqu zhiyou dui YiZhong zhu dong ji,
qita Yingshang wei zhudong ji ta, i1"*R~~1Wi~3:Mf*, ~fm~~*3:Mf*E). He
added that, while 'most Shanghai factories should not be allowed to close, those with few
employees could be allowed' (yiban Shanghai gongchan buxu ta guanmen, zhigong shao zhe
keyi, -~!t..t;aIr~i~E~n, 1UtI!.l>=1fRT~.:t.).This demonstrated that the Shanghai
authorities' paramount concern continued to be unemployment, not the quick disposal of
foreign enterprises. Huan replied that if factories were allowed to close, 'many things would
come to be grasped in our hands' (tingping gongchang xieye, you xuduo dongxi gua zai
43 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang went;
de huiyi fayan jilii.
44 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfu Jubuzhang de shengming; From
Huan Xiang to Zhou Enlai 19/6/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyijiyao.
4S MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyi fayan jilil.
201
women shou zhong, WT~Ir~~, f:ii.f~ *W fJlttEftfrJ=¥'i=I}. This included burdens as
well as assets. The takeover process would have to be gradual. 46
The closure of foreign businesses should be linked directly to the government's strategic
needs, suggested Yu Mei (-rmi) of the Transport Bureau. For instance, Yu argued, China
lacked wharves and warehouses. The Shanghai United Dockyards and the Shanghai &
Hongkew Wharf Company were examples of firms that could be of great use to them.
Wharves, warehouses and shipyards were key targets for early takeovers.V Expropriation
would seem to be a good choice, but because the Chinese also lacked enough ships to sustain
their import/export trade, they also needed to preserve links with the British traders based in
Hong Kong. As the largest docks were in the hands of Butterfield & Swire and Jardine,
Matheson & Co., they were 'at a great disadvantage' (wo hen beidong, l.lHtUtrJJ). They also
did not want to simply rent or lease docks and warehouses because the burden of supporting
large labour forces would pass to them."
The CCP were very well informed about internal divisions and disputes between different
British businesses. Ji Chaoding echoed John Kenyon's sentiments about the reasons for the
proposed withdrawal:
Jardines are the most important reason for the 'withdrawal,' and the actions of Jardines and the
British Foreign Office are closely entwined. The reason for going is that Keswick says he has lost
too much money, he plans to abandon the Chinese market, but he doesn't want others to get their
fingers in the pie.49
46 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyi fayan jilii.
47 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfu Jubuzhang de shengming; From
Huan Xiang to Zhou Enlai 19/6/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyijiyao.
48 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyi Jayan jilis.
49 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfu Jubuzhang de shengming; From
Huan Xiang to Zhou Enlai, 19/6/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyijiyao; 'Jardines are
the most important...' iChetui zhuyao shi Yihe, er Yihe yu Ying Waijiaobu de xingdong miqie yizhi. Zou de
yuanyin, shi Kaiseke shuo peiqian tai duo, ni Jangqi Zhongguo shichang, dan you bu yuan bieren lai ranzhi, ttlt~~.m~~,~~~~.*~U~ff~.m-•.~~.~,ma~~mRU*.,W~W*OO*~,
19~1'~jjIJA*~t~).
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The formidable Keswick family did indeed have strong links to the British Government. The
China Association was an influential lobbying organisation dominated by the Keswick family
and the other 'old China hands' who had entered into a form of symbiotic relationship with
the government, described by Cain and Hopkins as 'gentlemanly capitalism.r'" Ji also noted
that Jardine Matheson had already re-oriented the main thrust of their business away from
China towards south-east Asia, Japan and Taiwan.51 Jardine Matheson had been further
convinced of the desirability of withdrawal after the manager of their subsidiary the EWO
Brewery, Robin Gordon, was arrested. He was held for three days in March 1952 after being
unable to meet the monthly wage bil1.52He was released when the wages were paid.53
Ji Chaoding observed that the way to react to any planned mass withdrawal was to deal with
all the British businesses individually, in order to play on their divergent interests and
ambitions.54 Huan took up this theme, saying that they should 'separate Britain and America,
the British Government and British business, and different British businesses, and treat them
[all] individually' lfenhua Mei Ying, Ying zhengfu yu Yingshang, Yingshang zhongjian gebie
duidai, ~1t~~. ~~1ff~~ftij, ~ftij~ f8]1'~IJ~1ffl:).55
There was a conflict of interests, Huan noted, between trading firms like Jardine Matheson
and Swire and those with large fixed assets. Trading companies could reconfigure their
business models and trade via Hong Kong, but manufacturing companies could not. Huan
stated that they 'only want to pull in the trading firms, the rest we will continue to squeeze,
like Yee Tsoong' (zhi you maoyi shang la, ji reng shi yiguan de, ru YiZhong, R~ ~ ~ _t t:ll:.
HHJJ£- ~a~, ~Q Wi ~). 56 Huan Xiang concluded the meeting by saying;
SO PJ. Cain and A.G. Hopkins, British Imperialism; Crisis and Deconstruction, 1914-1990 (London: Longman,
1993); Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, pp. 123- 138, 199-208.
51 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyi fayan jilii.
52 MFA 118-00014-09, Guanyu Yingguo shangrenjieshu zai Hua maoyi;fujian er.
53 TNA FO 37i/99364, Conditions in China: information gleaned from accounts of British businessmen and
others leaving China, 1952 (pp to 8); Notes on conversations with British business men on conditions in and
trade with China, G.V. Kitson to R.H. Scott, Foreign Office, 17/6/52.
54 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijianji Zhang Hanfufubuzhang de shengming; From
Huan Xiang to Zhou Enlai 19/6/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyijiyao.




At present from the point of view of trade, the withdrawal or not of British merchants would neither
have a greatly beneficial nor a too detrimental an impact on us, but from a political perspective we
should still separate the British Government from British merchants, and implement a policy of
distinguishing [between firms] in China and treating them individually ... Regarding the political
and economic special privileges of British industrial and commercial firms in China, if they truly
voluntarily close, then we will obviously allow them to close, if however they do not close
voluntarily, we must ... progressively and slowly push them out and clean up, but a few
organisations that are advantageous to us, for example banks, import and export, shipping firms etc,
we should continue to retain them for a while, moreover we should actively provide them with the
conditions under which they can continue to exist. 57
In order to speed the closure of those firms the Chinese wanted to close, it was decided that
they 'could make things a little easier according to what was permitted under our laws' (keyi
zai women falii rongxu de fanwei nei yu yiding guocheng de fangbian, j:ij' ~Af±ft in)*~f~ iq:.
a~mlE I*JT-~i1~¥a~1.J1J!).58
How had central policy been reflected in Shanghai? A week before the meeting the Shanghai
FAD had written to Zhang Hanfu with their proposals for future policy. Their current policy,
they wrote, was one of gaining the 'upper hand' (zhudong). Sometimes they had directly
interfered in the British firms' business, but more often inaction yielded better results. Taking
the elimination of foreign interests slowly was considered 'not only advantageous to us
politically, but is also economically advantageous to us' (budan zai zhengzhi shang dui
57 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfu fubuzhang de shengming; 'At
present from the point of view of trade ... ' (zhao muqian maoyi shang de qingxu kan, Yingshang chetui bu chetui,
dui women de Iihai guanxi bu tai da. Dan cong zhengzhi shang kan, women reng ying fenhua Ying zhengfu yu
Yingshang, bing zai Yinghang zhongjian shixing qubie duidai ... dui zai Hua Yingguo gongshang ye de zhengzhi
jingji tequan, ruguo tamen zhende zidong jieshu, na dangran jiu ting ta jieshu, ruguo tamen bing bu zidong
jieshu, na women bixu yi anzhao zongli ben nian san yue xiang Waishi Chu Zhang huiyi shang jianghua de
jingshen, jiji you buzhuo de manman de ji ta ganjing; dan duiyu moxie yu wo youli de yewu he jigou, liru,
yinhang, jinchukou shang hangyun shang deng, women reng ying you yiyi de baoliu yixie, bing zhudong de gei
ta yixie keyi sheng xiaqu de tiaojian, ~.~H::njijm~...t.a~1~1f~~.~mitfNll!::J'tlll!.~1¥.1tma~~IJ~*~::J':t*.
iEL"J..~5a...t.~. ¥.Itm in$~Ht~i)(K-f!:j~ mi. 1H:E~miJ:f:l fB] ~ ff 12SJlIJ~1~~'"~1{:E$~ 00I mi~ a~it 5a
gmM~. ~.~m.~~M.*. D~M.~~.*. ~.~m*::J'~~.*. D¥.Itm~~~~~~~*$~~~*.~*~•...t.m~~M•. mmfi~~~ •• ~mg~~;m~!:j.~!:j¥.ltfi~~~§
~m~. ~M. mft. miliCmiMillmi8.¥.Itminmfi.~~§M-~. *~~~~g-~~~~~~
:Ji.:a~~1tj:).
58 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Harfu fubuzhang de shengming; From
Huan Xiang to Zhou Enlai 19/6/52; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyijiyao.
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women youli,ji zaijingji shang ta shi dui women youli de, ::f'18(£jij:5i:t.t)t1mff1~~IJ. flP(£
~£m_t1tPJ~:)t1mif1~~IJa~).59
Zhang Hanfu's reply
Vice Minister Zhang Hanfu responded to Lamb's messages and Eden's statement with a
formal statement of his own on 5th July. He said that China was willing to trade with all
nations on an equal and mutually advantageous basis. He blamed the problems of British
business on Britain's participation in the American embargo/" In internal Chinese documents
the companies' 'rotten. colonial traditional management methods' ifuxiu de zhimindi de
chuantongjingyingfangfa, Jm'*1a~~j~±ma~1t!1t~;g1J5!)were also blamed.61
Zhang stressed that Chinese Government's policy had always been to protect foreign
businesses: they had provided loans, made orders and mediated in labour disputes. Why
should the Chinese show favour to British interests, especially when Britain was being so
'unfriendly', and when Chinese firms were suffering from nearly identical problems?
Nevertheless, Zhang promised to help assist foreign firms to close, as long as they did so
according to Chinese law.62
The decisions taken at the Ministry's May meeting were approved by Zhou Enlai and
distributed across the country as the 'Instructions regarding countermeasures against the
closure of foreign firms and the conditions for dealing with illegality involving British
59 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfu fubuzhang de shengming; From
Shanghai FAD to Zhang Hanfu, 23/5/52.
60 MFA 118-00014-04, Wo dui Yingguo shangren cheli yijian ji Zhang Hanfu fubuzhang de shengming;
Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Waijiaobu. Zhang Hanfu fubuzhang jiu Ying zhengfu wu yue shiliu ri huifa
shengming [Central People's Government Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vice Minister Zhang Hanfu making
statement in reply to British Government's 19/5/52].
61 MFA 118-00014-13, Guanyu Yingguo fangmian dui Zhang Hanfu juzhang shengming de fanying [On the
British response to Vice Minister Zhang Hanfu's statement], 1/8/52-31/8/52; Neibu Zhishi (chugao) [Internal
instruction (draft)]; Guanyu Yingshang jieshu yewu de duice yu dui waishang 'wufan' gongzuo de zhishi
[Instruction on countermeasures against British merchants closing businesses and on 'Five Antis' work in
foreign enterprises].
62 MFA 118-00014-11, Guanyu dui Yingguo tanpan daibiao Lan Laine yi jiu wu er nian wu yue shi jiu ri
zhaohui de huifu (caogao) [Regarding reply to British negotiating representative Lamb's 19/5/52 memorandum
(draft)], 1/6/52-30/6/52.
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businessmen during the Five Antis Campaign.i'" The Chinese Government's stated policy
towards British business was to:
... attempt to make them voluntarily transfer [their assets], so that we can take them over under the
conditions of 'on just grounds' and 'to our advantage.' Those manufacturing concerns that are
unwilling to withdraw and are willing to continue at present can be permitted to continue
temporarily, those that are relatively proactive and who are working for the promotion of Sino-
British trade can be given orders, in order to suit the needs of our trading companies.f
They decided to pay special attention to those firms that imported industrial machinery,
chemicals and raw materials. Shipping businesses would be useful to future trade, as would
banks. Although foreign banks in China had little business, they would be useful to secure the
safety of Chinese banks abroad and facilitate future trade. They could be given enough
business to subsist, in order to prevent them from 'actively advocating withdrawal' (shi zhi
buzhijiji de zhuzhang chetui, 1~z=1'Rf.Rw.a~.:E~!H~~). 65
To conclude, we are carrying out a planned squeezing out of some of them, particularly some of
the manufacturing industries, and a 'taking back' of equipment that we need. At the same time, we
are also retaining some of them in a planned way, most importantly the import/export companies,
shipping companies and some of the industries ... In this way we can seek to resolve the
withdrawal of the British businesses in China in a more relaxed atmosphere in a position that is
more politically favourable to us.66
63 MFA 118-00014-13, Guanyu Yingguo fangmian dui Zhang Hanfu Juzhang shengming de fanying; Neibu
Zhishiichugao); 'Instructions regarding countermeasures ... ' (guanyu Yingshang jieshu yewu de duicai yu chuli
wufan yundong zhong Yingshang weifa an tiaojian de zhishi, *T~iflj~*~*e~~-tm~9.H1Bi&~TJJtp~
ifljm~!~f*e~t~jf-).
64 MFA 118-00014-13, Guanyu Yingguo fangmian dui Zhang Hanfu Juzhang shengming de fanying; Neibu
Zhishi(chugao); Guanyu Yingshang jieshu yewu de duice yu dui waishang 'wufan' gongzuo de zhishi; 'attempt
to make them voluntarily transfer ... ' tyiban de shuo, Yingshang zai Hua gongchang zhizao ye daduo yuanyi
chetui, women reng ying shefa, shi zhi zidong zhuanrang, you wo zai youli de tiaojian xia yuyi jieban. Muqian
wuyi chetui er yuan jixu weichi zhi zhizao ye, ke zanshi ling fa qu, gebie jiao jiji de, wei ZhongYing maoyi
jiagong de gongchang ze kejiagong dinghuo, yi shiying wo maoyi shang de yaoqiu, -r~U~l5t,~ifljtE~e~I
r~m~*J~ •• m, .mmmw~.~~~M.U, ~.tEfi~fi"~.~~~~~£ §m~ ••m~~~••M~~m~. ~g"~~~, ~~.m.~.~tp~~~~I~Ir. M~~IU •.
~;.o.~m:flt~ iflje~~*).
6S MFA 118-00014-13, Guanyu Yingguofangmian dui Zhang Hanfu fuzhang shengming de fanying; neibu zhishi
(chugao); Guanyu Yingshangjieshu yewu de duice yu dui waishang 'wufan' gongzuo de zhishi.
66 MFA 118-00014-13, Guanyu Yingguo Jangmian dui Zhang Hanfu fuzhang shengming de fanying; Neibu
Zhishi (chugao); guanyu Yingshang jieshu yewu de duice yu dui waishang 'wufan' gongzuo de zhishi
[Instruction on countermeasures against British merchants closing businesses and on 'Five Antis' work in
foreign enterprises]; 'To conclude, we are carrying out. .. ' (Zongde shuolai, women shi yao you jihua de jidiao
yi bufen, zhuyao shi yi bufen zhizao ye, bing shouhui wo suo xuyao de shebei. Tongshi, you ke you jihua de
zanshi baoliu yi bufen, zhuyao de shi jinchukou maoyi shang, hangyun ye yu bufen gongye. Dangran qizhong
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As the records of the May 1952 meeting show, the CCP developed an effective series of
countermeasures against a united withdrawal of British businesses, which would have had
disastrous effects on the Chinese economy. They developed pre-existing 'squeezing'
techniques into an effective tool with which to pressure the businesses into closing on their
terms and at a pace that suited them.
Requisitioning
In April 1951, the British Government expropriated the Chinese oil tanker the 'Yung Hao'
(Yonghao, 7k~~.9i)in Hong Kong, because they feared that it would be used to support the
Chinese war effort in Korea. In reply, the Chinese expropriated the entire property of the
Shell Company of China, Ltd., with the exception of some of their offices and their bank
deposits. Oil stocks were sold off at artificially low prices set by the military commissioner
placed in charge. A small trading office was allowed to remain open.67
In the second half of 1952, the Privy Council of the British Government controversially
settled a long-running dispute over the ownership of 71 commercial 'planes in Hong Kong.
The Privy Council overruled the Hong Kong High Court and awarded the 'planes to the
American claimant, despite there being strong grounds for awarding them to the People's
Republic. The Americans had threatened to withdraw Marshall Aid from Britain if these
aircraft were awarded to China.68 This was a wholly political move and Zhang Hanfu
protested loudly. He accused the British Government of being deliberately provocative and
'openly hostile.,69 The Chinese press claimed that Britain had used 'a variety of illegal tricks'
in a plot to 'rob these 'planes' on behalf of their' American masters.' 70
reng ran keyi qubie qi zhongyaoxing, diqu, zuoyong, xitong, er fenbie duidai. Zhe yang jiu keyi shi zai Hua
Yingshang de chetui zai songchi kongqi zhong qiude jiejue. Zai zhengzhi shang shi wo chuyu you/i de diwei, I~'~m*,.m.~~~~~mN-B~,~~.-B~~m~.#~~.M~~~••.~~.X~~
~~lja~t[~t1~Hll-=tf~~.~~a~.it!I±H::J~~ifij. f.Iit)E~~=tf~~I~. ~~ltI:j:lVl~~~~[2HlIJltm~tt.
~~. ~m. • •. ~9m~M. ~~.~~~~$.ifij~~m~~~~~I:j:l*~~~. ~a~k~.
5lCT~;j'IJ a~ttHft).
67 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, pp. 14-15; Shao, China. Britain, pp. 73-6; The Shanghai News, 'British
Seizure of Chinese Tanker Exposed,' 4/5/49.
68 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 76-9.
69 MFA 110-00021-01, Ying zhengfu jieduo woguo liang hangkong liu Gang feiji wofang zai du yanzhong
kangyi de shengming ji youguan jianbao [British Government seize our two airlines in Hong Kong, another
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The disputed 'planes belonged to the China National Aviation Company and the Central Air
Transport. The cases were settled in July and October with roughly half the 'planes being
dealt with at each time. In retaliation for the July decision, the Chinese requisitioned two
British dockyards: these were Shanghai Dockyards and the Mollers Engineering and
Shipbuilding Works. The Shanghai News reported that the 'elated' Chinese workers of these
companies celebrated the expropriation with drums and gongs." One Foreign Office observer
noted that the Chinese had clearly taken advantage of the situation to achieve something that
they had wanted for a long time.72 Yu Mei had indeed suggested at the May 1952 meeting at
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Shanghai Dockyards were a desirable target for an
early takeover.v' After the aircraft debacle, the Foreign Office decided in January 1953 not to
requisition any more Chinese property. Further requisitions would not be in Britain's interest.
China had very few valuable assets in British territories. They also did not want to risk
Communist-inspired public disorder in Hong Kong or the death of the Hong Kong-China
trade as British shipowners would refuse to risk their vessels in Chinese ports." Only a very
few British businesses or properties were expropriated by the new Chinese Government: the
rest would be dealt with through other means.
strong statement of protest from our side and related reports], 28/10/52; see also The Shanghai News, 'Chang
Han-fu Protests British Gov't Seizure of China's Aircraft in HK,' and 'British Gov't Warned Against what it
has Sown,' 5/8/52; 'British Brutality in Seizing Chinese Aircraft in HK; British Gov't once again proved lackey
of U.S. Imperialism,' 10/8/52.
70 The Shanghai News, 'Illegal and Absurd Trial,' 13/5/52, 'British Govt's Illegal Seizure of Chinese Aircraft in
Hongkong,' 17/8/52; 'Chang Han-fu Protests British Gov't Seizure of China's Aircraft in HK,' 30/10/52.
71 The Shanghai News, 'SMCC Orders Requisition of British Shipyards Here,' 18/8/52,
72 TNA FO 371199345, Confiscation and requisitioning of foreign property in China; particulars of cases where
British individuals and firms have suffered from Chinese requisitioning; requisitioning of public utility
companies in Shanghai, 1952; 'Requisition of two British dockyards (Shanghai Dockyards and Moller's) on 15th
August;' Foreign Office to L.H. Lamb, Beijing, 22/8/52; Shao, China, Britain, pp. 79-80.
73 MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5 yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti
de huiyi fayan jilii.
74 TNA FO 3711108082, Closure of GB Firms in China, 1952; Seizure of Chinese property in retaliation for the
requisitioning of British Firms in China. Foreign Office Minute by J.M. Addis, 24/1153.
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'The British boss is gone and will never return': Foreign public utility companies in
Shanghai and the requisitioning of the British Tram Company75
In a further response to the British Government's October 1952 decision to award the
remaining aircraft in Hong Kong to the American claimant, the Chinese expropriated three
large British public utility companies in Shanghai on the zo" November 1952. These were
the Shanghai Waterworks Company, the Shanghai Gas Company and the British Tram
Company." Additionally they expropriated Mackenzie & Co., a company specialising in
managing warehouses and press-packing."
Securing control of the city's public utilities was crucial. As one Foreign Office official noted:
'Foreign public utility companies are not popular anywhere, and no doubt they are
particularly unpopular in Communist countries.' 78The smooth running of these companies,
which were legacies of the city's former foreign administrations (the International Settlement
and the French Concession), was essential to the city's economy. The British Tram Company
employed 3,500 workers and carried 40 per cent of Shanghai's total passengers. The Gas
Company was the largest in town with 17,000 customers and the 3,213 workers of the
Shanghai Waterworks produced more than half of the city's water supply.79
Before examining the takeovers of these companies, perhaps it is worth taking a step back to
examine the situation before November 1952. When the CCP seized Shanghai in May 1949,
they immediately brought both foreign and Chinese public utility companies under their close
75 SMA B261-1-65, Shanghai Shi Yingdian dang zongzhi 1952 nian zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de
fangan, baogao, xiaogao, xuanchuan ziliao [Shanghai CCP British Tram Company central branch 1952 plan for
expropriation of British Tram Company, reports, brief reports and propaganda materials], November -
December 1952; Zhonggong Shanghai Dianche Gongsi dang weihui, xuanchuan cankao cailiao [CCP Shanghai
Tram Company Party Committee, propaganda consultative materials], 26/11152; 'The British Boss ...• (Yingguo
laoban shi yiqu bufufan le, ~OO~*&~--!-~~~ 7).
76 SMA B 1-2-1464-17, Zhongguo Renmin Jiefang Jun Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Junshi Guanzhi
Weiyuanhui guanyu jueding zhengyong Yingguo zai Shanghai Shi de 'Shanghai Dianche Gongsi,' 'Shanghai
Zilaishui Gongsi,' 'Shanghai Meiqi Gongsi' ji 'Fengmao Gongsi' quanbu caichan de mingling [Chinese
People's Liberation Army Shanghai People's Government Military Control Committee, order on decision to
expropriate the entire assets of Shanghai British 'Shanghai Tram Company,' 'Shanghai Waterworks Company,'
'Shanghai Gas Company' and 'Mackenzie & Company'], 20/11152.
77 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 80-83; He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 14.
78 TNA FO 371183348, British Commercial Policy in China; N.C.C. Trench, Minute 1/7/50 on Shanghai to
Foreign Office, No. 565, 9/6/50.
79 Zhou et al, Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 314-7.
209
supervision.i'' This was a top-down seizure: the old systems and personnel were retained. The
six large foreign public utility companies were to be protected as long as they followed
government instructions. As with the Kailuan mines, military liaison officers were sent to
each company to 'assist' their management.
According to Liu Shaoqi, the role of these military representatives across China was to
'supervise private enterprises that have a vital bearing on the national economy and people's
livelihood and whose owners cause trouble or move slowly.' They were also supposed to
assist them when appropriate." Foreign public utility companies in Shanghai were assisted
through loans and other arrangements, but the price was increased 'supervision' and
control.82 These loans were a mixed blessing: they enabled the company to continue in the
short term but as the currency depreciated, the loans were not simultaneously written down,
meaning that they became long-term burdens. 83 Communist Party and Youth League
organisations were strengthened in each enterprise and the unions were brought under CCP
control.84 The military liaison officers and Party cells within each enterprise were charged
with 'educating and uniting with the workers and winning over the engineers' (jiaoyu he
tuanjie zhigong, zhengqu gongcheng shi, fjJf~O~~JU{I. ~nI'~Uifi). Stability and
unity were emphasised, not revolution and class struggle/"
80 Shanghai Gongyong Shiye Zhi Bianzuan Weiyuanhui [Record of Labour in Shanghai Public Utility
Enterprises Committee], Shanghai Gongyong Shiye Zhi [Record of Labour in Shanghai Public Utility
Enterprises] (Shanghai: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
Publishing House], 2000), pp. 27-9, 62-4, 152-6,314-17.
81 Liu Shaoqi, 'Some Questions Concerning Urban Work,' 12/3/49, Selected Worksof Liu Shaoqi, Vol. 1.
82 Ye Jinming (Pt~PJl), 'Gongyong Shiye Chu jieguan Guomindang Gongyong Ju suoshu jigou he jiandu
waishang gongyong shiye' [Public Utility Department take over organs belonging to the Guomindang's Public
Utilities Bureau and supervise foreign public utility enterprises]; 'Gongyong Shiye Chu guanyujieguan gongzuo
de chubu zongjie' [Public Utility Department initial summary of takeover work], 817149,in Jieguan Shanghai,
pp. 379-84, 397-400; Shanghai shi Gonggong Jiaotong Gongsi bian xie zu [Shanghai Public Transport Company
Editorial Group], Shanghai Yingdian gongren yundongshi [History of Workers' Movements in the Shanghai
Electric Construction Company] (Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe [CCP Party History Publishing House], 1993),
pp. 8-9; TNA FO 371192258, Reports and situation of foreign-owned public utility companies in Shanghai, 1951;
Shanghai Foreign-Owned Utility Companies; Amendments to a Report written on the 13/9/49, E.R. Talamo,
Consul (Commercial), 5/5/51.
83 TNA FO 371183348, British Commercial Policy in China; N.C.C. Trench, Minute 117150attached to Shanghai
to Foreign Office, 565, 9/6/50.
84 See for example the development of the CCP organs in public utility companies following the 6th February
1950 bombings; SMA A59-1-31-1, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyuJazhan dang
de tongzhi [CCP Shanghai Public Utility Committee notice regarding development of the Party], 24/3/50.
85 MFA 118-00046-12, Shanghai Shi Waiqiao Shiwu Chu Ba-Jiu Yue gongzuo baogao [Work report of the
Shanghai Foreign Citizens Affairs Department for August-September], 21/9/49.
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As part of the Chinese response to the freezing of their assets by the American Government,
the two American public utility companies, the Shanghai Power Company and Shanghai
Telephone Company, were placed under the control of the Military Control Committee in
December 1950. The American and British staff soon departed." Once the foreign executives
had resigned, the Chinese managers were soon undermined. The manager of the Telephone
Company died of heart failure soon after retiring in February 1951. The three Power
Company managers were investigated on espionage charges for their links to the American
imperialists and the Guomindang.V The companies then operated effectively as state-run
enterprises under military control, before being officially put under state control in 1954.88
The policy adopted by the three British-owned companies was to wait for the inevitable
takeover and to prepare to be in the best possible negotiating position when it happened. They
adopted a policy of cooperation mixed with passivity. This involved avoiding taking on any
new burdens while not giving the Chinese an excuse to take them over without some form of
compensation. The three companies were all relying on remittances from abroad to keep
going. The status quo suited the Chinese, who faced many problems with limited resources.
They sought to benefit from the technical expertise of the companies' foreign staff by asking
them to train their eventual successors. The companies accepted that this would probably
accelerate the speed at which they would be taken over, but they welcomed a quick
settlement of this issue." As the table below demonstrates, during this·period of 'supervision'
the number of foreigners employed in all of Shanghai's large foreign public utilities
decreased significantly:
86 TNA FO 371192258, Reports and situation; Shanghai Power Co., 6/1151; Shanghai to Foreign Office, 9/4/51.
87 TNA FO 371192258, Reports and situation; Arrest of Employees of Shanghai Power Station, Shanghai to
Foreign Office, 5/4/51; Shanghai Telephone Company, Talamo, 3/5/51.
88 SMA A38-2-6-3, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei guanyu tongyi Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu
'guanyu qian Meishang Shanghai Dianli Gongsi yu Shanghai Dianhua Gongsi de jieshu jieguan wenti' de pifu
[CCP Shanghai Committee approval of Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs' Department's 'The
question of ending military control over the former American Shanghai Power Company and Shanghai
Telephone Company'], 1954; TNA FO 371192258, Reports and situation; Taking over of Shanghai Power
Company by Military Commission, Shanghai to Foreign Office, 8/1/51; for more on this company see Warren
W. Tozer, 'Last Bridge to China: The Shanghai Power Company, the Truman Administration and the Chinese
Communists,' Diplomatic History, Volume 1 Issue 1, Pages 1 - 95 (January 1977).
89 TNA FO 371192258, Reports and situation; Memorandum on the Shanghai Public Utility Companies;
Shanghai Electric Construction Company Limited (British Trams), E.R. Talamo, 5/1151; Shanghai Utility
Companies, E.R. Talamo, 13/9/49; Shanghai Gas Company, Ltd., Annual General Meeting, 19/9/51; The
Shanghai Electric Construction Company Ltd., AGM, 25/9/51.
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Table 8: Foreign employees of Shanghai public utility companies 1939- May 1951
Company Pre-War September 1949 May 1951
British Tram Co. (GB) 34 9 4
French Tram Co. (F) SO 40 8
Shanghai Gas Co. (GB) 30 10 2
Shanghai Power Company (US) 204 14 0
Shanghai Telephone Co. (US) 30 20 0
Shanghai Waterworks Co. (GB) 66 16 14
Source: adapted from TNA FO 371/92258, Reports and situation of foreign-
owned public utility companies in Shanghai, 195190
One report from the British Consul General in Shanghai suggested that:
The People's Government may now realise that they are incapable of taking over the foreign utility
companies not only now but in the immediate future. However there seems to be no doubt that the
utility companies will eventually be taken over."
On hearing that Pollock, the traffic manager of the British Tram Company, was planning to
return home in 1950, the Shanghai FAD approached him four times to try to persuade him to
stay on; he refused on the grounds of ill health.92 Archival traces show that Pollock was
being reported on by a senior member of his staff; reports remain of conversations that took
place in the office on local and international affairs. Particular emphasis was placed on
Pollock's disapproval of Britain's handling of the Hong Kong aircraft case. Knowing that he
held these kinds of opinions may have made the Chinese more inclined to ask him to stay."
On the morning of the 20th November, the military representatives charged with taking over
the three utility companies met at the Shanghai FAD where the expropriations were
90 TNA FO 371192258, Reports and situation; Shanghai Foreign-Owned Utility Companies; Amendments to a
Report written on 13/9/49, E.R. Talamo, Consul (Commercial), 5/5/51.
91 Ibid.
92 Shao, China. Britain, p. 82.
93 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; handwritten reports of conversations,
8/8/52,28/8/52, 15/9/52,3/10/52,27/10/52,30/10/52.
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announced." The workers at the British Tram Company were informed of the news through
the union's loudspeakers. According to The Shanghai News, younger workers then requested
music be played so that they might dance in celebration.f Extensive preparations had been
made. A few days of disorganisation in most private industries would not be widely noticed,
but the mismanagement of public utilities would affect the whole city and damage the CCP's
prestige. Itwas crucial to ensure a stable takeover." The city's only remaining foreign-owned
public utility company, the French-owned Compagnie Francaise De Tramways et
D'Eclairage Electriques de Shanghai, was taken over in November 1953.97
The plan for the first week after the takeover of the British Tram Company was to capitalise
on the moment of change to mobilise the workers. On the morning of the takeover, a union
meeting was called at which the government's policies were explained. That evening, another
meeting was held to welcome Gu Kaiji (lV~HH'&), the military representative" Gu was an
experienced underground Party activist who had worked in Shanghai's public utility
companies throughout the Sino-Japanese War.99 After 'Liberation' he had also established the
nucleus of the post-1949 Party in the tram company. He was, therefore, familiar with the
workings of the company.P" The company, he proclaimed, was a product of imperialist
aggression and special privileges. In New China, he went on:
94 SMA A59-1-1-124, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu Shanghai Shi Dianche
Gongsi deng san danwei zhengyong gongzuo de yi ci zonghe baogao [CCP Shanghai Public Utility Committee
first comprehensive report regarding work of expropriating Shanghai Tram Company etc three work units],
3/12/52; SMA A59-1-1-126, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu Shanghai Shi
Dianche Gongsi deng san danwei zhengyong gongzuo de er ci zonghe baogao [CCP Shanghai Public Utility
Committee second comprehensive report regarding work of expropriating Shanghai Tram Company etc three
work units], 12/12/52; The Shanghai News, 'SMCC Orders Requisition of 4 British Firms Here,' 21111152.
95 The Shanghai News, 'Shanghai People Support Requisition of 4 Firms,' 23/11/52.
96 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi defangan; Zhengyong Yingshang Shanghai Dianche
Gongsi de juti fangan yu buzhuo [Concrete plan and procedure for expropriation of the British Shanghai Tram
Company].
97 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, pp. 14-15.
98 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi defangan; Zhengyong Yingshang Shanghai Dianche
Gongsi de juti fangan yu buzhuo.
99 Gu Kaiji, 'Kangzhan shiqi Shanghai gongwei xitong zhi yuan Xin Si Jun qingkuang huiyi (gaolu)' [Record of
Assistance Given to the New Fourth Army by the 'Industry Committee' in the time of the War of Resistance
against Japan] in Shanghai shi youzheng guanli ju [Shanghai Municipal Post Administration Bureau], Huadong
zhanshi jiaotong tongxin shiliao huibian, Shanghai juan [Collection of Materials on East China Transport and
Communications in Wartime, Shanghai Volume] (Shanghai: Renmin Youdian Chubanshe [People's Post and
Telecommunications Publishing House], 1999), pp. 435-8.
100 Shanghai Yingdian Gongren Yundongshi, p. 296
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we cannot allow this transportation enterprise which is so important to the national livelihood to
continue as a monopoly, we have to expropriate it and take it over so that it can be managed by the
Chinese people themselves.'?'
In his speech, the wider struggle against imperialism was projected into the context of the
British Tram Company'sinternal affairs. Since 1949 the workers had been the masters of the
nation but, Gu argued, they had not yet been the masters of their own company. Now they
should feel a 'sense of ownership' (zhurenweng sixiang, ::EA~/'i!Hit):
This so-called 'takeover' is in fact a seizure by force of the British capitalists' right to manage and
lead, taking it for us all to manage, it is not that I will take over and everyone else will be taken
over, in a sentence, this is in reality a workers' takeover.l'"
Gu was keen to stress the importance of not allowing the change in the company's ownership
to affect production: stability and unity amongst the staff were crucial. 103 In the first week
after the takeover, the new owners moved quickly to consolidate their positions and to
understand the internal workings of the company.
101 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi defangan; Zhengyong Yingshang Dianche Gongsi
Jun Daibiao Gu Kaiji Tongzhi zai qunzhong dahui shang de baogao tigang [Outline of report given by Military
Representative Comrade Gu Kaiji at mass meeting on expropriation of British Shanghai Tram Company],
20/11152; 'we can not allow this ... ' (zhe yang youguan guoji minsheng de jiaotong qiye, women bu neng yunxu
fa changqi de jixu longduan xiaqu, bixu yao jiayi zhengyongjieguan, you women Zhongguo Renmin ziji jingying
banli, ~*$lL~!!Ji.tR~a~3(:~Jt~. :mifJ1'li~ftt!ffth*JtJla~!~M!~lml'*. ~'~jj!~1Jo~~tiEJ"Hi'if.~:m
m ~ !!JAR ~ 2~~~W-JI).
102 Ibid. 'This so called 'takeover' ... ' (suowei jieguan, jiu shi boduo Ie Yingguo zifang de guanliquan
lingdaoquan, na lai you women dajia guan, bing bu shi wo lai jieguan, dajia bei jieguan, yi juhua, shiji shang
shi gongren jieguan, plTWHi'if. M~~IJ~7~!!J~1Ja1'ifJl*~~~~*~. **~:mm*~'if. tt:1'~:m*
t~'if. *~~Jtt~'if. -1iJi!. ~lJ,jl:~Jt~IAt~~).
103 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi defangan; Zhengyong Yingshang Dianche Gongsi
Jun Daibiao Gu Kaiji Tongzhi zai qunzhong dahui shang de baogao.
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Figure 14: Offices of the British Tram Company
The future of foreign employees was to be dealt with in the second week after the takeover.
The majority of foreign managers and those employed on 'home' contracts had already
signalled their desire to leave China, and permission would soon be granted. Locally-
recruited foreign staff (mostly White Russians, Eurasians and working class Britons) would
be permitted to stay on at the company if they accepted the same wages as their Chinese
counterparts. If not, they would be given travel money to allow them to go to Hong Kong and
be pensioned off using the company's overseas reserves.i'" The home staff, who had been
engaged in Britain or elsewhere on relatively high wages, were dismissed on the iz"
December and told to leave Shanghai as soon as possible. On being interviewed by British
intelligence agents in Hong Kong, Pollock said that he had been made to dismiss half of the
104 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi defangan; Zhengyong Yingshang Shanghai Dianche
Gongsi de juti fangan yu buzhuo; SMA A59-1-1-126, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui
guanyu Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi deng san danwei zhengyong gongzuo de er ci zonghe baogao, 12/12/52.
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company's conductors before the takeover so that the Chinese could avoid the 'odium' of
having to sack them themselves. He also reported that the takeover had not really been
welcomed by the staff as the British had always paid 'rather high wages.' 105
Figure 15: Shanghai Tramway Company workers convert a tram to celebrate 'Liberation'
Figure 16: 'Liberation' tram on Nanjing Road
105 NARA RG59, Box 4204, 793.00/8-1952; Transmission of copies of reports of British interrogations of
British subjects recently arrived from Communist China, 2/3/53.
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Early reports suggest that many of the Chinese workers were caught by surprise by the
takeover. Many workers, cadres reported, had a longstanding dislike of imperialism, but they
also feared change. One was reported as saying, 'in my heart I am happy, but in my mind I
still have worries' (xinli shi kaixin, naozi haiyou yixie guji, IL'nb~:7f/L'. n~T~~ff-~
w~L~).The idea that they were now the 'owners' of the company worried them, it was
reported, because when the company had struggled, the foreign capitalists had borne
responsibility. Now, the workers were in charge.l'" In other companies CCP cadres reported
that the workers had a long list of worries, including fear of wage reductions, unemployment,
being reallocated to other factories, strengthened labour discipline and intense propaganda
study. The CCP planned to be conciliatory at first before laying the groundwork for
significant changes to come. They paid annual bonuses as usual when companies were first
taken over, to avoid resistance, but cancelled them later.I07
Other workers in the paint company expressed concerns based more on their own livelihoods
and futures. Higher-level administrators feared a reduction in their wages and had the feeling
that 'office workers who were disliked should scram' (kan bu guan de zhiyuan yinggai
gundan, ~1"tma~Im~mzl~~.fHIi) before they were made the targets of 'struggle.do8 It
seems that younger workers were generally more enthusiastic about the takeover. Older
workers harboured concerns over whether they would get their customary annual bonus and
whether their warm woollen coats would be replaced with the thin cotton coats worn by the
workers of the state-run public transport companies. These sorts of concerns were addressed
through small group meetings called zuotanhui (~i~~), which means literally 'sitting and
talking meetings.' Each individual was encouraged to talk about their thoughts and past
actions. 'Backwards' individuals (luohouJenzi, ~~~T) were isolated and held up as bad
examples,109Various propaganda media were employed to convey the all important messages
106 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; Di yi jieduan gongzo xiaogao [Brief
report on the first period], (undated),
107 SMA A56-2-52-35, Zhongyang Renmin Zhengfu Waijiaobu Shanghai Qu Qangwu Guanli Ju guanyu Taigu,
gongsi heying rna lou, bochuan yunshu gongsi nianjiang chuli de qingshi [Central People's Government
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Shanghai District Harbour Management Bureau, request for instructions regarding
dealing with yearly bonuses in Swires, state-private docks and lighter haulage companies], 30/11154.
108 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; Di yi jieduan gongzo xiaogao.
109 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi Dang
Weihu, zhengyong gongzuo di yi jieduan xiaogao [Shanghai Tram Company Party Committee, Brief report on
the first period of expropriation work], 1952; Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi Dang Weihui zhengyong jieguan
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of 'ownership,' stability and unity. These media included 'blackboard newspapers,'
pamphlets, and radio broadcasts. Workers were to sign 'patriotic compacts' (aiguo tiaoyue,
~l@~t~) to instil feelings of personal responsibility.I'"
The final stages of the takeover were to transform the external appearance of the company
including the signs, uniforms and so on and to consolidate control.IIIAs the company was of
the highest strategic importance and it had already been under effective CCP control from
1949 onwards, there was less consolidation to be done than in smaller private enterprises
where the CCP had not yet firmly established a presence (such as in the Orient Paint
Company, discussed below). !12The CCP cadres began their propaganda offensive by
emphasising the gains their activists had already made since 1949, such as the introduction of
a welfare system, a canteen and an after-hours school.!!3The majority of political campaigns
had already been carried out in the company, just as they had in state-run enterprises.114They
felt confident enough here to discuss the Communist future, a theme that was avoided in
takeovers of enterprises where the Party was weakly represented. Workers in the Soviet
Union, it was said, had sofas in their homes and ate meat every day. This kind of life was out
gongzuo zonggao [CCP Shanghai Tram Company Party Committee summary of expropriation take over work],
20/11/52-20/12/52; SMA A59-1-1-126, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu
Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi deng san danwei zhengyong gongzuo de erci zonghe baogao, 12/12/52.
110 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche
Gongsi Dang Weihui, xuanchuan cankao cailiao, 1001 [CCP Shanghai Tram Company Party Committee,
propaganda consultative materials, 1001], 26/11/52; Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi Dang Weihui,
xuanchuan cankao cailiao, 1002 [CCP Shanghai Tram Company Party Committee, propaganda consultative
materials, 1002], 10/12/52; Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi Dang Weihui, xuanchuan cankao cailiao,
1003 [CCP Shanghai Tram Company Party Committee, propaganda consultative materials, 1003], 12/12/52;
The Shanghai News, 'Public Utilities Workers Sign Patriotic Compacts,' 3/4/51.
III SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi defangan; Zhengyong Yingshang Shanghai Dianche
Gongsi de juti fangan yu.
112 SMA B261-2-273, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche Gongsi Dang Zhibu (Yingdian) guanyu dang he
gongzuo jihua [CCP Shanghai Tram Company Party Branch (British Trams) regarding plan for Party work],
June 1950; Yingdian Zongzhibu wu yufen gongzuo zonghe [British Tram Company Central Party Branch
summary of work for May], June 1950; SMA A59-1-63, Yingshang Shanghai Dianche Gongsi zhibu gongzuo
zongjie [British Shanghai Tram Company Branch summary of work], 1950; SMA A59-1-253-32, Zhonggong
Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Dangwei Yingdian zhi Weiyuanhui kang Mei yuan Chao Yingdian chubu zongjie
[CCP Shanghai Public Utility Party Committee British Tram Company Committee preliminary summary],
22/2/51.
JI3 SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche
Gongsi Dang Weihui, xuanchuan cankao cailiao, 1001.
114 See for example SMA A59-1-258-10, Zhonggong Shanghai Shiwei Gongyong Shiye weihui Yingdian
Zongzhi Weiyuanhui guanyu jindu yundong buzhuo he zuzhi liliang de huibao [CCP Shanghai Committee
Public Utility Committee, British Tram Company Central Party Branch Committee report on procedure of anti-
drug movement and organisational strength], 21/8/52; SMA A59-1-253-32, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong
Shiye Dangwei Yingdian zhi Weiyuanhui kang Mei yuan Chao Yingdian chubu zongjie.
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of reach for the time being, the cadres cautioned, especially as the British had left behind
them an old and decrepit company. A utopian vision was put forward, with cadres saying 'we
want to establish a city on top of this heap of ruins' (women jiu yao zai zheyang yi dui feixu
shangjianli ge chengshi qilai, ftm~Jt~frj&*$-lt~~...t~J1:1-~m~*).lIs
A year after the takeover of the public utility companies, the Party Committee at the Public
Utility Bureau reported successes in three main areas: 'the work of reforming work on
political lines' (zhengzhixing gaige de gongzuo, iE.Slja'ti~:¥:~~I 11=), i.e. the politicisation of
production; the enlargement, strengthening and rectification of the Party apparatus in the
companies; and the improvement of production. There were significant changes in the way
production and management were carried out. These changes were not however as
thoroughgoing as the CCP would have liked. The Committee also complained about the
inability of cadres to carry out campaigns effectively, worker apathy and problems with
production.i'" While it seems that many workers were indeed happy to see the back of the.
British, their embrace of the new authorities was not unconditional; their chief concern was
with the material consequences. Many of the CCP's measures, such as the cancellation of the
workers' annual bonuses and pension schemes in favour of a comprehensive labour insurance
based welfare scheme were not well received.I'" The CCP cadres faced numerous problems
in taking over the British Tram Company, problems that were typical of their experiences
elsewhere. They approached these problems pragmatically, not through pushing for
immediate change but through biding their time and ensuring a smooth transition.
liS SMA B261-1-65, zhengyong Yingshang dianche gongsi de fangan; Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Dianche
Gongs; Dang Weihui, xuanchuan cankao cailiao.
116 SMA A59-1-1-129, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu 1952 nian yi nian lai
gongyong shiye gongzuo de chubu zongjie baogao [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee summary report
on work in public utilities over the past year in 1952],6/1/53 ..
117 SMAA59-1-47-5, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu quxiao nianjiang tui xiang
qunzhong hou qingkuang huibao [CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee report on situation following
cancellation of yearly bonuses being announced to workers], 28/12/53; SMA A59-1-47-12, Zhonggong
Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye Weiyuanhui guanyu quxiao nianjiang shidang zhaogu zhigong de qingshi baogao
[CCP Shanghai Public Utilities Committee report requesting instructions on cancelling of annual bonuses and
appropriately looking after workers], 19/12/53; SMA A59-1-42, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Gongyong Shiye
Weiyuanhui guanyu /iu da waishang qiye tuizhijin, jianxin wenti baogao ji youguan cailiao [CCP Shanghai
Public Utilities Committee reports and related materials on problem of pensions and wage reductions], May
1950-December 1953. .
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The first steps towards the closure of Butterfield & Swire's interests in China
The majority of firms found that permission was soon granted when they applied to close
their branches in the 'outports' outside Shanghai. Many of these closures took place in the
shape of assets for liabilities transfers induced by vicious 'squeezing.' The CCP seemed to be
keen to concentrate the remaining British businesses in Shanghai. 118 The chairman of the
Hong Kong British Chamber of Commerce informed the British Government that:
there appeared to be concerted action all over China except in Shanghai in the method in which
obstacles were placed in the way of or withdrawn from European firms closing down. A particular
set of circumstances might arise for example in Tientsin and then within about two weeks exactly
similar circumstances would arise in Canton.l'"
The 'squeeze' being applied to their subsidiaries in Shanghai made Butterfield & Swire
realise that they were not going to be able to retreat from China through piecemeal
retrenchment. On the 24th September 1951, they sent a memorandum to the Shanghai Bureau
of Industry and Commerce making clear their situation. The memorandum said that in the 25
months that had followed 'Liberation' up until the 30th June 1951, some £900,000 had been
remitted into Shanghai to sustain the company's interests. Redundant labour was the principal
cost. They pointed out their attempts at economies, such as reducing the home-contract
European staff from 38 in 1949 to three in 1951, but their overheads had remained crippling.
They requested that all of their interests be allowed to make substantial retrenchments and to
sell properties. Only by taking such steps, they argued, could Swire carry on in China, to the
benefit of the Chinese. 'This appeal,' Swire later noted, 'fell on completely stony ground.'
After Lamb's note in May 1952 and Zhang's reply in July, Swire wrote to the Shanghai FAD
requesting permission to close several of their subsidiaries including Holt's Wharf, the Orient
Paint Colour & Varnish Company, the Taikoo Sugar Refining Company and Swire &
118 TNA Fa 676/503, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Behr & Mathew (Shanghai), 1954; L.E.
Schusterovitz, S. Behr and Mathew Ltd. to C.T. Crowe, Under Secretary of State, 17/5/54; TNA FO 3711108083,
Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; direct approaches by' British firms to the
Central Government of China, 1953 (part 2, pp 60-104); John Keswick, Hong Kong to Aldington, Political
Advisor, Hong Kong, 24/7/53.
119 TNA Fa 371/108083, Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; minutes of
meeting of the China Affairs Committee of the Hong Kong British Chamber of Commerce, 14/8/53.
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Mac1aine Ltd. 'Despite constant prodding,' they recalled, 'nothing happened.t'f" Many other
firms also tendered closure applications at this time.121
The Liverpool-based owners of Holt's Wharf (for whom Swire were the Shanghai agents)
were becoming impatient with the situation. They were losing £100,000 a year. A fifth of
their land and several warehouses had been occupied by the military without compensation,
and all other space had been occupied at a very low rental rate by the Government Food
Corporation. In November 1952, the owners asked Swire to endeavour to hand the wharf over
to the Chinese in exchange for all of its liabilities. Their liabilities represented only a fifteenth
of their assets. At the same time, they indicated that they would remit no more money in the
following year. On the 13th December, the Shanghai FAD introduced Swire to an
organisation that had expressed an interest in the wharf. This organisation was the Shanghai
Wharf Company, a body specifically established to take it over. After troubled negotiations
their assets were eventually handed over on the 2nd February 1953.122
Yao Kang and the closure of Butterfield & Swire's Insurance Department
Negotiations on the transfer or closure of foreign firms could be extremely difficult. A young
Shanghainese man named Yao Kang (~jtlXllJ)was in charge of the closure of Swire's Shanghai
Insurance Department; his experience of this period provides a insight into the processes
involved in such negotiations. 123 Yao had graduated from the prestigious Yenching
University in Beijing before joining Swire in 1948. He was sent to work in Britain in 1949
and rose rapidly in the estimation of the company's directors. In 1951 he returned to
Shanghai to become the head of the insurance department.P" A Chinese person being given
this kind of appointment, he later recalled, was completely unprecedented. He was young (26)
and enthusiastic and in his own words he 'totally ignored the risk, as a Chinese, of being
detained for the rest of your life.' Though he had trouble finding his way around as many
120 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 44-5.
121 See Shao, China, Britain, p. 134, see p. 220, n.62 for a full list of all those that applied to close at this time.
122 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 46-7; TNA FO 3711108082, Closure of GB Firms in
China, 1952; A. Veitch, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No.7, 22/1/53; Veitch, Shanghai, No. 17,4/2/53.
123 Under the modem Pinyin system this name would be rendered 'Yao Gang.'
124 'Yao Kang on Retirement,' Swire News, April 1998.
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street names had changed, he found his home town had not changed too much, 'only
psychclogically.t'Y Soon after his arrival Yao quickly came to understand that:
under the communist system then, there was no future, whether you were a foreign or Chinese
capitalist. Business couldn't survive. So my recommendation - not that I'm scared of staying in
China - was to pull out, the sooner the better, otherwise they can bleed US.126
Foreign insurance companies in Shanghai had long been struggling because inflation had
meant that policies taken out in local currency soon lost their value. Yao advised that the
Insurance Department be closed as soon as possible: 'remain friendly but no more business,
we don't want to do business, we want to get out.' 127
Closure negotiations were long and arduous processes for all firms, but Yao found that 'being
a local, dealing with the local officials was more efficient, faster.' His counterparts at the East
China Finance Bureau were relatively uneducated cadres from Shandong, but:
they respected me, I was able to discuss with them, and take charge over them. I had to be very
flrm and brave to deal with them ... I was very forceful ... Particularly during the Korean War,
they tried to be impolite. I said, 'look, you are serving the people, so am I.' There was an embargo
during the Korean War, there were shipments of rubber coming in for tyres, and I said 'if
something happens, who pays for the loss? 128
Yao's negotiation technique was to never place himself in a position of opposition, saying
'look, comrade, try to be calm, try to be polite, because I am trying to be polite, you and I are
both serving the people.' 'Luckily' he added 'I was a Chinese. I can sympathise because if I
were British, I could not use this tactic.' After nearly a year of negotiations Swire were able
to close down their Insurance Department in December 1952. Once the department was
closed, the final step was to payoff its sixteen clerks. The clerks had already had no work to
do for an entire year. By April 1953, Swires had finally managed to hold the compulsory
'direct negotiations' with their union and could now appeal to the Labour Bureau for
mediation. Their appeals went unanswered until they stopped the clerks' pay for a month-
and-a-half. The Bureau then began the mediation process. Swire again found it necessary to
125 Interview by author with Yao Kang, former Director of Butterfield and Swire, 1417109.
126 'Yao Kang on Retirement,' Swire News, April 1998.
127 Interview by author with Yao Kang, 14/7/09.
1281bid.
222
default on wages to be allowed to progress on to the third stage, which was arbitration. The .
clerks were finally paid off in June 1954, eighteen months after the process began and two-
and-a-half years since they had done any work.129
Having had success in his own negotiations, Yao was lent out to other Swire subsidiaries; 'I
just charged in and set up stall so we could settle things quickly and easily.' The political
climate had dispelled Yao's initial optimism at the thought of a stable China: 'once you
arrived in China and went though this for a few months you knew we were born in the wrong
class, wrong background, and our class would be condemned.' Every day after Yao left the
office at five, the Public Security Bureau would search his waste paper basket. When he had
guests for dinner, the servants would be asked who they were, how long they stayed and what
was discussed: 'privacy', he said, 'was totally gone.' As many of the Chinese staff were
undergoing intense political education and were encouraged to report all contacts with
foreign staff, they began to distance themselves in order to avoid trouble. Nevertheless, in
Yao's opinion the 'British did not suffer that much' compared to Chinese capitalists. They
'suffered by having to pay a little more money, but we all managed to get out.,130Yao went
on to work for Swire in Hong Kong.
The takeover of the Orient Paint Company
Following the transfer of Holt's Wharf, Swire's Shanghai office reported that there had been
'an unusual amount of interest in the Orient Paint, Colour & Varnish factory, and more than
normal indoctrination of staff.' The factory had only just been paying its way for some time
and appeals to be allowed to sell, lease or close the factory over the last two years had gone
unanswered.l" Over 600,000 Hong Kong Dollars had been remitted into Shanghai to allow it
to meet its ever-growing tax and labour liabilities. The last foreign staff member had departed
in 1951, leaving the factory to be run by a Chinese manager 'under the eye' of Butterfield &
Swire.132 In March 1953, the Chinese made their intent to take over the factory clear by
presenting a huge bill for £6,000 of 'additional income tax.' At the same time, the factory's
129 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 10; TNA FO 676/497, Foreign business interest in China:
Butterfield and Swires, 1954; D. Carey, B&S Shanghai to Veitch, Shanghai, 14/6/54.
130 Interview by author with Yao Kang, 1417109.
131 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 47-9.
132 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Minutes of meetings of the Directors of the Orient Paint Colour & Varnish Company,
February 1950, September 1950, July 1951, October 1952, September 1953, September 1954 (liquidation),
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largest customers cancelled their standing monthly orders en masse. As they were not
permitted to sell stocks of raw materials or raise loans to meet these demands, Swire had little
option but to offer the factory up to the government in exchange for its liabilities.m
The factory was located in Shanghai's industrial Yangshupu district. Having been built in
1934, it was modem and in good condition. It employed 21 office workers and 59 manual
workers. Preliminary investigations found that in 1951 this factory was capable of producing
300 tonnes of paint a month. State enterprises had been charged with producing a total of 655
tonnes a month but were only managing 360 tonnes. Itwas clear that Orient could be a useful
acquisition.Y" Prior to Swire's offer of a transfer of assets, the company's requests to be sold
or leased had been referred to the East China Industrial Bureau. The Bureau had turned them
down because, in their own words: 'a paint factory is much needed, but because we lack
cadres, for a short while we are afraid this would be difficult to implement' (youqi chang que
shu xuyao, dan youyu quefa ganbu, yishi kong nan jinxing, 5EE;~rMl~~~, 1883T~Z
T ~B, - at ~ ~tit!: fT ). 135The CCP's awareness of their lack of resources and
unpreparedness made them reluctant to take on new burdens.
In March 1953, the FAD again took Swire's transfer application to the Industrial Bureau.
From internal correspondence we can see that Huang Hua of the FAD was pushing for a
quick takeover of Orient.136 The Bureau now had the resources to take over the factory.137A
negotiator was introduced to Swire on the 4th June. He was introduced as the head of a private
133 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 47-9.
134 SMA BI63-1-150-5, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Gongsi
chuzu de baogao; Yongguang Youqi Chang diaocha jingguo ji yijian [Opinion following investigation into
Orient Paint Factory]; SMA BI63-1-150-102, Yongguang Youqi Gufen Youxian Gongsijianshi [Brief History of
the Orient Paint, Colour and Varnish Company Ltd.], 1952.
135 SMA BI63-1-150-5, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Gongsi
chuzu de baogao [Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Department report regarding rental of the
Orient Paint Company], 1615152; Huang Hua, Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department, to East China Industrial
Bureau, 1615152.
136 SMA A48-1-60-4, Zhonggong Shanghai Shi Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Bu guanyu Yingshang qiye zhuanrang he
zuyong wenti de qingshi baogao [CCP Shanghai Committee Organisation Bureau report requesting instructions
on transfer or rental of British firms], 114/53.
137 SMA BI63-1-150-38, Guanyu Yingshang Yongguang Youqi Gongsi zhuanrang wenti [Regarding the transfer
of the British Orient Paint Factory]; Shanghai FAD to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Beijing, 3113/53; SMA B 163-
1-150-1, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu zhuanfa Waijiao Bu guanyu Shanghai Yingshang
Yongguang Youqi Gongs; zhuanrang wenti the pifu [Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs
Department forwarding approval of Ministry of Foreign Affairs on question of transfer of Shanghai British
Orient Paint Company], 29/4/53.
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organisation, but, according to Swire, this camouflage soon broke down.138He purported to
represent the Yimin Industrial Company (Yimin Gongye Gongsi, M~I~1}~), but he was
in fact from the Shanghai Industrial Bureau.139 The major problem that arose during the
negotiations was that Orient owed Swire around £35,000, a liability the Chinese refused to
accept.140 In fact, the Chinese had decided not to accept this liability before negotiations even
began.141 Pressure was put on the company through the union to conclude the deal quickly,
and on the 18th July the management reported that:
Yesterday our salesmen were sent around the market instructing our customers not to buy anything
from us in future, nor to pay up for what they have already bought. As you know we have right
from the beginning been aware that negotiations might not be conducted fairly, but we never really
anticipated anything quite so dirty.
'Against such tactics' Swire later recalled, 'the Company was powerless, and bargaining was
useless.' The factory was transferred on the 29th July with the Chinese taking over £200,000-
worth of property in exchange for £23,OOO-worth of liabilities. This did not include the debt
to Swire.142It was clear that the Chinese were in a position of strength: they could decide on
the timing and manner of takeovers and even on which liabilities to a.ccept. Swire later
described this so-called 'transfer' as 'little more than forcible confiscation.' 143
138 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 47-9.
139 SMA BI63-1-150-11, Shanghai Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu Yingshang Shanghai Yongguang Youqi
Gongsi zhuanrang wenti de baogao [Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Department report on
question of transfer of the British Shanghai Orient Paint Company], 31/3/53; SMA B 163-1-150-38, Guanyu
Yingshang Yongguang Youqi Gongsi zhuanrang wenti; Shanghai FAD to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Beijing,
31/3/53; SMA BI63-1-150-86, Kailin Youqi Yanliao Gongye Gongsi guanyu jieguan Shanghai Youqi Chang
chubu fangan [Kailin Paint and Colour Industrial Company initial plan for taking over the Shanghai Paint
Factory [Orient]], 31/3/53. In SMA BI63-1-150-38 the takeover body is referred to as Yimin, but in SMA
BI63-1-150-86 it is recorded that the takeover would be in the name of the Kailin paint factory as this was a
similar factory to Orient. It is possible that these two names refer to different parts of the same company. The
takeover plan was formed by Kailin, and the leader of the takeover team was sent from Kailin.
140 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 47-9.
141 SMA BI63-1-150-38, Guanyu Yingshang Yongguang Youqi Gongsi zhuanrang; Shanghai FAD to Ministry
of Foreign Affairs Beijing, 31/3/53.
142 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 47-9; JSSCA CHINACL3-112A, Orient Paint Colour &
Varnish Company Transfer Agreement, 16/10/53.
143 JSSCA CHINA CL6, English translation of Deed of Transfer of Orient Paint, Colour & Varnish Company,
11/8/54.
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The Chinese were not just taking over the factory: they were also taking over its workforce.
This made the question of how the takeover was carried out on the ground extremely
important. How would the CCP cadres be received by the workers, and how would they set
about transforming the company? Was this the moment of anti-imperialist triumph that CCP
reports later presented it to be?
The instructions given to the takeover team, which were typical of instructions given to
cadres taking over all private firms at that time, were to 'mobilise the masses, educate the
masses, raise their political consciousness, rely on the masses, [and] take over smoothly'
ifadong qunzhong, jiaoyu qunzhong, tigao qi zhengzhi shuiping, yikao qunzhong, shunli de
jieguan xia lai, £Mg¥~. ~1fg¥~. f~~~iE.t5€Pl<~. i~~~f~. JIIW~IJa~fi:gl'*).
On the day before the takeover the work group (gongzuo zu, I i1=~.l3.)reported on the state of
'mass work' (qunzhong go ngzuo, ~f~ I i1=) to date in the factory. The workers, they
reported, had 'undergone relatively deep suffering' (qunzhong shou de tongku bijiao shen, ~f
i'A:Jta{_J!Jj=a= bt$~5*) under the 'oppression' (yapo, ffii§) of the imperialists. As such, they
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continued, they already 'possessed a degree of class consciousness' (you yiding de jieji juewu,
~ -~a~~fI~lii~lt~).144
Figure 18: Orient Paint, Colour & Varnish Co. Ltd. factory
Nevertheless, this was 'imperialism's factory' (diguozhuyi de chang, *OO3:)'(a~r) and
nationwide and citywide political campaigns had 'been restricted or blocked' (shoudao xie
xianzhi he zu' ai, St ilJ .J!f ~~ %IJ ~Q ~!B~).The workers and management were therefore still
'relatively conservative' (bijiao baoshou, bl:;$Q1*~) and had 'not taken well to the new order
of things' tjieshou xin shiwu bijiao cha, tiSt*JT~4'm bl:;$Q~).145 Some, it was reported,
welcomed the takeover, fearing that otherwise the factory may have had to close. Others, it
144 SMA BI63-1-150-78, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao [Shanghai Orient
Paint Factory work team work report], by Li Hongzhi (*~~~), 17/6/53; SMA BI63-1-150-63, Shanghai Shi
Renmin Zhengfu Gongye Ju guanyu Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang zuzhijigou de yijian [Shanghai People's
Government Industry Bureau opinion regarding organisation and structure of Shanghai Orient Paint Factory],
29/8/53.
145 SMA B 163-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua [Specific report
on takeover work for Shanghai Orient Paint Factory], 28/7/53; qunzhong gongzuo juti jihua [Specific report on
mass work].
seemed, were ambivalent and thought it was all the same as long as they were paid. Some,
cadres noted, feared the consequences of the takeover and were 'afraid to talk about political
questions' (tamenpa tan zhengzhi wenti, ftBffHEi.~U&)~iC]~)"46
The takeover of Orient Paint bore many similarities to the takeover of the British Tram
Company. Stability was emphasised over revolutionary change in both. There were also
important differences: Orient was a much smaller company than the Tram Company, and
much less strategically important. The Tram Company had been a prime target for
Communist infiltration, but there was no Party or Youth League organisation in the paint
factory.147The union had only been formed in March 1949 and its members were considered
to be 'quite weak' (gonghui weiyuanjiao ruo, I~~~~$~~~).148 The district leadership
and higher-level unions had not exercised effective control over Orient's union with the result
that the political education of the workers there had lagged behind those in state-owned
. 149enterpnses.
Within Orient, the situation was less than ideal in other ways too. Younger people tended to
be more enthusiastic about takeovers, but the Orient workers were an older and more
conservative group (only 6.5 per cent were under 25). Several workers had been members of
'reactionary' political and social organisations such as the Guomindang, or of the factory
union under the Japanese. They came under immediate suspicion. ISO The workers were also
deeply divided along native-place ties, with the Shandong, Anhui and Shanghai workers
forming distinct factions. lSI This division was reflected amongst the union members.
146 SMA BI63-1-150-78, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao.
147 SMA BI63-1-150-107, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang gongzuo zu guanyu jieguan zhunbei gongzuo
jihua [Shanghai Orient Paint Factory work team plan for takeover preparation work], 16/7/53.
148 SMA Q38-20-15, Yongguang Youhua Gufen Youxian Gongsi waiwen wenjian [Orient Paint Company Ltd.,
foreign language materials]; Record of Inaugural Union Meeting, 12/3/49; SMA BI63-1-150-17, Shanghai
Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong gongzuo juti jihua.
149 SMA BI63-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua.
150 SMA BI63-1-150-107, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang Gongzuo zu guanyu jieguan zhunbei gongzuo
jihua.
151 SMA BI63-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuojutijihua; SMA BI63-1-150-78, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao.
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Shandong and Anhui cadres aligned against those from Shanghai and this led to constant
infighting.152
The new authorities took control over the factory on the day that the final contract was
signed.153 The takeover team consisted of six cadres and was led by LiHongzhi (*~~;t) the
head of the state-run Kailin (7H*) paint factory. The other members were CCP cadres from
other companies, who had experience of either industrial or political work.154 That afternoon
a meeting was called for the union committee, to which two or three 'old workers' (lao
gongren, ~IA) and the manager Yao Jialang (~j~~!~) were invited.l55 Yao's specialised
knowledge was seen as crucial to the continued operation of the factory.P" The point of this
meeting was to co-opt these senior workers and to unite them behind the themes of stability,
unity and maintaining production. A new sense of collective ownership was instilled, with the
workers being told that 'the factory is now already ours' (xianzai yi chengwei women ziji de
chang le, !J{!?'£BJ£:7:J:&ifJ ~ 2a~r7):S7
The next day, a 'welcome meeting' (huanying dahui, )lX ill!*~)was held. The whole
workforce was asked to attend and to listen to speeches on the themes of coming together,
maintaining production and preventing wrecking. Over the next week, these themes were
repeatedly stressed in group meetings, which lasted for an hour after work every day.
Interminable meetings were a distinctive feature of CCP rule. Their aim was to politicise
daily life and to shape people into political beings. William Hinton recorded a popular
rhyming joke that circulated in north China a few years before 'Liberation', which went;
'Guomindang shui duo, Gongchandang hui duo' ('Under the Guomindang too many taxes,
under the CCP too many meetings,' ~~~~~. ~;o:Jt~~).158 Small group discussions
152 SMA B163-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua.
153 SMA B163-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua.
154 SMA B163-1-150-78, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang Gongzuo zu gongzuo.
155 SMA B163-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuojutijihua; SMA B163-1-150-86, Kailin Youqi Yanliao Gongye Gongsi guanyujieguan Shanghai Youqi
Chang chubufangan.
156 SMA B163-1-1S0-107, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang Gongzuo zu guanyu jieguan zhunbei gongzuo
jihua.
157 SMA B163-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua.
158 Hinton, Fanshen, p. 261.
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were seen to be the most effective way of transforming the workers' thinking. The workers
were also encouraged to talk about their personal 'sufferings of the past' (guoqu de tongku,
11~~~!Jj=a=).They wanted to get the workers talking and thinking, to 'begin to draw the
lines of class division' (chubu huaqing jieji jiexian, MW1~,1J;~~1i't&W~:l)and to make them
realise that, for them, this was 'finally true liberation' (cai suan chedi jiefang, :;t.~)JmM
h)i).159
Production meetings were held in order to answer questions, such as 'how can we finally
carry out our own production well?' (zenme cai neng gaohao ziji de shengchan, ~ z.:;tfi~t~
9.1- ~ 2~~~F?) and 'which problems has imperialism left for us?' (diguozhuyi gei women
liuxia shenme kunnan, *00 ~ 'j(gtimff1M l'~itz.lE~t?). Workers were encouraged to
relate personal accounts of 'oppression by the foreign devils' (yangguizi de boxue, j$~ =r-~~
~IJWIj) and to emulate model workers.l'"
The takeover group identified their three main tasks for the next few weeks as follows:
'calming the mood' of the masses (wending qingxu, ,,~~1~~); maintaining production; and
ensuring a smooth and stable takeover.l?' They stressed the importance of 'uniting with and
educating' all of the workers, especially the 'backwards [workers] and the most important
members of the [native place] factions' (luohouji ge bangpai de shouyao fenzi, ~m&*~
~*~~lf~~=r-).162 At this early stage, very little was mentioned of the long-term changes to
come, or of communist ideology.P'' Cadres were warned that even anti-British slogans were
159 SMA BI63-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua.
160 SMA BI63-1-150-63, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Gongye Ju guanyu Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang
zuzhijigou de yijian.
161 SMA BI63-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua; SMA BI63-1-150-98, Kailin Youqi Yanliao Gongye Gongsi guanyu zhengyong Shanghai
Yongguang Youqi Chang Wenti. jiehe ben chang juti qingkuang de chubu yijian [Kailin Paint and Colour
Company initial report on question of expropriating Shanghai Orient Paint Factory providing initial opinion on
concrete situation of integrating this factory], 1953; SMA BI63-1-150-63, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu.
Gongye Ju guanyu Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang zuzhijigou de yijian.
162 SMA BI63-1-150-78, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang gongzuo zu gongzuo baogao.
163 SMA BI63-1-150-17, Shanghai Yongguang Youqi Chang guanyu jieguan gongzuo juti jihua; qunzhong
gongzuo juti jihua.
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largely to be avoided in propaganda education at this stage (xuanchuan jiaoyu shi fangzhi
'Jan Yingkouhao,' '§'1t~~a1~nJ.t '&~1J~').164
The takeover of Jardine Matheson's EWO Brewery followed a remarkably similar process.
The most difficult thing about taking over this company, it was reported, was ensuring that
the cadres understood the technical processes behind brewing to avoid disrupting production.
High-level Chinese staff would be encouraged to stay on to ensure stability. Foreign staff
could stay or go as they pleased, but if they stayed it would be on the same rate as their
Chinese counterparts. As in Orient, a series of large meetings were held, followed by daily
informal meetings in small groups (pengtou hui, ~~ ~ ~ 'bump-head' meetings' and
zuotanhui). The Brewery was a larger and more politically significant enterprise than Orient.
Some 70 per cent of all the 229 workers had been involved in 'reactionary organisations,' but
the factory had also been much more thoroughly infiltrated by the CCP, who had been
secretly leading strikes there since 1946. By the time of the takeover in 1953, a member of
the underground CCP had already became the head of the company's very militant union.
Despite strong rhetoric that included descriptions of the takeover as 'real and concrete
struggle against the imperialists, and class struggle' (shi shiji de juti de fan di douzheng he
jieji douzheng, ~~~;F~~Jl1*~~&*4~~Q~1l"~4~), the takeover team's emphasis was
again on stability, a sense of collective responsibility and the need to maintain production.l'f
Three months after the takeover, wages were cut and working hours lengthened.l'"
The CCP used various methods to consolidate their control. On the 18th June 1952, a 'transfer'
of assets was completed from the Lever Brothers subsidiary the China Soap Company, to the
164 SMA BI63-1-150-86, Kailin Youqi Yanliao Gongye Gongsi guanyujieguan Shanghai Youqi Chang chubu
fangan.
165 SMA BI63-1-58-45, Difang guoying Shanghai Huaguang Pijiu Chang guanyu jieguan Yihe Pijiu Chang
gongzuo jihua [Local state-owned Shanghai Huaguang Brewery work plan for taking over EWO Brewery],
12/11/53; SMA BI63-1-58-38, Huadong Gongye Bu Yimin Gongye Gongsi, Shanghai Youzhi Gongye Lianhe
zong guanli chu yu ni jieguan Yingshang Yihe Pijiu Gongsi de zonghe baogao [East China Industrial Bureau
Yimin Industrial Company Shanghai Fats Industry United Management Department consolidated report on plan
to take over EWO Brewery], 3/2/53; SMA A51-1-16-54, Zhonggong Shanghai Qing Gongye Weiyuanhui
Difang Gongye Weiyuanhuiguanyujieguan Yihe Pijiu Chang gongzuo de zongjie baogao [CCP Shanghai Light
Industry Committee, Local Industry Committee summary report regarding work of taking over EWO Brewery],
1953.
166 NARA RG59, Box 4209, 793.00/10-654, American Consul General Hong Kong to State Department,
Washington, Conditions in Shanghai described by Mr. A. Veitch, British Acting Consul General, 6/10/54.
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Shanghai Yimin Industrial Company.l'" China Soap had been in severe financial difficulties,
and were one of the first firms to follow the 'Yee Tsoong model.' 168 Among the Chinese
negotiators was a young Jiang Zemin (5Ij~ ~), who later went on to be President of the PRC
from 1993 to 2003.169 After they took over the company, the Chinese authorities tried to instil
feelings of responsibility and 'ownership' amongst the workers. One way in which they did
this was through a campaign for safety and hygiene awareness. The imperialists had placed
machines over men and production over human life, they said. Now, the workers were
responsible for both safety and production. They were encouraged to discuss and solve health
and safety problems thernsclves.!" As in Orient and the British Tram Company, the old
management and systems were denigrated, but the status quo was maintained. The company's
unequal wage system had been devised, the CCP cadres claimed, by the 'imperialists' to
'cause division amongst the workers' (fenhua zhigong tuanjie, ~HtJmIIiI~). Low basic
wages were supplemented by a variety of bonuses depending on skill-levels and seniority.
The old system was retained out of necessity (due to a lack of resources) untill954, when it
was replaced by a new and more equitable system.l7I
Reports from cadres in Orient Paint in 1954 demonstrate that, when the new owners felt more
firmly in control, their rhetoric became more radical. Yao Jialang, the Chinese manager, was
no longer seen as a useful ally but instead was criticised as a 'running dog' of the British
imperialists. He apparently had a 'grave case of pro-foreign worship, especially pro-British'
(yanzhong de chong wai gainian, tebie shi chong Ying, PIa{_)*?I\~~. ~~~IJ~*5€).
Orient's past successes were no longer ascribed to its modem production techniques, but to
its 'connections with British imperialism' (he Yingdi you yixie guanxi, ~Q5€*~ ®~*,).
167 MFA 118-00014-05, Guanyu Shanghai de Yingguo shangren dui cheli defanyingji wo Shanghai Waishi Chu
de fanfa yu yijian [Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department viewpoint and opinion on reaction of British
businessmen to withdrawal], 26/5/51-28/6/52; Zhou et ai, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 317.
168 Shao, China, Britain, p. 135.
169 Qingnian Jiang Zemin zai Shanghai bianxie Weiyuanhui [Young Jiang Zemin in Shanghai Compilation
Committee], Richu Jiang Hua - qingnian Jiang Zemin zai Shanghai [Flame of Ambition: Young Jiang Zemin in
Shanghai] (Shanghai: Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe [Shanghai People's Publishing House], 2010).
170 SMA A37-1-60-134, Zhongguo Feizao Gongsi guanyu anquan weisheng da jiancha yundong de zongjie
baogao [China Soap Company summary report of safety and hygiene investigation campaign], 1952.
171 SMA A48-211-37, Guoying Zhongguo Feizao Gongsi gongsi gaige fangan [State Owned China Soap
Company wage reform plan], 18/6/54.
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High-level office workers, like Yao, were urged to recognise and repent their previous
mistakes through a process of 'education,' criticism and self criticism.In
Reports by ground-level cadres suggested that certain things had changed on Orient Paint's
factory floor. Under the management of the British capitalist imperialists the workers had, it
was said, only cared for themselves as individuals. Now they were working for themselves, in
a factory run through democratic means. Not only did production reportedly increase, but
tools were apparently better looked-after and spirits were reportedly higher. Historians need
to be wary of buying into the rosy images of life after the takeover represented in CCP
reports. Some information given in the reports does, however, suggest that there were at least
improvements in certain material aspects of life in the factory. One example of this was that
. .
in the past workers had to either bring food from home and eat it cold or spend part of their
wages buying food outside the gates. After the takeover, a canteen was established and fitted
with fans to ensure that the workers had healthy food and a good environment to eat it in.
Improved washing facilities were also provided.i" Most Chinese industrial workers did in
fact experience genuine improvements in their overall working conditions in the 1950s as
they benefitted from increased job security, improved overall wages and labour insurance.V"
Foreign Office observers reluctantly agreed that, despite all the propaganda, it truly seemed
that worker productivity in Shanghai was increasing under the Communist's strict
disciplinary regime.175 This was even the case in British businesses that had not yet been
taken over. In December 1953 Liddell Brothers and Company told the British Government
that the once-disruptive workforce in their factory had been brought into line by a Communist
activist. When he had been temporarily reassigned the trouble had started again, but the
workers had been brought back under control on his return. Lennox, the manager of Jardine
Matheson, reported that the quality and production at the EWO Cotton Mill was now better
172 SMA B163-1-150-49, Difang guoying Shanghai Youqi Chang gaikuang [Summary of local state owned
enterprise the Shanghai Paint Factory], 26/4/54.
173 SMA B 163-1-150-49, Difang guoying Shanghai Youqi Chang.
174 Cliver, 'Minzhu Guanli,' p. 420; This improvement in conditions was noted by the British Acting Consul
General A. Veitch: see NARA RG59, Box 4209,793.00/10-654, American Consul General Hong Kong to State
Department, Washington, Conditions in Shanghai described by Mr. A. Veitch, British Acting Consul General,
6/10/54.
175 TNA FO 3711108084, Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; direct approaches
by British firms to the Central Government of China, 1953 (part 3, pp 105 to end); Buxton's comments on
Trevelyan, Beijing to w.n. Allen, Foreign Office, 2/12/53.
233
than it had ever been in the 'old days.' Similar results were evident at the EWO Brewery and
Shanghai & Hongkew Wharf Company.V"
Other reports suggested, however, that all was not well in the factory. In the year after the
takeover, avoidable accidents became increasingly frequent. The workers, the factory's Party
Committee reported in December 1954, had rather disappointingly not taken on the
responsibilities of socialism. They cared little about the quality of the paint: complaints had
been received about fifteen ofthe sixteen brands. 'This is a huge blow to us politically,' they
reported, 'it will make the imperialists laugh at us' (zhe shi zai zhengzhi shang hen da de daji,
geng hui shi diguozhuyi kan women de xiaohua, ~~:f:EiEj:%~1:~~*a~n*, £~f~*IE3::
~=l[f.lt1f]a~~i!).l77 On a national level, the workers' lack of political awareness and lack of
pride in production would be a major contributing factor, leading to the perceived need to
further transform society along utopian lines from the late 1950s into the 1970s.
A 1966 report on Orient's history suggests that the legacy of the British imperialism endured
as a propaganda theme in the company long after the takeover. The anti-imperialist rhetoric
of the 1960s was much stronger than that of 1953. The report began by emphasising the
hardships faced under the imperialists: workers, it said, had been bullied by Sikh doormen
before going into the factory. They had not only been deprived of their political freedoms, but
also of personal freedoms (renshen meiyou ziyou, A~j5tfl ~ EB),such as being allowed to
talk or smoke in the factory while working (this was perhaps understandable in a factory that
produced flammable chemicals). 'The British cruelly oppressed the Chinese' (Yingguoren
canku de boxue Zhongguoren, ~IEA~iMa~~IJj1jIJ~ lEA) the report concluded before going
on to describe the joy with which the proud, militant workers received their liberators.
Reports from 1953 suggested a rather more nuanced and less ideologically satisfying reality,
in which the workers were apathetic, disorganised and distrustful of the CCP.178
Conclusion
176 TNA FO 3711108084, Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; direct approaches
by British firms to the Central Government of China, 1953 (part 3, pp 105 to end); Trevelyan, Beijing to W.O.
Allen, Foreign Office, 2/12/53.
177 SMA A51-1-53-97, Zhonggong Yongguang Youqi Chang zhibu weiyuanhui guanyu zhengzhi gongzuo de
jiancha baogao [CCP Orient Paint Factory branch committee investigative report on political work], 2/12/54.
178 SMA Q38-20-1, Shanghai Yongguang Huagongchang Changshi yangge qingkuang, 1935-53 [Historical
Overview of Situation of Shanghai Orient Paint Factory 1935-1953],2115/66.
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By the end of 1952, the Chinese Government had taken significant steps in getting rid of the
remaining British business presence in Shanghai. These businesses were dealt with along the
lines of policy established at the May meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As with the
Kailuan mines, they dealt with all firms individually and according to both the wider situation
and their immediate needs. Guan Datong emphasised the importance of wider domestic
considerations including tax revenue and unemployment over the quick elimination of
foreign interests. Radicalism was restrained in favour of economic stability. Zhang's reply to
the British demarche in which he said that British firms would be assisted to close was
essentially a front designed to give the CCP the upper hand in determining the speed of
closure negotiations. Conflicts between the British Government and British businesses, and
between individual British businessmen, were exploited to play their interests off against
each other. Smaller firms that were of no use to the Chinese were closed, or taken over
sooner while the departure of others was delayed. Some particularly useful firms were
encouraged to stay on through the awarding of contracts. The firms that remained after 1952
were either trading firms or manufacturing firms whose continued presence was deemed
desirable by the Chinese. Among these were firms that had large liabilities that the Chinese
were reluctant to take over, or those with large workforces the Chinese did not want to see
made unemployed.
At the end of 1949, there were 376 British firms in Shanghai. Their numbers reduced
drastically over the following years (as illustrated in the graph above). The most significant
declines in their numbers came in the early period of the CCP takeover (1949-51), when
many smaller concerns closed, and in 1952 when many of the larger firms finally gave up
hope and the Chinese began to allow closures. By the end of 1952, a total of 236 British
businesses had successfully closed or transferred their assets, representing 63 per cent of the
total British capital in China.179 By the end of 1952, the Chinese Government had taken
control of what they saw as the most strategically important and previously most foreign
dominated sectors of the Chinese economy; sectors which had a direct bearing on 'the
people's livelihood.' These included mining, oil, public utilities and 'monopolistic' light
industries (such as Vee Tsoong and the China Soap Companyj.l'"
179 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 138-9, 143.
180 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 149.
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Among those that remained were the major players: Butterfield & Swire, Jardine Matheson,
HSBC and others, but there were a few smaller firms too. As will be discussed in the next
chapter the 'transfer' of Yee Tsoong Tobacco set a workable model for a staged takeover of
these remaining firms -.Companies were pressured into positions of weakness until they had
no choice but to offer their assets to the Chinese in exchange for liabilities. In this way, the
Communists were able to take over large amounts of British assets in a staged and pragmatic
manner with little cost to themselves.
The rounds of requisitions and retaliatory requisitions between China and Britain in 1950 and
1952 represented new low points in Sino-British relations, which had already suffered as a
result of the strategic embargo. The Chinese took advantage of opportunities provided by the
British Government's seizure of their assets to acquire the vitally important public utility
companies and strategically important assets such as Shell's oil infrastructure, Shanghai
Dockyard's wharves and the three British public utility companies. In the long term, British
interests within China were seen by many to have been compromised by their government's
overriding concern with aligning behind American policy.181
181 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 82-3.
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The processes by which British firms were taken over and transformed sheds a great deal of
light on the ground level processes of the transformation of Shanghai more widely. Contrary
to later accounts, which presented the takeover of foreign firms as anti-imperialist triumphs,
takeovers were actually conducted in a staged and stable manner. Familiar patterns from the
expropriation of the public utility companies in 1952 were replicated with subtle changes in
later takeovers, like that of Orient Paint: stability and production were the key themes, not
revolution and transformation. In larger and more politically significant firms (such as the
British Tram Company or EWO Brewery), the CCP were already strong, and so the ground
was better prepared for the transfer of ownership. In less significant private firms such as
Orient Paint, the cadres faced the challenge of having to build a Party organisation and to
help the largely apathetic and apolitical workforce catch up with the rest of the city's workers.
There were concrete improvements in the standard of living for the workers in these
enterprises, but many of their problems continued. Only when control had been consolidated
over Orient Paint's workers did political education move away from moderate, unifying
themes and towards Communist ideology, class conflict and holding 'running dogs' of the
British like Yao Jialang to account. Unsure of their own abilities and painfully aware of their
limited resources, the CCP approached Shanghai warily. Only once they felt themselves
firmly in control did they begin to embark on more radical plans designed to transform this
decadent but decrepit city into a new socialist utopia.
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Chapter 5: Transfer and Withdrawal
By the end of 1952, the central and local authorities had developed a systematic approach to
the elimination of foreign businesses in Shanghai. ·While many smaller businesses were
permitted to close, larger concerns which were closely intertwined with the Chinese economy,
were to be taken over through transfers of all assets for all liabilities on the Yee Tsoong
model. Building on Zhang Hanfu's suggested plan for dealing with the Kailuan mines
('treating each situation on its merits and taking steady steps forwards') and the decisions
taken at the meeting of the economic and foreign affairs organs in May 1952 (discussed in the
previous chapter), the CCP went on between 1953 and 1955 to eliminate the majority of the
remaining foreign enterprises in Shanghai.
This chapter examines the processes through which British companies were eventually able
to close and withdraw. The number of British firms in Shanghai declined from 376 in May
1949 to 25 in 1954.1 Previous scholarship has tended to portray this period as one in which
the problems of British companies like Jardine Matheson were resolved relatively neatly.
Jardine Matheson and the other large trading companies went on to switch from trade in
China to a new pattern of trade with China via Hong Kong.2 The reality was rather more
complex. Firms arrived at the point of 'transfer' by many different paths, according to their
nature, size, reserves and directors' strategies. As in preceding years, the Chinese were
careful to set about this task in a pragmatic manner, with one eye on the effect the withdrawal
of foreign concerns would have on the wider economy. The final elimination of foreign
businesses was part of a wider transformation: the 'transition to socialism,' which began in
1953. Policies targeted at transforming the Chinese economy also affected British firms, both
directly and indirectly.
This chapter begins by establishing the final withdrawal of the majority of British businesses
within the context of the transition to socialism and the partial improvement in relations that
followed the Geneva conference of 1954. A series of case studies centring on different firms
and different economic sectors then follows. Butterfield & Swire are used as an example
through the 'squeezing' of large concerns who then went on to reorient the trade via Hong
Kong is examined. The experience of smaller firms is then considered in contrast to this.
I Zhang Hanfu zhuan, p. 149.
2 Clayton, Imperialism Revisited, Tang, China 's Nationalisation, Luard, Evan, Britain and China.
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Following this, several different case studies focusing on the real estate sector, banking and
textile mills are employed, to demonstrate the CCP's methods in dealing with firms that
could not be handled in the usual fashion.
The final elimination of foreign interests
In the first half of 1953, Zhou Enlai and Zhang Hanfu established a new taskforce at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The taskforce was charged with completing the elimination of
foreign economic interests and was headed by Huan Xiang. This measure was taken, it seems,
as there was a general feeling that in dealing with the enormous task of administering the city,
the CCP's foreign affairs cadres had perhaps lost sight of the broader policy goal: namely, the
complete eradication of foreign economic influence in China. How was this to be
accomplished'r'
Two documents were drawn up to be discussed at a conference on foreign affairs in June
1953. These were the 'Plan for furthering the fundamental purging of the economic privileges
of imperialism from China in 1953 to 1954' (guanyu 1953 nian zhi 1954 nian nei jinyibu
jiben suqing diguozhuyi zai Huajingji tequan defangan, :*-r-n3i:='-3iIm$pgiiI-tf7¥
*,*,,~~iin~3::>(f£$~~rn:~~~~~h~) and the 'Outline of dealing with the property of the
imperialism in China over the last three years' (san nian lai chuli diguozhuyi zai Hua caichan
de gaikuang, ='$*~H'*OO3::>(f£$Y!~F~~~/R).4
These documents stated that, because the CCP were about to embark on a programme of
economic transformation, it was necessary to get rid of the remaining imperialist economic
influence. This had to be done, it was stressed, in a stable and managed way and on a case-
by-case basis. The preferred method would be through 'transfers' of assets for liabilities. If
this was impossible, the firms could, as a last resort be expropriated, leased, bought or
allowed to close. Manufacturing concerns were the prime targets for elimination. Trading
organisations such as Jardine Matheson, Butterfield & Swire and Imperial Chemical
3 This was certainly the case regarding the elimination of foreign real estate interests, see SMA B258-2-40,
Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian li Shanghai waiguofangdichan shang gongzuo zongjie']i
zhiling pifu [Shanghai Municipal Government Foreign Affairs Department regarding 'Summary of work on
Shanghai foreign real estate companies in 1953' and reply with instructions], February 1954 - June 1954.
4 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 149-50.
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Industries (ICI) which provided vital imports to China would be encouraged to stay and do
busi smess.
The 'Transition to Socialism' and the Chinese economy
The announcement of the 'General Line for the Transition Period' in August 1953marked the
beginning of China's 'transition to socialism: Since 1949, the country had been run
according to the policy of 'New Democracy'; a period of compromise in which all social
groups would unite behind the shared project of national reconstruction. Under New
Democracy, it was intended that 'national capitalists' would be encouraged to do business so
that China's economy could develop over a decade or more. Historians have long assumed
that this policy was adopted as a cynical short-term measure and that its abandonment in
1953 was part of the CCP's plan all along. Recently, Bennis Wai Yip So has challenged this
idea. So suggests that, rather than being pre-planned, the decision to move forward with the
transition to socialism in 1953 was actually the product of a series of economic and political
circumstances that arose in 1952. This complicates our understanding of the elimination of
foreign businesses in several ways: it challenges the assumption that the Communists were
necessarily anti-business; it suggests that, regardless of the international context, the decision
to eliminate foreign firms was closely tied to domestic conditions; and it demonstrates that
the fortunes of the foreign firms in China were closely linked with their Chinese counterparts.
Rather than seeing the state sector and private sector as incompatible, So argues, the CCP
actually at first believed that they could use capitalism to boost the private sector under state
planning. The use of capitalism and the creation of joint public-private enterprises to take
over abandoned enterprises or enterprises in difficulty after 1949 were seen as temporary
measures. In fact, top leaders were reluctant to meddle too widely in the affairs of Chinese
capitalists, to avoid causing fear of nationalisation. They wanted more capitalism, not less.
Much to the chagrin of more radical local cadres, private enterprise was promoted, with Mao
enjoining his followers 'not to hit out in all directions."
S Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 149-50.
6 So, 'Policy-Making,' pp., 682-703; Mao 'Don't hit out in all directions,' Selected Works, Vol. 5, (Beijing:
Foreign Language Press, 1977), pp. 35-6.
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From 1949 to 1951, the value of private industrial output rose by 48 per cent. Wary of the
instabilities inherent in capitalism, however, the CCP placed increasingly stringent controls
over supply and purchasing, using government monopoly trading companies. Controls were
increased as concerns arose over the relative strength of the private sector over the state
sector." In a report from 1954 on the transformation of Shanghai's economy, the CCP
described their two main weapons for exerting control over capitalists as the state trading
companies and the People's Bank. The trading companies could be used to 'squeeze'
capitalists through price-fixing. By controlling the banking system the government could
strictly regulate access to capital.8 The 1952 Five Antis Campaign terrorised the Chinese
business community. As a result, the share of turnover belonging to private busineses
decreased dramatically and their continued operation came to rely almost entirely on being
given processing and purchasing orders by the trading companies. Private enterprises failed
in the absence of a market. This left the state sector looking superior. In light of the perceived
superiority of the state sector, Mao decided in late 1952 to advance the speed of socialist
transformation,"
Mao had not decided on the exact form the transition would take. An investigative team led
by Li Weihan (*;liJt) toured several large cities to look for an answer. Li concluded that
the best way to speed the transformation of the economy would be to adapt existing policies.
He argued that, after the Five Antis, managers did not dare manage. Costs and waste were
increasing and investment was minimal. He suggested incremental takeovers of private firms
through a series of stages, ranging at first from state supply and purchasing of products to
state-private joint ownership. His report was approved by Mao on the 15th June 1953 and the
new 'General Line' for a ten-to-fifteen year transition to socialism was announced. Chinese
capitalists were, in the main, eager to divest themselves of their responsibilities as soon as
possible. Many continued to hold nominal continued control in partnership with the state, but
this meant little in reality. The transition was declared complete in 1956.10
7 So, 'Policy-Making,' pp. 682-703.
8 SMA B 182-1-461-187, Shanghai ruhe cong xiaofei chengshi zhuanbian wei shengchan chengshi, 25/4/53.
9 So, 'Policy-Making,' pp. 682-703.
10 Ibid.
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So asserts that there was no hidden agenda for nationalisation before 1953: the CCP
genuinely wanted to make use of capitalism, not to abolish it. 11 The transformation to
socialism was based on immediate pragmatic concerns. The situation of foreign business was
different to that of Chinese business, because the CCP had always intended to eliminate them
in the short- to medium-term. It is clear, however, that the techniques applied to 'squeeze'
Chinese capitalists were also applied to foreign capitalists in an only slightly modified
fashion. Both Chinese and foreign capitalists were being pressured to surrender their
businesses to the Chinese Government through direct and indirect means. Foreign finns had
long existed within the local economy; they could hardly continue business as usual as the
environment changed around them. The contraction of the private economy and the increased
role of the state in supply and purchasing affected all firms, regardless of nationality. Seen in
this light, the processes of the transformation of the Chinese economy and the elimination of
foreign interests were closely intertwined. Both processes were much more complicated and
provisional than was once thought.
Sino-British relations and the Geneva Conference
At the same time things were changing on the international level. Since 1949, the Chinese
Government had stuck to its policy of 'non-recognition' of foreign diplomats from countries
with which the PRC had not yet established diplomatic relations. The British had recognised
China in 1950, but negotiations had stalled. As a result, on his arrival to take over as charge
d'affaires in 1953, Humphrey Trevelyan found the British Embassy in Beijing in an
'anomalous and humiliating position.' Of particular annoyance was that his communications
ften i d 12were 0 en Ignore .
Stalin's death in March 1953 changed the world situation dramatically. The Chinese took
proactive steps to end the Korean deadlock and this led to the signing of an Armistice
agreement in July 1953. The Armistice paved the way for a conference in Geneva on the
Korean and Vietnamese questions from April to July 1954. The month before the conference,
Zhang Hanfu attended a supper party held by Trevelyan to celebrate the Queen's coronation.
Trevelyan and others were invited for a return dinner at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After
11 George N. Ecklund, 'Protracted Expropriation of Private Business in Communist China,' Pacific Affairs, Vol.
36, 1963, pp. 238-249.
12 Trevelyan, Worlds Apart, pp. 15,20,51-2.
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years of isolation, these small steps seemed hugely important. 13 This partial detente,
Trevelyan believed, was aimed at courting the British and isolating the Americans.!" He was
correct. The Chinese delegation's primary aim in Geneva, former Shanghai FAD head Huang
Hua recalled in his memoirs, was to shatter the American policy of isolating China politically
and economically. IS China's willingness to talk at Geneva was consciously designed to be in
stark contrast to America's standoffish attitude.i"
The negotiations on Korea stalled. Despite this, Anthony Eden was able to hold a series of
personal talks with Zhou Enlai. The result was the upgrading of Sino-British diplomatic
relations to the charge d'affaires level. Recognition of their diplomatic status, albeit on a low
level, significantly improved the position of British representatives in China. They were now
assured regular contact with Communist officials. The Shanghai Consulate General was also
recognised by informal agreement. This allowed Urquhart to finally leave the country, in the
knowledge that he could be replaced.l" The Chinese also expressed willingness to solve the
problems of British firms remaining in China quickly."
The groundwork was laid in Geneva for a delegation of the British Labour Party, led by
former Prime Minister Clement Atlee, to visit China in August 1954.19 The visit was
carefully stage-managed on the Chinese side. Every enterprise they visited in Shanghai, for
instance, was thoroughly prepared. Reports were readied in advance on the improvements in
each one since 'Liberation.,2o Before the delegation arrived, Zhou Enlai gave a speech to his
cadres in which he said that the visit was a great opportunity; China's rapprochement with the
West could begin with Britain. He noted that the Labour delegation was coming despite
American opposition.i' British businessmen affiliated with the China Association were able
to organise trade missions to China in 1954 and 1955. Over the next few years, the British
13 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 144-8.
14 Trevelyan, Worlds Apart; China, pp. 72-6.
IS Huang Hua, Qinli yu jianwen, p. 94.
16 Zhai Qiang, 'China and the Geneva Conference of 1954,' The China Quarterly, No. 129 (March 1992), pp.
107-8,116-7.
17 Trevelyan, Worlds Apart, pp. 80-3, 107-8.
18 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 145-8.
19 Zhou et al .. , Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 54.
20 SMA A38-2-145-4, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyuyaoqiu dui ge youguan danwei de
cailiao ti chu shenke yijian de han [Letter from Shanghai People's Government FAD requesting in depth
suggestions on materials on all relevant work units], 21/8/54.
21 Tuijin Zhong Ying guanxi, zhengqu heping hezuo [Push forward Sino-British relations, struggle for peaceful
cooperation], Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu, Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan, pp. 79-86.
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Government took many steps to facilitate trade between the two countries, including
loosening trade restrictions in 1956-57, much to the Americans' displeasure.r'
Figure 19: Anthony Eden and Zhou Enlai at Geneva
Trevelyan noted in October 1954 that there had been certain improvements in Shanghai. For
instance, it was now much easier for British companies to change their personnel and closure
negotiations were progressing a little more quickly than before. The authorities were at least
'a little more friendly' now. The change was however, he noted, one of tone, rather than of
intent. There was still no doubt that the Chinese still wanted to take over the assets of all of
the British firms remaining in China. So there was little hope of 'equitable treatment by our
standards.Y' In his memoirs, Trevelyan later recalled that 'the post-Geneva honeymoon
ended in a quarrel as soon as it had begun.' Britain could not help but get involved in a row
that had flared up between China and America concerning the fate of Taiwan and Chinese
representation at the United Nations.i"
22 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 154-62.
23 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Trevelyan, Beijing to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 5/10/54.
24 Trevelyan, Worlds Apart, pp. 131-2; original emphasis.
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Discriminatory treatment? The Chinese official line
At Geneva, Trevelyan had brought up the situation of the British businessmen in Shanghai
with Huan Xiang numerous times. He requested that they be treated fairly and that those who
wished to close should be allowed to do so quickly and on fair terms. They should be allowed
to discharge their surplus Chinese staff, he said, and foreign staff members should be allowed
to enter and exit the country without impediment.f Huan's replies embodied the official
Chinese line: this was that British firms had not been treated unfairly; many British firms had
done good business between 1949 and 1951; there had been a tum for the worse in the second
half of 1951, just as the British had strengthened trade controls; the Chinese had taken
measures to relieve the plight of British firms by placing orders for goods and by offering
loans worth RMB 12,000 million in Hankou and Shanghai. In spite of this assistance, the
firms still had great difficulties for which, Huan argued, their managers were responsible, and
not the Chinese. The Chinese had allowed many firms to close, he pointed out. By 1953 over
170 foreign firms had closed successfully. Eighty of these were Shanghai firms and of those
around fifty were British_26
Those firms that had already transferred their assets to Chinese organisations in exchange for
liabilities had done so voluntarily, Huan continued. The Chinese had done them a favour in
accepting their staff and tax liabilities when often they did not even require the assets. He
then went on to say that the Chinese Government had never refused to permit foreign firms to
discharge their surplus Chinese staff and that no impediments had been placed deliberately in
the way of the movement of foreign staff. Technically speaking, Huan was correct. No
regulations or laws had been passed which openly discriminated against foreign firms or
restricted the freedom of movement of foreign personnel. 27 In practice, however, British
firms seemed to be treated very unfairly.
One example of this, the Foreign Office observed, was that although the tax system had been
used to 'squeeze' British firms, the tax regulations were not in themselves discriminatory
25 TNA FO 676/492, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 1; Foreign Office to Shanghai,
5/5/54 forwarding Geneva to Foreign Office, 4/5/54.
26 SMA BI-2-3658-25, Shanghai Shi Junshi Guanzhi Weiyuanhui Waishi Chu, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu
Waishi Chu guanyu song 'Ou Fei si zhang yu Du Weilian de tanhua gao [Shanghai Municipal Control
Committee Foreign Affairs Department, Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Department regarding
'Outline of talk between Head of Europe and Africa Section Huan Xiang and Trevelyan], 24/4/54.
27 Ibid.
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towards foreigners. In practice, the Chinese authorities interpreted the rules as they wished_28
A thin cloak of legality covered the CCP's actions. When it came to acquiring a foreign
company's assets, a Foreign Office observer commented, the Chinese followed a 'stock
pattern':
Their aim is to make a firm give up its property by its own act, so that no claim can lie against the
Chinese Government for restitution or compensation. Their method is to make the firm totally
insolvent by denying it the possibility of continuing its business, by multiplying its liabilities and
by refusing it permission to meet these liabilities by sale of property & stock. The means used are
unfair and very effective. A firm wishing to close is fortunate if it liquidates its affairs without
having to pay for it in foreign exchange.
This approach was not directed explicitly against British firms: it was simply the case that the
majority of remaining foreign businesses were British. Foreign Office observers believed that
the Chinese desire to eliminate British firms within China did not necessarily preclude future
trade along new lines (trade with China rather than trade in China). The majority of British
firms now wanted to close, and the Chinese wanted to ensure that they took nothing with
them. That the process was so prolonged was ascribed to the inefficiency of the Chinese
bureaucracy, their tendency to be temperamental and obdurate, and their desire to extract as
much money as possible in the process.i"
The final withdrawal of British businesses: 'old China hands' Butterfield & Swire
The paths by which British businesses arrived at the point at which they 'volunteered' to
transfer their assets to the Chinese varied from company to company. The decision usually
depended on the degree to which they were susceptible to 'squeezing'. Companies with large
reserves of stocks and capital could hold out longer than those which were operating on slim
margins. Companies with large, militant workforces could be more easily pressured than
small companies. Manufacturing companies were more easily 'squeezed' than other types of
companies such as trading concerns, which were not reliant on state trading companies for
supplies of raw materials and purchase of their products. The majority of companies tried to
hold out for as long as possible before agreeing to transfers to try to get something in




exchange for their assets. Some held on in the hope that their properties would be
requisitioned, a step that would potentially lay the groundwork for a future compensation
claim should there be a change in the political situation.
In their report on the closure of their interests in China, Butterfield & Swire referred to the
period 1953-1954 as the 'period of impatience.' The Chinese were now in a position to take
over their assets and wished to do so as soon as possible. In October 1953, their Shanghai
office wrote:
A most unusual amount of indoctrination is being ladled out to our godown [warehous~] staff just
now. Almost a complete stop has been put to all our efforts to sell, use, or remove anything, and
there is most patent discrimination in the matter of rental rates. The general picture has all the
appearances of the preliminaries of acquisition in some form or another."
The 'squeeze' was about to intensify. Enormous tax demands appeared, income was
restricted and the authorities began to demand repairs 'of colossal magnitude' be made
without delay.31 In November, for example, they were ordered to rewire one of their wharves
completely, dredge all of their wharves, renew the fenders on all their concrete wharves and
re-roof their warehouses. They had no local funds with which to do this and the Hong Kong
office refused to remit.32 Government corporations cancelled their leases en masse." Swire
decided to withdraw completely in April 1954, handing over their assets in exchange for their
liabilities. 'There was no other way', they later wrote:
They [the Chinese] leant over backwards now to avoid clean requisition, except of land - they
were going to have all properties with no claims attached, and probably regretted their earlier
requisitions, made out of pique. 34
Immediately following the Geneva conference, there was 'an appreciably better atmosphere'
in Shanghai. Swire decided to take advantage of this in August and approached the FAD for
30 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, p. 51.
31 Ibid.
32 TNA FO 676/497, Foreign business interest in China:.Butterfield and Swires, 1954; John Scott, Swires to
Crowe, Foreign Office, 18/2/54.
33 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 30-5.
34 Ibid., p. 51.
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an introduction to an organisation that might take over their asseta." In September, they were
introduced to an official from the China Ocean Shipping Agency. This was He Jingui, the
same man who had negotiated the takeover of Holt's Wharf in 1953. He was, Swire reported,
a 'professional negotiator' who changed 'his hat according to the subject in hand. ,36 At the
first negotiation a preliminary statement of assets was drawn up, showing that Swire
possessed some £2,000,000 to £3,000,000 of assets and only around £200,000 of liabilities.
The Chinese negotiator dismissed the significance of this, saying:
I do not want you to mention this. From a business point of view, my company is not interested in
this negotiation, but it is willing to try to help you out of your difficulties.
This was a clever move. The Chinese put themselves in the position of reluctantly helping
foreign companies to withdraw. Swire would have to conform to the negotiator's wishes, or
waste more time and money. At the second negotiation the Chinese made it clear that they
would not accept any unknown liabilities that might arise in future and they followed this by
imposing a strict deadline for completing negotiations. The deadline passed as the two sides
continued to argue over the details of the transfer. Swire felt that the Chinese were distorting
the idea of an 'all assets for all liabilities' transfer by refusing to accept responsibility for
certain unpaid taxes and labour costs. As Swire wished to complete the deal early to avoid the
usual end-of-year costs (bonuses etc), they eventually had to remit £7,500 to cover half of the
existing tax demands and £3,500 to payoff several staff-members. The transfer was agreed
on the 15thDecember 1954. Swire considered it a 'major swindle.t "
After the contract was signed, Swire's British negotiator, who 'had throughout the
negotiations called a spade a spade, and a swindle a swindle' was told that his attitude had
tried their patience. If they had wished, the Chinese said, they could have detained him much
longer: 'his attitude would not have passed twelve months ago' before Geneva.
'Confirmation', Swire concluded that, 'in other words ... power to grant an exit permit was
the final sanction. ,38
3S TNA FO 676/497, Foreign business interest in China: Butterfield and Swires, 1954; Veitch to Combs, 2/8/54;
J.K. Swire to Crowe, Foreign Office, 10/8/54.
36 TNA FO 676/497, Foreign business interest in China: Butterfield and Swires, 1954; John Scott to Crowe,
Foreign Office, 15/10/54. No characters available for He Jingui.
37 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 51-6; TNA FO 676/497, Foreign business interest in China:
Butterfield and Swires, 1954; Garner, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 32,16/12/54.
38 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 51-6.
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Before 'Liberation', Shanghai's ship tonnage represented seventy per cent of the national
total. The Communists had only inherited a tenth of this tonnage and the retreating
Guomindang had made off with the largest and best equipped ships.39The Chinese needed to
make use of Swire's ships, so they were allowed to retain a small shipping office in
Shanghai.4o For their part, companies like Butterfield & Swire, Jardine Matheson and ICI had
one eye on the future. They were international businesses for whom Shanghai represented
only a part of their wider interests. They were businessmen, not politicians, one Foreign
Office observer noted, and so they were practical in approach:
They waste no time on lament for the lost, and many look for a positive renewal of their
commercial connections with China, after they have disengaged themselves from their old
liabilities.41
Jardine Matheson were keen to shed their unprofitable industrial and other fixed assets in
Shanghai and shift from a pattern of trade in China to trade with China via Hong Kong.
Trevelyan suggested that Jardine Matheson's closure negotiations had been conducted very
quickly because they had 'made concession after concession' in their haste.42 ICI similarly
wished to close their interests quickly, leaving only a small office to arrange for imports to
China.43 Both Jardine Matheson and ICI were careful not to upset the Chinese and sour the
prospects for future business.
39 Shanghai jingji shang de zhongyao wenti gaishu [Overview of important economic problems in Shanghai],
09/49, Shanghaijiejang, 487.
40 JSSCA CHINA CL6, Withdrawal from China, pp. 51-6; TNA FO 676/497, Foreign business interest in China:
Butterfield and Swires, 1954; Gamer, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 32, 16/12/54.
41 TNA FO 676/492, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 1; Foreign Office Minute, 27/3/54,
author unknown.
42 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Trevelyan, Beijing to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 5/10/54.
43 Brodie, Crescent over Cathay, pp. 242-72.
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'The Chinese hold all the cards': Brandt & Rogers, Talati Estates and
S. Behr & Mathew Ltd.
The transfer of Butterfield & Swire tells us much about the experience of larger firms in this
period, but smaller firms also remained. Unlike Jardine Matheson, Swire and ICI, they were
unable to reorient their trade via Hong Kong. For larger companies, it was often simply a
question of profit and loss. They wanted to get their staff out as soon as possible and to
commence new forms of trade. For smaller firms, the human element often came into matters
much more strongly.
Take, for example, the case of Brandt & Rogers Ltd., land and estate agents whose chief
interest was in looking after properties belonging to various members of the Brandt family,
which had been established in Shanghai since 1900. The company was owned by two cousins,
AJ. and F.W. Brandt. The day-to-day management of the company was conducted by a
Chinese comprador named C.B. Lee with little supervision from the Brandts. Although the
Brandts were still held to be the 'responsible persons' in charge of the company, the firm's
union had effectively usurped control of the company's accounts and income. In 1950 they
.attempted to abandon the business, but this move was blocked by the union, who demanded
that a final settlement of the company's affairs must first be made before they would be
allowed to leave. Long and frustrating negotiations followed. The comprador was reportedly
of 'no use at all' as he had 'found it politic to fall ill and to stay ill.' Eventually, they decided
to offer the firm's assets against its liabilities. After what the British Consul General called
'long and wearisome palavers', they finally succeeded in reaching a settlement and left China
in May 1954. Their extensive properties were transferred to the control of the Shanghai
Municipal House and Land Company (a subsidiary of the Shanghai Municipal House and
Land Control Bureau). The cousins were thought by the Consul to have handled their affairs
poorly. There was animosity between the two as A.J. Brandt did not trust his cousin, who:
originally, probably partly through lack of backbone and partly because of insufficient interest in
the company's workings, let the union get and retain the upper hand. A stronger character might
have staved off disaster longer of have saved something from the wreck but in the long run the
results would have been roughly the same."
44 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Shanghai Consulate General to
Beijing Embassy, No. 168,29/5/54; see also Lu Wenda (ed.), Shanghai Fangdichan Zhi [Record of Real Estate
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From November 1954 onwards the Foreign Office forwarded a series of communications to a
Mr. Jamshed Talati, an elderly British subject of Indian origin, from his daughter in Britain.
Talati ran a real estate business in Tianjin named Talati Estates. His daughter urged him to
come home as soon as possible. Darab Dhunjishah, his business partner and the actual
manager of the company, had been expelled from China following a legal dispute. The
seventy-year-old Talati was left in charge. Talati was, in Dhunjishah's words, 'not at all
conversant with the important details of the affairs of our company.' Talati desperately
sought to assert his right to his business in the face of growing pressure to reach a transfer
agreement. 45 A government organisation was occupying one of their properties and
withholding rent, while the firm was being pressured with tax demands.i"
Dhunjishah had been firmly against such a transfer, and had been pushing instead for some
form of lease agreement. Talati continued to try this approach, but Trevelyan doubted that he
would be 'able to save anything from the fire.' Trevelyan felt strongly that Talati should
concede and agree to a transfer, but he could not advise him to do as this would be
overstepping his diplomatic remit, potentially leaving the British Government open to
compensation claims. Then Talati came up with a plan. He handed the firm over to the care
of a Chinese manager while he applied for an exit permit. Trevelyan was pessimistic. Much
to his surprise, the transfer of management was permitted. Talati was allowed to leave. Soon
after his departure, however, the Chinese manager completed an assets for liabilities
transfer.47 Talati's case demonstrated that, while larger firms were able to withdraw with the
prospect of switching to new patterns of trade, others had clung on desperately. That he was
allowed to transfer his 'responsible person' status to a Chinese subordinate suggests that
when the stakes were lower, the authorities were more confident and more flexible in
approach.
in Shanghai] (Shangha: Shanghai Shehui Kexueyuan Chubanshe [Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences
Publishing House], 1999), pp. 164-6.
45 TNA FO 676/520, Foreign business interest in China: Talati Estates, 1954; Darab Dhunjishah to H Trevelyan,
15/11/54; P.G.F. Dalton, Colonial Secretariat Hong Kong to W.!. Combs, Embassy Beijing, 18/9/54.
46 TNA FO 676/537, Foreign business interest in China: Talati Estates, 1955; Trevelyan, Beijing, to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 17/2/55; C.T. Crowe to Trevelyan, 4/4/55.
47 TNA FO 676/537, Foreign business interest in China: Talati Estates, 1955; Trevelyan, Beijing, to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 11/5/55; I.M. Addis, Beijing, to C.T. Crowe, 3/6/55; Minute by 'D.H.,' 26/11/55.
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A few firms, such as the egg packers S. Behr & Mathew and the International Export
. Company, attempted to force the Chinese authorities to confiscate their business by refusing
to pay workers' wages. Under Chinese law refusing to pay wages was illegal. 'To be robbed,
cheated and generally pushed around by the Chinese is not pleasant,' Urquhart's replacement
as Consul General Alan Veitch reported to London, 'but foreign concerns in China now hold
no cards worth playing and can only minimise their losses as far as they can.' Before closure
was allowed and foreign staff were pennitted to withdraw, he noted, all wages in arrears had
to be met. The best course, Veitch suggested, was 'to continue to pay up while (for the want
of better words) the going is good; the Chinese will know who can afford to pay.' If they
continued to withhold wages their representatives would 'moulder in China for years if not
for ever. ,48
The managers of many companies endured years of hardship, stress and tedium, but the
position of S. Behr & Mathew's Shanghai representative was particularly tragic. In early
1954, it was clear that the Chinese were about to put the squeeze on the company and force a
final transfer. The company's London directors had, however, decided to hold out in the hope
of preserving their property rights. The manager, an elderly Polish man named Schiffinan,
was caught in the middle. The Chinese would not rush to take over the factory, but would
build pressure through the accumulation of taxes and fines for late payment. Once their debts
had mounted sufficiently, the company could be seized under court order, maintaining 'the
fiction,' Foreign Office observers noted, that the Chinese had acted within the law. Schiffinan
had been trying to replace himself as manager for nearly two years. He had found it
impossible because it was to the Chinese's advantage to have this old, worried man as the
'responsible person.' A new manager, content to stay in Shanghai indefinitely would, Foreign
Office observers noted, 'not be such easy game,' nor such a burden on the conscience of the
finn's principles.Y
48 TNA FO 676/492, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 1; A. Veitch, British Consulate
General, Shanghai to W.!. Combs, Embassy, Beijing, 26/2/54.
49 TNA FO 676/492, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 1; Veitch at Consul General
Shanghai to W.I. Combs at Embassy, Beijing, 9/2/54; S. Schiffmann, Behr & Mathew Ltd., Shanghai to A.
Veitch, Consul General Shanghai, 4/2/54; Copy of letter from Schiffman to Foreign Affairs Department
Shanghai,8/8/53.
252
Figure 20: An unidentified foreign man changing his money as the newly released Renminbi
begins to circulate in Shanghai, March 1955
Schiffman was being put under coordinated and intense pressure by the labour union. The
union was acting in concert with the FAD and with government companies who were
interested in acquiring the company's cold storage facilities. He was frequently accosted by
groups of workers, who blamed him when there was no work for them to do. In February
1954, he had informed his directors in London that he saw no prospects for getting anything
from the Chinese and had asked for them to give him authority to transfer all the firm's assets
for their liabilities' and so rid themselves of further responsibilities and unpleasantness.' The
directors replied, telling him that they would never voluntarily surrender their assets. 50
Despite their resolve, the firm later agreed to a handover." Much to Schiffman's relief, an
assets for liabilities transfer was finally agreed in December 1954 after six months of
wrangling with the China National Food Corporation. 52
50 TNA FO 676/492, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 1; S. Schiffmann, Behr & Mathew
Ltd., Shanghai to A. Veitch, Consul General Shanghai, 4/2/54.
51 TNA FO 676/503, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Behr & Mathew (Shanghai), 1954; A. Veitch,
Shanghai to W.!. Combs, Beijing, No. 211, 1/7/54, enclosing letter from L.E. Schusterovitz, Director ofS. Behr
and Mathew to S. Schiffman, Shanghai, 17/6/54.
52 TNA FO 676/503, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Behr & Mathew (Shanghai), 1954; F.F.
Gamer, Shanghai to W.!. Combs, Beijing, No. 454, 29/12/54.
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Schiffman was not alone in feeling abandoned. It was not unusual for men on the ground to
feel exhausted, claustrophobic and bored. It was natural for them to feel resentful towards
their superiors in London or Hong Kong who were playing a waiting game and hoping to
avoid handing over their assets. The CCP's absolute control over entry and exit from China
deprived them of a feeling of control over their own destinies. Years of struggles with
government officials and angry workers compounded their anxiety. 53
As Frank King noted in his history of HSBC, there was considerable dissent amongst the
HSBC staff who remained in Shanghai. It was felt by many that they had been abandoned by
the Chief Manager in Hong Kong, Sir Arthur Morse, to years of frustration and boredom at
the expense of their career development. Such dissent was unusual in an organisation with
such a strong and cohesive institutional identity. Their anxiety and claustrophobia were
exacerbated by the fact that many had been interned by the Japanese during the Pacific War.
Despite the fact that the Hong Kong office were making sincere efforts to withdraw personnel,
these efforts were impeded by the refusal of the Chinese authorities to issue exit visas. There
was still a sense that those left behind were 'Forgotten Men. ,54 HSBC's situation was far
from unusual: feelings of abandonment and frustration were widespread.
Real estate companies
Shanghai Real Estate 1949-1953
Not all foreign businesses could be 'squeezed' in the same way. Real estate companies had
large fixed assets that they were reluctant to abandon: their incomes came from rents which
were hard to manipulate and their workforces were too small to apply effective pressure.
How did the CCP adapt their techniques to put pressure on different types of companies?
Before the Communist takeover, foreigners had owned, rented and built on land in Shanghai
for over a hundred years. Real estate ownership ranged in scale from the enormous portfolios
of the downtown property dynasties such as the Sassoons and the Hardoons, who between
53 See for example the case ofP.G. Rynd, HSBC's manager in Tianjin who seems, from. the archival record, to
have had some form of nervous breakdown; HSBC SHGII 0280, Letters and papers re: closure of office, 1946-
54.
54 HSBC 16411005/C, Oral History, Francis Richard Burch, pp. 88-9; HSBC 16411016/C, Oral History, O.P.
Edwards, pp. 66-7; King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Vol.4, pp. 376-80.
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them controlled Shanghai's most valuable and well-located real estate, to the ownership of
large suburban houses, small shops in poor areas and agricultural land. Land and real estate
accounted for around 65 per cent of all British assets in Shanghai.55 A hundred years of
complicated land deals, inheritances and disputes had left a confusing legacy. The situation
had been further complicated during and after the Pacific War as properties had been seized
by the Japanese, abandoned or destroyed. Owners had fled and returned numerous times,
sometimes abandoning their property and sometimes continuing to assert their claims from
overseas.
When the Communists entered the city in May 1949, the issue of how to take control over '
foreign-owned real estate was simultaneously a pressing one, and one which they were
reluctant to begin dealing with because, they admitted in confidential reports, of the
complexity and enormity of the task.56 Certain principles of foreign land ownership were laid
out following the establishment of the People's Republic in October. The most important of
these was that the new government did not recognise the right of foreign nationals to own
land in China.57 In December 1950, the State Council declared that China had rights over all
land occupied by foreigners from countries not recognised by the PRC. Foreigners from
unrecognised countries were not allowed to buy, sell or inherit land.58
In 1949, foreigners owned 25,900mu ofland (lmu is equal to 666m2) and some 7,650,000m2
of building space in Shanghai. Of the 14,659mu owned by foreigners in the centre of the city,
3,648mu was owned by churches, 3,413mu by foreign industrial and commercial concerns
and 2,624mu by foreign real estate companies.59 Church land would be taken over when the
churches were taken over. Over 95 per cent of all real estate property by value belonged to
business concerns and the majority of this would be transferred under the terms of transfer
agreements.Y The problem remained of how to deal with foreign real estate companies.
55 Shao, China. Britain, p. 136.
56 SMA B258-2-40, Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian Ii Shanghai waiguo fangdichan
shang gongzuo zongjie' ji zhiling pifu.
57 Lu Wenda Shanghai Fangdichan Zhi, p. 196.
58 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 17; Zhou et al.. , Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 322 ..
59 Lu, Shanghai Fangdichan Zhi, p. 196.
60 Shao, China. Britain, p. 136.
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Table 10: Foreign real estate in Shanghai, August 1951 (by nationality)61
Nationality Building Space (m') Per cent total Land area (mu) Per cent total
British 4,101,987 54 12,981 50
French 1,405,162 18 4,672 18
Other 905,667 12 3,003 12
US 1,243,636 16 5,303 20
Total 7,656,452 100 25,959 100
Source: Adapted/rom Zhou, Shanghai waishi zhi, p.32I.
Table 11: Foreign real estate in Shanghai, August 1951 (by land use)62
Type Building Space Total (per Land area Total
(m') cent) 1mu) (percent)
Churches 1,577,993 20.6 4,941 19
Diplomatic organs 118,801 1.5 458 1.8
Enterprises 2,287,407 29.9 10,536 40.5
Groups 267,426 3.5 1,699 6.5
Individuals 1,134,680 14.8 4,508 17.3
Real Estate Cos. 2,270,145 29.7 3,817 14.7
Total 7,656,452 100 25,959 100
Source: Adapted/rom Zhou, Shanghai waishi zhi, pp.32I-2.
Dealing with foreign real estate companies
The Communists did not even begin to try to solve this problem until 1953. The Shanghai
FAD reported to Beijing in early 1953 that Shanghai still had forty foreign real estate
companies, which owned 2,807mu of land and managed 9,965 buildings, with a further
19,211 buildings being leased out. 22 of these companies were British. British companies
owned two-thirds 'of the total land and buildings owned by all foreign real estate companies.
For the FAD, these British real estate companies were products of Shanghai's 'semi-colonial'
history. Financial groups such as the Sassoons had, in their view, taken advantage of their
'imperialist special privileges' (diguozhuyi tequan, *I@::E),(~~~.R) to speculate on Chinese
land under the complicit eye of the old Shanghai Municipal Counci1.63
61 Zhou, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 321.
62Ibid., pp. 321-322.
63 SMA B258-2-40, Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian li Shanghai waiguo fangdichan
shang gongzuo zongjie' ji zhiling pifu.
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The British dominance of the real estate sector was due mostly to the extensive real estate
holdings of Sassoons and two other large concerns, Kadoorie and Hardoon, which had all
been set up by Iraqi Jews with British citizenship. These three concerns dominated the real
estate market in Shanghai's economic and financial centre on the Western bank of the
Huangpu River.64 The Sassoon group was the largest foreign owner of land and property in
China. Sassoons owned several real estate companies as well as banking and trading concerns.
They possessed a great deal of prime real estate in the city centre including several of
Shanghai's iconic buildings: the Cathay Hotel, the Chengdu Restaurant, and Hamilton House.
In 1953 their financial position was relatively sound. In the early period after the takeover,
they had been forced to remit nearly £400,000 into Shanghai, but these remittances had
stopped and the firm had been successfully relying on income from rentals to get by. The
company were set in principle against what they called the 'give away' policy adopted by
other firms and were determined not to transfer their assets in exchange for liabilities."
Figure 21: View of the Bund showing the Cathay Hotel
The Cathay Hotel is the tall building with a dark, pointed roof
64 Zhou, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 322.
65 TNA FO 676/498, Foreign Business Interests in China (British), Arnhold Trading Co., 1954; Veitch to
Chancery, No. 115,23/4/54.
257
In early 1954, the Shanghai FAD submitted a lengthy report to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs on their progress in dealing with foreign real estate. Before 1953, the report began;
the Department had not carried out extensive research into the problem, nor had they
developed any practical policies. Previously, they confessed, they had believed the real estate
sector to be extremely complex. Real estate companies were less susceptible to pressure than
other companies and so they had delayed taking action. They had only begun to address this
problem in January 1953 in response to calls to action from Beijing. The publication of
Beijing's 'Plan for furthering the complete purging of the special economic interests of
imperialism from China in 1953 to 1954' led them to take firmer action. A special office was
established in Shanghai. As with other companies, the FAD chose to approach the real estate
companies on the basis of 'different treatment' (qubie duidai, ~~IJ~1ffl:),taking each case on
its merits. By the end of the year, fourteen companies had been closed or taken over,
including six American real estate companies (non-operational since 1950), which were put
under Chinese Government 'administration' (daiguan, i-\::g). The amount of land taken over
was 31 per cent of the total and 29 per cent of buildings had been taken over.66
Real estate companies had to be dealt with differently to other companies. The majority of
their assets were fixed, not transferable; their incomes from rentals were relatively stable and
their workforces small. They did not rely on government monopolies for the supply of raw
materials or for the purchase of finished products as manufacturing companies did, and this
made them relatively immune to 'squeezing. ,67 Apart from forbidding them to increase rents
and forcing them to make repairs, there was little that could be done. 'Apart from causing
difficulty for their managers' the FAD admitted, 'there are few other factors we can use to
squeeze and pressure them' (yi cucheng qijingying kunnan wai, qita ke zi liyong zuoweiji hi
tamen de tiaojian bu duo, ~:.tf1Efi.X~~£~~xt91'. ~1t!nir~~lj,EiH'F~f1f~1iP.m~~~1*::J'
~). These comments regarding what the CCP desired but were unable to do to real estate
66 SMA B258-2-40, Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian li Shanghai waiguo fangdichan
shang gongzuo zongjie' ji zhiling pifu; on the takeover of the American real estate companies see SMA B7-2-
285-45, Shanghai Shi Renmin Weiyuanhui Waishi Chu guanyu song shang Waijiaobu guanyu chuli qi jia
Meishang fangdichan gongsi de yijian de han [Letter from Shanghai People's Committee Foreign Affairs
Department to Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding opinion on dealing with seven American real estate
companies],5/9/55.
67 SMA B258-2-40, Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian Ii Shanghai waiguo fangdichan
shang gongzuo zongjie' ji zhiling pifu.
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companies represent a rare written admission of the 'squeezing' measures that were usually
applied to other foreign companies.f
Itwas decided that the Sassoons' interests would henceforth be the focus of the FAD's efforts.
In early 1954, there were 26 real estate companies remaining, and the government had
already developed plans for taking over ten of them. The question remained of how to deal
with the remaining sixteen (twelve of which were British). The largest remaining companies
were: the Shanghai Estate & Finance Company, the Cathay Land Company, the Far Eastern
Investment Company and the San Sin Properties Company (which were all part of the
Sassoon group): the Shanghai Land Investment Company and the American-owned China
Realty Company. Between them, they owned 5,696 buildings and 1,507mu ofland, dwarfing
the other remaining companies.'"
As they were unable to apply the usual degree of pressure to real estate companies, the FAD
suggested to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they should be dealt with through a process
of investigation into their histories. On discovering evidence of illegality, the Chinese would
have reason to take them under 'administration.t " The Ministry expressed their agreement in
principal, but they suggested that based on their experience of dealing with real estate
companies in Tianjin, the FAD would not find evidence of many illegalities with which to
justify takeovers. 'The most effective method', they suggested, 'is a surprise attack based on
property rights, and adding difficulties from other directions' (cong chanquan shang tuji, jia
shang qitafanmian de kunnan shi zui youli defangfa, )')"F*JZ1:.~*. 1J01:..ftft!?hIma~1E
~1H~::Qi~7J a~h$!). These 'other directions' included forcing them into large debts and
presenting large tax demands. 'Reduce their economic income,' ordered the Ministry,
'increase their management difficulties, and then push them to offer a "hand over" or a
"transfer'" ijianshao qi jingji shouru, zengjia qi jingying kunnan, jin er cucheng qi tichu
'yizhuan' huo 'zhuanrang,' 1~!P.ft~£;1f45rA. ±11Jo.ft~£;g1E~1t itiii'iJi)EPl.ftt!lli '~$~QX;
'$~il').71When Trevelyan later brought up the difficulties of foreign real estate companies
with an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the Geneva Conference, the official
68 SMA B258-2-40, Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian li Shanghai waiguo fangdichan
shang gongzuo zongjie' ji zhiling pifu.
69 Ibid.
10 Shao, China, Britain, p. 136.
11 SMA B258-2-40, Shanghai Shi Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu '1953 nian li Shanghai waiguo fangdichan
shang gongzuo zongjie' ji zhiling pifu.
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had rejected any suggestion that they had been 'robbed' (boduo, ~M~)of their properties,
saying that this was 'wrong, incorrect, I cannot accept this' (bu dui de, cuowu de, wo bu neng
jieshou, ~ ~1a~, tti i~ a~, ft ~ ~~ti§t). 72 Indeed, they may not have been 'robbed'
through the use of openly discriminatory legislation or requisition, but the result was the
same.
On the 14thMay 1954, foreign real estate companies were ordered by the authorities to stop
collecting rent on their properties. This was a huge financial blow. A few were transferred to
Chinese organisations, while others were permitted to close down.73 By the end of 1954, the
task of dealing with foreign real estate companies was declared more or less complete.i" The
eight enterprises which made up the Sassoon group were eventually transferred to the state-
owned China Enterprise Company in 1958. The transfer included 57 buildings and some
540,OOOm2of real estate.75
Taking over foreign real estate: 'administration'
Commercial properties would be transferred into government hands, but how did the CCP go
about acquiring privately owned properties from foreign individuals? Sorting out the city's
land and property ownership was a difficult challenge. Many foreign and Chinese land and
property owners had abandoned their properties during the Pacific War or before the
Communist takeover. Others had died. At first, the CCP instigated measures to take over
abandoned properties, properties in serious disrepair or properties that had been claimed by
people purporting to be the owners on very thin legal grounds." In December 1949 the
Chinese Government began a registration process to dispose of ownerless land. Property
owners, Chinese or foreign, were to register their claim to the property within three years.
72 MFA 110-00236-04, Zhang Yue,fu sizhang yu Yingguo Daiban Chu Du Weilianguanyu Shanghai Waishang
Fangdichan Gongsi bei quxian jingzu hou wairen fangwu zhao daili ren deng jiu xiang wenti de tanhua jilii
[Minutes of discussion between Vice Section Head Zhang Vue and British Negotiating Office's Trevelyan nine
questions regarding Shanghai foreign real estate companies finding agents after ability to rent cancelled etc.],
14/7/54- 30/7/54.
73 Zhou et al.., Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 322-3.
74 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, p. 17.
75 Zhou et al.; Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 320.
76 SMA BI-2-1444, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu daiguan wairen fangdichan ji weituo
daili banfa de baogao [Shanghai Peoples' Government Foreign Affairs Department report regarding taking
foreign real estate under administration and methods for transferring management], 23/4/53; Shanghai Shi
daiguan wairen fangdichan banfa caoan [Shanghai draft methods for taking foreign real estate under
administration].
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Otherwise the land would become state property. In 1951 a second registration process took
place with a three-month time limit, and in 1952, the government began to take control of
unclaimed land and houses."
Private (as opposed to commercial) property constituted 15 per cent of all land and 14 per
cent of all buildings owned by foreigners in Shanghai. In February 1954, the FAD submitted
a report on their progress in dealing with foreign private property over the past four years. As
with the real estate companies, it was admitted that 'for many years (especially before 1953)'
the FAD 'had not actively considered how to deal with foreign private real estate step by step
in a well-planned way' (ji nian lai (tebie zai yijiuwusan nian qian) wei zhudong kaolii you
jihua, you buzhuo de chuli waiqiao sirenfangdichan, J1.~* (~~~llt£-iL3i'::'~WJ) *::E
TJJ~~~i.t~ll, ~W~~~~~H~IB'I\HHAAm±ihjD=).Their work, they confessed, had been
slow and disorganised.f
On a positive note, it was reported, they had experienced some success in dealing with
privately-owned foreign land: 2,534 out of3,931mu had been taken over. The majority of this
was 'taken back' (shouhui, ~1(@]) during the suburban land reform movements between 1951
and 1953. The FAD reported that, unlike dealing with the real estate companies, it was not
necessary to 'squeeze and pressure' tjibi, m~) foreigners into giving over private property.
Foreigners were progressively leaving the city as their businesses closed, so it was simply a
matter of making sure that they could not find others to take over their properties on their
departure/"
By 1954, procedures had been put in place would allow the CCP to achieve their goal of
ensuring that, when foreigners left they would take over their properties. New rules prevented
real estate agencies from looking after property belonging to owners overseas. Overseas
owners then had to find new agents willing to take this responsibility, a nearly impossible
task in the current climate.8o Regulations on transferring the management of properties were
77 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 136-7.
78 SMA B258-2-38-1, Shanghaishi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu, si nian lai Shanghai chuli waiqiao siren
fangdichan gongzuo baogao [Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Department, work report on
dealing with foreign private real estate over the last four years], February 1954.
79 Ibid.
80 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Trevelyan, Beijing to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 5/10/54.
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strengthened in April 1953 with a view to 'strictly controlling' (yange kongzhi, F~!2:iWJ) the
disposal of foreign private property so as to be able to take it over more quickly." Around
seventy per cent of all buildings taken over so far had been first put under 'administration'
(daiguan, i~~) for a set period before becoming the property of the state. Many buildings
had been taken as they either had no one looking after them or because the owner had died
and there was no legal inheritor. Putting buildings under 'administration' was the preferred
technique for taking them over, because it provided a legal justification and was a relatively
stable process. Owners could, theoretically, claim their property back during the period of
'administration', but very few did so. Only two or three property owners had requested the
return of their properties by Apri11953.82 Very few were expropriated: this measure was only
used when absolutely necessary for military purposes or for municipal construction.Y
Properties could also be put under 'administration' if the owner's title was incomplete or
unclear, which was often the case in this city which had seen so many changes of government
and so much disruption since 1937.84 'The special situation relating to the real estate deeds of
foreigners in Shanghai', noted one FAD commentator in 1955, 'is very complicated and
chaotic, it is also our powerful handle [tool] for dealing with foreign real estate' (Shanghai
wairen teyou de Jangdichan qizheng qingkuang, shi Juza er hunluan de, zhe ye shi women chuli
wairenJangdichan de yi ge youli babing, .tjm91'A.~f=i~~m±thF~iiE1~1.R" ~~~~~mn~liL
~~, ~1h~~m~H!91'A.m:tt2F~~-1'f=it.Jt~~).85The FAD would then dispute the
ownership of the property. The properties of those owners who could not support their claims
with definitive proof were put under state control. These measures were, Trevelyan noted, the
same as those used against Chinese property-holders as the state pushed to get as much
property transferred into its hands as possible. An extra layer of difficulty was added as many
foreigners had registered their properties in the names of Chinese associates before 1949, to
81 SMA B 1-2-1444, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu daiguan wairen fangdichan ji weituo
daili banfa de baogao; Guanyu 'Shanghai Shi wairen fangdichan weituo daili banfa' zhi shuoming
[Clarification on 'Methods for Foreigners in Shanghai to transfer management of real estate].
82 Ibid.
83 SMA B258-2-38-1, Shanghaishi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu, si nian lai Shanghai chuli waiqiao siren
fangdichan gongzuo baogao.
84 Zhou et al.i, Shanghai waishi zhi, pp. 322-3.
85SMA Bl-2-1611, Shanghai Shi Waishi Chu guanyu song wairenfangdichan qizheng qingkuang shuoming
[Shanghai Foreign Affairs Department explanation regarding sending of situation of foreign real estate], January.
1955.
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evade strict property regulations enforced by the Guomindang.f" The final small piece of
foreign privately-owned real estate was not transferred into the government's hands until
1964.87
Taking over foreign real estate: repairs to dangerous properties
Other pragmatic techniques based on ground-level realities were also employed to take over
foreign-owned properties. War, economic crises and the annual typhoons that hit the city had
all contributed to a general dilapidation of buildings that was now a major risk to public
safety. The Public Security Bureau counted 10,999 unsafe buildings in 1950. 'Exploitative'
landlords could not be trusted to carry out much-needed repairs of their own accord. Helping
ordinary citizens to have their housing repaired was presented as a way in which the CCP
were able to make direct improvements in peoples' lives. Under the 'imperialists' and the
'reactionaries', one CCP report claimed, many citizens were killed or injured by unsafe
buildings every year. The old administrations, they alleged, had done nothing about it,
exposing their true lack of concern for ordinary people/"
In March 1950, the Public Works Bureau established measures to compel Chinese and
foreign property-owners to make repairs to dangerous buildings. Owners who were unable to
pay for repairs were instructed to seek loans from the government banks or face going to
court." As with many of the CCP's policies in the early years this plan had looked good on
paper. The Public Works Bureau reported in 1953, however, that when it came to
implementation, it had mostly been a failure. They had so much mundane work to do that
they had been unable to focus on the broader policy goals. Radical transformation was held in
abeyance in the name of day-to-day administration. Even had they prioritised change, they
would have lacked the workmen and supplies needed to actually carry out the repairs."
86 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Trevelyan, Beijing to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 5110/54; This was essentially a reversal of the old pre-War practice of registering Chinese assets
under foreign names in order to protect them.
81 Zhou et al .. , Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 323.
88 SMA Bl-1-1220, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu, Shi Gongwu Ju deng niding ben shi chuli weixianjianzhu
banfa [Shanghai People's Government, Public Works Bureau etc drafting methods for dealing with dangerous
buildings], 1950[-1954]; Yi jiu wu san nian chuli ben shi siyou weixian zhuwu zonghe baogao[Summary report
on dealing with privately owned dangerous residences in 1953], March 1954.
89 Ibid.
90 SMA B 1-1-1220, chuli weixian jianzhu de baogao.
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In August 1951, after a series of accidents involving unsafe buildings the authorities declared
that any structure that the owner refused to repair when ordered to do so would be put under
'administration.' These rules, directed at both Chinese and foreign residents, later came to be
adopted as a useful tool with which to take over foreign real estate outright and to put
pressure on the larger foreign real estate companies through denying them revenue."
The Shanghai FAD reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1953 that taking
over foreign-owned buildings on the premise that they were in dangerous disrepair was but
one more method being used in the 1953 push to 'purge' the remaining 'imperialist economic
influence.' Dangerous foreign properties and dangerous Chinese properties were, they
suggested, 'to be dealt with differently in principle.' 'Measures should be taken to resolve the
ownership of the former' the report stated, meaning that they should be taken over
completely. The latter could 'be supervised and assisted to make repairs' (yuanze shang
yousuo qubie. Qianzhe ying shefa jiejue qi chanquan, huozhe ke ducu bing xiezhu qi xiuli, 1*
9l1J...t~JiJi[2i~IJ. Wi:1fml§i5!~/R:~F*~, ~:1fj:iJ'I1lE*t1J.WJ~11~!~).92 It was through
these processes that as much as fifty per cent of private British housing property was
transferred into Chinese Government hands."
A typical example of this was when the manager representing two of Sassoons' interests (the
Shanghai Estates & Finance Company and the Far Eastern Investment Company) was called
to the Public Works Bureau in April 1954 and instructed to plan for (and to begin to
implement) repairs to nearly 260 houses within two weeks. This was an impossible task.
When the two weeks expired, the buildings were taken under government 'administration.'
The company not only lost rental incomes: they were also expected to keep paying the
maintenance staff and to pay for all the repairs." As many properties were in poor condition
following years of neglect, it was hard to argue that repairs were unnecessary."
91 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 136-7.
92 SMA B258-2-50-l, Shanghai Shi Renmin Zhengfu Waishi Chu guanyu chuli wairen weixian fangwu zhi
yuanzexing yijian ji daiti 'guanyu chuli wairen weixian fangwu buchong zhishi' qing he shi de baogao
[Shanghai People's Government Foreign Affairs Department report requesting instructions on principled
opinion regarding dangerous foreign buildings and drafting of 'additional instructions on dealing with dangerous
foreign buildings], 24/10/53.
93 Shao, China, Britain, pp. 136-7.
94 TNA Fa 676/498, Foreign Business Interests in China (British), Arnhold Trading Co., 1954; Veitch to
Chancery, No. 115,23/4/54; S. Kosovsky, E.D. Sassoon & Co. Ltd. Shanghai to A. Veitch, 19/4/54.
95 TNA Fa 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part2; Trevelyan, Beijing to C.T. Crowe,
Foreign Office, 5/10/54.
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An enormous list of expensive repairs was also delivered to the Hong Kong Shanghai Hotel
Company, the owners of the 'old and gloomy' Astor House. The repairs were to be
completed within two months. The Hong Kong head office refused to remit funds for repairs
until rents owed to them by government organisations were paid. They also argued that,
although Astor House was indeed in poor shape, it was not dangerous. In reply to this
ultimatum, the Housing Bureau gave the hotel company a heavy fine and told them that they
would be taking over their properties for one year to conduct repairs on their behalf. The
company saw no prospect for future income from the property, and so refused to remit in the
hope that the Chinese would seize their assets."
Figure 22: Astor House Hotel and Garden Bridge
96 TNA FO 676/518, Foreign business interest in China: Hong Kong Shanghai Hotel Co, 1954; Foreign Office
to Shanghai, No. 101, 13/8/54; Veitch, Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 69,28/8/54; Extract of Jiefang Ribao,
24/7/53; Translation of House and Land Bureau's 'Decision,' 20/8/54; Veitch, Shanghai to W.I. Combs, Beijing,
No. 290, 24/8/54; P.G.F. Dalton, Colonial Secretariat Hong Kong, to W.I. Combs, Beijing, 17/9/54.
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The Hong Kong Shanghai Hotel Company was not the only ones angling for such a result. In
December 1954, the manager of the Shanghai Land Investment Company wrote to Fred
Garner, the British Consul in Shanghai, informing him of two accidents that had occurred on
their Shanghai properties. In one a maidservant had been hospitalised following a fall from a
rotted staircase, and at another property, roof tiles had fallen from a house onto the street
below, injuring a man. The manager, who was named Read, was in an uncomfortable position.
He did not have the money to make repairs and none was forthcoming from his superiors in
Hong Kong. 'The houses', he wrote, 'are deteriorating every day and are in a very dangerous
condition.'97 The directors were deliberately allowing their properties to decay in order to
force the Chinese into taking them over.
The Foreign Office thought this policy naive. Previous experience had taught them that the
Chinese would not 'swerve from their established policy of waiting until a firm was forced to
give itself up merely because a few lives might be lost in accidents before the policy bore
fruit.' They feared that Read would be held personally responsible and might even be
imprisoned should any further injuries occur." This was yet another case of divergence
between the interests of the directors overseas and managers on the spot. In August 1955, the
authorities placed a large number of the firm's properties under 'administration' and levied a
heavy fine.99 Read urged his superiors to offer some assets to the Chinese to cover their
liabilities. The directors refused and so Read resigned.l" The company eventually gave in
and transferred their assets in April 1956.101
Finding themselves unable to 'squeeze' real estate companies in the same manner as they
squeezed manufacturing and trading concerns, the CCP had developed new methods to put
pressure on property owners and to take over their assets while avoiding expropriations and
preserving a thin veneer of legality. Once again, the methods used were similar to those
employed against Chinese property owners but employed in a more purposeful manner. The
97 TNA FO 676/519, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Shanghai Land Investment Co, 1954; F.F.
Gamer Shanghai to Foreign Office, 30/12/54; G.T. Read, Shanghai Land Investment Company to F.F. Gamer,
29/12/54. Emphasis in source.
98 TNA FO 676/519, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Shanghai Land Investment Co, 1954; D.R.
Hurd, memo, 5/1/55; F.F. Gamer to Foreign Office, No. 416, 23/11/54.
99 TNA FO 676/532, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Shanghai Land Investment Co., 1955;
Bureau of Real Estate Administration, Shanghai, to Shanghai Land Investment Co., 26/8/55.
100 TNA FO 676/532, Foreign Business Interests in China (British); Shanghai Land Investment Co., 1955; From
Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 553,29/8/55; Gamer to Foreign Office, No. 73,2/11/55.
101 Lu Wenda, Shanghai Fangdichan Zhi, pp. 146-8. .
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Shanghai authorities' admission that before 1953 they had been too overwhelmed to focus on
the big picture, and that they did not really have a strategy until Beijing began to pressure for
faster results, demonstrates that the CCP's policy towards foreigners was much more
provisional and ill-planned than has been previously recognised.
Foreign banks
Among the last British enterprises to leave were the three largest banks: the Hongkong &
Shanghai Banking Corporation, the Chartered Bank and the Mercantile Bank of India and
China.102HSBC, which was the largest and most symbolically important of the three banks,
had decided to minimise its losses early on. They had closed their branches outside Shanghai
by January 1950, with the exception of a few branches that had become entangled in c1osure-
related disputes that dragged on for years. Like most other foreign enterprises in Shanghai,
HSBC were 'squeezed.,I03 Between 1950 and 1954, Hong Kong had to remit approximately
HK $10 million into Shanghai to cover mounting labour costs, high taxes and the refund of
pre-Liberation account liabilities (the government inflated pre-1949 deposit amounts to avoid
these balances being wiped out by currency depreciation. This worked in favour of depositors
and against the bank104). The three British banks approached the Shanghai authorities in July
1952 and informed them that they wished to close. lOS It was not until the spring of 1955 that
all three successfully transferred their assets in exchange for their li~bi1ities to the state-
owned Da Hua Enterprise Company.i'"
The main obstacle to HSBC's closure had been the issue of what to do with the banks'
reserves of US dollars, which could not be transferred into Chinese hands, due to America's
financial embargo against China. The issue was eventually side-lined by the Chinese, who
were more concerned with persuading HSBC and the Chartered Bank to retain small
organisations in China. As the dollar issue could not be resolved, HSBC were unable to
withdraw completely: a 'responsible person' had to remain in Shanghai. A small office with
102 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Colin Crowe, Foreign Office to
W.I. Combs, Beijing, 30/4/54.
103 King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, VolA, pp. 382-95; Shao, China, Britain, pp. 138-43.
104 HSBC SHGI 0788, Refund of pre-Liberation Deposits, 1953.
105 King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, VolA, pp. 382-95; Shao, China, Britain, pp. 138-43.
106 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 319.
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limited duties remained throughout the Cultural Revolution and into the reform era.107 In
1956, the bank's famous building on the Bund became the headquarters of the Shanghai
People's Govemmcnt.l'"
As discussed previously, it is difficult to trace the careers of former Chinese employees of
foreign businesses after they were paid off. One former HSBC employee remembered that
there had been 'a great clapping and welcome' from the 150 Chinese staff as the Communist
officials walked into the bank when the main office was taken over in 1955. Only around a
dozen staff were retained in the new organisation, however, and the rest were reportedly 'sent
to all sorts of places all over the country.' 109 It seems that at the very least the majority of
paid off staff of foreign companies were not permitted to hold onto the large sums of cash
that they received as severance pay. Paid-off employees of the Arnhold Trading Company
were obliged to buy large numbers of government bonds and to place the rest of the money in
the bank. It was then released to them in controlled drawings.I'"
The China Engineers and Patons & Baldwins
In public, the Communists stuck to the line presented at Geneva: namely, that they had not
discriminated against foreign firms. The secretive nature of their policy towards foreign
businesses means that it is difficult for historians to find Chinese archival sources that
demonstrate how the final 'squeeze' of British businesses was actually carried out.
Occasionally, however, archival sources do allow a rare glimpse of the CCP's policies and
methods. One such document is a report sent from the Shanghai FAD to the Shanghai
Municipal Committee in October 1955. This report was titled 'Opinion regarding increasing
control over and pressure on the production of the British owned Shanghai Worsted Mill and
Patons & Baldwins' (Guanyu jinyibu kongzhi yasuo Ying shang Shanghai Maofang Rong
Chang ji Mifeng Rongxian shengchan de yijian, *Ti1I:-ii7t~iliIJJ.3l~m~im_t5fij=e~t1r
107 King, Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Vol.4, pp. 382-95; Shao, China, Britain, pp. 139-41.
108 Zhou et al., Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 319.
109 HSBC, 1641-055-C, Oral History, William Alexander Stewart.
110 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; China Affairs Committee,
Minutes of Meeting, 14/4/54, Hong Kong.
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&. !&; .$~1ti~F a~~ .!Ji!.). Although this document relates to two specific firms, it is
.indicative of wider policies and attitudes. III
Before addressing the report, we should briefly consider the companies in question. They
were two of the largest textile mills in Shanghai. The Shanghai Worsted Mill belonged to the
China Engineers Ltd., an engineering and import company managed by William Charles
Gomersal1. Gomersall was a strong advocate of the 'stay put' policy. His China Engineers
had huge fixed assets in Shanghai. As well as owning the mill, Gomersall had acquired the
China Printing & Finishing Company from its Manchester owners, the Calico Printers'
Association. In August 1949, China Printing & Finishing had been experiencing severe
financial difficulties and had applied for closure, threatening the jobs of its 2,000 workers.
Gomersall had stepped in and leased the mill, demonstrating, he said, his faith in the new
government. In October 1950, China Engineers acquired all of the Calico Printers'
Association's shares in the company.i" These investments represented large fixed assets that
would have to remain in Shanghai. As other firms withdrew, Gomersall became an
increasingly desperate-sounding lone voice as he continued to advocate improved economic
and political relations with the Communist govemment.l':'
In Gornersall's opinion, the fast pace of withdrawal from China was being set by John
Keswick of Jardine Matheson. Keswick was keen to shed his unprofitable manufacturing
assets in Shanghai and to begin a new era of trade with Communist China via Hong Kong.Il4
This new approach was facilitated by the fact that Jardine Matheson had long re-oriented
their trade away from unstable China and towards Japan and south-east Asia. More ships
went south from Hong Kong than went northwards along the China coast. I IS
111 SMA Q22-l-58, Shanghai Shi Ren Wei Waishi Chu guanyu kongzhi Ying shang maofang chang shengchan
wenti de baogao ji Zhongguo zhengzhi pin gongsi Shanghai caigou gongying zhan yu Mifeng, Shanghai liang
chang de laiwang wenshu [Shanghai Municipal Peoples Government Foreign Affairs Department report on
increasing control over British wool factories and correspondence between China Knitwear Company Shanghai
Purchasing and Supply Station and Patons & Baldwins and Shanghai Worsted Mills], 21111155.
112 TNA FO 676/521, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1954; China Engineers Ltd.,
Shanghai to the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Beijing, 6/6/54.
113 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955; Memorandum on the
Position of the China Engineers Ltd. in China, Notes Prepared for H.M. Minister- Hongkong, 6/7/55; the China
Engineers were the majority shareholders in the Shanghai Worsted Mill Ltd. with 30 per cent of the shares.
114 Ibid.
us TNA FO 371175938, Position of British subjects in China: evacuation from Shanghai; Consul General
Shanghai to Foreign Office, 7/2/49; MFA 118-00014-07, shangtao Yingguo shangren cheli wenti; 1952 nian 5
yue 30 ri guanyu Yingshang wenti de huiyi fayan jilii.
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In 1953, the cotton mill had made its largest profit ever (£500,000) as the government had
fixed the prices of cotton and cloth to give mills a boost after the disruptive Five Antis
movement. The majority of the larger Chinese mills had by this time become state-private
enterprises. They had been forced into this position through their inability to meet the state's
tax demands. The China Printing & Finishing Company and the other mills, Chinese and
foreign, that were yet to become state or state-private organisations worked essentially as
contractors processing orders for the state working for small profit margins. 116 As profits
made in Shanghai could not be remitted abroad, they accumulated. This meant that the
company was far less vulnerable to squeezing than other British companies, which had little
cash in Shanghai and were very susceptible to sudden demands for taxes or other
liabilities.'!"
The other company discussed in the October 1955 report was Patons & Baldwins. In the
grand scheme of British business in Shanghai, Patons & Baldwins were a relatively new
company. Since the tum of the century, they had exported British yam to China, but in the
face of Japanese competition, they had decided to build a worsted mill in Shanghai in 1934.
Their manager, John Kenyon, considered this a crucial step in the development of Shanghai's
textile industry. He later wrote that he could not help but feel jealous as others emulated them.
Three years later, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. From 1937 onwards production was
disrupted. The factory was seized by the Japanese in 1941 and was recovered in 1945. After
the currency crisis of 1947, the Guomindang Government imposed a series of controls on
foreign exchange. This meant that profits accrued were not remitted abroad. Instead, they
were reinvested in Shanghai. Patons & Baldwins built a welfare building for their workers,
'the like of which did not exist in China', with changing rooms and baths, a cafeteria-style
canteen with a hall for entertainment, a nursery, a clinic and a Iibrary.i'"
As the Communists approached in 1949, Kenyon had decided that it would have been a 'poor
do' for Patons & Baldwins to 'shut up shop and run.' They decided that, although times
116 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Colin Crowe, Foreign Office to
W.I. Combs, Beijing, 30/4/54; Ecklund, 'Protracted Expropriation,' pp. 239-240.
117 SMA Q22-1-58, Shanghai Shi Ren Wei Waishi Chu guanyu kongzhi Ying shang maofang chang shengchan
wenti de baogao.
118 TNA FO 676/499, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1954; C.T. Crowe to H.
Trevelyan, 19/7/54, enclosing Memorandum on Patons & Baldwins Limited, 617/54.
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would be hard they would take a temporary financial hit as the price of 'sticking it out:' 119
Kenyon saw the position of his company as very different to that of the China Engineers. The
Chinese, he said, would be well aware that Gomersall had bought the China Printing &
Finishing Company on the cheap. Gomersall had paid a nominal fee of £ 100,000 and
therefore this Was the maximum sum he could possibly expect in return. Therefore, he was
'batting under a distinct handicap.' Patons & Baldwins, on the other hand, had worked to
establish themselves in Shanghai, and had not yet recouped even a portion of their investment.
They were, he said, a 'legitimate business' rather than a 'speculative investment' .120 Patons &
Baldwins were relatively immune to 'squeezing', due to their large stocks.F'
As other large British concerns withdrew, the China Engineers and Patons & Baldwins
committed themselves to persevering. The partial thaw in Sino-British relations after Geneva
made Gomersall optimistic about the prospect of being allowed to continue production on a
fair basis, or of getting something from the Chinese in exchange for his firm's assets.122 He
estimated that perhaps only a tenth of the £200,OOO,OOO-worthof British assets were left.
Perhaps, he hoped, one-twentieth might still be recovered.123
Kenyon stressed in correspondence with the Foreign Office that, unlike Gomersall, he was
not 'wearing rosy spectacles.' Rather, he was mindful of the fact that his firm had very large
resources of stocks and money. Therefore, he suggested, the
technique of squeezing us out will have to be a bit more overt than the normal one of 'inability to
carry on', and we would greatly prefer to be requisitioned rather than manoeuvred into the position
off handing over all our assets against our liabilitiesY4
In other words, policies designed at 'squeezing' Patons & Baldwins would have to be openly
discriminatory .' Requisition would be welcomed, because this would mean that they would
119 TNA FO 676/499, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1954; C.T. Crowe to H.
Trevelyan, 19/7/54; Kenyon, Patons & Baldwins, Limited memorandum to Morgan Phillips MP, 6/7/54.
120TNA FO 676/531, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1955; Kenyon to Crowe, 8/2/55.
121TNA FO 676/499, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1954; Trevelyan to Crowe,
20/12/54.
122TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955; Memorandum.
123Ibid.
124TNA FO 3711108084, Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; direct approaches
by British firms to the Central Government of China, 1953 (part 3, pp 105 to end); J.S. Kenyon, Patons &
Baldwins Ltd. to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 8/12/53.
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retain a claim to their properties. Of course, this was not how their decision to remain in
China was presented to the Chinese; Patons & Baldwins repeatedly stressed that they were
keen to continue, on the condition that they be allowed to remit profits back home. If this was
impossible, they said, the Chinese should be willing to purchase the firm's factory and assets
for a fair price. 125 When other firms were closing down, suggested Kenyon, there was
'nothing wrong with appearing (we repeat appearing) to take a completely opposite line.' 126
Gomersall's two textile factories were still working in 1954, but they were doing so entirely
on the government's terms. The government supplied the raw materials, directed the
quantities of goods to be produced and paid for the finished product. The amounts paid to the
China Printing & Finishing Company covered their expenses, but the Shanghai Worsted Mill
could not even cover their costs. Their 'vast resources' were being slowly drained:
thus we are managers and owners in name only with the responsibility of carrying on, but without
the slightest authority or discretion as to the methods by which we consider it desirable to carry
on.127
When Gomersall finally felt that he had been defeated in his attempts to lobby for an
improvement in Sino-British trade, he decided to wind down his operations in China. He
began by approaching the Textile Bureau in December 1954 and offering to sell his mill. It
was government policy, he understood, to take over private mills. The Bureau replied that
they were surprised to hear this. As his mill was making a profit, they said, they had no
intention of taking it over.128 Numerous other attempts in 1955 also met with negative replies
or were simply ignored.129 Gomersall saw this as very unfair; if Swire, Jardine Matheson,
HSBC and the others could negotiate their withdrawal, why couldn't China Engineers? He
felt especially hurt by the fact that they had 'adopted a more friendly attitude to the People's
125 TNA FO 676/499, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1954; Foreign Office to
Shanghai, No. 559,17/7/54; Foreign Office to Shanghai, No. 616,27/7/54.
126 TNA FO 3711108084, Closure of British firms in China; detention of British businessmen; direct approaches'
by British firms to the Central Government of China, 1953 (part 3, pp 105 to end); I.S. Kenyon, Patons &
Baldwins Ltd. to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, telegram to be forwarded to Patons & Baldwins
manager Shanghai, 11112/53.
127 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955.
128 TNA FO 676/521, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1954; Shanghai to Foreign
Office, No. 33,20/12/54.
129 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955; W.C. Gomersall,
China Engineers, to Trevelyan, 23/3/55; Diary of a Meeting Held at the FAD on Thursday, 8/6/55; Foreign
Office to Zhang Hanfu, Draft, 9/12/55.
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Government than any other finn.,!30By the end of 1955, Gomersall's and Kenyon's mills
were be the only non-state mills remaining.P' The Chinese also refused to purchase Paton's
mill, saying that they would like the company to carry on in China. Kenyon interpreted this as
meaning that 'they realise that it would be difficult for them to take over the finn now
without compensation, but hope to be in a position to do so later on.' 132
The Chinese had no intention of allowing these two British companies to remain in Shanghai
in the long term, nor would they contemplate paying money for assets they could later take
for free. The -problem was that these two companies were relatively immune at present to
'squeezing' as they had large stocks of capital. Itwould be difficult to manoeuvre them into a
position where they would consider offering up all of their assets for all of their liabilities.
The question of how to do this was the subject of the October 1955 secret report mentioned at
the start of this section. 'In order to weaken the Shanghai Worsted Mill's and Patons &
Baldwins' economic foundations,' the report stated,
to increase their difficulties, and to rattle their belief in continuing to wait and see, so that we can
deal with them ... we plan to progressively increase control over and pressure on these two
enterprises.V'
The large stocks of raw materials built up by both companies were used up in 1954, and so
both joined the government's supply and purchase organisation. The government could now
fix the prices of raw materials and finished products to keep their profits low. After the
companies joined the government scheme, the FAD reported, 'we deliberately reduced their
workloads, and their incomes' (yihou women you yiyi xuejian qi renwu, shouru jianshao, ~.:J.
~~{f]~~.>(~IJ;~!tff*. ql(A;~~). Though they often now ran at net losses, they still
130 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955; Diary of a Meeting
Held at the FAD on Thursday, 717155; Diary of a Meeting Held at the FAD on Thursday, 23/6/55.
131 TNA FO 6761534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955; Gomersall to
Trevelyan, 6/4/55.
132 TNA FO 676/531, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1955; Trevelyan to Foreign
Office, No. 133, 2/2/55.
133 SMA Q22-1-58, Shanghai Shi Ren Wei Waishi Chu guanyu kongzhi ring shang maofang chang shengchan .
wenti de baogao; 'In order to weaken ... ' (Wei xueruo ShangMao, Mifeng liang qiye de jingji jichu, zengjia qi
kunnan, dongyao qi jixu guanwang de xinxin, yi bianyu women chuli, women yu Huadong Fangzhi Guanli Ju,
Zhongguo Baihuo Gongsi Shanghai Caigou Gongying Zhan, Shanghai Shi Di San Shangye Ju lianxi Yanjiu hou,
ni dui liang qiye de shengchan zuo jinyibu de kongzhi, yasuo, ~i1!IJ~~_t~.**pij:Jl:~a~~i1f¥~tll.~1JIl:Jtw.. ~~:Jt ••• ~~~~. ~~~.m~w. .m~$*~~.W~. *OOWa0~_t.*Mmm~. _t.$.~.~~G*eRfi. m~pij~~~~~~~-~~m~. ffim~
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had ample currency reserves. These reserves, cadres noted, had now become 'the main
impediment to our dealing with these two companies' (yi chengwei women chuli liang qiye
zui da zhang 'ai, EPl:l:Jftif1~Hlpij1£~~*~;fi~). 134
Various administrative measures were employed to force the two companies to use up their
reserves, such as forcing them to pay for raw materials in cash six months in advance. This
left them open to fluctuations in purchase prices. This was clearly a discriminatory practice,
the FAD recognised, but the British would not dare to refuse to comply. Another suggested
policy was to enter into agreements with companies and then to delay the date of purchase in
order to create a backlog of finished goods. Without cash from sales they would find it
difficult to purchase raw materials (women keyi jinlian tuichi shougou riqi, yi jiya qi
chengpin, yiji yiya qi xianjin, ftif1ilJ~:.t~_;_mill.~l[W;Jf3 nJL ~:.t~.Hlli:jt:Pl~.9)\FlP~.Hlli:jt:
!.m~). This plan was not adopted for the time being, as the difference in treatment between
the British firms and Chinese state and private firms would be 'too obvious' itai tuchu, j:~
tti) and it would be too difficult to justify (er liyou you bijiao qianqiang, iD]!1EB ~ tt$Q~
5;). Even at this late stage in the 'period of impatience', more subtle measures and plausible
deniability were preferred. The CCP wanted to exercise caution to preserve the thin veil of
legality that covered their actions. 135
The authorities would 'also arrange some quite complicated difficulties for these two
companies in production, and give them low profit goods to process' (hai keyi dui liang qiye
buzhi shengchan shang bijiao Juza kunnan, zhiliang yaoqiu bijiao yange, er lirun jiao di de
pin liang, H!ilJ!;'{~;fpij1£~f5ii~F.t tt$Q~~IEJt. mi:l:~* tt$QPf!. rm~lnlI]$Qiff
a~~:i:). 'If the above measures can be implemented' the report concluded,
within a short period we can change the 'stable' situation in these two companies, and break the
two companies' capitalists willingness to preserve the status quo, their delusion of planning for the
long-term and waiting and seeing, in order to produce a situation advantageous to our dealing with
them.136
134 SMA Q22-1-58, Shanghai Shi Ren Wei Waishi Chu guanyu kongzhi Ying shang maofang chang shengchan
wenti de baogao.
13S Ibid.
136 Ibid. 'If the above measures ... ' (ru yishang banfa kexing, ze zai duan shiqi nei, women jiu keyi gaibian liang
qiye 'anding' xian zhuang, dasuan changqi dengdai guanwang de youxiang wei women de chuli zaocheng youli
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In October 1955, Gomersall attempted to offer only the assets of the China Engineers' trading
company in an all-assets-for-all-liabilities transfer. This offer was rejected, and it became
clear that the Chinese would only settle for a complete handover of all of his assets, including
the two textile mills.137 In December, the FAD informed Gomersall that they were unable to
find an organisation willing to take over the assets of China Engineers.138 This seems to have
been a delaying tactic; the Chinese were unwilling to simply take Gomersall's companies
piecemeal or without first bleeding them dry.139The companies were finally transferred into
Chinese hands in 1956. Gomersall had been proven wrong in his belief that there was a future
for British business in China. British companies had been tolerated and used in the short term
in order to avoid unemployment and economic disruption, but they did not feature in the
CCP's long-term plans for socialist Shanghai."?
On hearing that Gomersall' s attempts to get something back on his investment had been to no
avail, Patons & Baldwins decided to stop trying to close, and chose instead to continue to try
to run their mills. Extinction was all but inevitable, they realised, but it was a question of how
to comport themselves in the meantime. Kenyon concluded that 'with most of the other
foreign firms having either been expropriated or thrown up the sponge, it can't be long before
our tum comes. It seems therefore a pity not to wait a little bit longer rather than force events
by our own action.' 141 This policy seems to have paid off as Patons & Baldwins' factories
were eventually purchased by the Chinese authorities in June 1959.142
de jumian, Y.Il ~:tJ:w.5!ilIff.9!IJi±~HatMP'J. fiif]~JtilI~:ta~j1.{j:Jt~'~ ~'a~!JiI.:I}!. fHi j1.{j:Jt~1.i~
~~:I}!. n.*MWM~~~~ •. ~fiif]~~~.d~~~~OO.
137 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955; Gamer, Shanghai, No.
82, 31110/55.
138 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955, Shanghai to Beijing,
No. 409, 28/12/55.
139 TNA FO 676/534, Foreign business interest in China: The China Engineers Ltd., 1955, W.C. Gomersall to P.
Dalton, Hong Kong, 30/12/55.
140 William Charles Gomersall Obituary, Electrical Engineers, p. 605.
141 TNA FO 676/531, Foreign business interest in China: Patons and Baldwins, 1955; Kenyon to Crowe, 8/2/55.
142 Shao, China. Britain, pp. 139, 143.
275
Conclusion
After the announcement of the 'transition to socialism' in 1953, the CCP sped up the process
of taking over foreign firms. Their primary tactic was to 'squeeze' foreign companies until
they voluntarily offered all of their assets in exchange for discharging their liabilities. They
employed this clever tactie in order to avoid confrontational requisitions which would give
rise to claims for compensation. This technique worked particularly well for dealing with
manufacturing concerns and for businesses with large workforces. The majority of firms
wished to avoid giving over their assets in the hope of selling them, or at the very least
having them requisitioned in order to be able to claim compensation at a later date. Despite.
the improvement in Sino-British relations that followed the Geneva Conference in 1954,most
were eventually compelled to transfer their assets in the end. Firms such as S. Behr &
Mathew had to balance their desire to hold out with the obvious human costs paid by their
local managers. When it came to dealing with foreign real estate companies and others which
could not be easily pressured, such as the China Engineers and Patons & Baldwins, the CCP
had to be pragmatic and adapt their strategy.
The processes by which the CCP took over British firms tell us much about their approach to
the transformation of Shanghai's economy more widely. The elimination of foreign
businesses occurred alongside the socialisation of the Chinese economy, but was more
targeted and direct. New perspectives on the timing of the transition to socialism call the idea
that the Chinese had a grand plan for economic transformation from the early 1950s into
question. Their policy was often more contingent, more ill-conceived and more based on
perceived current realities than has previously been believed. It is extremely likely that the
elimination of foreign firms was accelerated as the Chinese private sector began to fail and
was eventually eliminated. Policy towards British businesses was at all times grounded by
consideration of the local consequences. Ground-level cadres waited to act until they were in
a position of strength: they recognised their weaknesses in terms of manpower, resources and
skills and worked around these problems through pragmatic manoeuvring under the cover of
strict secrecy.
The withdrawal of British companies was not the end of commercial interaction between
Britain and China. The larger trading firms continued trade via Hong Kong throughout the
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1960s and 1970s into the reform era thirty years later. They were joined in this endeavour by
the 'Icebreakers,' the 48 Group of leftist businessmen in the United Kingdom who had made
contact with the Chinese in the early 1950s. Some firms, including HSBC, maintained small
offices in Shanghai. While the relatively upbeat official narrative born of consultation
between Keswick, the China Association and the Foreign Office became one of a switch from
'trade in China to trade with China' via Hong Kong. Many firms which had large fixed assets
(like the China Engineers) were unable to reorient their trade and therefore lost out entirely.
On the 4th January 1956, Zhang Hanfu reported to Zhou Enlai that there were now only 110
foreign enterprises remaining in the whole of China, down from 1,104 in 1949. In February
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a document entitled 'Plan for continuing to deal with
the remaining economic influence of capitalist countries in China' (jixu chuli zibenzhuyi
guojia zai Hua ~anyujingji shilifangan, t~tl~H'~*.:E')(OO~f:E$~i~~2~~jJ1J~).
By August only 66 remained, 16 of which were in Shanghai. The largest of these firms was
Patons & Baldwins which closed in 1959:43 In 1967 there still remained five small foreign
owned shops and a dairy, none of which were British-owned.144
143 Zhang Hanfu zhuan, pp. 146,150-151.
144 Zhou, Shanghai waishi zhi, p. 321.
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Conclusion
The elimination of the British business presence from Shanghai following the coming to
power of the CCP in 1949 was one part of a much wider political, social and economic
transformation. To paraphrase Mao, the CCP were not simply destroying the old world but
were creating the new. In contrast to the decadent and decaying city the CCP inherited, 'New
Shanghai' would be an independent, Chinese, socialist and orderly place. In this new
Shanghai there would be no place for hangovers from the old world. Foreign businesses,
which had entered China on privileged terms and which, in the Communists' eyes had
dominated and degraded the competitiveness of the domestic economy, would not be
welcome. Britain's long history of economic and political involvement in China was a source
of great hostility, even if she had been eclipsed by America as the arch-imperialist on the
world stage.
The problem lay in deciding how to go about removing the British presence from the city.
Was this a moment of radical anti-imperialist triumph? The CCP's propaganda presented it as
such, but in fact the situation on the ground was much less ideologically satisfying. This
multi-layered account has embraced the everyday interactions on the factory floor, the
mistakes, missteps and mutual misunderstanding that are so important in understanding this
period of transition. The CCP were not a nearly omnipotent, ruthless and effective force with
a long-term plan for eliminating the British business presence. In fact, much of their policy
was provisional and poorly implemented. Long-term, revolutionary and transformative goals
were compromised in favour of short-term economic stability. How does inform our
conception of the CCP in the early years of the People's Republic? It has been argued in this
thesis that, contrary to received wisdom, the CCP were not strong and efficient, they were
actually quite weak in terms of manpower, skills and resources (the People's Liberation
Army were of course the paramount military force in China and so it would be foolish to
refer to the CCP as entirely 'weak'). Their great strength lay in their awareness of their own
weaknesses and in their ability to work around them. This was chiefly achieved by employing
strict secrecy and by erecting a facade of unresponsiveness to foreign diplomats and
businessmen. This put the CCP firmly in control of all interactions and left their true
intentions a mystery. They were also willing to use deception and ruthless force when they
considered it necessary.
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The CCP were hostile towards foreign capitalists from the very beginning. This did not,
however, equate to a plan for eliminating them. In the earliest days of the Communist
takeover the CCP had only got as far as developing the 'non-recognition policy' and putting
foreigners on the back foot. Their refusal to engage with foreigners when it didn't suit them
left them in a position of strength. By obscuring their real intentions the CCP encouraged a
degree of optimism in some businessmen and removed the right of others to protest when
they felt that they had been treated unfairly. Their aim was to completely transform Shanghai,
but because dealing with foreigners was of secondary importance to them when balanced
against dealing with other domestic problems, such as ensuring public order and economic
stability; they took a long-term and flexible approach and maneuvered foreign firms into
positions of weakness before taking them over or closing them down.
After the takeover, the Communists found it relatively easy to pressure foreign cultural
organisations (schools, newspapers and churches etc.) into closing. The closure of businesses
had wider economic implications however, and these also needed consideration. At first
British businesses were dealt with along similar lines to Chinese businesses. Under the
banner of New Democracy the CCP sought to co-opt 'national capitalists' to unite the country
behind the broad goal of economic reconstruction to ease unemployment and curb inflation.
On similar lines, foreign firms were promised protection and were encouraged to stay in
China in order to prevent economic collapse. I
This encouragement did not preclude them from being 'squeezed.' 'Squeezing' was used to
extract revenue and to break their positions of near monopoly. Chinese firms were similarly
'restricted' and 'controlled' as the government directly intervened in the economy to establish
economic order. For several years the majority of British businessmen sought to wait out this
'squeezing' in the hope of better things to come, or of gaining future compensation once the
CCP grew impatient and decided to expropriate their assets. Expropriation was not
forthcoming for the majority. A much reduced British population struggled to maintain their
position in the face of economic pressures and militant workforces. Life for foreigners
remaining in Shanghai became increasingly claustrophobic as the community shrank in size
and their favourite haunts were closed. Agency was removed from the managers of the larger
IHe et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, pp. 15.
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firms as they were not allowed to sell or close their businesses. Foreign managers were
designated 'responsible persons' who were personally liable for their company's actions.
They faced imprisonment for defaulting on wage or tax payments and were not granted exit
permits until the affairs of their companies were resolved to the satisfaction of the Chinese.
Figure 23: New Shanghai's economy escapes imperialism, 3017/49
The first image shows 'Old Shanghai's economy' being crushed by imperialism,
in the image below 'New Shanghai's economy' has sprung out from under the
weight of imperialism, toppling it.
The Communists had to strike a difficult balance between gaining revolutionary legitimacy
through long-term transformation with more pragmatic concerns based on immediate
circumstances. At first, Chinese workers in foreign companies were given almost free reign
to cause trouble. When the Communists had Shanghai's labour force more under their control
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a stricter policy was enforced that aimed at preventing tense situations from getting out of
hand. In firms that were taken over, such as the British Tram Company and the Orient Paint,
Colour and Vamish Company, the priorities of the takeover teams were to maintain
production, to ensure a stable handover and to retain the original staffs and organisations and
not to fundamentally transform the enterprises. Once the new owners were firmly in control
more radical changes would follow.
In 1952 the Chinese Government decided to adapt their existing 'squeezing' techniques into a
mechanism for pressuring foreign firms into voluntarily transferring all of their assets against
all of their liabilities. Foreign firms were not allowed to dispose of their assets in any other
way, unless they obtained the government's approval. This allowed the CCP to set the pace
of the transition, bleeding the companies' resources before finally taking them over. These
'transfers' were, on paper at least, entirely legal and voluntary. In reality, a thin veneer of
legality had been laid over a wide-scale expropriation. The CCP had developed an extremely
effective and pragmatic policy of expropriation which denied the British firms any recourse
but to comply. The method by which they carried out their seizure of British goods was also
calculated so as to ensure short-term economic stability. A prolonged 'squeeze' followed by a
series of voluntary transfers meant that there was no single event that would provoke serious
retaliation (diplomatic, military or economic) from the British Government. Neither side had
particularly benefitted from the round of retaliatory requisitions that had taken place in 1951.
The British, the Chinese correctly calculated, were more concerned with the preservation of
Hong Kong and with the possibility of future trade.
Chinese secondary accounts portray the decision of foreign companies to offer their assets up
for 'transfers' as resulting from the hostile actions of foreign powers towards China. Their
desperate economic situation was the result of the American-led embargo. Britain's uncertain
attitude towards New China and towards severing ties with the American-backed
Guomindang had harmed its interests in Shanghai. There was also, they said, something in
the nature of British businesses that made them unsuccessful: they had previously relied on
their 'special privileges' to exist, with 'New China' under transformation, they could no
longer operate as they once had. They therefore looked towards 'transfers' to escape their
. . 2situations.
2 He et al., Shanghai waishi sishi nian, pp. 15.
281
The fact that the British firms signed legal documents stating that these were 'voluntary
'transfers" seriously damaged the chances of future compensation claims. The British
Foreign Office began to consider the issue of compensation with the improvement in
relations that followed the Geneva Conference in 1954. The general feeling was that this was
not the time to bring up this issue. Itwould be preferable, urged one senior figure, not to push
the Chinese into an unfavourable decision now, especially when things might improve in the
future. It would be best to get all the remaining British firms and their staffs out of China
before pursuing such claims. Furthermore, a claim was soon to be made against the Chinese
for the shooting down of a Cathay Pacific plane near Hong Kong. It would be better to deal
with this situation first rather than confusing this issue and potentially having to deal with
Chinese counter-claims for the expropriations of the Chinese aircraft in Hong Kong and the
requisitioned Yunghao tanker.'
It would, in any case, be difficult to assign a value for expropriated assets in Shanghai. A
commonly quoted (but unofficial) estimate of the value of British investments in China in
1949 was £300 million. John Keswick estimated British interests in Shanghai alone to be
worth £160 million.4 In another sense, however, fixed assets in China were also almost
completely without value after the Communist takeover as the political and economic
conditions in the country prevented them from being profitable. Very seldom were foreign
companies allowed to remit profits out of the country' Over the decade of war and instability
that had followed the last 'normal' trading year of 1940, the value of British assets in China
had, in any case, been written down to merely nominal figures. The British Charge d'Affaires
in Beijing, John Hutchinson, noted that in the case of companies such as the textile giants
Patons & Baldwins, the capital they had initially invested in China had been repaid many
times over in the form of profits. The loss of their assets 'would not necessarily mean an
equivalent loss of investment. ,6
3 TNA FO 676/493, Foreign business interest in China: British, 1954, Part 2; Crowe, Foreign Office to
Trevelyan Beijing, 4/9/54; Trevelyan, Beijing to Crowe, Foreign Office, 1917154.
4 TNA FO 371183347 British Commercial Policy in China: Trading conditions and positions of British firms in
China, 1950; J.S.H. Shattock Memorandum on Parliamentary Question, British Assets, China, 6/5/50 (question
asked 8/5/50 by Mr. Gammans to Mr. Ernest Davies).
5 TNA FO 371183345, British Commercial Policy in China: Trading Conditions and Positions of British firms in
China, 1950; Shanghai to Foreign Office, No. 317,114/50.
6 TNA FO 371183348, British Commercial Policy in China; Trading conditions and positions of British firms in
China; John Hutchinson, Beijing to FO, No. 611, 20/5/50.
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In the long term, the issue of compensation could only really be pursued when relations
between the two sides improved. After the death of Mao in 1976 China implemented a series
of economic reforms that saw it progressively reopened to Western companies. British
companies in Hong Kong were well positioned to take advantage of this opportunity. Many
of these firms, including Jardine, Matheson & Co., HSBC and Butterfield & Swire had been
'squeezed' out after 1949. With the resumption of trade the issue of compensation was again
raised, but the firms decided that they did not want to jeopardise future commercial
opportunities through the pursuit of past slights. In any case, the foreign firms would not have
a strong legal position from which to make such claims as their assets had been handed over
'voluntarily.Y
Just over thirty years after the Communist takeover in 1949 Shanghai again became a
booming commercial centre. China was once more opened to British business, booming in
the early 1990s. While the elimination of the British presence after 1949 marked the end of
an era it was not the end of Britain in China. In hindsight we can see that the change in
Shanghai was not definitive, it was but one of a series of reconfigurations that the city has
undergone since foreigners first arrived there in 1843: Over nearly 170 years Shanghai has
been through many transformations, accepting and rejecting foreigners and foreign influences
to varying degrees.
A few Britons continued to live in Shanghai throughout the Maoist era. HSBC man W.A.
Stewart recalled living a 'quiet life' as the Bank's representative in Shanghai from 1958 to
1961. He lived in a 'beautiful house with extensive grounds' where he was relatively cut off
from Chinese society. The Bank, which had been unable to close because of its frozen dollar
assets, was given just enough business from government corporations to survive, it served as
a useful avenue for assisting China's export trade." Even during the tumultuous Cultural
Revolution, British ships continued to call at Chinese ports. Trade with China never really
ended.
7 JSSCA, CHINACL6, Correspondence on issue of compensation, 1981, 1988; R.A. Schlee, John Swire & Sons
to C.M. O'Connor, Ocean Transport and Trading Ltd., 20/8/81.
8 HSBC 1641-055-C, Oral History, William Alexander Stewart.
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Despite the continued presence of a few foreign firms and individuals throughout the Maoist
era and the return of the foreign firms in the reform era, the elimination of the British
presence after 1949 did spell the end of 'Britain in China' in one very real sense. This was
not just the takeover of British assets by the Chinese, but the end of a way of thinking about
China and Shanghai, and of a way of life. As Robert Bickers has argued, 'Britain in China'
was not simply a collection of businesses presided over by a diplomatic body, it was a
tangible community with its own interests and multiple identities with its locus in Shanghai."
After 1949 this world was dismantled in a process akin to the decolonisation of Britain's
formal and informal empire. First to go were the cultural trappings, the organisations that
were the tools of 'cultural aggression'. Foreigners who committed offences in Shanghai were
taught that the Chinese were now in control and that their assumptions of immunity were no
longer valid. Propaganda focused on the assertion of Chinese sovereignty, national renewal
and of holding foreigners to account for past and current 'humiliations'. The city underwent a
spatial reconfiguration as former sites of 'imperialist influence', including the Shanghai
Racecourse, were transformed into sites that served the purposes of the new socialist republic.
Chinese Government organisations occupied the grand offices and hotels that lined the Bund
and repurposed them to 'serve the people.' The economic presence was last to go. With it
went the Britons themselves, the large settled community, many of whom saw Shanghai as
their home in the long or short term and even, for some, as their birthright. They retreated to
Hong Kong, to Britain and to new homes in the wider British Empire and British world.
Occasional rows over Britain's past actions in China occasionally do flare up, but when
British firms re-entered China their passage was smoothed by the absence of too overt an
imperialist legacy. Shanghai is now receptive to all things foreign. Foreign capitalists are now
welcomed back and encouraged to invest. In 2010 the city 'welcomed the world' to the
Shanghai Expo. China consumes Western products and culture (albeit not as uncritically as
some may suppose). British luxury brands increasingly look to China's nouveau riche to buy
their products which are, to the Chinese eye, synonymous with gentility and refinement.
Despite this, the expurgation of foreign businesses and individuals from 1949 onwards
fundamentally redefined the grounds on which foreigners have been recieved. The Bund
remains the symbolic heart of the city. Foreign businesses (including Armani and Dolce &
Gabbana) have re-occupied parts of this valuable real estate, on the top of each of its tall
9 Bickers, Britain in China, pp. 10-15.
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Western-style buildings, however, flies a red, five-starred Chinese flag. The city's true
ownership is not in doubt.
Figure 24: Chinese flags fly over the Shanghai Bund
The ending of the British presence gave credibility to the claims of the anti-imperialist CCP.
Despite the Guomindang's many successes in the field of diplomacy (including the ending of
extraterritoriality and the retrocession of the foreign concessions) they had not overseen an
almost total elimination of the foreign presence on the scale of that carried out after 1949.
The CCP had fulfilled one of their key revolutionary promises and had succeeded in getting
rid of the foreigners. They had gone far further than the GMD in asserting China's
independence. The narrative they created of China 'standing up' (in the words of Mao
Zedong), would become the CCP's single most important source of legitimacy in the years to
come.1O
Anti-imperialism has been enshrined in the prologues of all of the vanous Chinese
constitutions that have been written since 1949. II This anti-imperialism, it should be
remembered, was not simply negative in nature; it was seen as one part of the creation of a
10 Mao, 'Opening Address to the Chinese People's Consultative Conference,' 21/9/49, People's Daily, 22/9/49.
IIWilliam L. Tung, The Political Institutions of Modern China (The Hague,: Nijhoff, 1964).
285
better future. It was hoped that the removal of foreign imperialist influences would bring a
new and independent China into being, strengthen the Chinese economy and help lift its
people from poverty. That dream was not fulfilled during the Maoist era. British businesses
may have lost out economically, but it is true to say that the British had less to lose than the
Anglophone and westernised classes of Chinese friends, assistants, compradors and managers
they left behind. These people found that as nationalism hardened the Sino-foreign grey area
they had once inhabited shrank and disappeared. They had to make difficult choices between
fleeing the mainland for Taiwan or Hong Kong, abandoning their homes, and potentially their
families in the process, or staying and trying to accommodate themselves to the new order.
Many were branded the 'running dogs' of foreign imperialism and suffered terribly in the
years that followed.
Events since the death of Mao in 1976 have demonstrated that the pragmatism shown by the
CCP in the early 1950s was by no means exceptional. The CCP's attitudes towards problems
as diverse as embarking on economic reform (without large-scale politicalliberalisation) and
the recovery of Hong Kong under the 'one country two systems' model have demonstrated a
high degree of flexibility in practice while rhetoric has often remained ideological in tone. At
international meetings (like the recent Copenhagen climate accords) China's elite bureaucrats
frequently out-think and out-manoeuvre Britain's career politicians. As China's position in
world affairs comes to be increasingly strong and the West seems to enter into a period of
relative decline the incentive for the Chinese to seek cooperation would seem to diminish.
This has led to a great deal of concern from Britons and other Westerners who fear the rise of
a newly assertive China. It is worth remembering, however, that above all the CCP have a
long history of pragmatism. Rather than asserting themselves at the West's expense, it is
likely that the CCP will continue to recognise the utility of Western markets for Chinese
products. Long-term considerations based upon China's own best interests are likely to
remain its central concern in its strategic planning.
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